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EDWARDS A. PARK AND SAMUEL H. TAYLOR,

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THE TWOFOLD FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF RHYTHM AND ACCENTUATION; OR, THE RELATION OF THE RHYTHMICAL TO THE LOGICAL PRINCIPLE OF THE MELODY OF HUMAN SPEECH.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF PROF. HUPFELD BY REV. CHARLES M. MEAD, PH.D., PROFESSOR IN ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE investigations hitherto made in regard to the principle of Hebrew accentuation — growing out of the conviction that the cantillation now practised in the Jewish synagogues does not correctly represent it, and that its real significance can not be chiefly musical — have established the fact that the main principle underlying this accentuation must be a logical one, a division according to the sense, but that in connection with this there is also a phonetic or musical element, belonging to the sphere of modulation, which is not to be overlooked. But the significance and extent of the latter element and its relation to the first were not clear, and continued to be a subject of controversy. Years ago I deduced this element from the nature of rhythm, and sought to find in it the higher principle in which logic and phonetics meet together.[1] But in order to a clear understanding of the subject, and a

[1] In the "Geschichte der Hebr. Sinnabtheilung" (3d Part: Beleuchtung dunkler Stellen der alttestlamentlichen Text geschichte) in the "Theologische Studien und Kritiken" of 1837, No. 4; also in the first number of my Heb. Grammar, §§ 23, 24.

definitive settlement of the long-disputed question, relating, as it does, to so difficult and remote a department of philology and anthropology, great clearness and distinctness of ideas is necessary; and in order to gain this, a more minute and exhaustive discussion is required than I was then able to give. First of all, we must find the law of nature out of which the phonetico-musical, or physical, element in human speech proceeds, in order to gain an understanding of its relation to the logical principle of speech, and of the co-operation of both elements in the rhythm and accent of melodious language. To this end we proceed first to examine more particularly accent, in which the phenomena in question most clearly come to view.

Accent or *tone* is, as all know, that emphasis or stress (τόνος), i.e. that raising of the voice, by which one part of the discourse — one syllable or word — is raised above the others and distinguished as the chief syllable or chief word. It is the simple and wonderful means by which the mind (whose business it is in general to penetrate and illuminate the vast quantity and multitudinous forms of matter, and thus to simplify them and assimilate them to itself) points out and enforces that, in a series of words and sentences, which for its purpose is most essential; that in which the chief idea, and so the unity, of the whole series lies. It describes to the ear the course of the mind above the discourse, and its several strokes are, as it were, the audible footsteps of the mind's march. Without it language would form a crude, lifeless mass of sound. It is this which breathes life and soul into that mass of sound, by presenting to the ear smaller and larger members or parts of speech, of which each constitutes by itself a notion, and by constructing out of these members the meaning of the whole, forming them into a sort of organic body, proceeding in a regular gradation from the smaller to the greater members. At the lowest stage it constructs words, by reducing to one single notion an aggregate of sounds and syllables, together with the distinct elements of root and inflection involved in them, by means of emphasis

laid on the principal syllable (verbal accent).[1] Next, by emphasizing the principal one of a series of words (i.e. the principal syllable of this word, by means therefore of the verbal accent) it unites the series into a single sentence. In like manner several sentences, by the prominence given to the principal sentence, are made to form a period. And even beyond this limit, accent operates in still greater divisions, according as the mind by means of it is able to master the quantity. This depends, on the one hand, on the mental clearness and vivacity of the speaker or reader; on the other, on his power over his voice — on his elocution. That which constitutes the principle of unity in these divisions of speech is also the principle of their separation; and it is accordingly accent which effects the division of the sense — the separation of the words and the division into sentences and periods — which is designated in writing partly by interspaces, partly by punctuation.[2] But the influence of accent is by no means limited to giving prominence to those parts of spoken language which (in the way just described) receive the intonation, and form the exponents of the contents of a whole series, the illuminated peaks, as it were, which tower up out of the obscure mass of words. It embraces within its sphere the whole mass of words, its intonations being graduated and classified according to their logical relations. And only by this fact can be explained the secret of its power,

[1] Cf. Wm. von Humboldt: Ueber Entstehung der grammatischen Formen, in den Abhandlungen der Berliner Akademie 1824, p. 423. According to its principle the accent ought strictly always to fall upon that syllable which is for the notion the chief syllable, which constitutes the logical centre and the kernel of the word, therefore the stem syllable. But this is the case actually only in the German language, where the terminations have been by degrees subdued and suppressed. In other languages, where this has not been accomplished, the accent must depend on the strength of the final syllables, according to a phonetic (rhythmical) law. See below.

[2] But only the Hebrew writings of the Old Test. in their present form designate the divisions of the sense within the period (the so-called verse) simply by its system of accents, and so by that which constitutes the principle of the division. Respecting the ancient designation of the larger sections and their historical development into the present accentuation, see the above-mentioned Essay in the Stud. und Krit. 1837, p. 836 sq., and Heb. Gram. §§ 18–22.

viz. that it is able to blend a plurality of sounds into unity, and to mark single sounds as exponents of the contents of the whole series. This is done simply by making prominent one of a series of sounds, and thus giving to the others a point around which they may group themselves (in ascending and descending gradation), forming, therefore, a centre and kernel, and thus producing a unity of sound, which represents to the ear the unity of idea. In the case of the verbal accent, as related to the other syllables of the word, this is at once obvious. Inasmuch, now, as the accent of the sentence is nothing else than the verbal accent of the principal word, and therefore, in order to be the accent of the sentence must make itself more prominent than the verbal accent of the other words of the sentence, and inasmuch as the same is true in a still higher degree of the accent of the leading sentence in a period, there results at once a gradation, a rank, among the accents, according to the logical importance of the sphere of each in relation to the whole. At the same time, however, it is, as a matter of course, to be inferred from this that the gradation is not confined to the tones of the principal words of the sentence, but extends to that of all the other words; in short, that *the tone of every word accords with its logical relation to the whole.* And this is fully confirmed by a closer consideration and comparison of the accents with which the separate words are spoken.[1] Furthermore, a similar difference will show itself in respect to the *duration* of the tone, or of the rapidity of the movement of the voice among the different parts of the discourse. As in every word the unaccented (earlier) syllables hasten towards the accented syllable, so in every sentence the accent hastens from one word quickly to another more closely connected with it in sense, or dwells longer on another, and separates it from the rest, in accordance with the notion it is aiming to express; here pressing towards the chief word of the sentence as its highest point; there calmly passing it by, and gradually sinking down. Thus, out of the rough image

[1] Of this more below, in treating of the rhythmical principle of speech.

of articulate sound there rises up a finer, more spiritual, as it were a rectified image, which, with its infinitely fine gradations and shades, presents exactly the order of the notions (the logical relations), as well as the relations of the feelings, involved in the discourse. These gradations of the accent are primarily gradations of the *force* or *strength* of the tone of the voice; but, since every increase of force is also connected with a slight raising of the scale, there results at the same time a certain melody in speech.

Thus far the principle of accent, and of the melody which it introduces into speech, seems to be a purely mental one, concerning merely the understanding and (in so far as the emotions participate in it) the feelings. Accordingly one might think that accent is something voluntary, arbitrary, which may be used or omitted at pleasure; an ornament, or an accomplishment, without which, indeed, speech does not fully express what is in the mind (therefore essential to the perfection of speech), but which one may in many cases forego. But this would be a complete error. Accent is rather a physical necessity, which in speaking we cannot avoid, even if we would. Even when one takes pains to speak without accent (e.g. for the sake of affecting gentility, or of concealing his feelings), he can do no more than to diminish the gradations of it as much as possible and make them unnoticeable, but cannot entirely suppress them. Accent must therefore grow out of a law of nature, to which the voice in its progress is bound. And this law is in physics well known as the law of motion in all fluids. It is the law of undulation, of fluctuation.[1] That the voice also moves according to this law, that its course is "undulatory," i.e.

[1] This, by the way, is etymologically the fundamental notion of the words for motion: In German *bewegen*, related to *wogen*, *wage*, *wiege*, *wagen*, etc.; Latin, *ago* (properly *vago*, Aeol. *βάγω*, from which *vagus*, *vacillo*, *wackeln*, cognate *veho*, *ὄχος*, wagon, *vectis*, scales); from it *agina*, scales, *axis*, axle, *axilla*, shoulder (contracted, *ala*), especially of things which move around a fixed centre; again, *ἄξιος* (i.e. equiponderant); *oculus*, Sanscr. *akshas*, eye (from its rolling, axle-like motion), etc. Cf. my Essay in A. Kuhn's Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung, VIII. 370 sq.

constantly rises and falls, is elevated and depressed, was long ago observed,[1] and the law in this application known by the name of *rise* and *fall*.[2] But how does the voice come to be subject to this law? The more immediate cause lies in the so-called beating of the pulse or heart, i.e. in the undulatory strokes of the blood, and of the breathing which stands in reciprocal relation to it. For speaking is an action connected with expiration, and is produced by sounds of various kinds being elicited from it, as the air pssses through its canal at two principal points (the head of the windpipe and the mouth) through the co-operation of the organs there situated. The tones produced at the first place are clear tones (vowels); the others are sounds, more or less perceptible, which serve as accompaniments to the former (hence called consonants), and together with them form a single sound or syllable.[3] It is consequently clear that, when one speaks, the supply of breath (i.e. of the air thrown out after each inhalation) which is expended in the production of articulate sounds, is divided into as many parts or single expulsions of the breath as there are separate members or single sounds in the discourse. Since, however, the breath expelled proceeds from a source characterized by undulation, i.e. from the beating of the heart, its separate expulsions cannot flow out in a uniform, smooth stream, but must constantly rise and fall in waves, like those of the blood in the beating of the pulse, i.e. exhibit a constant alternation of strength and weakness, elevation and depression. And this alternation expresses itself, of course, in the tones produced by it, primarily therefore in an alter-

[1] E.g. by DeWette, Introd. to Commentary on the Psalms, No. VII., p. 52 of ed. 3. (It is wanting in the 4th ed.)

[2] Probably borrowed from the term used by the Greek grammarians, ἄρσις and θέσις which is applied by Priscianus and modern writers on metre (especially by Bentley, in the Schediasma de metris Terentianis, I.) to the voice, but properly refers to the movement of the foot or hand in beating time, and has, therefore, just the opposite meaning, viz. θέσις is the stroke of the foot or hand (Latin *ictus*) which accompanies the accented part of the measure; ἄρσις is the unaccented part. So *sublatio* and *positio* in Quinctilian.

[3] Vid. my Essay "Von der Natur und den Arten der Sprachlaute" in Jahn's Jahrbücher der Philologie, 1829, Vol. I. No. 4, p. 451 sq.

nation of strong and weak syllables, and thus manifests itself as a law of the movement of the voice.[1] This is the natural law from which the so-called accent or tone proceeds, which, in this aspect of it, is nothing else than those elevations (summits) of the waves of the breath and voice, or of the stronger expulsions of the breath, which, alternating with weaker expulsions or depressions of the voice, produce in speech the antithesis of tone and tonelessness, of accented and unaccented parts of speech, like the antithesis of light and shade. Now, this antithesis, and its regular, constant return, is in speech, strictly speaking, what is designated by a Greek word, much used but little understood, *rhythm*[2] (Lat. numerus or numeri), and is the same thing as measure. Accent, as the climax of this, appears accordingly to be of rhythmical origin and nature; i.e. the origin of it, as well as the law of its movement, is not chiefly logical, but physical, i.e. traceable to the rhythm or undulation of the blood and breath, and hence of the voice.

That this is the origin and character of accent is shown by observing in all languages — at least in all which have long and short syllables and any definite accent at all — the rules respecting the position of the accent, or the determination of the location and quality of the stress. This — whatever influence etymology and composition may in particular cases have upon it — is everywhere subject to, and conditioned by, the higher law of rhythm or statics. Inasmuch as this law of accentuation has, so far as I know, not been sufficiently

[1] Voice is, properly speaking, the clear tone (so *vox*, *φωνή*) produced in the glottis, contained in the vowel (hence *vocalis*, *φωνήεις*) and constituting the loud, sounding element of the language; then in a wider sense, instrument of speech in general. The breath in its modifications just mentioned works primarily only on the tone of the glottis, or a vowel which it produces; but, since this is the soul of the syllable, and of language in general, it works by means of it on the whole language.

[2] Etymologically it denotes (from *ῥέω*, to flow) a stream = *ῥεῦμα*. Applied to the flow of speech, it must designate either, as Buttmann thinks, an easy, flowing motion, or, since that is too vague for the figure and the thing meant, the wave-like, rocking, uniform rise and fall of the motion, and so just the essence of the so-called rhythm. Cf. above, note 4.

noticed or recognized, I have undertaken to give a more particular demonstration of it in the appended excursus.

Before following the rhythmical principle of accentuation in its wider application to the larger divisions of speech, it may be well to illustrate briefly its manifestations in other expressions of human life. It is self-evident that the same law must hold especially with regard to other tones produced by the breath — to singing and to the music of wind instruments, in all of which, together with the alternation of high and low tones (melody), is observable a constant antithesis of loud and soft tones. This antithesis and regular alternation — which, on account of the stronger intonation and unfolding of the voice, is here much more prominent than in speaking — has here long ago been noticed and known by the name of *measure*, designated in written music by the so-called bar, by which the musical strains are divided into parts, all equal to each other in length. The rationale of measure, however, is to be found in nothing else than this constant alternation of loud and soft tones, or of accented and unaccented tones. Between these, however, at the same time is observable, much more than in speaking, a relation of equilibrium or parallelism. For, since this antithesis flows from the undulatory pulsation of the blood and the breath, both parts, according to the law of hydrostatics, balance each other; and of this that regularity of movement in music is only a consequence although not a necessary one; and accordingly in many ancient rhythms and melodies, Greek as well as German, the measure is looser. Now it is well known that the so-called measure or rhythm is not only characteristic of singing and the music of wind instruments, but is common to all music, even to that of instruments played by the hand, nay, even to all movements of the human body (of the feet in walking and dancing, of the hands, arms, etc.); and is the more conspicuous in proportion to the force and amount of these movements. How is it, now, in these cases to be explained? Just as in the others, by the pulsation of the blood and breath, because these are the sources of all our physical

life, and hence their movement communicates itself to all the movements and actions, or vital functions of man. Nay, it passes over in its influence into those expressions and states of the emotions which stand in more immediate connection with the physical state (of this more below), and it stamps upon them the law of parallelism, measure, rhythm, i.e. of the constant alternation of two antithetic movements, corresponding to, and counterbalancing, each other.[1]

Returning now to the proper subject of our investigation, language, we should be led by the foregoing discussion to

[1] In the details, however, i.e. in the individual members and functions of the human organism, the correspondence of their motions with that of those sources cannot be mathematically proved, i.e. cannot be traced to the same number or to a definite mathematical ratio; nor indeed is there an exact equality in the undulatory strokes of those sources themselves, the blood and the breath (to one inhalation there are ordinarily three or four beats of the pulse). Hence the physiologists whose investigations are directed almost exclusively to the mechanical and chemical structure of the human organism, and who measure, weigh, and count everything, entirely ignore the above considered phenomena of the higher organic life, — accent, rhythm, measure, etc., — or if they incidentally speak of them, yet know scientifically nothing about their origin and laws, as little as they do about the reciprocal action of mind and body and the resultant mixed states and phenomena of this border region, which equally concern physiology and psychology. The law above laid down is rather to be derived from the whole, grand antithetic character which pervades the human organism — and in a lower degree all organic existences — in its countless members and activities, both in the structure of its mechanism, i.e. in the composition and adaptation of its limbs and organs and in the mixture of their elements, and in its movement and activity, i.e. in the individual functions and the co-operation of those organs, in other words, in the life of the organism. Everywhere is seen here reciprocal action, oscillation, regular alternation of opposite qualities, activities, motions or stages of motion, in order constantly to preserve or restore equilibrium and harmony among them; and just herein consists the peculiar and wonderful character of organic life. To this is to be added the great expansibility and elasticity of the organs as influenced by the mind, as is best to be seen in the breath, which by artificial means can be used so much more extensively than is essential to life, and can be adapted to other motions. Hence, however various and diverse the mathematical relation or the exponent of the motion in the several members may be, yet in the general effect the particular deviations and incongruities are lost in the general harmony, in such a way that the organism as a whole exhibits in its movements the great law of rhythm, and stamps it on all organic actions, and thus makes man, so to speak, a rhythmical creature, whose movements however, as may readily be conceived, cannot be mathematically calculated and determined.

confine rhythm and the accent belonging to it to the syllables, or the smallest parts of speech, and thus make it a mere syllabic rhythm and its accent merely a syllabic accent, returning with each couplet of syllables, without regard to the sense and the corresponding divisions naturally made in a discourse. But rhythm does not end with this; and now there presents itself a new, higher aspect of accentuation — that from which we started — its being used by the mind for its own purposes. It serves, as we have seen, as a means by which the mind by making prominent certain leading syllables, reduces to smaller or greater wholes, or single conceptions, the variety of sounds and syllables of which language, outwardly considered, is composed (which, as it were, constitute the body of language), or rather by which the mind animates these structures or members of the dead body of language, and pictures outwardly to the ear its inner unity. This is done by elevating the accent (raising it to a higher power), applying it to words and sentences as well as to syllables, adapting it by various gradations and distinctions to the sense, in the way described above. Thus, to the simple rhythmical principle of accentuation, a second, complex, logical, or intellectual is joined. These two are quite different from each other. The former is a mechanical one, measuring off the tones with mechanical regularity according to the number of syllables. The latter is an organic one, by which the accentuation is divided into various members and, as it were, built into an organic structure. Hence there arises between them a conflict, especially at the lower stage, in regard to the single word. For the former demands, in accordance with the rhythmical law, the repetition of the accent in polysyllabic words as often as two syllables occur, and on the other hand refuses to give it to a monosyllabic word which immediately follows an accented syllable, in order to avoid such a concurrence of two elevations of the voice as is contrary to the rhythmical law. The latter, on the contrary, can allow to the longest word only one accent, as the exponent of the one notion contained in it, and cannot refuse it even to the small-

est monosyllable, however many of them may follow one another. Accordingly in such cases the dilemma seems to be presented: either one principle or the other must be given up; either, in accordance with the first, we must cease attempting to emphasize the unity of the word, or, in accordance with the second, we must forego rhythm. Nevertheless we see even here how the flexibility and elasticity of organic antithesis adjusts the conflict. This is done as follows. On the one hand, the rhythmical accents of polysyllabic words are subordinated to the verbal accent, and thus arises the antithesis of primary and secondary accent,[1] which forms an intermediate step between accented syllables and those wholly unaccented. On the other hand, monosyllabic words, which, besides being weak in a phonetic and rhythmical point of view, are also in their logical relation not qualified to stand alone, i.e. which, as to their import, are always joined with other words (e.g. particles of all sorts, auxiliary verbs), or by chance are construed with another, and unite with it to form one common notion, give up their accent to this other, and in pronunciation lean upon it (enclisis, etc.). The remaining incongruities (in which, in general — at least in prose, — the logical principle precedes, and the rhythmical follows, while in poetry, on the contrary, the latter decidedly preponderates) may be to a great extent harmonized by an elastic pronunciation, and so the rhythmical law be satisfied; this depends on the character of the delivery and the mood or art of the speaker. Since, according to the foregoing, the rhythmical principle unites with the logical, or with the division according to the sense, there is presented, together with the logical gradation and division, a corresponding division of

[1] In Hebrew, where under the name of Metheg it is very regularly written, since the verbal accent rests universally on the latter part of the word (the last two syllables), it is throughout a preliminary accent, which may appear not only once, but very frequently, according to the number and nature of the syllables; twice, nay even three times, e.g. מַעֲמָדְךָ, מְעַמָּדְךָ, מְמַעֲמָדְךָ, Isa. xxii. 19; תְּמַאכִילֵךְ, Deut. viii. 16. Similarly in English, where the secondary accent is regularly two syllables distant from the primary, and in polysyllables may recur twice, e.g. *indivísible, indivisibílity.*

the rhythm, which brings the rise and fall of each smaller or larger logical member into parallelism with one another, by which means the stream of the discourse is broken up, in accordance with the logical division, into larger or smaller waves, from whole sentences and periods down to the single parts of the sentence and to the words, of which the former very nearly correspond to the breaths drawn in and expelled, the latter to the beating of the pulse; which rhythmical division, however, is variously limited and modified by the amount of breath inhaled, by the expense of power in the use of the voice, and by the law of rhythm. At the same time all these divisions are separated from each other by proportionate suspensions of the voice, or pauses, which, in accordance with the static law, form a series corresponding to the length of the several divisions, and are therefore in a certain sense the exponents of these, as are on the other hand the force and elevation of the rising slide in them (accents). We will now more particularly consider this division, passing in order from the smaller to the larger parts of a discourse.

1. At the first or lowest stage, where the syllabic accent assumes the character of verbal accent, the syllabic rhythm also becomes verbal rhythm, i.e. a parallelism between the accented and unaccented part of the word;[1] this becomes, in polysyllables, especially in compound words, an antithesis between the primary and secondary accent. Furthermore,

[1] In Hebrew this parallellism — conformably to the rigorously rhythmical character of the ecclesiastical elocution marked by the accentuation — is developed into a decided equilibrium between the accented syllable and the foregoing unaccented part of the word, which determines the quantity of the vocalization. On the one hand, in forms which have before the accented syllable only one open syllable, the latter is prolonged, e.g. קָטַל , מָקוֹם. On the other hand, in forms which have several syllables before the accent, the open ones are as far as possible rejected, in order to preserve the dissyllabic character; this is done unconditionally with the third syllable from the accent, as מְקוֹמוֹת , קְטַלְתֶּם; conditionally with the syllable next preceding, as קוֹטְלִים (with ֵ), whereas ֵ in forms like עוֹלָמִים remains. Similarly in English, where the quantity, and accordingly the pronunciation, of the same open syllables changes according as they stand alone or in pairs before the accent, e.g. *dĕprīve, dīlāte, prēpāre, rēstōre;* but *dĕprĭvātion, dīlātation, prĕpărātion*, etc.

the different position of the accent occasions likewise various forms of rhythm. If it falls on the first syllable or, at least, on the fore part of the word, and one or more syllables follow, so that the elevation precedes and the depression follows, then the rhythm is trochaic or dactylic. If however it rests on the final syllable or on the latter part of the word, so that the depression begins the measure and the elevation succeeds, then the rhythm is iambic or anapestic. Inasmuch as in every language the accent has a general tendency towards either the fore or the latter part of the words, in each language one or the other of these movements is the prevailing one.[1]

2. A second stage is presented when two words, or rather two notions, are united into one compound notion, either into a sentence (in its simplest form) or a part of a sentence. Then the elevations (accents), in accordance with the law of rhythm, assume the character of intensified elevations and depressions, i.e. of high and low tones, or rather of higher and lower tones, or of the preliminary tone and the principal tone, according as the first or second word is to be emphasized. Such cases are especially the following: The construction with the genitive, as, lord′ of the land, or, on the contrary, with the emphasis on the genitive, as, king′dom of God″, voice′ of the peo″ple; logically identical with this is the case of compound words (the status constructus of the Semitic languages), only with the order reversed, as, Volks′stim`me. Further, when similar things are paired, or put into apposition with each other, as, heav′en and earth, God′ and Lord; but on the other hand, come′ and see″, God′ the Fa″ther (in

[1] In languages which, like the Sanscrit, Arabic, and Ethiopic, for the most part have weakened the words with open and short syllables, or their terminations (the present German, and still more the English), and hence draw the accent back as far as possible, the movement is principally dactylic or trochaic, as *kátălă*, *jáktŏlŏ*, *σώμăτος*. In others, in which, through the apocope of the vowel of the final consonant, the compound or (for other reasons) long final syllable has the accent (as in Hebrew, Syriac, and, among modern languages, in Spanish and French), the movement is generally iambic (or anapestic), cf. *kātól*, *jiktól*, *mŭjér*, (from *múltĕr*), *ănímál*, (from *ánímăl*), *solvér* (from *sólvĕrĕ*), *sabér*, *savoir* (from *sápĕrĕ*).

distinction from the Son). Again, substantives with adjectives or other modifiers; as, the almi′ghty God`, God′ in heaven; or, on the other hand, great′ God″ (exclamation). Likewise verbs, with adverbs or objects and other modifiers; as, rule′ just ly, fear′ God, bring′ to nought; or, gov′ern wise″ly, fear′ God″ (not men), etc. Finally, the union of subject and predicate in one sentence (when the predicate is complete in one word or notion); as, the sun′ shines, the wind′ blows`, let-us-break′ our-bands`; or the boy′ lies″, love′ is blind″. The first rhythm, that of the high and low tone, as being the one adapted to the natural course and intonation of the voice, and as constituting in itself a small rhythmical period, is the most common and prevalent. The other, being occasioned by a special emphasis of the sense (especially by antithesis), produces a tension which requires to be relieved, in order that the sentence may have a rhythmical conclusion; hence admissible only in the protasis or in a member of a longer period, not at the end of a series.[1]

3. A third stage is presented, when more than two notions are united into one sentence or into an extended member of a sentence. From these compound, logical members of the sentence there result compound members of the rhythm, i.e. various stages of elevation and depression, which become here really (in the strict sense) high and low tones (in a narrower sense than that described in No. 2). If they form a complete sentence (completing the sense), so that the voice after rising sinks again to rest, then by its rise and fall it

[1] Corresponding to this stage of rhythm is in Hebrew the composition of a rhythmical member out of a so-called conjunctivus and a distinctivus, also of a subordinate distinctivus with a superior. Again, in classic prosody, the dipody, according to which the iambic and trochaic rhythms were measured (also in the Latin senarius, according to Terentianus Maur., six loci, but only three ictûs were counted, hence called trimeter, "scandendo binos quod pedes conjungimus"), somewhat as the Roman *passûs* in measuring distances are double steps. This measurement rests on the same rhythmical principle and impulse, viz. to bring two members ("feet") into the relation of rising and falling tone. Hence its scheme is to be constructed thus: ⏑ ′ – ⏑ ` – or – ′ ⏑ – ` ⏑ (Why the iambic rhythms are measured as trochees, is from a rhythmical point of view unintelligible, and seems to rest only on a conceit of Bentley).

describes a complete bow or semicircle (periodus), consisting of two segments, and having its points or the boundaries of its segments where that part of the sentence comes which is most important in relation to the sense, i.e. where the strongest verbal accent (the high tone) falls. And the height to which it rises is determined partly by the number and importance (the emphasis) of the parts of the sentence, and accordingly of the intervals between the elevations and depressions, partly by the strength of the voice. Within this bow, however, and within each of its segments, this alternate rise and fall is repeated on a smaller scale (like ripples on waves), as often as pairs of closely related words or phrases occur in it (like those given in No. 2). These are accordingly only relative elevations and depressions, in contradistinction to the proper high and low tones which form a sphere of absolute rise and fall. As an example of a rhythmical sentence in four parts, where the rise and fall are uniform, we may take the first sentence in the Bible:

In the begin'ning created God″ | the heav'en and the earth‴.

Here the boundary between the rising and the falling part is in the word "God," each part being composed of two rhythmical members or stages in the rise and fall of the voice, each of which, taken by itself, would consist of a relatively high and low tone according to the scheme ⏑ ´ ⏑ `; but united into a sentence the first consists of two stages of elevation, the latter of two stages of depression, somewhat as follows:



Nevertheless those smaller distinctions of relative rise and fall are faintly traceable in connection with the more prominent ones when one pays careful attention; and hence the figure of the rhythm, in order to be exact, must assume a form somewhat like the following:

In like manner the rhythmical member, "created-God," is, properly speaking, composed of two logical members which,

taken by themselves, would constitute a rising and a falling tone, but in this connection are united into one member with the rising inflection.[1] By extending the members of the sentence this simple rhythm becomes complex, composed of several stages, in which case, of course, with the number of the stages their difference diminishes, and with the number of the members of the hemistich, or of one stage, their movement becomes more rapid; e.g. with three members in the part having the falling slide:

In the begin'ning created God'' | the heav'en and the earth` and its inhab``itants.

Here the word "earth" stands in a double parallelism: "heav'en and earth`," and "earth' and its inhab`itants"; in the former it has the falling, in the latter, the rising slide, so that its accent would strictly be represented by ˇ (a figure which has already been used in treating of Latin and Greek accents, in cases of contraction, where an acute appears instead of a circumflex, e.g. ἑστῶς from ἑστὰώς); its intonation is therefore intermediate between the rising slide of "heaven" and the falling slide of "inhabitants"; and so the following figure of a triple subdivision of the part affected with the falling slide is presented:

Or, by resolving the antithesis into two parallelisms, with four members in the falling slide:

In the begin'ning created God` | the heav'en and its host`, the earth' and all that is therein`,

in the following scheme:



Or, as in Neh. ix. 6, three parallel sentences with six members:

The heavens with all-their-host, the earth and all-things-that-are-therein, the seas and all-that-is-therein:

[1] In the Hebrew original this sentence contains no genuine rising slide, because, as a single verse (period), it is, as usual, divided into two independent hemistiches, which are too small to take a rising slide.

where furthermore in each of the three parallelisms the falling part is composed of a smaller elevation and depression: "all'-their-host`," etc.; so that in that portion of the sentence which has the downward slide there is produced a compound rhythm having three gradations:



If, however, the expression "in the beginning" is to be emphasized, or, as in Neh. ix. 6 (where this expression does not precede), the subject, "Thou, *Jehovah*, *alone* | hast made heaven," etc., so that it alone has the rising inflection, and all the rest the downward, then the former part must rise all the higher, in order, as it were, to keep balance with the complex falling part, and to furnish the latter a sufficient height from which to fall. Thus:

In the beginning | crea'ted God` the heav'en and the earth`.

Thou alone' Jehovah` | hast made' heav'en and its host`, etc.

Sometimes the sentence is composed of two small ones (protasis and apodosis, etc.) with the same melody, as,

He speaks', and-it-is-done` = his command' is obeyed`.

When several notions belong logically together, as factors of a larger member of the sentence, and even when they are united in the same way (e.g. by the same grammatical construction) they separate again into pairs according to the strength of the attraction of each for the other, according to their affinities, e.g.

The voice | of the blood of thy brother ||

where the words "voice of the blood" naturally belong together, but the genitive is drawn away from this connection by a second genitive still more closely connected with it. And thus, through the enlargement of a sentence, or of a part of a sentence, by the addition of new factors, there result constantly among them new groupings, and consequently modifications of the rhythm and melody; in regard to which

the change in the position of the words also has much influence.

4. As a fourth stage in the development of rhythm may be considered the case when two or more sentences, which are connected together as protasis and apodosis or in some other logical relation, and accordingly constitute a logical period, assume the relation to each other of elevation and depression (high and low tone) in the higher sense of the terms. Two sentences, e.g. antecedent and consequent:

And God′ spake\ | let there *be′ light*\ || and there *was′ light*\.

Antithesis:

And God′ called the light\ *Day′!* | and the *dark′ness* he called *Night*\.

When more than two sentences form a period they unite according to their logical affinities in the rising or the falling scale, and constitute compound members in the parallelism. Examples of the most manifold logical relations and arrangements of sentences in a period — at the same time rhythmically controlled by the symmetry of the parallelism, and extending even to the strophe — are given in Hebrew poetry and in the discourses of the prophets (cf. the compilation in De Wette's Commentary on the Psalms, Introd. vii., or Introd. to the Old Test. § 129 sq.). As an example of a longer rhetorical period, composed of several smaller periods, we adduce only Isa. i. 15:

When-ye-spread-forth your-*hands*, I-will-hide mine-*eyes*; when-ye-make many *prayers*, I will not *hear*: || for your *hands* are full of *blood*.

Here two smaller periods, consisting of antecedent and consequent, compose the first member, the elevation preceding the concluding sentence, which contains the explanation (the reason) of what goes before; the first period constitutes the first stage in the elevation; the other, the second, or the climax of the rising tone. Within these again each antecedent rises while the consequent falls; but these depressions are

only relative and are suspended because they belong to the rising part of the period (especially the latter, which belongs to the second stage of the rising scale); only in the concluding sentence is the fall an absolute one. In general, every depression is lower, the nearer it leaves the sense complete, i.e. the greater the whole is which it terminates, and *vice versa*.

This is the melody of speech, which was above simply shown to belong to the logical accent, but which is made complete only by the co-operation of the logical and the rhythmical principle, in which also is alone to be found the full notion of accent. Properly to express or render this melody is the business of elocution or declamation. On account of the manifold shades in the accent — which image forth the logical relations of the sense — this melody is richer than that of music; but its extreme high and low tones — even in the most elevated intonation of rhetorical feeling — are confined within smaller intervals of the musical scale, and its tones can accordingly no more be represented musically (by notes) than can these gradations or intervals. Not till rhetorical tones rise into musical tones does the voice rise and fall in intervals that are strictly musical.[1]

[1] This relation did not escape the old Greek and Latin grammarians and rhetoricians, who exhibit in general, concerning everything relating to language and oratory (both as to essence and form), an accuracy and delicacy of observation, a perspicuity and definiteness of conception, which forms a mortifying contrast with the crudeness with which our modern (especially German) grammarians and writers view and treat their language. The most accurate treatment of it is to be found in Dionysius (Halicarn.), De Compositione verborum, chap. xi. (ed. Schaefer), p. 126, where he reckons the melody of an ordinary speech to embrace five notes, with the additional remark that it does not rise more than three and a half tones in the ascending; nor fall more than this in the descending scale: "ἐνὶ μετρεῖται διαστήματι, τῷ λεγομένῳ διάπεντε (as opposed to the musical octave, called διὰ πασῶν) ὡς ἔγγιστα· καὶ οὔτε ἐπετείνεται πέρα τῶν τριῶν τόνον καὶ ἡμιτονίου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄξυ (rising slide), οὔτε ἀνιέναι τοῦ χωρίου τουτοῦ πλεῖον ἐπὶ τὸ βαρύ (falling slide). Dionysius treats minutely of the musical intervals (p. 130,) where he correctly defines the difference between musical melody (ἡ ὀργανικὴ καὶ ᾠδικὴ μοῦσα, i.e. instrumental and vocal music) and the melody of speech by saying that it τὰς λέξεις τοῖς μέλεσιν ὑποτάττειν ἄξιοι, καὶ οὐ τὰ μέλη ταῖς λέξεσιν (i.e. that here the rhythmico-musical element sudordinates the logical

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This leads now to the further question: What is the relation of the rhythm of common speech just considered, to that of poetry, or rhythmical discourse properly so called (of the *numerosa oratio* to the *numeris adstricta*); what is the relation of the melody of speech to strict melody, or that of song; and how does the latter grow out of the former? For if, as we have seen, rhythm and melody are not peculiarly the ornament of poetry and song, but belong by a general law to all human speech, how does it happen that men generally attribute them only to poetic language, and call it (exclusively or pre-eminently) "rhythmical," in contradistinction to ordinary language, as though the latter were unrhythmical and irregular (*prosa numeris soluta*)? And if this, as being an error or an inaccuracy, needs no further consideration, why is poetry characterized by a rhythm so much more regular and palpable than that of prose, by a rhythm which even in its external features is so unmistakable, and strikes every one's eye and ear by the form of the words themselves and the sentences, (also in writing outwardly represented by breaks or lines), as well as by the whole movement of the thought, all of which are throughout shaped according to a definite rhythmi-

element, whereas in the former the rhythm and melody must accommodate themselves to the meaning and the logical relations); and then he gives an example of the deviation of the musical pronunciation from the ordinary intonation (διαφορὰ ἡ διαφέρει μουσική, sc. ᾠδὴ λογική) in a passage from Euripides. P. 135 he expresses the character of the melody of ordinary language (μέλος φωνῆς ψιλῆς) as distinguished from song (ᾠδική) by apt adjectives: it is, he says, εὐμελές not ἐμμελές, εὔρυθμον not ἔρρυθμον (*canora*, but not *cantus*; *numerosa*, but not *numeris adstricta*). Cf. also the fine observations on rhetorical rhythm, and its difference from the poetical, in Cicero, De Oratore iii. 43 sq., and especially in the Orator, chap. 16–20, 41–71. In modern literature I have found the above proposition, that language has far finer intervals, and hence a much richer "octave" (?) than song, in G. v. Seckendorff's Vorlesungen über Declamation und Mimik, i. 55–58; the best work on declamation that I am acquainted with; the author was, as a practical speaker, a celebrated virtuoso. He considers language and declamation in general, especially from p. 116 on, constantly from its musical principle and in correct relation to musical melody. Only the ground of the relation to the musical tone is sought too one-sidedly in the strength of it. It will be seen below that the musical tone is specifically (qualitatively) different from that of speech, and arises from a peculiar intonation.

cal law and set form, and which seem to constitute the specific difference between poetry and prose? Is rhythm in this form and application nothing but an arbitrary, artificial ornament and embellishment of poetry? or is it the product of a law of human nature, the natural utterance of a particular state of the human mind, as was above demonstrated with regard to rhythm in general? If, now, only the latter can be assumed, what is the law or impulse of human nature which produces such a rhythm, and what is that state of the mind which naturally expresses itself in it? The question likewise presents itself: Of what mental state is song the natural utterance rather than common language, and how are its particular tones formed? To this more intricate question — a full answer to which would require a more extended anthropological investigation than I can here enter upon — we devote a brief discussion in conclusion.[1]

Although rhythm, as a fundamental law of human speech, cannot be lacking in any kind of discourse, it is yet susceptible of very different degrees of development and cultivation. It is more prominent and distinct, the more forcibly the voice pronounces its intonations and, as it were, swells its waves, and thus increases the force and momentum of the movement; for then its elevations and depressions are separated more widely from each other and thus come more decidedly to balance one another, just as the wave rises the higher, the greater the quantity of water and the force which sets it in motion. This strength of intonation or of the undulation of the voice may indeed be arbitrarily produced, but it is naturally the effect of an elevated state of the mind; primarily, of a state of excitement or emotion, which raises the undulation of the blood, and hence increases the force of the voice, as well as of all other vital manifestations. But this only to a certain point. An intellectual element must interpose, by which the emotion is kept from breaking out into a wild tumult, controlled and con-

[1] Cf. in the Appendix to my Psalms Vol. iv. (Untersuchung der Psalmensammlung überhaupt), § 6, where this is somewhat more minutely treated.

ducted in a particular direction, and thus brought into a regular undulation; so that the modulation of the voice flows from a similar movement of the soul. Now this is the case in the poetic mood or enthusiasm. This is that state of the mind in which emotional excitement is produced by a poetic idea, i.e. by a conception which rouses the feelings and at the same time attracts to itself the intellectua lcontemplation, thus occupying at once both the intellect and the feelings; a state, therefore, in which neither the one nor the other one-sidedly sways the soul, but each permeates the other, and is thus held in balance; in which consequently the excited fountain of emotion, curbed and guided by the intellectual element of thought, is brought into an undulatory, vibratory (i.e. rhythmical) motion, swinging, as it were, upon which the soul can pour out its feelings and meditations in no other way than in wave-like or symmetrical (i.e. rhythmical) sentences.[1]

This rhythmical movement of the soul in the poetic mood seizes the whole man with irresistible force, and hence expresses itself through all the human organs which are capable of movement or activity, external or internal, bodily or mental. Externally (physically), in the first place, by the rhythmical movement of the feet, and accompanied by corresponding movements of the whole body, i.e. by dancing, in its original significance — the rudest and most expressive utterance of the poetic mood in a state of nature. Next by rhythmico-musical tones or sounds of the voice, i.e. by singing, which even without words serves to express poetic moods, especially joyous moods. This is an elevation or intensification of common language, yet specifically different from it, i.e. not only in the degree of force, but also in the kind of intonation. Its tones arise not only from the stronger intonation of the voice (which is produced also in crying or shouting in a still greater degree, yet without becoming song), but also from the peculiar swell and oscillation which the

[1] This may be both psychologically and physically more particularly shown; but there is no space for it here (vid. my Psalms, as quoted p. 21, note).

voice assumes, in a noticeable undulation, on which the voice pours out distinctly vibratory (elastic) tones, which rise and fall at great intervals, i.e. musical tones. Song can, it is true, be at any time arbitrarily produced; but, as a free and natural utterance, it is exclusively characteristic of the poetic mood, and is its specific language, so that this mood may be properly defined and illustrated by designating it as the mood in which one "sings." These tones and strains, when produced by an instrument, instead of by the voice, give us instrumental music, which is likewise primarily an expression of the poetic mood. This mood finds its most spiritual expression, when it gives utterance not only to a general, vague feeling in rude tones of melody or music, but to a definite idea, consisting of distinct notions, in words, i.e. in song. This is poetry in its full development, i.e. brought before the consciousness and spiritually transfigured, and is the most perfect expression of the poetic mood. This mood manifests itself most strikingly in the union and harmonious co-operation of all the three modes of expression — dancing, music, and singing, as it is found among people in a state of nature; but this union is natural and feasible only at a certain stage of cultivation; when this is passed, music and singing are separated from dancing; instrumental, further, from vocal music; and song becomes a mere poem not to be sung. By this separation the several arts receive more cultivation, but are in danger of becoming too artificial and of degenerating, i.e. of passing beyond the bounds of the truly poetical, of being removed from their original source, and of forgetting their proper nature and design.[1] In so far, however, as singing and dancing are an expression of poetic feeling, which consists in a rhythmical, undulatory movement of the soul, the law of their movement and their essential character must consist in the parallelism of their members. This parallelism, however, is susceptible of various degrees of development, according as it relates to the larger series or the smaller members of the series. This is most clearly

[1] Cf. Herder, Spirit of Heb. Poetry, ii. 7, p. 266 sq.

seen in the dance, where either the only discernible rhythm consists in parallel rows (circular dance, chorus) as in the dances of rude people and the old national dances of Germany, which dramatically represent a poetic mood, situation or experience of the human heart and life, and so involve the soul of dance without measuring off its separate movements; or the movement is likewise rhythmically regulated and divided off, down to its smallest parts, the single steps, by the constant return of a uniform parallelism of the step, i.e. by the alternation of heavy and light treads in the same measure; or, finally, there remains nothing but the dancing steps without any larger rows, and so without expressing any poetic thought (body without soul), like our waltzes, etc. The same distinctions are to be seen in the rhythm of music and of other tones (e.g. of the drum), which must assert itself not only in the minutiae, by means of the so-called measure, i.e. the constant recurrence of the parallelism of accented and unaccented tones, but also on a larger scale, by means of the parallelism of the musical strains and periods. And this is found in its most perfect and noble form in poetic utterance, in song. This, as a marrying of the inward with the outward, of thought with tones or words, includes two methods by which the poetic mood expresses itself, therefore a twofold rhythm. First, an inward rhythm, that of the thoughts themselves. For since the essence of the poetic mood consists in a regular undulation of excited feeling, the course of poetic thought must also be undulatory, consequently must consist in a continuous parallelism of thoughts and sentences. This is the soul of poetry and the foundation of all rhythm. This inner rhythm, or rhythm of the thoughts, manifests itself outwardly in language (song) in gradations similar to those of the rhythm of dancing and of music. At first it only brings the larger series, the sentences and periods, into parallelism, making verses and strophes, the latter sometimes outwardly represented by responding choruses (Heb. עֲנָה of the chorus, Exod. xv. 21; 1 Sam. xviii. 7). This is the oldest and most essential form of

rhythm, further than which the poetry of the Old Testament did not get. In modern poetry it is distinguished by rhyme, i.e. by the similar sound of the termination of the corresponding series, in order to make the parallelism strike the ear more distinctly. Or the separate words and syllables are also rhythmically regulated (syllabic rhythm) by the regular recurrence of the undulation of elevated and depressed syllables ("foot," *pes*, more correctly, verse-step, analogous to the dancing-step, *pas*, from *passus*); in which case the syllables are either measured according to their length (metre), or only counted, with or without regard to the verbal accent. This is the most perfect rhythm: a thoroughgoing division of articulate language from the largest down to the smallest parts. Descending (analytically) it is attained by a continued dichotomy or dissection of the periods (of the verse), by means of an incision in the middle (the so-called caesura of classical prosody), into parallel members or antitheses, then into hemistiches, then into dipodies (parallel double steps). Then, in an ascending direction, the verses are united into groups of verses (strophes), first into distiches, then into various other combinations; but everywhere is parallelism. Even when the rhythm in all its gradations and forms is tripartite (compound), the fundamental law of parallelism, or of the antithesis of two members, is not abolished; because then two parts always stand over against a third, often in the completed form of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which seeks to reconcile the opposition in a higher unity.[1] And as there are dances which consist merely in dancing-steps

[1] The same law appears in the region of visible things as the law of symmetry — a fundamental condition of every manifestation and form of the beautiful, the perfect analogue of rhythm for the ear, not transferred from the latter to the eye, but proceeding from the same fundamental law of human life. And whence the bewitching charm which everything that conforms to this law has for us? Whence in particular the wonderful power of music over man, celebrated even in the myths of antiquity? What is there in it that makes us so proud and buoyant and quickens every pulse? It is not the tickling effect of the tones, but its *rhythm*, which, *proceeding from the quickened pulse of the source of our life, excite the same pulsation of elevated life in every hearer*; it rests therefore on agreement with the law of our life.

which are not united into larger choral dances, so there is a rhythm in speech which prevails only in the separate words and their syllables without extending to the sentences and periods, as, e.g. when one writes prose in iambics.[1]

Next to poetry, the language of elevated oratory presents the most marked and distinct development of rhythm. It too flows from an excited, elevated mood (so-called pathos); but, in so far as the stimulating idea is a general truth or a moral good, it seeks to fill others with enthusiasm for it and incite them to action; hence it aims at an effect on the outer world, and serves accordingly an intelligent design; whereas poetry proper has no other end than to discharge the contents of its feelings in words, and thus to satisfy itself. In case of preponderating emotion, at the highest point of oratorical enthusiasm, the language will rise into almost the musical flow and rhythm of that of poetry, and will advance in parallel sentences, nay, even periods, which, as a general rule, are distinguished from those of lyric poetry only by a greater fulness in thought and expression (so with the prophets or orators of the Old Testament). When the intellectual element preponderates, on the other hand, it will approximate to prose, and the rhythm or parallelism peculiar to every elevated mood will manifest itself only in a more free and unconstrained form, in a general striving after parallelism and fulness of expression, sonorousness in the final words, etc. (so-called oratorical numerus); while at the same time the increased strength of the voice calls up the logical antitheses involved in every discourse, and finely unfolds them in series of sounds rhythmically controlled, i.e. as much as possible made to balance each other. In ordinary discourse, or so-called common prose, where, in the total lack of emotional excitement, the stream of the discourse glides along calmly and without any visible undulation, so that in it the

[1] These various grades of rhythm, as also the analogy of dancing, have been already pointed out by De Wette in the Introd. to his Commentary on the Psalms, § viii., where in general excellent observations on rhythm are to be found.

logical members and antitheses sink and disappear, rhythm seems to be wholly wanting, and it is generally designated, in distinction from poetry and rhetorico-rhythmical prose, as unrhythmical. But, as has been already observed, this is only relatively correct. In fact there is rhythm here as well as accent, but in such fine and obscure gradations that they are for the ear scarcely perceptible. But the concealed rhythm of prose discloses itself at once, as soon as the voice pronounces stronger intonations, and by this means all prose, even the most speculative and profound, may be spoken and read in perfect rhythm (in which case, to be sure, there is presented a ridiculous incongruity of matter and delivery). Such a rhythmical elocution, and that too, of the most solemn kind, has become customary among the Jews, as also among other people, especially in reading the scriptures, all parts of them, even the purely historical. And after it had for a long time been verbally handed down as an acquired art of the prelectors and grammarians, it finally received a fixed designation in the text of the sacred books, as we find it now in the manuscripts of the Old Testament. To prepare the way for a correct understanding of this, is the object of this investigation.

Excursus.

The rhythmical law manifests itself, in the first place, in the position of the accent, i.e. in the determination of the syllable which it shall affect. Here the general rule holds, that the verbal accent, without regard to the position of the root, rests, even in the longest word, only on one of the three last syllables, and according to the quantity or length of the two last. If these are both short, the accent rests on the antepenultimate; if both are long, or even only one of them (in Greek it is the last, in Latin the next to the last), on the penultimate (on the accent on the last syllable, see below); and afterwards the tone moves forwards and backwards. E.g. Greek: *στόμᾰτος, στομᾰ́των; ἄνθρωπος, ἀνθρώπων; τύπτω, ἔτυπον, ἐτυπέτην.* Latin: *Mácĕdŏ,*

Macédŏnĕs, Macĕdónĭă; púĕrōs, puerórum, puerìrúmque; aúdiūnt, audiébam, audiēbámus.[1] Arabic and Ethiopic: *kátălă, katálta, kataltónna; jáktălŏ, jáktŏlŭ, jaktólna, jaktălána; jakúlŭ, jakʾlána; válădĭ, valládăkă, valladátăkă;* Substantives: *kátĕlŭ, kătélătu, katelína; medínătŭ, ínătu, ínătáni;* also with enclitics: *kóllămā, ʿéndămā*, but *ʾĕlámă*, etc.[2] At first sight the Hebrew intonation, which puts the

[1] So in the Romance languages (N. B. in so far as the Latin quantity has been preserved, especially in Italian), as *crĕdĕrĕ, credéva, credevámo; amába, ābámo* (in Spanish *ábămos*, because the penultimate is here shortened); *benéfico*, but *pudico*, etc.; in Spanish, even in case of apocope of the final vowel if the quantity is not thus, as usual, lengthened, as *ángĕl, órdĕn, dificĕl, ámăn* (Ital. *ámăno*, from *amant*). Even in English the Latin accentuation, under the same conditions makes itself felt; e.g. the words in *-átor, ˈ-ăty, -ĕty*, (Latin *ˈ-ătas, ĭtas*), *ˈ-ent* (Latin *-ens*), *-ˈĭmĕn*; adjectives in *-ĭc, -ĭfĭc, -ĭd, -ĭt*, etc., e.g. *prolífĭc, históřĭc, mosáĭc, intrépĭd, illícit*, and many others which cannot be traced to any definite termination. It is true that in many other words from the Latin (or French) the accent, conforming to the English rhythm, which springs from the accent of the German element, and is applied to the Romanic, where it, of course, can only produce confusion, is thrown back further than in Latin. This, however, has always been first brought about by apocope, together with a shortening of the last syllables, while the rule for the position of the accent itself remains in general unshaken. Only in many forms, in which many syllables of formation are heaped together at the close, the German tendency to shorten these and draw back the accent as near as possible upon the root conflicts with the rule, e.g. *ámĭcăblў, ámĭăblĕnĕss*, where the accent is crowded back upon the fourth and fifth syllable. The same thing is effected in Italian and Spanish, especially by the appending of short, unaccented suffixes to the verb; e.g. *mánda-vĭsĕnĕ, búscā-mĕlŏ*. But these are consequences which, in a certain sense, are forced upon language against its will, and which in pronunciation are either as far as possible accommodated to the normal measure, or are entirely avoided, as for the most part in Italian. Since in all these languages the Latin quantity and accentuation is so powerful as to determine the pronunciation, the latter can of course be understood and fixed only by reference to the Latin forms; and it is quite preposterous to seek to fix it merely by mechanical rules — according to the general form of the final syllables without regard to derivation — rules which have just as many or even more exceptions, and are of no use at all, and through which thick volumes, especially on English pronunciation, are made fruitless and aimless.

[2] When this Essay was first published (1852) I assumed that also in Sanscrit — whose vocalization rivals the Arabic and Ethiopic in purity and trueness to its original character — the etymological principle of accentuation, as in Greek, stands under the rhythmical law, all the more inasmuch as the remarkable law running through all forms — the law of equilibrium between root and formation or inflexion endings — testifies to the power of this law. This assumption, never-

accent for the most part on the last syllable, and only by way of exception on the penultimate, never on the antepenulti-

theless, has not been confirmed by the later investigations respecting the actual Sanscrit accentuation as regards the final syllables, — in Benfey's Grammatik (Leipsic, 1852) and Bopp's Vergleichende Accentuationssystem des Sanscrit und des Griechischen (Berlin, 1854). Bopp makes it even exactly opposed to the rhythmical law, whose prevalence in the Greek language he considers a mark of degeneracy, and designates, as the principle of the Sanscrit accent, the "pushing back" of the tone as far as possible towards the beginning of the word, which, he says, was esteemed the "most dignified and forcible" accentuation (p. 16). This would surely be no principle at all; and so in his preface (p. v) he lays it down, over against the logical principle of the German languages and the rhythmical principle of the others, as a third, free or grammatical, in Sanscrit confined to no limits (without law therefore). Not having grasped the significance of the rhythmical law, which, as I have shown, is a law of nature, and finding, in the consequent fact that the accent is limited to the last three syllables, only an arbitrary confinement of the accent, he makes the principle of the Sanscrit accent only to consist negatively in freedom from this constraint, without stating clearly what the positive law is. This is, however, in fact, of a rhythmical character; for the Sanscrit accent, to express it briefly, follows the centre of gravity, i.e. that point in the word where the equilibrium between different elements or factors of the word rests. Only it is not merely mechanical, determined by the outward gravity (length) of the syllables, as in most languages, but chiefly organic, determined by the significance of the syllable in question in its relation to the whole word and the other factors, i.e. it rests upon the syllable which is for the form the most important (as the soul of the word), and the outward weight of the other factors operates only conditionally. Accordingly the accent rests: (1) on the root, on the kernel of the word (as in German), where the root appears strong (i.e. when the formation-endings are defective, strengthened from the simple root), either absolutely strong or conditionally so, according to the strength of the terminations that are added; (2) on the syllable of formation which determines the sense: either (a) derivatively, from the root to the particular form in appended vowels, *a*, *u* (*nu*), *nâ*, these likewise partly absolutely, partly conditionally strong; or (b) derivatively, and at the same time serving as inflection syllables in prefixes — augment and reduplication (long and short); the first absolute and changeless, the latter conditioned by the strength of the inflection-endings, and hence changing except in the desiderative. But when the accent is conditioned and changeable, there is seen an oscillation between four elements (factors) — stem, vowel of formation, mode-vowel, and personal ending. First, between the mode-vowel and personal ending of weak stems, viz. in the *modus obliquus* (potential, subjunctive, where the significance of the word lies in the mode-vowel and the personal endings are shortened, as in the preterite); here the accent rests either on the strong mode-vowel before the weak personal ending, or on the strong personal ending after a shortened mode-vowel; on the other hand, in case of reduplication, on this; in the Subj. 1st Pers., either on the strong stem or vowel of formation, in spite of the strong mode-vowel *â*, and in

mate — just contrary to the Arabic and Ethiopic intonation (cf. *katál*, *jiktól* with *kátala*, *jáktolo*) — seems to deviate entirely from this rule. Yet a closer view shows that the variation is only accidental, and that there is a substantial agreement. The reason why the Hebrew accent is limited to the last two syllables is the same as operates similarly in other languages, viz. because these syllables, like the syllables in general, according to the punctuation of the Hebrew language handed down to us, are always long or heavy, partly by position, partly by nature, or by artificial lengthening of the vowels. That it mainly rests on the ultimate, arises from the fact that this syllable, on account of the general apocope of the original final vowel (still retained in the Arabic and Ethiopic languages), has become in all radical words compound, i.e. the product of a contraction of two simple ones (*-tàl* and *-tăl* from *-tălă*, *-tèl* from *-tĕlă*, etc.), and therefore, in a language which has such rigid rules and so delicate a sense for syllabication in regard to the consonant as the Semitic have, must necessarily draw the accent to itself. And this holds true, of course, also of the inflected final syllables of the same kind.[1] The accent can fall on the

the Imp. (2d and 3d Pers. exc. 3d Sing.), when the stem is weak and without mode-vowel, on the personal ending. Next, the oscillation takes place between the vowel of formation and the personal ending: when the strong vowel *a* occurs, unconditionally upon it; when the weak vowels *u*, *nu*, *nî* occur, conditionally, according to the weakness of the personal ending. Finally, between the stem and the personal endings (when no vowel of formation comes between, and the personal endings are immediately appended), on the strong stem before weak personal endings, and *vice versa*.

[1] The same phenomenon appears also in the Romanic languages, especially in the Spanish, where in consequence of apocope compound final syllables arise, which are now prolonged, and draw the accent to itself; e.g. *solvèr* from the Latin *sólvĕrĕ*. In French this lengthening is often carried still further, so as to form diphthongs, as *sápĕrĕ*, *sabèr*, *savoìr*. Also in Arabic and Ethiopic this rule must hold, although not recognized. That the Arabian grammarians say nothing about it, is quite explicable from the fact that the thing with them is only an exception; and, considering the defectiveness of their rules on this subject (in most languages the one least noticed; cf. the meagre, shallow, and disconnected statements in Silvestre de Sacy, Gram. Art. i. p. 145, ed. 1), this omission can prove nothing against analogy and the nature of the case. An indirect, although distorted, testimony for it is found, moreover, in the droll statement

penultimate only in two cases: either when a word originally monosyllabic and ending in two consonants receives, according to the rules for syllables, a second unaccented one, as *kódesch* from *kòdsch*, *tóhu* instead of *tohv*, *chóli* for *cholj*; or when an inflection-ending, forming an open syllable, has been added. According to this simple law, its position changes in words to which new syllables are added, according to the character of the final syllables; e.g. verbs: *katàl*, *katáltî*, *kᵉtaltèm*, *kᵉtaltíhu*, *kᵉtaltihèm*; *jakúmû*, *jᵉkumùn*, *jᵉkumûni*, *jᵉkumúnûchèm*; substantives: *kôtèl*, *kotᵉlàh*, *kotᵉlîm*; *mᵉdînàh*, *mᵉdînòth*, *mᵉdînāthâïm*; *dābàr*, *dᵉbārîm*, *dibrêchèm*. Yet many inflection-endings with open final syllables — these being always long by nature — draw the accent to themselves; either unconditionally, by their greater length and importance, as, e.g. the feminine ending *âh* (ה־) in the noun (in contradistinction to the unaccented accusative ending *âh*) and the pronominal suffixes *î* and particularly *ô* and *âh* (הּ־), which, as being contractions from *áhû* and *áhâ*, must have the accent; or only in the connection of the sentence, when the open penultimate syllable, which strictly should have the accent, is thrown out; whereas at the close of the sentence (in pause) it reappears on the latter. Thus, *katᵉlû*, *katálû*; *kābᵉdù*, *kābédû* (from *kābèd*); *vajjᵉhì*, *vajjéhî* (cf. πατρός, πατέρος). Sometimes also the accent is drawn back from the ultimate upon the open penultimate for particular reasons,

(in Silvestre de Sacy, ibid. No. 7), that every compound syllable, as often as it occurs in a word is to be accented, e.g. *éstáchrágtu!* (This Bopp also, ibid Rem. 159, finds inconceivable.) That the compound final syllable of the imperative has the accent (e.g. *öktól*) is stated by Ewald, Gram. Ar. i. § 142. The same must be true of the Future apocop. and the pronominal suffixes *tom*, *kom* and *hom*, as well as of the paragogic Future and Imperative in *an* (for *ánna*); with the penultimate compound syllable before open inflection-endings it is of course the case. In Ethiopic the unaccented pronunciation of the compound final syllable in the noun, as *mánfăs*, *dĕngĕl* (nominative) from the full *mánfăsă* of the Acc. and status constructus, remains; and so is to be explained doubtless also that of the Fut. (which is here always apocopated) *ĭgábĕt*, *jĕgbăr*, i.e. it arises from the prevailing accent of the full forms on the antepenultimate (cf. the above-mentioned extension of the opposite Hebrew rhythm beyond its limits). This is true perhaps also of the Arabic Fut. apocop. But I cannot believe it to be original and normal.

especially when an accented syllable immediately follows, e.g. *kárâ*, *ló* (instead of *kārà*), *látĕt*, *l'chà* (from *lātèt*).[1]

But all this accords entirely with the rhythmical law of the alternation and equilibrium of rise and fall, and indeed can be explained only by it. The reason why the accent can stand only on one of the last three syllables is that a simple rhythmical department, the elevation in which is marked by the accent, can, strictly speaking, include only two syllables, and can include three only when in the descending part two short syllables (or syllables shortened in pronunciation) are equal to one long one; so that the regulative scheme ⏜ ⏑ or ⏜ – here alternates with the variations ⏜ ⏑ ⏑, ⏜ ⏑ ⏑, according to the nature of the syllables; in which connection it is to be observed that the emphasis of the rising slide gives to the short syllables so much force that it can balance even a protracted downward slide, and that the lack of intonation in the downward slide shortens long syllables. In polysyllables the fore part of the word forms a sphere in which preliminary strokes introduce the accented part, and, when it consists of several syllables, secondary accents come in of themselves, which in most languages are recognized and fixed, and in many, as the Hebrew and the English, are rhythmically regulated. The verbal accent however must, in such words, select not the fore, but the latter, part for its sphere (which part, on account of the inflection-endings which modify the sense, is also the most important part of the word), because only here can the rhythm be prominent, since it would otherwise be destroyed again by the unaccented syllables following. So also the rhythm of a

[1] A real exception to the rule of accentuation in question is found however in the German language in its present form, in which, on account of a weakening of the former full, strong endings, and on the other hand a lengthening and contracting of short syllables in the middle, the accent has gradually come to be put always on the kernel of the word, on the root, and thus depends on the sense, not the length of the syllable. Yet even here the exception is not uniform; e.g. cf. *lebéndig* with *lébend*, *wahrhâftig* with *wáhrhaft*, *allmáchtig* with *állmacht*. On this transition in general, vid. J. Grimm, Deutsche Grammatik, i. 12 sq. (2d ed.).

sentence (the so-called *numerus oratorius*) is satisfied with a development at the close of the sentence (cf. Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 46).

But also the difference in the kind of intonation in many languages, depending on the position and nature of the accented syllable, is explainable only by the nature of rhythm. This is true especially of the distinction of the acute (*ὀξύς*), grave (*βαρύς*), and extended or circumflex (*περισπώμενος*) in Greek, i.e. of elevated tone, depressed tone, and the tone composed of both, ˊ, ˋ, and ˆ or ˜; of which the last two are only special modifications and representatives of the first, as of the normal tone. That the so-called acute or rising tone stands only on the penultimate or antepenultimate, while on the ultimate it is exchanged for the grave or falling tone, is explained by the fact that it constitutes the elevation of the rhythmical undulation of the voice, and therefore requires and presupposes a subsequent depression as the necessary support of the elevation; consequently that, where the latter is wanting, as on the last syllable, it can, of course, not noticeably rise,[1] and becomes a low tone, or rather a relatively lower or depressed tone.[2] But it rises again and becomes a high tone, as soon as a syllable is added to it, e.g. *εἰκὼν, εἰκόνος*; *ἀντὶ, ἀντίος, ὃς, ὅστις*; *σοφὸς, σοφία*, and *σοφόστε*; or when it stands at the close of a sentence, where on account of the pause it is enabled to rise.[3] This is called also by the Greek grammarians *ἐγείρειν τόνον* (also *ὀρθοτόνειν*), in opposition to *κοιμίζειν*, which was used of the depression in the

[1] The height of the elevation is variable, and corresponds to the extent of the falling part (of which more hereafter).

[2] The Jewish grammarians also call the accent on the final syllable מִלְּרַע, "below," i.e. deep tone, in opposition to מִלְּעֵל, "above," i.e. high tone, on the penultimate. As opposed however to the acute, i.e. sharp tone, it would be appropriately called the obtuse or suppressed tone (*ἀμβλύς*, as it really is termed by one Greek grammarian); somewhat as in German poetry for similar reasons the monosyllabic rhymes are called obtuse, in contradistinction to the more melodious dissyllabic rhymes.

[3] Something similar is found in Hebrew, where in pause the short vowel of the final syllable is lengthened, and the rejected penultimate is restored and receives the accent: *katăl*ˋ, *katāl*ˆ: *kaṭelū*ˋ, *katāʾlū*.

low tone (the former therefore being regarded as the erect one, ὀρθός, the latter as the recumbent or inclined one). The same is the case with the Italian gravis on final syllables which have become such through the apocope of the final syllable (hence called *voci tronche*), and thus have gone over from the former high tone to the present low one; e.g. *virtù*, *pietà*, *può*, from the more ancient *úde*, *áde*, *puóte* (Latin, *virtúte*, *pietáte*, etc.). This intonation of the final syllable of polysyllabic words, conflicting, as it does, with the natural rhythm, and hence in many languages unknown or not recognized, is in general unquestionably owing to the preponderance which this syllable (always a syllable of formation or inflection) has obtained, on the one hand, by its own weight (partly quantitative, partly logical or etymological), on the other hand, by the incidental weakness of the root, or the incapacity of the syllable of formation or connecting vowel immediately preceding to receive the accent, or by the rejection of this syllable. It is owing, therefore, to the fact that the equilibrium between root and termination (most clearly discernible in the Sanscrit) is pushed forward upon the latter. Here belong, first, grave case-endings. These are either absolutely grave, as -εἰ, -ὶ (-τὶ, -ιστὶ), as πανδημεὶ, ἑκοντὶ (which I take to be a case-ending, instrumentalis, the like of which are found in most of the adverbial endings); or the relatively grave of the genitive and dative of the third declension of all number[1] in monosyllables, as μηνὸς, -νὶ, with μῆνα, μῆνες

[1] This is, to be sure, in Greek not recognizable in the short endings of these cases in the Sing. of the 2d Decl.; but it is in the 1st and 2d, where the short vowels of the Nom., Accus., and Voc., ᾰ and *o*, are lengthened and those already long and accented take the circumflex: -ης, -ῃ; -ου, -ῳ; but -ᾱ, -αν; -ος, -ον, -ε: -ᾶς, -ᾶ; -ῆς, -ῇ; -οῦ, -ῷ; -αῖν, -αῖς, but -ὰ, -ὼ; -ὰς, -οὺς. This is explained by the Sanscrit, in which these cases, together with the locative and instrumental, are the oblique cases, and have long endings, in contradistinction to the weaker endings of the *casus recti* (to which, besides the Nom. and Voc., also the Accus. belongs), and are characterized by reciprocal action and equilibrium between root and termination, formation-endings and case-endings, as in all parts of speech. As here, the *casus obliquus*, and in the verb the *modus obliquus* as opposed to the *rectus*, are designated by stronger terminations, so, on the other hand, also the feminine gender, as opposed to the normal masculine, as in all languages.

(sometimes with an abbreviation of the root, as χερὸς, χερὶ, with χεῖρα; πῑρὸς, μῡὸς, from πῦρ, μῦς), or in dissyllables with the expulsion of the vowel of the syllable of formation, as πατρὸς, ἀνδρὸς, γαστρὸς instead of πατέρος, etc. (also transferred to μητρὸς, θυγατρὸς instead of μήτερος, etc., like θρῃκὸς instead of θρήϊκος), κῠνὸς instead of κυόνος (more of the same in Sanscrit). Next, here belongs a series of formation-endings joined, as a general rule, to the simple root. Thus, the participles of the 2d Aor. act. and pass. -ὼν, -ὸν and -εἰς, -ἐν (Sanscrit -*ant*, -*at*), the Perf. act. -ὼς, -υῖα, -ὸς (Sanscrit -*ivân*, fem. -*ushî*, neut. -*vas* from *ivans*); e.g. φῠγὼν together with φεύγων, τῠπεὶς with τύψας; likewise the participles in -ὰς, -εἰς, -οὺς, -ὺς, neut. -ὰν, -ἐν, etc. of the verbs in -μι (Sanscrit -*ant*, -*vant*, neut. -*at*, -*vat*); pass. Part. -τὸς, with rejection of the connecting vowel (Sanscrit -*itâs*, -*tâs*), e.g. τυπτὸς, στᾰτὸς, θετὸς, τᾰτὸς, κλῠτὸς (also Sanscrit *tuptâs*, *sthitâs*, *dhitâs*, *tatâs*, *s'ru'tâs*). Again, substantives from the simple root, sometimes with the vowel modified; as, the grave feminine ending -ὴ, -ὰ (Sanscrit -*â*), e.g. τομὴ, φῠγὴ, φθορὰ; -ονὴ, e.g. ἡδονὴ, αὐονὴ, Sanscrit -*anâ*, e.g. *jâtanâ*, *vandanâ*; and denominatives in -ιὰ (Sanscrit -*jâ*), also -ὺς, -τὺς, -ὰς (-αδος); and the masculine -εὺς (Sanscrit -*us*, -*ûs*), as, τομεὺς; -τὴρ (Sanscrit -*tr*. accus. -*târam* and -*táram*) fem. -τρὶς, e.g. θῠτὴρ, δοτὴρ, πατὴρ, but μήτηρ (Sanscrit *pitâ* from *pâ*, but *mâtâ*); -μὸς (Sanscrit -*mâs*) and fem. -μὴ (from short stems, otherwise -ήμη, etc.), but neut. -μα (Sanscrit -*man* and -*mam*), as Θεσμὸς, δεσμὸς, -σμὴ, στιγμὴ, but θῆμα, στίγμα. Adjectives: added to the simple stem, -ὸς (Sanscr. -*âs*, *trasâs*), as φανὸς, τομὸς, -νὸς pass.=-τὸς (Sanscrit -*nâs*); denom. -ῑνὸς, -ειυὸς (Sanscrit -*în*, -*inâs*), -λὸς, -ηλὸς, -ωλὸς (Sanscrit -*lâs*, -*alâs*, -*ilas*, -*ulas*), from which the abstract -ωλὴ; -ρὸς with the connecting vowel -ερὸς, -ηρὸς, -ωρὸς (Sanscrit -*râs*, -*irâs*, -*urâs*, -*êras*, -*ôras*), -ικὸς, -ακὸς (Sanscrit -*akâs*, -*ikâs*); -ὺς neut. -ὺ (Sanscrit -*ûs*, -*û*) from which again -υκὸς (Sanscr. -*ukâs*), -ὴς neut. -ἐς (Sanscr. -*âs*, -*âs*). In general

Cf. on the Semitic languages my "Abhandlung über das System der Semit. Demonstrativbildung u. s. w." in the "Zeitschrift für Künde des Morgenlands" ii. 150 sq.

that which draws the tone to one ending rather than another not different in quantity, is the more pointed concrete significance, as e.g. the concrete, as opposed to the purely abstract, a positive gender, as opposed to the lack of gender (neuter), a derivative, individualized notion, as opposed to a general, radical notion. Cf. the same ending as concrete, -ὸς, as abstract masc. and neut. -ος, adj. -ὺς, -ὴς, -εὺς, vs. abstr. neut. -ος; masc., fem. -μὸς, -μὴ, vs. neut. -μα. In another class of monosyllables and dissyllables, especially particles — like the prepositions, indefinite pronouns, and adverbs — which either receive no tone and lean upon another word (enclitics), or at the most receive, like dissyllables, the grave accent, their incapacity to take the rising slide lies in the dependent character of the notion which they represent, and their consequent close connection with the following or foregoing word. But as soon as, by a change in their position or meaning, they become independent, the unaccented words and enclitics receive the grave, the others the acute accent, e.g. ἐξ, ὡς, and ἔξ, ὥς,; περι, πέρι; τις, τὶς, τίς; ποτε, ποτὲ, πότε. In like manner the verbs εἰμι and φημι, which on account of their close connection with other words often stand without accent, have, when in a different position, the acute accent on the final syllable of all the forms of the present, as, εἰμὶ, ἐστὸν, etc., which otherwise do not have it, and ἐστι then receives the acute, ἔστι. A perfect analogy to this is furnished in the above-mentioned Hebrew accentuation in the course of the sentence (*katᵉlù*) as distinguished form that of the pause *katā''lû*.[1] Finally, as regards the prolonged or

[1] The above examples may suffice to illustrate the part which the rhythmical law has in the position of the grave accent — a point which needs and deserves a minute and thorough investigation, but which I could here only touch upon incidentally. Yet I can now at least refer to the complete presentation of the facts and the comparison with the Sanscrit in Bopp's Vergleichende Accentuationssystem, although the principle is there not recognized. The view above propounded respecting this accent, as being low tone, conflicts with the prevalent doctrine, according to which it is made equivalent to tonelessness. This conception rests, it is true, on the unanimous testimony of the Greek and Latin grammarians, who also, following Dionysius Thrax and his commentators, make the inference that therefore all unaccented syllables should strictly be

circumflex tone, that which determines its use instead of the acute accent, lies also in the rhythmical relation between

marked with this accent; and the odd statement is even added, that the ancient, more accurate grammarians really had so written (of which of course there is no trace to be found in the MSS.); vid. Villoison, Anecdota ii. 111 sq., 118 sq. On this notion rests furthermore the singular designation of the *verba παροξύτονα* by *βαρύτονα*, which is also found as early as Dionysius Thrax (art. gramm. cap. 16, in Fabricius, biblioth. gr. vii. 31). And this view might be traced back even to the authority of Plato, Crat. 35 (the oldest mention of accents, of course only of the oral accents), where undoubtedly *βαρεῖα* is used, in contradistinction to *ὀξεῖα*, of a syllable that has become toneless (*φι* in *Δίφιλος*, from *Διΐ* and *φίλος*). Nevertheless I do not hesitate to pronounce this notion a misunderstanding on the part of the ancient grammarians, such as are so often found in them, as in the earlier grammarians of every nation. Only so much seems to be true in it: the word *βαρεῖα*, in distinction from *ὀξεῖα* as used of an accented syllable, was used also (and perhaps first, if we may draw a conclusion from that passage in Plato) of an unaccented syllable (for both words, as used by Plato, relate to syllables, not to *προσῳδία*, as in later writers), *ὀξύς* and *ὀξύνω* being probably at first used only in the wider sense of the intonation (properly speaking, the making sharp or prominent) of a syllable in general, that is, exactly like our "rise" and "fall," by which we understand primarily only accent and lack of accent. But this holds of course only of the oral pronunciation, not of the signs now used. That the inventors of these designated by ⏑ only the absence of accent, and originally applied it to every unaccented syllable (which in that case, to be sure, they must have done), is too foolish a thing to accuse them of; but it is also positively senseless, because it is in contradiction to the actual use of the sign on the ultimate. For if it is nothing but a sign of tonelessness, then it is incomprehensible what it has to do just here, since with this exception it never stands on the unaccented syllables. But if, as Dionysius and his followers say (what is quite true), it here stands instead of the acute accent in the midst of a sentence (*ἐν τῇ συνέπειᾳ*, vid. Villoison ii. 112), then that is a new significance, different from the other, and this, as the only one actually in use, is also the only one, and nothing more is to be said about it, except to state the kind of the tone. Accordingly that alleged significance of tonelessness, which never appears in actual use, is at any rate a transcendental, prehistoric one, and without any practical validity; without doubt, however, even as an alleged fact of literary history, from the very first groundless, and the offspring of a false inference. It is rather quite clear that the sign, which is likewise a tone-sign, can denote nothing but a kind of tone different from the acute; indeed the invention of various signs necessarily implies the observance of various kinds of intonation; and to this must be referred also the terms *ὀξεῖα* and *βαρεῖα* in the language of grammarians (what kind of tone it designates, is clear enough of itself, and its use is, I trust, sufficiently illustrated above). It is therefore, time that our philologists stop repeating that meaningless fable, which the thoughtful Buttmann (ausführliche Gr. § 9, 2) gives with the discreet remark added, "according to the theory of the ancients," and § 13 A. 3 attempts to modify and rectify against

elevation and depression. For, as the acute accent, as was seen above, is in place only when the elevation, through its quantity or its tone, stands in a certain equilibrium with the following depression (– –, – ⏑ ⏑, – – ⏑, – ⏑ or ⏑ ⏑), so, on the other hand, the protracted accent takes its place when the syllable of elevation, through its nature and position, has a decided preponderance over the following depression, or (by means of contraction) absorbs it into itself. Hence the ancient grammarians describe this tone not merely as simply protracted, but as curved, i.e. as rising and then falling, thus uniting in itself elevation and depression,[1] which was appropriately represented by the sign ˄ or ˆ, and designated by the term *περισπώμενος* (also *συνημμένος* and *κεκλασμένος* or *περικεκλασμένος*. Consequently it stands (1) not on a syllable merely lengthened by position, but only on one long by nature, because only such an one is capable of protraction and of a preponderance; (2) not on the antepenultimate (because the two following syllables completely balance the elevation), but only one of the last two; (3) also not on a long penultimate, when one equally long follows (because then again the depression forms the same equilibrium with the elevation as in the preceding case, and keeps the latter within bounds), but only when the following syllable is short, and thus gives the preponderance to the preceding, and gives to the accent full liberty to extend itself at pleasure, and thus, in a certain sense, to take a part of the depression into itself, as is wont to be done involuntarily in following the rhythmical impulse to fill up the measure and restore the equilibrium, e.g. *πρῶτος* = ⏑• ⏑, but *πρώτου* = ⏑⏑ (whereas *ἄλλος* is

his own faint, yet well-grounded doubts, nevertheless, without examining more carefully the correctness of the premise. Also the usual designation of the words in question as *ὀξύτονα* I must consider incorrect, and not justified by the fact that they appear at the close of the sentence. This position gives the accent a special force, and raises it thus to a high tone, but proves nothing as to the normal tone of the ultimate in connected discourse, any more than does in Hebrew the lengthening of a syllable in pause as to the normal quantity.

[1] This is also virtually confirmed by the fact that in cases of enclisis another accent may follow this one immediately in the same word, as *σῶμά μου, οἵός τε*.

rather a pure trochee, =); (4) on the last syllable only either when it is known or obscurely felt to be a syllable formed by the contraction of two into one, hence really etymologically composed of rise and fall, as is shown in the sign ^ (musically represented or), in which cases very early contractions have been retained in the feeling of the language (as, that of *-ῶν* from *-άων*, cf. Lat. *-árum*, found even in the Sanscrit), or when, as an inflection-ending, it receives special emphasis (a grave inflection-ending). Here belong, in the noun, in the 1st and 2d Decl., the terminations of the oblique cases of the genitive and dative, in distinction from those of the *casus recti*, which receive the simple grave tone (on which see p. 34, note): 1st Decl. *-ῆς*, *-ῇ* *-αῖν*, *-ῶν*, *-αῖς*, but *-ὴ*, *-ὰ* *-αὶ*, *-ὰς*; 2d decl. *-οῦ*, *-ῷ*, *-οῖν*, *-ῶν*, *-οῖς*, but *-ὼ*, *-οὶ*, *-οὺς*; Attic 2d Decl. *-ῷ* *-ῷν*, *-ῶν*, *-ῷς*, but *-ὼς*, *-ὼν*, *-ὼ* *-ῷ*, *-ὼς* (only the Gen. sing. *-ὼ* deviates from the rule); contracted forms of the 3d Decl. *-οῦς*, *-οῖ*, *-οῖν*, *-ῶν*, *-οῖς*, but *-ὼ* in the Nom. and Acc. sing. and dual.[1] Here are to be reckoned also some adverbial forms, which strictly, as in all languages, are similar oblique cases; not only those that are commonly counted among this class, in *-ῇ*, *-ῆς*, *-οῦ*, *-ῆ* for *-ῇ*, *-οῖ* (in names of places, as locative), as ἐξῆς, ὁμοῦ, εἰκῇ, but also, as I think, the most common adverbial ending *-ως*, when the final syllable is accented (cf. the Sanscrit adverbial endings *-ât* and *-ăsja*, the former ablative, the latter genitive of words in *-as* = *-ος*, from which *-ως*). So in the verb, the grave endings in the simple (shortened) stem of the 2d Aor. Inf. *-εῖν*, Subj. pass. *-ῶ*, *-ῇς*, etc., Imp. middle *-οῦ*, as also of the so-called 2d Fut. of

[1] These are commonly explained by the rules of contraction, and for the recusant Accusative *-ὼ* (instead of *-ῶ* from *-όα*) an arbitrary analogy, i.e. conformity to the Nom., is assumed. But by reference to the above general law of declensions the difficulty is solved without doing any violence. The difficult Vocative *οῖ*, found with the Nom. *ὼ* (whose diphthong also in Sanscrit undergoes a gunification, i.e. a diphthongification, of the *i* and *u* in the Voc. in *é*, *ó* = *ai*, au (eu)) has the circumflex probably on account of the diphthong (which, as being compound, is everywhere held to be longer than a simple long syllable, and accordingly can more easily draw the circumflex to itself), as *εῦ* from *εὺς* (in an open syllable, made such by the dropping of the final *s*).

the verbs in λ, μ, ν, ρ: -ῶ, -εῖς, etc., -εῖν, -ῶν, and of the so-called Attic Fut. -ιῶ, -ιεῖς, etc.; whose strong circumflex endings I would derive, not, with Buttmann, from contraction after the previous rejection of the *s* in the future, but from the weak or pure stem and an inflection peculiar to itself, and independent of that of the 1st Fut. (as of the 1st Aor.).[1] As to the cases in which this accent stands on monosyllables which seem to be neither contractions nor inflection-endings, the interrogatives πῶς, ποῖ, ποῦ, etc. are doubtless to be taken as case-endings, like the corresponding adverbial-endings; in other cases, the antithesis — as νῦν and the enclitic νυν — and other emphasis, or an effort to make up for the smallness of the word by a counter-weight, as πῦρ, μῦς, etc., may have led to it. Moreover it cannot but be that in final syllables or monosyllables which have also the downward slide the boundary between the two is often indistinct, and our present means of investigation allow us to come to no determinate result.

[1] The very similarity and close relation to one another of the 1st Aor. and 1st Fut. on the one hand, and the 2d Aor. and 2d Fut. on the other, and on the contrary the total difference of the formations on both sides, clearly shows that we have before us here two different modes of formation of the Pret. and Fut., which go independently alongside of each other. In the Aor. this is already acknowledged; but it is true also of the Fut. The one, 1st Aor. and 1st Fut., is formed by welding on the auxiliary verb *as* (*esse*) in the corresponding forms, as is now evident from the Sanscrit, and repeats itself in almost all languages. The other, 2d Aor. and 2d Fut., however, is formed from the pure stem in its simplest form with strong mode-endings; the former often with a reduplication in front (so in Sanscrit); the latter has no analogy in Sanscrit, but has it in Latin, and is plainly, in strictness, a Subjunctive (like the Lat. Fut. in the 3d and 4th Conj.), which, as is well known, is most closely related to the Future. That those strong endings with the circumflex however, cannot have arisen merely from contraction, is shown by the Inf. of the 2d Aor. act. -εῖν (Dor. -έν or -ῆν, with -εν, -ην in the Pres.), which can be derived from no conceivable contraction, and by the Imp. middle -οῦ, which at least does not conform to the rule of contraction, and points to an -έσο, consequently (as in -ὲ of the Imp. act. of many words, in -έσθαι of the Inf. middle, and -ὼν, -ὲις of the Part.) can be explained only by an independent tendency of the accent towards the formation-endings, i.e. a tendency lying in the character of the formation. Since, nevertheless, in the case of -εῖν there are in Ionic corresponding resolved forms, it is obvious how little reliance can be placed on this argument in the other cases.

ARTICLE II.

THE DIVINE AND HUMAN NATURES IN CHRIST.

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THE fundamental idea of Christianity is a deed, rather than a doctrine or a law. As a moral force it had its beginning in the faith of Abel. As a historic fact it began in that marvellous birth at Bethlehem, in which God revealed himself to men in man's nature. Any adequate philosophy of Christianity must, therefore, take into account this central fact. It must be able to construe it in all its modes and tenses; its logical and chronological relations; its vital forces, simple and compound, ethical and psychological. But who can thus compass this most stupendous work of God? Who can ascend to its sublime heights, or sound the depths of its wisdom and love?

When we propound the doctrine of man we have a single idea, an identical and finite organism, and in a department where consciousness helps us and experience gives us light. Even when God is our theme the subject, though illimitable, is homogeneous and a unit. But when we come to study the person of Christ our Lord, we pass from the simple to the complex, from the difficult elements of the problem to its more difficult solution. Ideas, not only distinct, but metaphysically opposite, the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative, — require to be conciliated in the most wonderful of all unities and agencies.

Just here comes the real "conflict of the ages." Upon this battle-field the contest between faith and false philosophy, reason and revelation, has been sharpest. More and more the opposing forces are drawn towards this centre, where all

[1] Concio ad Clerum; delivered at the Commencement of Yale College, July 26, 1864, on the text John i. 1–14.

for the church is to be won or lost. The deniers of miracle and of mystery array themselves more and more defiantly against this greatest of miracles and profoundest of mysteries. Never, perhaps, has the thinking world been more attracted to the founder of Christianity, as the problem of history as well as theology, than in the present age. Germany, that vast mental kaleidoscope, where beliefs and disbeliefs revolve and sparkle with the fascinations of genius; where the philosophies, atheistic and pantheistic, have been employed in coroners' inquests and reputed post-mortem examinations of the Christian religion, and in digging its grave; where the schools, serious and sardonic, have been intent on pulling down the kingdom of heaven, — the land of Luther, notwithstanding these adverse things, has yet, during the last half-century, produced a Christological literature rich in hermeneutical and historical research beyond that of almost any other age or nation.

But, in entering on my subject, I have the fullest conviction that, while the light elicited by these discussions is shining more directly than ever upon him whom we call Saviour and Lord, philosophy cannot interpret for us either him or his mission. Science cannot do it. The life of Christ must explain for us the mystery of his person; and only the peculiarity of his person is able to account for the peculiar facts of his life. *He himself is the key to himself*, and to the whole evangelic history, of which he is the central and controlling figure. Christ in the Bible, Christ in the church, is "the light he gives for us to see him by."

The complex idea of the God-man is made up of the separate ideas of God and man. These two factors bespeak, therefore, our careful examination. No essential element of either can be left out of the inquiry without disturbing the process, and no foreign one can be brought into it without prejudicing the result.

I. My first inquiry relates to the Divine Nature in Christ.

Let me in the outset free my subject from the incubus of a certain philosophic pre-supposition, that a conception of the

Infinite by the finite is impossible. It is an objection to this assumption, that it forecloses all inquiry, and at the starting-point gives speculative Atheism as the foregone conclusion. It banishes from the province of thought an idea, which, though it may be vague, is yet more positive than any other, and which has determined, and is determining more than all others, the great problems of philosophy and of faith, — the idea of the Infinite. By what force does that which is inconceivable rule thus absolutely, and mould our intellectual and religious processes? If God cannot be thought, how can he be revealed or known? And if he cannot be known, how can it be true that this is "eternal life" — to know God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent? We are brought by this supposition to the wail of universal orphanage that sweeps over Atheism and Pantheism as really as over the Christian faith. For if we cannot conceive of the Infinite to affirm his existence, we cannot to deny it, or to affirm that everything is God. If "the idea of personality," as the Pantheist asserts, "loses all significance beyond the province of the finite," so, for the same reason, does the idea of being or thing. Does the infinite baffle us here? It baffles us everywhere.

We cannot, it is true, comprehend the Absolute, but we can apprehend him. Incomprehensible and inconceivable are not synonomous. I cannot grasp Mont Blanc in my palms; but I can look on its towering summit from the distance. From its sunny vale and the surrounding peaks I can survey its rugged acclivities and drink in all its grand and glittering beauties. In like manner the infinite-divine is cognizable to the finite-human. For to know the Infinite is not to limit or measure him, but to distinguish him from all that is capable of limitation or measurement.

The significance of the term "Logos," or "the Word," must be sought in the drift of the Christian scriptures, of which the first verse of John's Gospel is an epitome: "In the beginning was the Word." But what is the beginning (*Ἐν ἀρχῇ*) here referred to? Was it the opening of the old dispensation or of the new? The commencement of the

material cosmos, or of the spiritual creations? It was neither. The Word was in the beginning of all these, and before them, and hence prior to all beginnings. He constituted no part of the creation, for he was its author: "All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made."

Every idea of pre-existence in regard to the divine in Christ which is not absolutely beginningless is shut out by this preliminary statement. It announ es the absolute eternity of the Word, and thus distinguishes him from all finite beings by an impassable abyss. He who was before all things and all time, must be "without beginning of days or end of years," the alpha and omega, the first and the last.

In the next clause of the same verse the apostle lifts the veil again from the divine nature, and shows this eternal word to be a *distinction* within that nature: "And the Word was with God." This distinction further on in the revelation opens into the *personality* of the Son of God, and gives to Christology the doctrine of the eternal sonship.

This idea of the Logos is older than Philo and Plato, of whom certain critics suppose the apostle borrowed it. Foregleams of the personal distinction in the Godhead appear in the creative fiat: "Let us make man in our image"; also in the theophanies of the Old Testament, as the germ of the incarnation in the New. It is more than the distinction of attribute and subject, of essence and ray. It lies deeper than any mere mode of manifestation or economy. It is a property of the divine nature, a mode of *being*, and a theologic ground of the incarnation and of all the economies. This Word was not a son by creation, as Adam was, nor ethically, by regeneration or adoption, as believers are; but he was *the* Son of the Highest by an immutable distinction in the divine nature — the only begotten, "whose goings forth have been of old," and to whom he saith: "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever."

In the correlative idea of Father, this inner distinction is brought out with equal explicitness. There is a veritable

and eternal fatherhood in the Divine, and a true sonship, of which all human paternities are only an image. Finite fathers and sons become such by a law of reproduction and self-distribution. But the infinite Father was always Father, was never sonless, nor the Son fatherless. The divine nature does not admit of reproduction and distribution, as does the human, or of becoming anything or otherwise than it was in eternity.

One sentence more lays open the full content of the term "Logos," as the Divine in Christ: "And the Word was God."

I will not stop to answer those who transpose the subject and the predicate, and read, "God was the Word"; or, because the predicate in the original is without the article, read, "And the Word was *a* God," — secondary and created. The laws of the language, New Testament and classic, are too unyielding for the purpose of such exegetes, and are now too well understood to require on this occasion a defensive exposition. For eighteen centuries the proem of this Gospel has served for the church the double purpose of a beacon, giving out its steady, guiding light in the darkness through which it has taken its way, and a breakwater, against which the waves of antitrinitarian error have been dashing in vain. The Word, which, as the Son of God, was in the beginning, and was eternally present with God, is also God: "This is the true God and eternal life." The Deity of the Word, implied in the statement of his eternity and personality, is affirmed in this culminating revelation, thus establishing, against heathenism and Judaism, the two fundamental Christian ideas of the Divine Being — *unity of nature* and *personal distinction.*

I take this distinction to be personal, because God has revealed it in forms of language and of action most unequivocally personal and concrete. The terms "Father" and "Son," sender and sent, knowing and known, loving and being loved, indicate interpersonal relations. So also do the pronouns employed in unfolding the distinction. All the modes of presenting it, and all the allusions to it, are strictly personal:

"I came forth from the Father, and the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that himself doeth"; "As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father"; "O Father, glorify thou me with thyself, with the glory that I had with thee before the world was"; "I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent me." Can this be a mere play upon words, an impersonation carried on with elaborate skill through the whole Christian revelation, and yet be most illusory and false just where it seems most real and true?

I do not claim that the idea of person has the same breadth of meaning in the divine nature as in the human, for that would give us three Gods, instead of the Triune. In the human, it includes the entire and separate entity. In the divine, it is restricted to a peculiar property, *within* the inseparable essence, by which each person is distinguished from the others. The persons are thus limited by the unity, while the unity is ineffably articulated by the persons.

This triune idea of God, to some purely speculative and occult, is in reality most practical and fully revealed. The plan of redemption is based upon it, and moves forward on it in the unity of historic order, and the sublimity of a majestic divine providence. It forms the deep, rich background, on which are laid, with infinite skill, the contrasting colors of fall and redemption, law and gospel, justice and love.

Drop now, for a moment, these ideas of the Deity and personality of the Word, and see into what difficulties, exegetical and historical, it will lead us. How will you, then, conciliate these significant scriptures: "God manifest in the flesh," when it was not the Father, but the Logos — Son, that "was made flesh"; "I and my Father are one," when he only who is Son by nature can, without blasphemy, assert himself identical with the Father? Where will you find the key to the divine side in the life of Christ, without which precisely that is missed which gives to it all its significance and value? How will you unlock its mystery of miracles, denied by the destructive critics, but explicable on no theory of legerdemain, naturalism, or delegated power? Why that

affluence of titles, and that opulence of divine ideas contained in them: "Lord of glory"; "Mighty God"; "God over all, blessed for ever"? Whence came that name, "Son," as a co-equal with the Father, in the formula of baptism and the benediction? Whence that exclusive claim to the most tender remembrance in the eucharistical supper, in which there is not a word about God, or an allusion to him, except as the Word which was with God "was God"? What is all this otherwise but a snare for the nations to entrap them in idolatry? How, too, can you explain that peculiar prerogative of Christ, in which lies the whole practical value of his mission — his right to forgive sin, and his call to the weary wayfarer: "Come unto me, and I will give you rest?" This was his calm and constant, but most bitterly contested claim, for in it he made himself "equal with God." His enemies rightly judged that God only can forgive sins. They said for this offence he ought to die, and on this ground based their accusation and joined the issue which ended in his crucifixion. Yet he did not bate a jot from the claim, but held it forth steadfastly to the end. It was verified to himself by the consciousness of his divinity, and to the world by the actuality of sins forgiven.

Thus the divine in Christ, by his explicit teachings, consists in the personality and Deity of the Word. These two fundamental points in the Christian system were given to the church by its founder as his own view of himself. For eighteen centuries they have lain in its deep heart as intuitions of faith, most practical and essential to the living unity and scriptural idea of God. "The economical and practical doctrine of the Trinity," says Neander, "constituted from the first the fundamental consciousness of the Christian church."

Two opposing theories, against which the church has defended these articles of its faith, require a brief notice — the Arian and the Sabellian. The one rules out the divinity of Christ, and is essentially deistic. The other denies his personality, and leans strongly to Pantheism.

According to the former, Christ is only a creature, finite and from nothing. Between him and the Godhead the distance is infinite, and no conceivable pre-existence can annihilate or diminish it. He knows not God or himself perfectly, and cannot be relied on as revealing either. The ethical sonship which the theory allows can give to a mere creature no title to be called God, or the Son of God; nor can it bring him into any essentially different relation to God from that in which believers stand to him. It is professedly in the interest of the divine Unity, and in opposition to the Trinity. But the unity which it maintains is ethnic, and not Christian. It is mathematical, not living and moral. It is a rigid, inarticulable uniformity of substance, shut out from the world and man by a remote and lofty absenteeism. Its boasted simplicity is fatal to its claim as a Christian doctrine; for it is simpler than the Trinity only as Deism is simpler than Christianity, as a merely human Saviour is simpler and feebler than our divine-human Lord and Christ. History, which in the long view is the best critic, pronounces it fluctuating and self-contradictory. Now, it presents Christ as a creature, and then, in deference to the scriptures, as a subcreator. Here, by its philosophy, he is from nothing; there, in its apologetics, he is a derivative God. Theoretically, it opens an impassable gulf between this creature and the Creator. In its evangelic moods it has tried to span the abyss, by throwing half way across it this created Saviour, allowed, in a kind of theologic strategy, as deutero-divine. In its mutations it has never taken any strong hold of a truly Christian consciousness, or for any length of time held a prominent place in the church. It comes in as a disturbing element when the faith-principle languishes, and speculation rules. It is cast out when faith revives and philosophy is baptized at the altar of Christian, instead of Deistic, science. Practically it lacks depth and power, because its Christ has no proper divinity.

The Sabellian view, by its denial of the personality of the Logos — Son, claims to be in the interests of the same Unity.

It allows a modal distinction in the Divine Being, as hidden and revealed, as silent and speaking, God *in* himself, and God *out* of himself, but not an immanent and real one. A favorite illustration of this distinction is, "Brahma sleeping, and Brahma waking," or actionless and active. Prior to his creative work God dwells in undisturbed silence, "sleeping on eternity." He is reasonless and motionless, without thought, consciousness, reflection, or memory. From the capacity of self-revelation in his waking hour came forth the Father, Son, and Spirit, with stars, suns, and trees as finite revealing *media*. By means of these, alike finite and instrumental, the Absolute dramatizes himself before himself on the plain of the finite. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as *dramatis personæ*, take the leading parts, and the stars, trees, flowers, and man, the subordinate. All are alike implemental, all equally finite and phenomenal. There is no difficulty in a trinity of such finite impersonations. Nor, on the same principle, is there in a multiplicity of them. But in thus reducing the Father and Son to finite, dramatic impersonations, the theory denies a truly divine in Christ, and leans towards Deism. And in affirming these impersonations to be outgoings of the Absolute, and therefore one in essence with it, it runs in the opposite direction into Pantheism — the identity of God and the world — as its logical climax. The scheme, in this latter phase, shows an extraordinary boldness of speculative adventure, and an immense generalization. Its pathway down the ages lies through the Pagan polytheisms of the pre-Christian period and the insurrectionary philosophies and disbeliefs of later times. In some of its recent Germanic forms it exhibits great metaphysic subtilty and dialectic skill, and, as a system of mental gymnastics, is not without its use. But for a specific and permanent incarnation, in either aspect, Sabellianism has no need, and allows no room. The Logos, at best, is only a spark of divinity magically finited, and the incarnation its temporary twinkle on the Judean hills, when it throws off its shadowy human, and falls back into its native abyss of substance and silence.

Dorner calls it "the medium between Deism and Pantheism, dazzling but shallow."

The doctrine of the Bible and the church stands between these errors, in the truths which they both affirm and deny, with none of their self-contradictions or vacillations. It neither reduces the unity of God to a dead uniformity, nor confounds him with man and the universe. There is identity of substance, and also personal distinction. The Being is one, the persons three, and without contradiction or confusion. The one Being is not three beings, but one; nor are the three persons one person in the same sense that they are three. The Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Spirit, nor the Spirit the Father, yet each is God, and together make up the eternal self-consciousness and blessedness of the absolute Divine.

The problem of the divine and human in Christ falls back, therefore, for solution upon the prior problem of the divine. The one was not and could not be scientifically solved until the other had been. The Incarnation of God, and the Trinity stand or fall together. A doctrine which is most metaphysical is here seen to hold the closest connection with the great fundamental and practical fact in Christianity. The tri-personal unity finds its most luminous revelation and proof in the incarnation of God; and the church now holds and has ever held it in this vital form, through its faith in a veritable divine-human Saviour.

Eighteen centuries of critical discussion, believing, unbelieving, and disbelieving, have made it evident that there is no escape from a deistic humanitarianism on the one hand, or a nebulous pantheism on the other, except in the Christian conception of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. All movement from this central idea is towards one or the other of these anti-Christian extremes. In all the Christian ages this has stood between a dead Judaism and a deader heathenism; between a sciolistic naturalism and a theosophic spiritism; between the positive philosophies and the negative; the "broad churches" and the narrow. It has repeatedly fought

with, and conquered, them all, and is advancing, through agonisms and antagonisms, to a final victory.[1]

The defence of the Trinity, as the basis of incarnation, has served the double purpose to the church of sharpening its intellect, of ripening and enriching its practical judgment, and of making it acquainted with the self-repeating and contradictory nature of all fundamental errors. The very heresies against which it has maintained the divinity of Christ have been often overruled as wholesome retarding or accelerating forces, by the emphasis of some half-truth which the decline of church-life was suffering to escape, or was leaving in the background, and which it has been thus roused to seize anew, and incorporate into the unities and vitalities of the system. In her successive contests, the church has taken a manlier grasp of just the weapons by which her enemies are sure to be won over to this truth, or to be worsted. More and more she lays hold on a power which is appropriating to its sublime ends all the advancements in art, science, and philosophy, which draws truth from all departments, freshly and livingly, to the divine in Christ, as the source and centre of all.

II. I pass now to the second part of my subject — the human nature of Christ — contained in the term "flesh."

In its restricted use σάρξ, translated flesh, denotes one of the constituents of the bodily organization. But in a comprehensive biblical sense it expresses sometimes the condition of the race as depraved, and sometimes the rational and

[1] "It is becoming ever more universally discerned that all the essential determinations of the conception of God must be settled in the light and under the influence of the doctrine of the Trinity. So also is the conviction becoming every day more general that, for Christology, the matter of prime consequence is to conceive the divine in Christ in the absolute, the highest, that is, in the personal form, and that the divine in Christ is to be distinguished both from the divine in the world and the divine in believers." "We can affirm that the pantheistic, no less than the deistic, contradiction to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity has been, as to principle, overcome for the evangelical church." — History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. By Dr. J. A. Dorner. Vol. iii. pp. 229, 221.

corporeal natures conjoined. This last I understand to be its use in the text, to express *the entire humanity* of Christ, a true body and a reasonable soul.

That the human nature of Christ included a true body is so evident that few, except some of the old Gnostics, have ever denied it. But that he possessed a reasonable soul, a real and complete humanity, is a proposition that meets with more objection and dissent.

As rationality constitutes the essence of the human nature, the question is simply one of Christ's finite *rational* existence. And it is to be determined by his own testimony and that of the apostles, as we determined the question of his divine nature. What, then, is the testimony?

1. Jesus was the *son of Mary:*

He recognized her as his mother; not the mother of an abridged, but of a complete human nature. There is no intimation in the history that he was a soulless, half son, or she the mother of a mere shred or shell of humanity. That the conception was supernatural does not indicate that it was incomplete. The son of Mary, according to the evidence, was as completely human as the son of Elizabeth.

2. Jesus was the *son of man:*

This was his most familiar designation of himself. It is as "the son of man" that he "hath not where to lay his head," that he must "suffer many things and be put to death," and must finally "sit on the throne of his glory." This human sonship enters into his entire work as a mediator, and runs through his whole history.

It was the paradox of the two sonships conjoined, the human and divine, that so staggered the wise men of his time, who "by wisdom knew not God"; yet he fearlessly propounded it to friend and foe. He pushed it to the very front of his claims, and held it as essential to the explanation of his person, and the true idea of his work.

3. Jesus was a *man:*

The one Mediator between God and man is "the man Christ Jesus." "As by man came death, by man came also

the resurrection from the dead." "For, if through the offence of one, many be dead. much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many." The argument of the apostle, so clear and conclusive, rests on the fact that the humanity of the Mediator is identical with that of the race, that the second Adam, who conquers death, is of the same finite nature with the first Adam, by whom it came into the world. The work of redemption proceeds, logically and historically, upon this identity.

Now, is it possible that a soulless *form* of man can answer to the fulness of this testimony? Can it explain the completeness of the human in the life of Christ, and meet the exigencies of his mediatorial work? Have not the terms "man," and "son of man," a well-defined use to express a veritable and complete humanity? And would our Lord and his apostles turn them from this use in plain didactic discourse, thus misleading, for eighteen centuries, his studious and loving followers? Nor do I admit that their language is so ambiguous that we cannot know whether Jesus was a man in reality, or one only by a figure of speech. Christ was not a Delphic priest, nor are his teachings dark and Pythonic sayings. It was his avowed object to reveal himself so fully to the world that there should be no more doubt as to his humanity than in respect to his divinity. For this purpose his language is the fittest possible, — most simple, emphatic, and exact. It is a perfectly open vehicle of thought, in which the wealth of these divine ideas lies all uncovered. And when he proclaims himself the son of Mary and of man we must understand a real and finite humanity to make one part of his self-revelation, as from the term "God" and "Son of God," we do the true divinity to be another part.

The evidence of his humanity is not less explicit from the life of Christ than from this testimony — his growth, temptations, and sufferings. His physical nature, like that of other children, was immature at his birth. So also were his intellectual and moral powers. He was born as other children

are; and grew as they grow, in stature and strength, as well as in wisdom. He had a child's mind, as well as body. Both were symmetrical and beautifully perfect in every stage of his progress, through childhood on to ripe manhood. No violence was done to the human rationality by the divine. There were no ruptures in the development. Though it may have been preternaturally rapid, there was in it no forcing of the child's will, or of the man's. The wisdom in which, as man, he increased, was limited, yet it was sufficient in every emergency for the purpose of the divinity that shaped his ends.

He was also "tempted in all points like as we are," and "he learned obedience by the things that he suffered." But temptation, strictly speaking, is predicable only of the finite rationality. The purely divine is not temptable, either in the sense of enticement to sin or of learning obedience by suffering. Neither is the animal organism of man. It has no consciousness of law as a moral rule, or of love, and is incapable of either transgression or allurment to it. Duty is ethical and personal. So are temptation and sin. Hence, the temptations of our Lord to distrust his Father's care in the wilderness and the garden, to yield his purpose of sublime love, and submit to the ruling evil of the world, were genuine human experiences, in which his strong but tenderly sensitive nature was set upon by all the unrestrained powers of darkness. What else could they have been? And he saw, in these assaults, more clearly than any other man ever saw all the incentives to evil. He conceded their force; he felt them to his heart's core. But he withstood them all; he steadily confronted and defeated them all.

But how acute were his sufferings! "Now is my soul sorrowful." "My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death." "I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straightened till it be accomplished." But it was neither a superhuman nor a brute anguish that he endured. It must have been a sorrow of the intelligent, conscious spirit, either the human or the divine, that forced the cry "My

God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" and the prayer, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me." Which was it? What could it be, but that same πνεῦμα, the essence of human rationality, which from the cross he "yielded up," and breathed into the keeping of his Father? Could the infinite Spirit give up itself to itself; or breathe itself out of itself; or in any way be separated from itself? If not, these last words of the divine man, uttered in the agonies of the crucifixion, must stand as the culminating proof of his genuine and complete humanity.

The theory of divine sorrow, should it be admitted, makes nothing against this evidence of a veritable human nature and human sorrow. For if the divine in Christ could suffer, much more could the human. But the theory is not admitted. I do not find it in reason or revelation, in faith or any sound philosophy. It is not in the scriptures, explicitly or by implication, any more than it is that God hungered and ate, was weary and slept, was crucified and died. Nor is it a necessary deduction from the compassionate tenderness of the Divine Being. Yet it is maintained, "we are not to conclude that only the human can suffer," that "no pang can touch the divine nature." We speak of God as displeased; and "this displeased state of course, is a painful state." [1]

[1] God in Christ. By Dr. Bushnell. In his late volume, "Christ and his Salvation," Dr. Bushnell advances to a more positive inculcation of the doctrine of divine sorrow. "Is there any sensibility in God," he asks, "that can suffer? Is he ever wrenched by suffering? Nothing is more certain. He would not be good, having evil in his dominions, without suffering, even according to his goodness." Then as his goodness is infinite, his sufferings also must be infinite, and this, too, from the first incoming of evil into his dominions. "His love sharpens into a pain when it looks upon evil." It "becomes an agony, in that it is a love to transgressors." Since the fall of the angels, it follows, then, that this agony has been unceasing, and must continue forever, in that God will be always looking on evil and transgressors. God's "dislikes, disgusts, indignations, etc. are mingling and commingling as cups of gall for the pure good feeling of his breast." "And here precisely is the stress of the cross." Nature had no power to "express this moral pain of God's heart, though the ancient providential history was trying vainly to elaborate the same. Nothing could ever express it but the physical suffering of Jesus." "Here is the precise relation of the agony of the cross." The burden, the mental and moral pain, of the cross is

But since suffering, as a painful state, implies mutability and dependence, we must conclude that it cannot touch the Immutable and Absolute, that the finite and dependent only are subject to it. Human anger may be painful, but God's displeasure, which is his disapprobation of evil, is not human. It is a painless element of his infinite holiness and blessedness, from which there can be neither subtraction nor diminution. Else his hatred of sin must be the occasion of an unmitigated misery, and the most holy, as being the most sensitive, would be the most unhappy. The theory has recently culminated in the impossibility of an unmingled divine happiness. "The highest enjoyment," says a late writer, "always involves an element of pain as the condition of its being," God's cup of felicity is not pure, but "is mingled with drops of bitterness." The God over all, blessed forever, is not, then, entirely happy. He is subject to evil. His felicity is marred by bitterness, through a necessity of his nature. The pain is organic and chronic, for which there is no relief. And, as a recommendation, it is claimed that this view brings us nearer to God, assures us more of his sympathy, and is adapted to soften the heart and lead us to repentance. It may be adapted to awaken our commiseration that God should suffer so much; but, as this pain is a condition of his "highest enjoyment," I see in it no element of conviction, or occasion for repentance. Even our pity finds some relief in the fact that this pain "does not obliterate" God's felicity. And as it is a condition of his highest enjoyment, there are no motives for us to remove or lesson it, if either were possible;

God's, the "wrenching" of the Deity, the "gall" in his breast; the physical suffering, the animal pain which gives it expression, this is man's. Although it is maintained that these agonies make many subtractions from the divine blessedness, it is not allowed that they cause any diminution of it, since God's consciousness of suffering brings with it a compensation, which fully repays the loss. The essential defect in this theory of Christ, is the exclusion of the rational human. Hence, as in all one-nature theories, comes the attempt to make the divine supply its place, and hence comes also the loss of a really God-man Redeemer. The doctrine of loss and gain may be appropriate to finite natures, but not, we think, to the Infinite.

> "Dare I say
> Creator, Thou art feebler than thy work;
> Thou art sadder than thy creature?"

In respect to God's sympathy, how does it appear that it is conditioned on his being subject to suffering any more than to sin? Strictly speaking, God has no sympathy, no fellow-feeling, with the wicked, and can have none—the All-holy with the unholy. How could the Crucified sympathize with his crucifiers; or feel other than moral disgust and repulsion? Yet precisely here, in this utter absence of sympathy with the wicked, is the marvel of God's mercy. It is the nature of love to desire to relieve suffering; but it does not follow that it must share, in order to relieve, it. It is not necessary to success in surgery that the operator should experience the pains of amputation, or in ministering to "a mind diseased" that we should become subject to the glooms of melancholy or the horrors of remorse. Moral and physical suffering in the human organism are not identical. The gout is not the same as a grief of heart, nor does the mind have the tooth-ache, the asthma, or a fever when the nerves report these ills to it. No more was the Divine in Christ necessarily cast into agony by the pains of the human nature with which it was united.

Would it not, on this theory, bring God nearer to us to suppose that he sinned as well as suffered with us? Would not this seem a still greater condescension? Oh no! you say, this would bring him too near, and make him too much like ourselves. So does the idea of divine bitterness, agonies, and pangs. It reduces the Absolute to the mutable and dependent, and imports a finite feebleness into the Omnipotent. It destroys God's self-consistency, and subtracts from his infinite blessedness. It shakes our faith in the stability of his government, to be told that he can have no pure and perfect joy that does not root itself in some deep sorrow; that his tranquility is disturbed, his nature wrenched by the evil which he permits; that he fluctuates from pleasure to pain, from blessedness to bitterness.

And what is the ethical necessity which demands this Apollinarian dogma? The reality of divine sympathy, which it is supposed cannot be realized through the sufferings of the human nature. But it is just this sympathy which the regenerate secure through Christ's human soul, which was made a perfect medium of communication through suffering, and more fully than would be possible through a mere body of opaque, passionless matter.[1] Through the refined, sympathetic, human intelligence of Jesus, God has the most perfect fellow-feeling everywhere with the strugglers after truth and holiness, humanizing thereby his love, and making it responsive to every pang they feel, and every prayer for help they utter, — a love not a whit less divine for coming to them through the victorious struggles of a complete and glorified human nature.

The exigencies of Christ's work, which required in him an example of virtue, also demand a full humanity. Matter can be wrought into exquisite forms and models of art, — has been divinely organized into the matchless beauty of the human body. But no art can make of it an example of virtue. Nor is the physical in man, the mere animal life, capable of the moral qualities indispensable to an example of truth and piety. All the elements of Christ's perfect character existed in matchless harmony and beauty in the Supreme before the incarnation. But they were no proper example for fallen man. They were unappreciable; too lofty and distant for his imitation. They needed to be brought down and softened, and made to live and breathe again in the very humanity from which they were lost. Then, a new moral power was added to the world's recovering influences, in him who thus became "the first-born among many brethren."

If, now, against all this evidence, external and internal, exegetical and historical, we must conclude that the finite-

[1] "Deitas autem nec absque corpore patiente passionem unquam admittit, nec absque anima dolente et perturbata, perturbationem et dolorem exhibet; neque absque mente anxia et orante anxia est aut orat." — Athanasius contra Apollinarium, p. 950.

rational was wanting in Jesus, what proof can we rely on that the same was not wanting in John and Paul, in Napoleon and Alexander? Did the consciousness of these men prove to them the completeness of their human nature? So did the consciousness of Jesus prove to him the completeness of his. Do their contemporaries bear testimony to their humanity? His bear an equally explicit testimony to his humanity. Were the apostles deceived in respect to his human nature? Why may they not have been in regard to his divine? And if *his* consciousness fails us here, and with it *their* testimony, in what can we trust? We are bewildered. First principles fail us. How can we be sure that we are not spectres, and that all around us is not spectral?

If God was not incarnate in a real humanity, in a living and rational Christ, but only in a soulless, empty body, — of all we feel or fear, hope or suffer, there was in him we take to our hearts as Redeemer and Friend absolutely nothing. Between him and me the chasm is infinite, and still unbridged. To the High and Lofty One there are no steps for my feet to ascend. Of my responsible, immortal human, the Son of God took nothing, felt nothing, touched nothing. My God he is, my Judge; but not my Mediator — the man Christ-Jesus.

In respect to the *origin* of our Lord's humanity, it has been explained sometimes by emanation, sometimes by immediate creation, but commonly by procreation, or derivation from the father of the race.

According to the first view the human soul is a particle of the divine, and in substance identical with it. This precludes the possibility of a special incarnation, and makes the human of Christ and of every other man, in its essence, one with the Divine. The view held by the mystic theologians is deeply tinged with this pantheistic error, and the entire system of the Swedish seer is constructed upon it; — "God is very man," "the only man," and is virtually incarnate in every human being. As to his inner life, every man is God; and as to his external, he is a form in which God finites himself, and through which he sees, thinks, and acts.

A few in almost every period have been attracted by this unitary philosophy, as an improvement upon Christian theism. They fancy it more spiritual and profound, while the history of human opinions shows it to be just the opposite. It seems to them warmer, to bring them nearer to God, and to make them pneumatic and divine. Sometimes it produces of its votaries, seers and revelators, and now and then a new Christ, a new Comforter, or a "new church." It projects its wishes into the future, and calls them prophecy, and converts its desires into dogmas, and gives them out as gospels. Now, it mends up the old Bible, and now, makes a new one. Full of great expectations, it is always on the eve of anticipated triumph — of a glorious universality.

"It is necessary to my comfort," says one of this class, "that I should feel myself a part of God." "The difference between God and man," writes another, "is simply that between the greater and the less." A recent writer in one of our most popular quarterlies pronounces the theory of two natures in Christ "clumsy," affirming the divine and human to be one "identical nature," and man "God's brother by sameness of nature."

Here the theistic and pantheistic philosophies stand directly confronting each other. A distinction of nature, in kind and not in degree merely, between the divine and human, is a first principle of Christian theism, as its denial is of pantheism. Without this distinction, faith and worship are lost for man in the identity of the worshipper and the worshipped. "The ultimate struggle," says Amand Saintes, the acute biographer of Spinoza, is not between Christianity and philosophy, but between Christianity and Spinozism, its most inveterate antagonist.

The *creative* theory supposes the soul of Christ to be an immediate production out of nothing, which is, therefore, isolated from the Adamic race, except by a merely somatic link. No law of reproduction or continuity of rational existence connects him with the human species. He stands alone, entirely outside of the ethical and historical of the race.

The fallen creature is not in any sense, restored in him, but a new creation breaks upon the world. The model-man is not the lost image of God recovered, but a new mould is made, and impressions afterwards, in redemption, taken from that.

The common view, holding an organic unity of the race, and of Jesus with the race, by derivation from its common head, escapes this isolation of Christ, on the one hand, and the identity of the two natures on the other. It is not quite the creativeism of Hylary, nor the traducienism of Tertullian, but a combination of elements from them both. It rests on the divine testimony, confirmed by natural science, that God introduced the human family by immediate creation, and continues it by procreation. "God gives souls," says Augustine, "through the medium of natural descent." On this law, the species has a historical development, as well as natural unity. Humanity is neither a vast generic person nor a chaos of personalities, but a divinely articulated organism of distinct, responsible, and, if I may so express it, consanguineous souls. It is a human race and family, not atomic, nor automatic, but originally theocratic and theocentric. The miraculous conception of Jesus strikes down into, and works through, this law of natural descent. Mary was the mother of a complete human nature in her son, as really, though not in the same way, as God is the father of the entire divine nature in his Son. The manifest Divinity does not conflict with the evidence of the humanity. Each is established by its own separate and sufficient proof. Neither can be assumed as incompatible with the other, or unnecessary. "The author of our salvation," says Calvin, "is descended from Adam, the common parent of all." Luther taught that Christ took upon himself the full nature of man in its state of abasement, and under the condition of dying. And the new humanity which Christ introduced was not a new essence of nature, but a new moral status, an ethical, not a substantial re-creation.

Here a difficulty meets us which will introduce another

feature of Christ's humanity, namely, its sinlessness.[1] If his human nature was complete, and derived from fallen Adam, must he not have inherited with the infirmities of the nature its sinfulness also? It is, in part, to escape this difficulty that some assume for the human of Christ a newly created soul; and others, denying to him a human rationality, and allowing only a divine, turn the doctrine of Christ's sinlessness into the truism that God is not a sinner.

Starting from the same pre-supposition, the impossibility of a sinless birth in the sinful family of man, the pantheistic philosophers affirm a natural oppugnancy between the human and the divine in Christ. The human spirit "in its first form," "as finitely constituted," is natural and evil, "in discord with itself and with God." And as Christ took upon himself human finitude, he took this discord with it. "In his inner self," remarks Strauss, "which was God, he was sinless; but the historical appearance cannot have been pure." He could not "withdraw himself from the need of purification more than other men." Although the hinderances to good in his life were reduced to a vanishing medium, "his proximate sinlessness was only a sinfulness done away."

The life of Jesus has been twice written during the present century from this speculative point of view — thirty years ago by a stalwart German, and recently by a fantastic Frenchman. Each starts with the postulate of pantheism, — that the supernatural is unhistorical, and a miracle impossible. What can such men know of a person and a history of which miracle is the grand peculiarity? Testimony is nothing with them. Facts are nothing. Philosophy, fancy, is everthing. Yet both stirred the church to its centre, Romish and Protestant, calling out the ablest defenders. The latter drapes his deep hostility to the Christian faith in the rustling folds of a fascinating naturalism. He eulogizes Jesus as a beautiful young moralist, a genius, a hero; and then defames him as

[1] "Sed objicitis: Si omnia accepit, sane et humanas cogitationes habuit; impossibile autem est, humanis cogitationibus non inesse peccatum; quomodo igitur Christus absque peccato erit?" — Athanasius contra Apollinarium, p. 944.

a sombre giant and a deceiver, who accepted the Utopias of his time and race. He holds him up as a model that can never be replaced by a superior, yet declares his reasonings, tried by the logic of the Stagyrite, weak and insipid. "Time has changed the power of the great Founder," he says, in a simulated tearfulness, "into something very grievous to us; for when the worship of Jesus grows feeble in the heart of humanity, it will be because of the very acts which made men believe in him." Thus this French romancer kisses the world's great benefactor, and then betrays him into the hands of his enemies. He first crowns and then crucifies him; almost deifies, and then meanly assassinates, him whom the best adore and the purest love.

So inveterately hostile are all the phases of the one-substance philosophy to the sinlessness of Jesus, — a most vital point in the Christian faith, on which there can be neither surrender, concealment, nor compromise. It is this sinless human that distinguishes the Messiah from all other founders of religion and all other men, and that makes him the example of virtue which we need. Without this there could be no true sacrifice, no atonement. Only the just could suffer vicariously for the unjust. Hence the explicitness of the scriptures. It is as a logical necessity of Christianity that he was the "holy child," "the Holy One and the Just," "who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth," that he did always those things which pleased the Father, and was able to say "Which of you convinceth me of sin?"

No, finitude is not an evil, nor is sin a necessary quality of the finite. Holiness is man's normal state, the original law of his being. It is God's image in which he was finitely constituted. Sin is a rupture of his moral nature, a disorder, and a disaster. Therefore it was possible for God to take hold of the fallen nature without taking the fall. He who made that nature could mend it, could restore the broken image to its original coloring and beauty, and reset it in the same material frame.[1] Whether Jesus was unable to sin, or

1 "Nam si sol quem ille fecit et nos contuemur, dum in caelo volvitur, terres-

merely able not to sin, is a question on which some differ who are agreed that he did not sin. To say that he was able not to sin, and did not, is an inadequate statement. It is no more than was true of Adam before the fall. It expresses only the human side of his character. But taking into account the divine, as the dominating force, a moral inability to sin is essential to the whole truth. We may say he was able to sin if he willed to; but considering that his whole moral being was strongly set against it, and that it was the purpose of God to destroy sin in the world through sinlessness in him, we are obliged to say, in justice to his divine-human person, he could not will to sin. Yet not by physical restraint or force, but in the freedom of his holy nature, and in the bias of his whole being towards God. The inner man unfolded by a free, divine-human impulse, in spotless purity and perfect self-harmony — the affections with the appetites, the imagination with the reason, the will with the understanding.

From the very starting-point of Christ's existence, where the divine first touches the human germ, and bias to evil became possible, the stain of the fall was carefully warded off. In his entire human there was no defect or redundance. Rectification or amendment was not needed, and was impossible. Addition would have disfigured, and alteration marred it. The closer our approach to it in our devout contemplations, the more it draws and subdues us. Nearness, which dispels the enchantment that distance lends to most characters, enchains us to his. It is the most real and truest human life, the most pure, and most free, after no model, yet "the original of all time," the determining centre of all true humanity and the starting-point of moral progress. The loftiest aspirations can desire nothing more exalted to strive

tria corpora attingendo non maculatur, nec tenebris obscuratur, sed potius cuncta ipse illuminat et purgat; multo magis sanctissimum Dei Verbum solis effector et dominus, cum se in corpore cognoscendum praebebat, inde non inquinabatur; sed potius ipse corruptionis expers, corpori mortali vitam et munditiam conferebat, qui peccatum, inquit, non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore ejus."— Athanasius de Incarnatione Verbi Dei, p. 62.

after, nor does the humblest struggler in the conflicts of life need anything more sympathetic and tender. No pang of regret ever troubled him, and no prayer for pardon escaped him. How is this? Was that eye so clear to sin in others blind or blurred to it in himself, — that spirit, so sensitive to evil at the circumference, apathetic to it at the centre? Oh no! Jesus is the spotless and the holy; the world's tempted and sinless One, grappling with sin for, and in the place of, the sinner. He suffers evil, but in a way to subdue the prince of evil. In bearing sin, he destroys it. By yielding, he conquers; and in giving himself for the world, he saves it.

Thus the life of Jesus demonstrates his complete Adamic and his sinless humanity. Behold the man in whom virtue finds its unity and totality, and the world, the universal morality, august yet winning, breathing an eternal beauty, but refreshing to the faint and the feeblest. What a combination of work and worship, of self-denial and self-affirmation, — a teacher whose life is his doctrine, an example in which all duties, delights, and denials mingle in heavenly harmony! What is such a man? What can he be, but "the man Christ Jesus," "the Mediator between God and man"?

But the most difficult part of my subject remains to be considered. How do these two natures, the divine and human, stand related in Christ? In what sense was the Word made flesh in him?

The answer is more than intimated by the separate ideas of God and man which his life shows to be indispensable to his work and person. The Word was made flesh *by the vital union of the two natures in the one divine-human Christ and Saviour*. This union is not a speculation, or a philosophy of Christianity, but its accomplished and central fact. It is not a mode of explaining the incarnation, but the incarnation (ἐνσάρκωσις) itself, the personal and permanent entrance of God into the human nature for its redemption. So it stands in the evangelic narratives, and in the faith of the saints, broadly distinguished from diverse theories which have been

mistaken for it, but which it excludes from the category of Christian doctrine.

Let me allude to a few of these excluded theories.

1. The *identity* of the two natures. According to this view, the terms "human" and "divine," "God" and "man," are interchangeable and synonymous. It allows neither faith nor philosophy, for there can be no communion or relatedness where there is no distinction; and no possibility in what is identical of being made anything other than it is in its own unchangeable sameness.

2. The *conversion* of the divine nature into the human. For the Word to be made flesh, on this theory, is the same as for the divine nature, by transubstantiation, to become the human. "Jehovah became Jesus," says an essayist, writing in behalf of this transmutation dogma, "and is, therefore, the human soul." God fell away from his own infinite nature in the incarnation, and became finite. He is shut out from his attributes; his knowledge is obliterated, and all ability to re-acquire it lost; except through the bodily organs of the soulless Jesus, to which he is restricted.[1]

How preposterous the idea of such a fall of the Divine; such a disintegration and dissolution of the Infinite! Can the human mind even be so shut out from its faculties, and in such an absolute dependence on a merely physical organism? Has it no pure intellections, or exclusively intellectual functions? Do our thoughts never go farther nor faster than the powers of bodily locomotion carry them? And the reason, — does it get nothing from God, or concerning him of law, liberty, and immortality, except through sensation? Much less, then, can the limitless Divine mind be so rent from its attributes — the Godhead so cramped and imprisoned in the darkness and emptiness of man's mortal tenement. To what an orphanage would the universe be subjected in such a bereavement of its Ruler! The conception is gross and heathenish. It is a disturbance to all Christian

[1] "Nec divinitatis mutationem, sed humanitatis innovationem arbitrio suo effecit." — Athanasius contra Apollinarium, p. 943.

sensibilities, and it falls out from the circle of Christian thought, by the gravity of its essential error, almost as soon as it comes in.

3. The *transmutation* of the human into the divine. This is the converse of the explanation just referred to. Both are drawn out on the same pantheistic background, and are set aside by the same class of objections. In the exuberant rhetoric of his gratitude, Augustine exclaims, "God became man, that man might become God." But it is as impossible to change man into God as God into man. Finitude and creatural dependence are as indispensable to manhood as infinitude and independence are to the Godhead. God can create finite beings, but not an infinite one. He *is*, but is not created or capable of being created. Unless the infinite can produce another infinite, which is an absurdity, and could produce him out of the finite, the deification of the human in Christ is an absolute impossibility. What would such another God be but a fabricated deity, a finite Infinite?

Christ's human nature was, indeed, perfected by the action of the divine upon, and in it. It was glorified. But this was only its completeness, its perfection as human, not its deification or dissolution. The fire which separates the silver from the dross in the furnace, penetrates, pervades, and melts it, but does not change its metallic nature. The human soul is in the most vital connection, the most mysterious interaction with the body, impelling and regulating all its motions; but there is no conversion of matter into mind, nor the least approach to it. Faintly thus may be shadowed the influence of the divine upon the human in Christ. It takes hold of it, raises it up, unfolds, illumines, invigorates, and completes, but does not change its substance. It is human still, and must remain so forever, — God's idea of man realized in man's Redeemer.

4. The *mixture* of the two natures in a third nature, neither human nor divine.

As a theory of the divine-human in Christ, this encounters the objections which are fatal to all transmutation schemes.

A conversion of the divine into the human, or of the human into the divine, is no more within the limits of possibility than their entire change. God can as easily throw off his whole nature as half of it, and make an entire God out of a creature as a part of one.

The doctrine of degrees, discrete or simultaneous, employed by the pantheistic explainers of incarnation, is wholly incompatible with the Christian ideas of the God-man. For God cannot be more or less infinite. The Absolute does not admit of comparison, neither can man be more or less finite and created. The two natures can never approach and mingle in a third, which is neither one nor the other, though they can be united. The supposition allows to Christ no proper divinity or humanity. The divine Word is not a real person, but an impersonation. And the human being without rationality is equally *thing*-like and theatric. In the play of the parts it is represented as an external person, as Hamlet and Othello are in the plots of the great dramatist. But it is only a mask, behind which there is no true personal humanity or Divinity. Dorner says no doctrine of the person of Christ can be Christian, which teaches either the identity of the human and divine, the conversion of one into the other, or their commixture.

Turn now from these impracticable theories to the veritable facts in the case — to the human and divine as essentially distinct, and yet related natures. It is evident that there was in Christ one nature purely divine; it is equally evident that there was another as purely human. It is as certain, therefore, by the logic of facts, that there are two natures united in him as that one and one are two.

I cannot better present the union of these natures in Christ than by condensing the statement of it made by the Council at Chalcedon, A.D. 451. "We teach and confess one Lord Jesus Christ, perfect in Deity and perfect in humanity, very God and very man; consisting of reasonable soul and of flesh; of the same substance with the Father as to his Godhead, and of the same substance with us as to his manhood;

in two natures, unmixed, unconverted, undivided. The distinction of natures was never abolished, nor severed into two persons, but the peculiarities of each were preserved and combined into one person, who is the Lord Jesus Christ." This confession has great historic value, notwithstanding the partisan strifes out of and above which it rose. It is the voice of the church, modern and medieval, as well as primitive, and a witness to its doctrinal unity on this central point. It clearly distinguishes the true view from the speculative theories above referred to, and against which the church was early called, and is still called, to defend its faith. The later investigations have unfolded it in a more scientific exactness, and the life-processes of the church have wrought it out into a greater intellectual fulness and ethical richness. But they have introduced no new elements, nor let go either of these old and essential ones.

Are there difficulties in this idea of two natures in one person? There are greater ones in the Nestorian dogma of two natures and two persons, which gives to Christianity two Christs instead of one; and also in the hypothesis of one nature and one person. For if the one nature be the human, as the Socinians say, it leaves us only a finite and fallible Saviour. But if divine, according to the Apollinarians, we have no true God-man as Mediator in Christ, for "a Mediator is not a Mediator of one, but God is one." Difficulties are not, however, proof of error. They are found in some of the most obvious facts and fundamental truths, in the hypostatic union of matter and mind; in the divine existence without beginning, cause, or change, and in omnipotent, creative power. But Christian faith does not stumble at such difficulties; neither does philosophy. The conception of a divine-human Saviour rests for support on history and divine testimony. For the work of mediation, of sacrifice, and salvation by sacrifice, it is perfectly congruous with all we know of the character of God, and the nature and needs of man. Nay, it is the condition and archetype of reconciliation and redemption. It harmonizes justice and love, and is the centre-point of God's regal and paternal administration.

The old Lutheran formula, "the finite is capable of the infinite," contains a first principle of the incarnation and of redemption. Nor is it contradictory to that of the Reformed church — "the finite is incapable of the infinite." It is only the other side of the same great truth. The one looks towards the union of the two natures in Christ; the other, towards their essential distinction. The dualism maintained in the Reformed church preserved its Christology from the ubiquity-dogma, and the communication of attributes which marred the Lutheran, though it came into the peril of a merely mechanical or moral union. On the other hand, the Lutheran coalescence was a reaction from the Romish too great separation, — an extreme of that capability of the finite for the infinite which is indispensable to their union, and which must be maintained. The fall of the human nature did not destroy its substance, or any of its original susceptibility. It did not alter its essential, but only its ethical, relations to God. It is still conscious of dependence on the divine nature, and from a sense of inner discord, of self-schism, and separation from God, it feels the need of a reconciling and redeeming power. This shows it capable of a re-union with God, and of moral harmony with itself.

The finite is not, therefore, an evil — the moral antagonism of the infinite, but a good work of God. In its first form, the human was affiliated with the Divine, leaned upon it, loved it, and lived in the most intimate fellowship with it. It was its perfect picture, marred now, indeed, but not past the restorative power of the Master Artist.

Upon this condition of essential distinction and essential relatedness, the infinite Divine descends and dwells in and with the finite-human in Christ. He who was in the form of God "made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men." In stooping thus to take up the fallen human nature into the divine-human personality, the Son of God came into the form and condition of a servant. But in this humiliation (κένωσις) he did not lay off the divine essence. He did not

empty the Godhead of a single attribute, nor bereave it of a single regal prerogative, nor tarnish a ray of its glory. If the Divine was temporarily veiled, it was also most signally revealed in new lights and new relations.[1] It was seen taking up the whole human into itself, and reconciling it thereto, without making it superhuman, and without violence to its freedom. It was seen giving to the human the whole infinite-divine, completely atoned in Christ, without conversion, diminution, or limitation. The glorious result is the all-sufficient, theanthropic Redeemer, the Head and Representative of the redeemed. In him God is ever the hegeomonic, and ransomed man the free harmonic, answering in his whole nature to the most delicate touches of the Divine, as an unstrung Aeolian, retuned by the fingers of God and swept by his breath sends forth the mingled melodies of earth and heaven.

The key to this incarnating and redeeming work we must look for in the divine love. This is God's ethical nature. "God is love"; and love, like knowledge, is indefinitely communicable. Distribution does not divide, nor imparting, lessen it. It is the vinculum that connects the two natures in Christ; the mysterious bridge across the separating abyss, upon which the Divine passed over to the human in him, — the great unifying force of the moral world. While this love unites the two natures in the person of Christ, it makes the fullest revelation of God, and raises up, and secures a realization of, the true greatness of man. The sensibility and fulness of feminine grace, a feature of Christianity which Romanism recognizes, but mars, in Mariolatry, is blended in Jesus with the grandeur of heroic and perfected manhood. Divinely tender and charitable in his feelings, he was discriminatingly exact in his moral judgments. Profound in his teachings,

[1] "*Se ipsum exinanivit.* Inanitio haec eadem est cum humiliatione, de qua postea videbimus. . . . . Non potuit quidem Christus abdicare se Divinitate; sed eam ad tempus occultam tenuit, ne appareret sub carnis infirmitate. Itaque gloriam suam non minuendo, sed supprimendo, in conspectu hominum deposuit." — Calvin's Commentary, In Epistolae Pauli ad Philippenses, Cap. ii. 7.

he was simple in his language as a child, while laying the foundations of a universal spiritual empire.

There is a deep mystery in this doctrine of Christ. We cannot explain it, but it harmonizes and explains everything in the life of the God-man, — the two-fold attributes which are ascribed to him, and the mixed elements in his activities, the supernatural in his miracles, and the natural in his human growth. As he increased in stature and wisdom, the fact of God's incarnation in him became more and more manifest to the world, his Messianic character became more complete, and his consciousness of the divinity within him, more distinct and full. Growing thus, thirty years, in a divine-human thoughtfulness and silence, he waited for his work till his strength and his hour were fully come. Then went he forth upon the world's great battle-field, to suffering, death, and to victory.

But as when fire melts iron it permeates every part, yet is not melted, and when heated iron is under the hammer the fire is not hammered, but the hot iron, so in the personal experiences of this conflict, the Divine was in the closest oneness of sympathy and support with the human; but it was not thrown into pangs by the human suffering, with which it was ineffably connected. In the evangelic narrative, hunger and thirst, as well as suffering and death, are affirmed of the divine-human person, but are predicable only of the human. Miracles are also by the same law ascribed to him. He turned water into wine, spake the tempestuous sea into a calm, and raised the dead. But these are the prerogatives and acts only of the divine nature. The attributes and possibilities of the two natures are united in the one personal Mediator without being mixed or commuted. If the finite infirmities of the human appear in the life and death of the mysterious person, so also does the infinite strength of the divine. We say, he was troubled, and so he was; but he was also untroubled as a sea of love. Did he shrink from the cup of vicarious sorrow? And yet, he did not shrink, but drank it all, affirming: "For this cause came

I into the world." God forsakes him, and yet is near and within him. He expires, and is "alive forevermore."

Such, my brethren, is the Christ whom we are called to preach; the faith once delivered to the saints which we are set to defend; not God alone in Christ, nor man, but the completeness of both in his divine-human person, and in the church which is his body. How accordant with infinite wisdom in redemption, that the idea of man, begun in Adam, but cut short of realization by sin, should be thus completed in Christ as the second Adam; that the fallen humanity should find its archetypal at-one-ment with the divinity, in this personal union! How sublime that faith of the church which grasps, as its magnetic centre and Saviour, one who stands in the complete nature of the sinful subject and the righteous Sovereign! How grand, in the march of the ages, the preparation for his advent, and how timely also in the slow but sure haste of providence, when all the philosophies of men and the economies of God had demonstrated the world's great need of him! And the future, too, how bright is it in the power and presence with his church of a risen and reigning Saviour! — bright in the progress of the arts and sciences, of civilization and literature, the tardy though sure followers after the Man of Calvary; bright in the militant hosts on earth, and the countless companies yet to be redeemed; — all, the achievement of the Word made flesh — "the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth!"

ARTICLE III.

THE ART OF CONVERSATION.

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If things are to be valued according to their use, very few arts are to be more diligently sought or desired than the art of conversing well. Speech is the distinguishing faculty of man; it is the utterance of reason; and it is the medium by which reason imparts her light and increases it. Adequately to communicate our thoughts is a most important faculty, and in constant demand. The art of agreeable conversation renders a man very pleasing, and helps him forward in life; it is the channel, too, of doing good. Other arts may be of rare application, but there is a constant demand for the faculties of the man whose conversable powers are like a torch in a dark cell, which, if it reveals some deformity, puts the darkness to flight.

There is such a thing as perfection in this line, and it is likely a perfection that has never yet been seen. The sweetest rose formed by nature may have been blown; the brightest sun may have imparted his beams; but it is likely the best talker remains yet to be born. When we look around the world we find very few attain the highest or even a remarkable excellence. There are croakers, and grumblers, and dumbfounders, and murmurers, and groaners, and brawlers, and weepers, but very few real talkers. It requires a combination of gifts, each one in their separation rather rare: wit, wisdom, reading, memory, promptness, confidence, modesty, fertility of resources, and felicity in using them. We must have a confidence in ourselves and a respect for our company, and all these improved by cultivation and practice. Men are often good in one line: some tell stories well, but they tell too many; some repeat their good things too often; some are too severe, too proud, too ill-

natured; and some too yielding. Some are too egotistical, and some usurp all the talk to themselves; for as the surface of a flower-garden amidst its bed of verdure and beauty must have walks of barren gravel, so a good converser must have his intervals of silence, and become an animated listener while he permits others to speak.

An art so delightful, and yet so seldom learned, may receive a few assisting observations.

Let us consider, first, the nature of conversation; secondly, how acquired, and thirdly, its principal faults and imperfections.

First, then, conversation has several distinct parts, of which the principal are, small talk, discussion, anecdotes or telling stories, telling news, especially bad news, flattery, apophthegm and repartee, and, lastly, religious conversation.

To begin, then, with small talk, very necessary to a small creature like man, and very useful when it cements friendship and leads to something better. Though the Saviour says, "for every idle word we speak we must give an account in the day of judgment," yet there is some small talk that is not to come into the definition of idle words, for it is sanctioned by the permission of scripture itself. It is natural, and almost necessary to our social intercourse. We are told (2 John 10): "If there come any unto you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into your house, neither bid him God speed." God speed! A remarkable expression; the current mode of salutation. The original signifies health to you; may you enjoy your health. So the apostles also began their epistles by the common mode of salutation, showing that their high mission did not impair their politeness. When Moses met his father-in-law in the wilderness, *they asked each other of their welfare*, and it was not until they came into the tent that Moses told his father-in-law *all that the Lord had done unto Pharaoh* (Ex. xviii. 7, 8). These practices are founded in nature; we follow them to this day. When we meet each other in the street we are in haste to tell each other what each must have known before: It is a

fine day; it is very cold; it is a dry time; it is a warm summer; how the canker-worms disfigure the trees; the philosophy of all which is, I will say something to which you must agree; I will not have a dispute with you in the outset; and if a person depart from these conventional rules he appears abrupt. It is said when Dr. Alexander passed through New England in the beginning of this century, he called on Dr. Strong of Hartford, who, before he had hardly shut the door, said to his guest: "Dr. Alexander, what is the origin of evil?" Dr. Alexander's reply was: "Is it necessary for us to begin there? Or is *that* the first thing?" Small talk is like the cement that binds the bricks together, or it is like the leaves on the tree, which indicate the vegetable life which gives ripeness to the fruit. It is the side path that leads to the main road. I pity the man that has no small talk; and I pity him still more that has nothing better. A bat makes a miserable bird, because he can never fly higher than his own level on his wicker wing.[1]

But discussion is an important ingredient in conversation; and by discussion I mean not the debates of the schools, but the discussion of the parlor. Some people conceive an everlasting opposition between politeness and earnest discussion. Politeness consists, they think, in always saying, Yes, yes, to your opponent; always agreeing to the proposed opinion, however absurd or unlimited. Thus, if a man in company should say that the moon is made of green cheese, you must reply, according to some: "Why, yes sir, there is a great deal in what you say; your opinion is very plausible, I am sure; I have seen the moon look like a skim-milk cheese, with a half circle dug out of the centre. Appearances are wholly in your favor." This opposition between politeness and discussion is wholly imaginary. It is one of the greatest arts in conversation to contradict without offence. This was the great skill of Socrates. When he seemed most to agree with a companion there was no knowing where he was coming

[1] Aeneid, Book vii. line 478 (Dryden's translation).

out. He often either contradicted him at last, or made him contradict himself.

Discussion is a most delightful mode of conversation, if the company are *up to it*, and the more earnest the better. Then you drop the mask; then you lay bare the heart; then your opinions, like the pebbles on the shore, under the action of the advancing or receding wave, are worn into smoothness and polished into beauty. Then mind meets mind, and your most sober conclusions are brought into sympathy with all mankind. You are improved for the moment, and you carry your improvement into the solitude of reflection. It is a stimulus to memory, and you cannot take up a book without feeling the influence of free discussion.

What a beautiful description has Rousseau given of the conversation in Paris. "Their conversation," says he, "consists neither in dissertation or epigram; they reason without argumentation; they have pleasantry without punning; they associate with skill, genius and reason, maxims and flashes of wit, sharp satire and severe morality. They run through all subjects, that each one may have something to say; they exhaust no subject, for fear of tiring their hearer; they propose their themes casually; they treat them rapidly, and precision leads to elegance. Each one delivers his opinion and supports it briefly; no one attacks with heat that of another, nor defends obstinately his own; they examine in order to enlighten, and stop before it becomes a dispute. Each is both instructed and amused, and all are pleased; even the sage himself bears away recollections worthy of his meditation in the silence of retreat." [1] Now as the French are the best conversers in the world, and Rousseau one of the best witnesses both of their beauties and defects, we may regard this description as a compendious portrait of what parlor discussion should be.

It is sad to think how few, even of educated men, are qualified for agreeable and profitable discussion. It is not every red cow that gives good milk; and the fault is not

[1] New Heloise, vol. ii. pp. 95, 96.

so much in want of ability, as of frankness, openness, sincerity, superiority to egotism and care of reputation — that *abandon* which the critic of the stage speaks of, which is the best preparation for excellence either in public or private speaking. Give me the man that is not passion's slave, and I will not only wear him in my heart of hearts, but I will welcome him to my room; and what delight can be greater than such a circle? I have sometimes thought that hearing a consummate orator is one of the greatest pleasures of our sublunary life. But no — I recant — I recall the opinion. There is one still greater: it is the evening when you sit up till three o'clock in the morning, sometimes jumping up from your chair, sometimes sitting down again; winding your pocket handkerchief around your knees — tying your legs together; knocking your opponent's chair over, as well as his arguments; sometimes talking loud, and then in a subdued key — running through all the notes of the gamut; lost in some discussion, where the mortification and the triumph strangely meet to temper each other, and both combine to seal an advancement on your memory, whose light is to be extinguished only by closing the eye in death.

Telling the news is a frequent part of pleasant conversation. Every one has felt the pleasure of being the first to communicate some important tidings: you seemed to grow an inch taller in discharging your office. The best direction is, be simple and brief; do not keep your hearer too long in suspense. If your news is really important no language that you can invent can possibly adorn it. The shortest and simplest way of telling the story is always the best. Do not circulate false rumors; do not tell the news until you believe it to be true; do not add to the story; do not increase the miracle, nor color the adornments; be accurate as well as true, — tell the event just as it was. Do not first excite and then torture curiosity, like the nurse in Romeo and Juliet:

"*Juliet.* All this I knew before.
What says he of our marriage? What of that?

"*Nurse.* Lord how my head aches! what a head have I!
It beats as it would fall in twenty pieces.
My back o' t'other side — oh my back, my back!
Beshrew your heart for sending me about,
To catch my death with jaunting up and down.
"*Juliet.* I' faith, I'm sorry that thou art not well.
Sweet, sweet nurse, sweet nurse, tell me, what says my love?
"*Nurse.* Your love says, like an honest gentleman,
And a courteous, and a kind, and a handsome,
And, I warrant, a virtuous, — Where is your mother?"

So she tortures the curiosity of her mistress, and gives her an opportunity of showing her good-nature. Bad news must also be told. When you are the messenger of very painful tidings, what is the best method? After much reflection, I must conclude that the shortest and simplest way of communicating the facts is the best. Here nature and philosophy meet; here our last experience confirms our first practice. You have to impart to an affectionate mother the death of her son who was drowned at sea. How shall it be done? Nature teaches; art can add nothing more: "O lady, I have sad news to impart; your son, on such a day, fell from the yard, and was drowned. He has left us." This is the way in which they communicated things of old. So Homer (Iliad, xviii. 20, 21), when the tidings is brought to Achilles of Patroclus's death: "Patroclus is down; they are fighting around his naked corpse, and his armor is held by the plume-waving Hector." So the Romans when they lost the battle of Trasimenus. The people assembled in the Forum in the utmost agitation; the Pretor, M. Pomponius, announced: Pugna, inquit, magna victi sumus, (Livy xxii. sect. 7). A striking instance is found in British history. When General Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga, the rumor (very indefinite) one morning had reached the house of Commons. Every one was alert to hear, when Lord North arose slowly in his place, and with a solemn voice, said: "General Burgoyne and his whole army are prisoners to the Americans"; and a dead silence of several minutes followed. How different is this from the shuffling and equivocations in

which in modern times we disguise our defeats! The same method is sanctioned in the Bible. When Eli sat trembling for the ark of God, he heard the dreadful news: "And the messenger answered and said, Israel is fled before the Philistines; and there hath been a great slaughter among the people; and thy two sons Hophni and Phinehas are dead; and the ark of God is taken" (1 Sam. iv. 17). What condensed language; and every word laded with sorrow. No wonder that the effect followed: "And it came to pass when he made mention of the ark of God, that he fell from off the seat backward, by the side of the gate, and his neck break, and he died; for he was an old man and heavy; and he had judged Israel forty years."

Flattery is a form of conversation that sometimes emerges in our social circles. Some suppose that this kind of speech is always unchristian; that there are no occasions on which the voice of commendation ought to be heard. But I think we have examples of it in the Bible. How does Paul commend the Corinthians before he reproves them: "In everything ye are enriched by us in all utterance and in all knowledge; so that ye come behind in no gift." The truth is, flattery may be good in its place; and there is a place for it. It is a very bad kind of wisdom when it employs falsehood for its instrument, and is applied to deceive mankind. But suppose a very discouraged youth preaches in my pulpit: he is very low-spirited, and has the meanest estimate of his powers. May I not tell all the good things that appeared in his discourse; all that is commendable in his spirit, voice, and manner? May I not put the best construction on his defects, and reveal to his encouragement those capacities which need only to be exercised to ripen into use? There is another spot where a little flattery is useful — to temper reproof. We have a beautiful example in Cicero's Oration of Thanks to Caesar for the pardon of Marcellus. This oration has sometimes been quoted as an instance of the servility with which Cicero offered incense to the successful dictator. But surely such critics can never have read the whole speech with suf-

ficient care. How many counsels he suggests. What a future course he points out to the conqueror. What reproof he immingles with his highest praise! What a bed of roses he prepares for his pupil, with none of the thorns extracted; and how delicately does he suggest to him that the only lasting praise of his life is to be merited by deeds yet to be done. Certainly it required some courage to be such a flatterer as Cicero was before such a master; he seems to insinuate that the only lasting laurel was to be won by restoring freedom to Rome. If this praise did not make Caesar a patriot, it probably had some influence in preparing a victim. It was a condiment to his advice which *ought* to have made it more efficacious. There is a beautiful example of monitory complimenting in the closing lines of Dr. Young's first book of Night Thoughts. But we must explain a little. It is well known that Dr. Young and Pope were contemporaries. Pope had then just published his Essay on Man; and it is well known that, amidst all the fine ethics of that splendid essay, there is a wonderful absence of all religious motive. The doctrine of immortality is not once recognized; and Dr. Young, as a Christian divine, must have seen and lamented this significant omission. With these facts before us, may we not say that there is a delicate compliment mixed with a more delicate reproof contained in these splendid lines? After speaking of him who made Maeonides our own, that is, translated Homer, he proceeds,—

> "Man too he sung — immortal man I sing.
> . . . . . .
> O had he pressed his theme, pursued the track
> Which opens out of darkness into day;
> O had he mounted on his wing of fire,
> Soared where I sink, and sung immortal man, —
> How had he blessed mankind! and rescued me."

Sir James Mackintosh gives us a fine example in a remark on Southey: "These are the just and the beautiful reflections of a fine writer, who should have transplanted into his writings more of the benevolence of his nature and his life."

There are three cases, then, when flattery is allowable — at

least commendation: first, to discouraged youth; secondly, as a seasoning to reproof, to make it more efficacious; and thirdly, to promote general good-will. We say so many bad things behind each other's backs, that if we did not say some good things to each other's faces, the world would become a den of lions.[1]

Even self-praise is tolerated and forgiven when the exquisite manner of displaying it hides its deformity. A fine example is found in the closing lines of Pope's Rape of the Lock:

> "Not all the tresses that fair head can boast
> Shall raise such envy as the lock you lost;
> For, after all the murders of your eye,
> When, after millions slain, yourself shall die;
> When those fair suns shall set, as set they must,
> And all those tresses shall be laid in dust, —
> This lock the muse shall consecrate to fame,
> And midst the stars inscribe Belinda's name."

Not Belinda's name is inscribed amidst the stars, but the name of Belinda's poet, Alexander Pope. Homer, Virgil, and Cervantes have something of this manoeuvre.[2]

[1] After all, it must be confessed that our Saviour gives us some striking instances of the frustration of expected flattery. Take the example in John xiii. 39. After Peter had said he would lay down his life for his master, no doubt he expected that Jesus would pat him on his back, and commend his zeal and fidelity. But oh what a contrast was the reply! "Wilt thou lay down thy life for my sake? Verily, verily, I say unto thee, the cock shall not crow till thou hast denied me thrice."

[2] The instances Pope has copied are these: first, Homer's Iliad, Lib. vi. lines 357, 358, where the poet makes Helen say to Hector:

> Οἷσιν ἐπὶ Ζεὺς θῆκε κακὸν μόρον, ὡς καὶ ὀπίσσω
> Ἀνθρώποισι πελώμεθ' ἀοίδιμοι ἐσσομένοισιν.

which Cowper translates:

> "Whom the gods ordain
> Sad themes for song in ages yet to come."

Virgil in his fifth Eclogue has these lines:

> Tale tuum carmen nobis, divine poëta,
> Quale sopor fessis in gramine, quale per aestum
> Dulcis aquae saliente sitim restinguere rivo.

And Cervantes makes Cardenio say (see Don Quixote, Jarvis's translation, Vol. ii. Chap. iii.) that Don Quixote's character is so rare that "I much question

Apophthegms and repartees are sometimes important items in conversation. The wise man tells us that "a word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in pictures of silver." How often is it the case that a man throws his whole character into a single speech, as when Erasmus said: Non amo contentiosam veritatem; or when Caesar said, he had rather be the first man in a village than the second at Rome. What a beautiful testimony did the late Dr. Pierce of Brookline unconsciously give to his own bland and genial character, when he said that he was never insulted but once in his life, and that was by a drunken man. How completely did King William III. reveal his maxims of government, when, being told there was a man in England that was ready to die a martyr if he had a chance: "I am determined," said the king, "in my reign, he shall never have a chance." Or when Louis XIV. was pouring his victorious troops into Holland, and the Dutch were repeatedly defeated; the patriot king said: One thing we can do, and that is to die in the last ditch. The speech of John Adams when he returned from England, and learned, after the formation of the Constitution, that Washington was nominated for President, indicated both Washington's character and his own. He at first seemed a little disappointed that the warrior had overtopped the statesman; but finally recovering and consoling himself, said: "Well, Washington always knew how to keep his mouth shut." The shrewd farmer in Newbury made something of a characteristic speech. When the news of peace with Great Britain came in 1815, and the whole country was intoxicated with joy, he said, stroking his face: "I am glad of the peace; but I am sorry I sold my oats when I did." Here we learn two things: first, that oats were rising, and second, that the man's patriotism, being weak in its origin, was falling before the price. It is not unusual for a sharp saying to do more in a debate than a long argument (how much did his keen

whether, if one had a mind to dress up a fiction like it, any genius could be found capable of succeeding in it." The more incidental the remark, the more artful is the self-praise.

replies do for the late Dr. Beecher, whether in the private circle or on the platform); and if they concentrate truth they always make it more efficacious.

But I must hasten on to a more important theme — religious conversation. We have a deep conviction that among the possibilities of life and the gifts of God there is an ideal of excellence in religious conversation which has never been realized in fact since the days of Paul and of Christ. It is a treasure yet buried beneath the ground. It is a sea-moss of a more exquisite beauty than the ocean, with all its rollings, has ever yet cast up. Now, as in ancient Greece, the first thing in order to pave the way for improvement in statuary or architecture, was to seize those ideal forms of perfection which the artist was to approach as near as he could, so in religious conversation we must form some conception of what should be arrived at, and what we may hope to approach, if not to attain. It gleams before us like a fixed star, which wants nothing but approximation to blaze into a sun. You may say, to be sure, that religious conversation is a spontaneous emotion of the heart; it is the immediate voice of purified nature. True; but nature always needs direction. The fairest wind will not bring the vessel into port without a man at the helm. Think of Paul — who more spontaneous? And yet he tells the Corinthians: "being crafty, I caught you with guile." O holy craft! O honest guile! Multiply, O thou God of truth, in all thy children such blessed obliquity! Or, without the raptures of devotion, let us wish and pray that the highest impulse of benevolence may be under the direction of the severest wisdom.

The apostle illustrates the principle in his own case. We know little of his personal conduct, though it is fair to presume that he exemplified his own exhortation: "Let your speech be always with grace, seasoned with salt, that ye may know how to answer every man" (Col. iv. 6). But we know how he managed his public addresses. What could be more skilful? The fervor of his zeal never disturbed his knowledge of human nature. His address at Athens (Acts xvii.),

his plea before king Agrippa (Acts xxvi.), his first Epistle to the Corinthians, his Epistle to the Hebrews (if he be the author), are examples of the most exquisite address. Now I allow that some men are good talkers in public who are dumb in the private circle. But I suspect it was not so with Paul. I should like to know what that soldier that was chained to him in his own hired house at Rome said of him to his companions in after times. If he did not become a Christian, I can imagine him saying: "After all, that fanatic was a most remarkable man. I never saw such a prisoner before. Why he would talk even to me; and I had no need to watch him, for I was sure if I loosened the chain he would not run away."

The gaoler of Socrates was astonished at the conversation of his prisoner, and charmed with his serenity. I am *almost* sorry that the sacred writers, in the abundance of their materials, could afford to throw away the testimony of the sentinel who wore the social chain.

Religious conversation must not be insulated from all conversation; it ought to be a silent stream, winding through the meadow of life, flowing according to the inclination of the surface, and always ready to pause, or turn in any profitable direction. A Christian should always be civil, and always ready to improve a companion, without ostentation. In the society of worldly men he needs caution, and the direction of special grace. There is no impression among worldly people more common than that pious people are assuming, self-righteous, dictatorial, and think themselves a great deal better than the mass of mankind; in short they are apt to confound the Christian with the Pharisee; and hence they are watchful lest they should invade their pleasures, and usurp over them an unpermitted authority. The great object of the benevolent conversationist is to abate this suspicion and get around this obstruction. He must hear with patience, rebuke with meekness, be severe with gentleness, be fixed without dogmatism, and be a teacher even when he seems most to be a common disciple. He must try

to get rid of all formality and restraint, and must speak from the fulness of his own heart. We love to see a water-trough overflow. In all places and each society we must desire to carry with us a full head and a warm heart.

One of the most difficult tasks is administering consolation in scenes of deep distress. Nothing can be done at first. Grief must have time to exhaust its violence before the hour of help can come. The silence of a tear is better than the wisdom of any words. There is force in the example of Job's friends (however uncharitable they were afterwards), when they sat down with him on the ground seven days and seven nights, and none spake a word unto him; for they saw that his grief was very great (Job. ii. 13). But the calmer hour will come. As in a heated and laborious day to the most busy laborer who tills the soil, the descending sun brings the twilight, the hour of rest, but not of sleep — the sweet interval when neither noon-day toil nor midnight rest exercises or stupefies us; so to calamity comes the time of reflection; then the mind is attentive and the heart is tender; then is the time to speak; then the condition of the sufferer gives meaning to the provision of the gospel, and the mind can relish sober conversation; we must drop the balm of Gilead into the heart, and point to the great physician. The superiority of private talk over the declamation of the pulpit is, that in such a case, it can be better directed. You have only the individual before you; you understand his case; he can tell you all his sorrows and all his wants. The preacher must always address a class; you have the man and the hour; and it is a glorious, golden opportunity to show your skill, to honor your God, to raise a friend from depression, and perhaps to save a soul from death.

For this office some good men have been eminently prepared by their own experience. Our sorrows are the monitors that prepare us eminently for the work of consolation. They will not allow us to be formal; they show us the unspeakable value of sincerity and truth.

In religious conversation, one of the most disagreeable

parts is reproof. We are called upon by apostolic authority "to reprove, rebuke, and exhort, with all long-suffering and doctrine." Here the good man has occasion for all his skill; he may tinge the brim of the cup with a circle of honey, but he must not increase the sweetness until it destroys the force of his medicine. Yet there is a best way; there is a medium; there is a compound in which all the best ingredients meet. The fact that we are all sinners is a memento that we should look down on none. When Paul, who was a perfect gentleman, called the high priest "a whited wall," there was a reason for his extraordinary severity. Generally, reproof must be tempered by moderation. It must come at the right time and the right place, or as another apostle says: "And of some have compassion, making a difference; and others save with fear, pulling them out of the fire." It is my happiness to know a man who is himself an example of the greatest skill in this line, and who has the highest power of conversation, who on a certain occasion exemplified all I mean. It was in former times, when we rode in stages, and the driver, who was a ferocious looking fellow, was awfully profane in his language, and our friend determined to get outside of the carriage, take a part of the driver's seat, and administer to him a little friendly advice. He began by talking about his horses, which happened to be very fine ones; and our friend was no bad judge of horse-flesh. He inquired where they were raised, and how they were fed, and what was their price, and so proceeding from theme to theme, he won the fellow's esteem and confidence, until finally he touched on the subject, long-suspended and never lost sight of — the unhappy habits to which our occupation might lead us, the evils of the tongue. It was a most complete success. If it were merely fiction, I should say it was the means by which the man was converted to Christianity and never swore any more; and for aught I know it might be so; but I shall relate only what I know. The man received his admonition with apparent gratitude, and confessed the folly and sin of the practice; and our friend was rewarded at once

with the pleasure of a free conversation with a new acquaintance, and the consciousness of lodging in his memory a kind admonition never to be forgotten.

But, after all, there is a general ideal of religious conversation which we must strive to fill up; a common ground where all its excellences meet; a garden blooming with every flower, shaded by every tree, and watered by a confluence of all the crystal streams of social delight. A point

> "Where thought meets thought ere from the lips it part,
> And each warm wish springs mutual from the heart."

Such occasions do not wholly depend upon human volition. They turn up; they are gifts of a gracious Providence in a benignant hour. To their success all the compartments of felicity must concur, — intelligence, cultivation, civility, confidence in ourselves and each other, a clear head, a sound heart, a mixture of taste and utility, and a light which, like the coruscations of the northern sky, flames without burning, and flashes, but does not blind us with its excess. One reason why some parties waste their time at cards, or some other game, is their mental barrenness. They really have nothing to discuss; they are incapable of it. An intelligent Christian does not resign these things from self-denial; it is the last thing to think of. He is in pursuit of a nobler gratification. He can say without poetic exaggeration:

> "Cards were superfluous here, with all the tricks
> That idleness has ever yet contrived
> To fill the void of an unfurnished brain;
> To palliate dullness, and give time a shove —
> Time as he passes us has a dove's wing,
> Unsoiled, and swift, and of a silken sound."

We have thus endeavored to give some of the elements of conversation: first, the small talk, which, like cement in a tower, binds the more solid parts together; secondly, earnest discussion, the most difficult and the most happy attainment of cultivated life; thirdly, the more pleasing art of relating anecdotes, and of putting them in the right place, and, I may add here, not repeating them too often;

fourthly, relating the news and bringing bad tidings; fifthly, the power of an apophthegm and repartee; and, lastly, the luxury and improvement of a rightly-adjusted and well-sustained religious conversation. I will not pledge myself that these are *all* the parts of conversation; but these are specimens.

It is time now to say a word on the question how this divine art is to be acquired. It is unfortunate that at the best time of learning, it is hardest to receive the lesson. Youth is the best time; but youth is sensitive; youth is timorous and bashful. How often is it the case that in our first attempts to sustain our parts in the dialogue of society we go home abashed and confounded. We fly to solitude; we blush in midnight darkness; we cover our heads beneath the bedclothes; we sink into despair, and sadly suppose that our character is ruined forever. And, after all, what have you done? Have you violated the ten commandments? No; but perhaps you were in a party, and stooped suddenly down to pick up a lady's fan, and pitched over at her feet—it may be tore her dress, and set your own nose a bleeding; or the minister came to see you, and, in sitting closely around the tea-table, in handing him the cream-pitcher with a trembling hand, you turned the contents into his lap, on his silk vest, or his black pantaloons, and the whole table was in confusion; towels were brought; women screamed; chairs were shoved back; and you stood aghast, thinking, Oh if this earth would only open and swallow me up forever! But after all, my young friend, be comforted. All those squalls will blow over, and sunshine will come at last. I should not wonder if the very girl at whose feet you fell, and set your nose a bleeding, should marry you at last. Stranger things than that have happened in this strange world; at any rate, this is the discipline by which we sometimes learn to talk; and oftentimes the sensibilities from which we suffer so keenly become the very monitors by which we are prompted to excel. Who would give it away for clownish indifference? Who would barter a blushing modesty for a brazen face?

In order to learn this celestial art we must have a social disposition and a benevolent heart. We must recollect our Saviour's maxim: "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." We must try to furnish ourselves with abundance. We must have a storehouse, and keep it always full. Think what a wonderful power language is; what a long line of improvement it has gone through; what an implement of pleasure; what an image of reason; what a magical power of expressing all the shades of thought! Recollect the most happy expressions you have ever heard. It has not probably reached its consummation. We must be free also; we must lay aside that skittish prudence, that selfish economy, which leads a man, when going into company, to think only of his own reputation. We must be willing to learn as well as to teach, and mingle our silence with our vocal activity. We must consider the rôle which the great author of the drama of life intended us to fill. Though the general rule may be, not to be austere, yet if that is the shape of your nature, be so to a degree. Act well your part, and know what your part is; and shape the image of your conversation according to the wood or marble of which the original form was composed. You must learn principally from practice, accompanied with attention and observation, and aconstant desire to excel.

The last thing suggested was the faults of this social art. They are many; they are constantly occurring; we cannot even sketch them. One of the chief is nothingism, or rather barrenness; a company where there is neither wit nor wisdom; neither imagination nor reason, curiosity nor improvement; one of those parties where nothing was said which you would even wish to remember; where not only nonsense filled the time, but undelightful nonsense. Suppose a person were to point out to me a heap of stones and ask me, Is it handsome? No. Is it homely? No. Is it indifferent? No; it is hardly that. What is it? Why, it is nothing. Now there are a great many conversations that are like a heap of stones. They have just about as much beauty, and just about as

much taste; for if you touch your tongue to one of the stones it is neither bitter nor sweet. Avoid then this dismal barrenness. I need not say avoid scandal, and indeed all private character. Do not spend your time like a bevy of surgeons in a hospital, in dissecting the carcass of a murdered reputation. Do not even carry into company a dismal tone, a discontented accent. Speak at least with a cheerful voice; do not aim to say smart things; do not let your wit, like the pump of an artesian well, draw up its clay-colored water from a depth that no one ever sounded before or ever wishes to sound again. It is a sad misfortune to have the reputation of a wit. In all companies he meets the ghost of his own reputation. It makes the victim a force-pump to throw out the blackest water that ever flowed through society. I have often thought that Sidney Smith must have been an unhappy man. If I remember right Shuter, the famous comic-actor, was once serious, and went to hear Whitefield preach, and frequently conversed with him; and among other things, he alluded to this very thing, — the burden of being obliged in all companies to make them laugh. If a good man ever says a pleasant thing, it must be in company where there are no expectations. Pleasant things rise up in conversation like bubbles on a pure stream, winding beneath the shades, and free in its winding.

It is a great fault to talk too much. "Let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak," is a rule supported by divine authority. If you will put your hands up, you will find that you have two ears and but one tongue. And if you go into company and see three chairs arranged side by side and you take the middle one, and two ladies are seated beside you, one on your right hand and one on your left, you will find you have an ear for each of them, and you have but one tongue, while they together have two, and it would be very strange if both their tongues could not run, to say the least, as fast as your one. This seems to be an indication of Providence that you should be full as ready to hear as to speak. Do not, then, occupy the time that belongs to others.

Dr. Johnson was not a good *private* converser; he was only tolerable when in the chair of instruction. The same may be said of Coleridge. He never talked; he only preached. Do not go into society to soliloquize; do not be violent; do not attitudinize; do not be surly; do not wound any one's feelings; do not growl like a lion, nor chatter like a monkey. Never play the mimic, certainly not in general company. In a word, maintain your ease without letting down your dignity; be playful, but not vulgar; sweet, but not insipid; copious, but not overflowing; learned without pedantry, and serious without gloom. For the most opposite excellences do not imply by their combination an impossible perfection.

There are few people that touch the summit of excellence in the art of conversation. Just as among the swallows that fly around a steeple, it is only a part of the number that settle on the vane. Various reasons may be suggested for this. Men of copious minds do not always pour out their effusions in a crystal stream. Some are irritable, some sullen; some have lost their tongues over their folios; some are sensitive; some tremblingly alive to their own reputation, and hazard nothing without preparation. But one of the most common causes why a man of ability fails in conversation is a double surface to his heart and a double tone to his tongue. He is like a tree that gives its fading blossoms before its flourishing fruit. He talks from a superficial consciousness, that is, he rattles away without the least effort, pouring out his first thoughts in his first language. Goldsmith was an example. Everybody that had read his books, was disappointed when they heard him talk. It was said of him, "he wrote like an angel, and talked like a parrot." Some could not believe that he was the author of his own "Traveller." It was a wonder that a man could have been so wise and so silly. The phenomenon is easily accounted for: he went into company in his mental undress. His reputation as an able man was secure; he could not talk *that* away. Most of us are kept straight by a regard to our reputation. If we talk like fools we shall be treated like fools. But

Goldsmith had no trouble on that score. He was like an eminent beauty among the ladies, whose conversation is saved by her face. Webster had something like this. He delighted to whistle and talk like a boy. John Adams was another example. I have a strong impression, if, in the days of Queen Elizabeth, you could have overtaken the bard of Avon going up from Stratford to London, and could have heard his conversation, as he rode on his nag with his wife on a pillion behind him, had you not known by a previous introduction, you would never suspect you were in the presence of the immortal Shakespeare. How do you know this? I reply, I do not know. We have few traditions of the peculiarities and personalities of the great bard whose delineations of all other characters are so well known; and yet I never had a conviction so deeply rooted without positive proof as that Shakespeare did not talk up to his reputation. Why? First, the relaxed temper of his mind; secondly, the supreme carelessness of his best effusion; thirdly, the depths of his inner consciousness show that it must have had an outer rind; and, finally, analogy. We find many dramatic writers who have this superficial folly, which covers up and dares not indicate the thoughts it conceals. Sheridan was in some degree an example. How like a fool he acted in his convivial pleasantries. He hardly degenerated when he was drunk.

We have scanned our subject, leaping over many chasms. It is sad to reflect that, with such ideal excellence, the vast majority fall so far short. Only to think what conversation might be and what it is! We are told by Steele that Addison, though by no means a good converser in general company, was delightful in the society of a few of his select friends. He was then like the night-blooming cerues, pouring out his blossoms, which fell as fast as they opened. Tradition has preserved the memory of a sister of this unrivalled man, who was as remarkable for a woman as he was for a man. She had his wit, his virtue, and more extensive powers in conversation. She was twice married, and was the

delight of every circle in which she moved. Her distinguishing excellence was a kind of forbearing wit, which, while it could make the object of her satire supremely ridiculous, was yet governed by good-nature and pointed only to reformation. All this was found in her brother. But what a delightful woman she must have been! carrying wisdom, hilarity, and instruction into every circle she was called to enter. Such heroes have been found; such characters have illustrated the paths of private life. Excellent things have been spoken, which were never printed; leaves have trembled in the air, beautified the branches, mingled with the blossoms, discharged their office, and perished by the next autumnal frost, whose only fame was to rustle for a while on the ground.

It is a counterbalancing consolation to reflect that, if millions of envious, bitter, and idle words have been spoken, and have escaped forever from every record but the dreadful book of God's remembrance, we may call to mind the good things that have perished — the pearls that time has cast away, and no transcriber has collected. Let us think of the conversations of Addison's sister, and all the daughters of wisdom that have followed her example.[1]

[1] "Of the sisters of Addison two died young; the third, Dorothy, was first married to Dr. Satre, refugee French minister from Montpelier, who became a perbendary in Westminster, and afterwards to Daniel Combes, Esq. Swift has described her "as a kind of wit, and very like her brother." — Lucy Aikin.

ARTICLE IV.

THE PROVINCE OF IMAGINATION IN SACERD ORATORY.[1]

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THE specific nature and object of this Association seem to prescribe a theme having reference to oratory, and specially to the oratory of the pulpit. I propose to discuss, then, *the True Province of Imagination in Sacred Oratory*, whether, and how far, this faculty may be of use to the preacher.

As the word, however, is used of late with considerable latitude, it may be well first to define what I mean by imagination.

I understand, then, by this term, not the mere power which the mind possesses of forming images of absent material objects, which is, in reality, only memory in one of its forms, but rather the faculty of the ideal — the power of conceiving and representing under sensible forms the purely ideal. It is that which makes the difference between the copyist and the creator. It is that which lies at the foundation of all true art, whose legitimate office it is to carry us beyond the merely phenomenal, and place us in the presence of the real, the truly beautiful. It is that which in the well-known words of the poet:

> "bodies forth
> The form of things unknown."

"To imagine, in this high and true sense of the word," says Fleming, "is to realize the ideal, to make intelligible truths descend into the forms of sensible nature, to represent the invisible by the visible, the infinite by the finite. In this view of it, imagination may be regarded as the *differentia*

[1] An Address delivered before the Rhetorical Society of the Chicago Theological Seminary at its Anniversary in April 1865.

of man, — the distinctive mark which separates him, *a grege mutorum*. That the inferior animals have memory, and what has been called passive imagination, is proved by the fact that they dream — and that in this state the sensuous impressions made on them during their waking hours are reproduced. But they have no trace of that higher faculty and function which transcends the sphere of sense, and which out of elements supplied by things seen and temporal can create new objects, the contemplation of which lifts us to the infinite and the unseen, and gives us thoughts which wander through eternity." [1]

How far, now, is this faculty of the ideal admissible and of use in the pulpit? Such is the question before us — a question, I need not say, of practical importance to one entering the sacred ministry.

At the first glance one would say, the case is too plain to admit of hesitation. The faculties of the mind are all of use, and were intended by their Creator to be used; nor is there one among them which is not needed by the orator in the exercise of his art. The fact that among the instruments with which nature has furnished the mind we find this faculty, is in itself an argument in its favor; and unless reason can be shown to the contrary, it is fair to presume that it is legitimately at the service of the pulpit orator.

There are, however, those who would debar this faculty entirely from the pulpit as unworthy of the sacred office. It is the preacher's business, they tell us, to deal with facts, and not with fancies; with realities, and not with fictions and figments of the brain. They would rule out the ideal, therefore, as wholly at variance with the real.

This however is, I need hardly say, entirely a false view of the nature of the ideal. The ideal and the real are not opposites — are not necessarily at variance. The two are, on the contrary, in their highest range, one and the same. The material, the sensible, the tangible, are not the only realities, are not the highest and chiefest truths. There are facts, the

[1] Vocabulary of Philosophy.

grandest and most important, that lie beyond the range of sense. The whole realm of the spiritual, the very realm with which the preacher has to do, is in its very nature invisible, intangible, ideal, but none the less real. The philosophy unfortunately becoming prevalent of late, which comprises only the phenomenal, and ignores a cause; which recognizes only fixed and inexorable laws, and knows nothing of a lawgiver; to which nothing is a reality but the sensible and material universe and its forces, — this surely is not the philosophy of the Christian religion. Christianity rocognizes and has to do with something beyond and above the merely phenomenal and material — with the invisible and the spiritual. It deals with facts and realities; but its facts and realities are of this higher sort. To reject the ideal, then, as necessarily at variance with the real, is strangely to ignore the true nature, not of the ideal only, but of Christianity itself, and to shut out the latter from its highest and most legitimate sphere. The preacher has to do with realities; but so long as those realities pertain to the realm of the ideal and spiritual, and not to the realm of sense, the faculty of the ideal may well be of service to him in conceiving and presenting those realities. He has to do with facts; but it may well be that the clear apprehension and proper statement of those facts will call into requisition the faculty of ideal representation. It requires a certain degree of imagination to be able to state correctly the simplest historic fact, much more those great and peculiar facts which Christianity reveals.

It is objected to the use of the imagination in pulpit oratory, that it tends to an absurd and fanciful style, a redundancy of figures of speech, and the like serious defects. It is not, however, I suspect, to the imaginative faculty, but rather to the abuse, or even it may be to the entire absence and neglect, of that faculty, that these defects are really to be ascribed. A lively imagination, under the control and guidance of a correct taste, would be the surest preventive often of these very faults. It is not imagination, but the

want of imagination, that leads to the absurd mingling of metaphor that sometimes occurs in public speaking; as when, for example, a certain legislative orator, not long since, spoke of the wheels of government as blocked by *sharks*, which, like the locusts of Egypt, settled on every green thing. The imagination never perpetrates such blunders. That much abused faculty, had it existed to the extent of a grain of mustard-seed in that man, would forever have kept him from all such absurdity.

The orator is essentially an artist. His, the highest of all arts — the art of persuasion; and the highest of all oratory is that of the pulpit, as dealing with themes the most profound, and interests the most momentous. It were strange, surely, if this artist were denied the most potent instrument of his art, and of all art; if this orator were debarred the use of that which is, in all other cases, essential to the highest and most effective oratory. For in oratory, as in all art, it is mainly the ideal element that imparts the peculiar charm, nameless and indescribable, which distinguishes the productions of true genius.

Without discussing further the right of the pulpit orator to avail himself of this faculty, I proceed to mention certain specific advantages to be derived from its proper and legitimate use.

And first it is obvious that *the higher and bolder flights of oratory* are largely due to the faculty of the ideal. When in the full tide and tumult of excited feeling the orator, carried away by the impulse of the moment and the force of the argument, leaps at a bound over the limits of time and place, and summons the absent and the invisible, and even calls up the dead, to bear witness to his words, we have an illustration of the true power and province of imagination in oratory. An instance of this occurs in the Oration on the Crown, where Demosthenes suddenly appeals, in confirmation of what he is saying, to the illustrious dead who rushed into danger at Marathon, and those who stood side by side at Platea. Hardly less sublime than this apostrophe of the great Athe-

nian orator is the passage in which the apostle to the Gentiles, having named many persons illustrious for faith, by a bold and striking figure gathers these ancient heroes from the past as spectators of the present — a cloud of spiritual forms hovering over the race-course where the Christian runs for the prize of his high calling: "Seeing then that ye are encompassed with so great a *cloud of witnesses*." Bolder and more sublime than either is the remarkable passage in which Isaiah describes the descent of the monarch of Babylon to the realms of Sheol. From their shadowy thrones the kings and nations of antiquity rise to receive the coming stranger: "Hell from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming; it stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth; it hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations."

I can hardly forbear to add, from the oratory of the present day, a further illustration of the use and power of the imagination in the bolder flights of eloquence. When over the ruins of Fort Sumter the old historic flag was raised again, the orator,[1] inspired by the sublimity of the occasion, and conscious that he was uttering the sentiments of the nation, after charging upon the ambitious political leaders of the South the whole guilt of this war, thus proceeds to arraign them for retribution: "A day will come when God will reveal justice, and arraign at his bar these mighty miscreants, and then every orphan that their bloody war has made, and every widow that sits sorrowing, and every maimed and wounded sufferer, and every burdened heart in all the wide regions of this land, will rise up and come before the Lord, to lay upon these chief culprits of modern history their awful witness, and from a thousand battle-fields shall rise up armies of airy witnesses, who with the memory of their awful sufferings shall confront these miscreants with shrieks of fierce accusation, and every pale and starved prisoner shall raise his skinny hand in judgment. Blood shall call out for vengeance, and tears shall flow for justice, and grief shall

[1] Henry Ward Beecher, in 1865.

silently beckon, the heart smitten shall wail for justice, good men and angels will cry out: How long, O Lord, how long wilt thou not avenge? And then these guiltiest and most remorseless traitors, these high and cultured men with might and wisdom used for the destruction of their country, these most accursed and detested of all criminals, that have drenched a continent in needless blood, and moved the foundations of their times with hideous crimes and cruelty, caught up in black clouds full of voices of vengeance and lurid with punishment, shall be whirled aloft and plunged downward forever and ever in an endless retribution, while God shall say: Thus shall it be with all who betray their country; and all in heaven and upon earth will say, Amen."

Thus to summon at the bar of divine justice the authors of this great crime, and there to confront them with all those whom their cruel ambition has made desolate, and with the dead from a thousand battle-fields, while it is one of the boldest flights of oratory, is also a striking instance of the power of the ideal.

2. The orator is dependent on the imagination for *the power of clear and vivid description of absent objects.* This power is of great service to the orator. It enables him by the skilful touch of the artist to make his hearers, to all intents, spectators of events however remote, and scenes however distant, as at the waving of some magician's wand they start into life before us, and stand out with the distinctness of reality before our eyes. This is in no small degree the secret of effective oratory, and the hiding of its power. The tame and common-place speaker tells us that the thing occurred thus and thus; that the murderer entered by a dark passage, ascended the stairs, entered the chamber, dispatched his victim, and made his escape, passing down such a street; all which may be very true, but scarcely more impressive than to be told that the diameter of the earth's orbit is so many thousand miles. The true orator, by a few skilful touches, brings the whole scene before us — the victim, the approach of danger, the entrance, the blow, the escape of the

assassin. Under the handling of a Webster we do not so much hear or read, as *see*, these things transpiring before our own eyes. It is the imagination which enables the orator thus to seize upon the details, and impart reality to the picture.

A fine illustration of this occurs in the sermon of Horace Bushnell on Unconscious Influence, in which he has occasion to depict the effects which would follow the withdrawal of light from the earth. "Many," he tells us, "will be ready to think that light is a very tame and feeble instrument, because it is noiseless. An earthquake, for example, is to them a much more vigorous and effective agency. Hear how it comes thundering through the solid foundations of nature. It racks a whole continent. The noblest works of man, — cities, monuments, and temples, are in a moment levelled to the ground, or swallowed down the opening gulfs of fire. Little do they think that the light of every morning, the soft and genial and silent light, is an agent many times more powerful. But let the light of the morning cease, and return no more; let the hour of morning come and bring with it no dawn; the outcries of a horror-stricken world fill the air, and make, as it were, the darkness audible; the beasts go wild and frantic at the loss of the sun; the vegetable growths turn pale and die, and chill creeps on, and frosty winds begin to howl across the freezing earth; colder and yet colder is the night; the vital blood at length of all creatures stops congealed; down goes the frost toward the earth's centre; the heart of the sea is frozen; nay, the earthquakes are themselves frozen in under their fiery caverns. The very globe itself, too, and all the fellow planets that have lost their sun, are become mere balls of ice, swinging silent in the darkness." A mind less imaginative would never have conceived the idea of depicting the effect of continued darkness, or if it had attempted anything of the kind, would have been content with the general statement, that the earth would become uncomfortable to the inhabitants, and everything would freeze.

3. The imagination is of service to the orator by contributing to *the clear and forcible statement of truth.* It imparts definiteness of conception, and sharpness of outline to his own mental views, and what he thus sharply and definitely apprehends he is able the more clearly and forcibly to present to his hearers. Truths and arguments thus presented stand out in bold relief, and with stereoscopic distinctness on the field of vision, not mere flat surfaces, but with length, breadth, and thickness of their own, each casting a shadow.

This effect is produced sometimes by the suggestion of the most apt word or forcible expression. Much depends often on the choice of a single word. In a sermon on the Concealment of Sin, South speaks of the great and flourishing condition of some of the *topping* sinners of the world, and of the *remorseless rage* of conscience. Alluding to the fact that justice is represented as blind, he tells us that "therefore it finds out the sinner not with its eyes, but with its hands — not by seeing, but by striking."

Sometimes the effect is produced by a bold and startling metaphor, giving vividness and intensity to the expression, as a sudden flash in a dark night brings out the most distant objects, and lights up the whole horizon. Thus the same preacher speaks of the sinner's conscience as "hitting him in the teeth"; of the devil "spreading his wing" over the sinner, so as to keep him quiet in sin, and prevent his taking the alarm; of the covetous man as "greedier than the sea, and barrener than the shore"; of the perjured shop-keeper "who sits retailing away heaven and salvation for pence and half-pence, and seldom vends any commodity but he sells his soul with it, like brown paper, into the bargain."[1] The terrible earnestness and force of these expressions startle us. The sentences of such a writer are, like Ezekiel's vision, self-moving, and full of eyes round about. We pick our way among them cautiously, as past the cages of wild beasts in a menagerie, that glare at us as we go by, and seem ready to spring from behind their iron bars. The effect of a lively imagina-

[1] Sermon on Covetousness.

tion in giving intensity and vividness to the conceptions and utterances of the preacher is well illustrated in the description which Dr. Bushnell gives of the human passions, in the discourse on The Dignity of Human Nature shown from its Ruins: "Here, within the soul's gloomy chamber, the loosened passions rage and chafe, impatient of their law; here huddle on the wild and desultory thoughts; here the imagination crowds in shapes of glory and disgust, tokens both, and mockeries of its own creative power, no longer in the keeping of reason; here sits remorse, scowling and biting her chain; here creep out the fears, a meagre and pale multitude; here drives on the will in his chariot of war; here lie trampled the great aspirations, groaning in immortal thirst; here the blasted affections, weeping out their life in silent injury; all that you see without in the wars, revenges, and crazed religions of the world is faithfully represented in the appalling disorders of your own spirit."

How vividly is a simple truth presented under the following clear, and well-sustained metaphor. "They [the revolutionary movements of society] mark revolutions of the wheel of progress. In the dim and distant past the strokes of that wheel are heard only at vast intervals. Like the leap of Hesiod's horses of the gods, while making one bound, awful ages have past away. So of the car of social progress: the wheel strokes at first fall on the ear, solemn and slow, over the vast and twilight profound. But quickening with time, they grow more and more rapid as they approach, till at length they become undistinguishable, and sweep by us with the continuous rush of the steam-car, hurrying, storm-like, to its goal." [1]

One hundred years ago, along the aisles and arches of the venerable abbey where are gathered the ashes of England's most illustrious dead, and where from the walls look down the busts and statues of her statesmen, her warriors, her poets, a clear, sharp voice rang out, in tones which must have fallen with startling effect upon the courtly audience,

[1] Address of Dr. Post of St. Louis on National Regeneration.

the following sentences: "And therefore for a man to run headlong into the bottomless pit, while the eye of a seeing conscience assures him that it is bottomless and open, and all return from it desperate and impossible; while his ruin stares him in the face, and the sword of vengeance points directly at his heart, still to press on to the embraces of his sin, is a problem unresolvable upon any other ground, but that sin infatuates before it destroys. For Judas to receive and swallow the sop when his master gave it him seasoned with those terrible words, 'It had been good for that man if he had never been born,' surely this argued a furious appetite and a strong stomach, that could thus catch at a morsel with the fire and brimstone all flaming about it, and, as it were, digest death itself, and make a meal upon perdition."[1]

It is not, however, solely by the intensity and energy which it imparts to his conceptions that imagination contributes to the effectiveness of the orator. Quite as much is due, perhaps, to the purity of style and elevation of sentiment which it tends to produce. There is no one quality more favorable to clearness and purity of style, to that crystalline transparency that sets a thought in a frame-work of light, and makes it stand forth in its beauty like a star in the clear azure, than the faculty of the ideal. It has been said of Plato that his words must have grown into their places, so spontaneous do they seem, and so fitting. A recent English reviewer pronounces Milton's speech of Belial, in the debate of the fallen angels in Pandemonium, the greatest classical triumph, the highest achievement of the pure style, in English literature.

Of Shelley the same critic remarks that the rhythm of some modulating air seems to move his words into their places without an effort of the poet, and almost without his knowledge; while in the language of Wordsworth, on the other hand, we detect something of the taint of labor and of duty. As to elevation of sentiment, we all know how much it is in the power of a just and apt illustration to dignify, while it adorns, the subject treated, and thus to elevate the

[1] Sermon by South, on the Practice of Religion enforced by Reason.

mind of the hearer. A happy instance of this occurs in the oration of Webster on the completion of the Bunker Hill Monument, when by a simile at once apt and elegant he likens the character of Washington to the grand and solid shaft that stood before him: "his public principles as firm as the earth on which it stands; his personal motives as pure as the serene heaven in which its summit is lost." When speaking of the motives that led to the peopling of New England, the same orator says of the May Flower: "Like the dove from the ark, she had put forth only to find rest." "The stars which guided her were the unobscured constellations of civil and religious liberty. Her deck was the altar of the living God. Fervent prayers on bended knees mingled morning and evening with the voices of the ocean and the sighing of the wind in her shrouds." With what beauty and dignity do these simple images invest the theme.

When South tells us that the words of Jeremiah in the lamentions are like the noise of a breaking heart, and when he compares an ungrateful heart that is unmoved by acts of kindness, to a rock which, beaten continuously by the waves, still throws them back into the bosom of the sea that sent them, but is not at all moved by any of them, we know not whether the force or the beauty of the comparison is the more to be admired.

It may perhaps be thought that, while the imagination contributes somewhat to the vividness and force of the more ornate and rhetorical portions of discourse, the more solid, and especially the argumentative, portions derive their power from a different source. Yet, even in close and solid reasoning, the faculty of the ideal is not, I suspect, wholly without its use. An illustration, or an apt and striking metaphor, that shall embody and project an abstract truth or a general principle into concrete reality, is often the most effective form of argument, as every orator well knows. How forcibly is the essential incompatibility of liberty with slavery, and the folly of seeking to combine them in one and the same system of social order, set forth by one of our own most gifted minds

in the following metaphor: "We have thought to incorporate in our social and civil order, with eternal rights, human and divine, a vast wrong, most audaciously and flagrantly violative of both. We have thought to do this — to bind up the torch and magazine together; and that with the self-consciousness of the nineteenth century burning and kindling upon it. The explosion has filled land and seas with our ruin. And now, in the work of reconstruction, shall we take up the blazing timbers and attempt to rebuild them into the national structure? If so, we but labor in the very fire — we challenge fate. We build conflagration, explosion, ruin, into our architecture. Slavery — the sighs from her vast prison-house of past ages following her like a tempest — now stands before us, the confessed enemy of our national life, reaching hands for readmittance across the gulf of public ruin, and over the graves of half a generation. Shall we clasp those hands again, reeking with the blood of a million of our countrymen? A mighty army of melancholy heroic shadows forbid." [1]

Nothing contributes more to force of reasoning, especially in the detection of fallacies and exposing of absurdities and sophisms, than that sharpness of the intellectual powers which we call wit, and which again closely borders on the ideal. An example of this we have in that solid reasoner, John Howe, driest of learned divines, who gives us in his "Living Temple" a specimen of satirical writing, hardly equalled for keenness and unrelenting sarcasm by anything in the English language. Scarcely more pitiless is Voltaire, or Carlysle, those terrible satirists. I refer to his discussion of the atomic theory of the soul, "which is said to be composed of very well-polished, the smoothest and the roundest, atoms; and which are of the neatest fashion, and every way, you must suppose, the best conditioned the whole country could afford." "And now because it is not to be thought that all atoms are rational, for then the stump of a tree or a bundle of straw might serve to make a soul of, for aught we know,

[1] Dr. Post on National Regeneration.

as good as the best," the question is raised by what properties an atom shall be entitled to this privilege of being rational. Having ascertained that it is only those which are extremely minute that can be admitted to this honor, he proceeds to lament the misfortune of those which prove to be too large: "Here sure, the fate is very hard of those that come nearest the size, but only by a very little too much corpulency happen to be excluded as unworthy to be counted among the rational atoms." The question is then raised, "whether if an atom were perfectly round, and so very rational, but by an unexpected misadventure it comes to have some little corner somewhere clapped on, it be hereby quite spoiled of its rationality? And whether, again, one that comes somewhat near that figure, only it hath some little protuberances upon it, might not by a little fileing, or the friendly rubs of other atoms, become rational?"

Supposing now, a sufficient number of these little atoms brought together to constitute a soul, our merciless logician is exercised to know the *modus operandi* of their proceeding — how, being so light and so round, they continue to hold together and keep their places in solemn council; how, being so much alike, the mathematical atoms can be distinguished from the moral; how, since the particles are so constantly changing, it happens that any man should even continue of the same opinion with himself for a quarter of an hour together; and finally, how the mere motion of these atoms constitutes thought. "They can frisk about and fly to and fro, and interfere among themselves, and hit, and jostle, and tumble over one another, and that will contribute a great deal."[1] O merciless reasoner! Is it not enough to vanquish the enemy and put him to route, without pursuing him all around the horizon in such a ridiculous plight? And, as if that were not enough, must you deliberately bind the slain foe to your chariot, and drag it, as Achilles did the dead body of Hector, nine times around the walls?

4. I have spoken of the imagination as aiding the orator

[1] Living Temple, part i. chap. iii.

by imparting clearness and definiteness of conception, and thus contributing to the clear and forcible statement of truth. But further than this, it is needed, if I mistake not, in order to *the right apprehension of many of the highest and noblest themes.* Whatever appeals to the imagination can be rightly comprehended only by the imagination, as what addresses the reason and judgment can be appreciated only by those faculties. The Bible has much that is addressed to the plain common sense of man, and it requires common sense to understand these things. It has much that is addressed to the reasoning power, and some degree of the power of reasoning is requisite for the comprehension of that. It has much also that is addressed to the imagination, and these things a mind destitute of imagination, or in which that power is but feebly developed, can never rightly apprehend. There are some things in revelation, as there are some things in nature, and some in art, which reveal themselves in their true meaning and power only to the *ideal* faculty. It takes a poet or an artist to catch the true significance and feel the full power of some things. Niagara appeals to the sense of the sublime and the beautifnl in the soul. A mind in which that sense is wanting, or but imperfectly possessed, cannot understand the scene. The statistician comes with his facts and figures, the logician with his syllogisms, the mathematician with his diagrams and logarithms, the mere man of science, with his chemical analysis, and his fossil remains; and what do all these know or comprehend of the wonderful scene? As little, very likely, as the donkeys that carry them. If their heads are full of their own figures and syllogisms and fossils, if they are *mere* statisticians, mathematicians, logicians, chemists, and not poets as well, there is to them very little meaning or power in the wonderful vision. It reveals nothing. They have seen only a waterfall, have heard only a noise. There are lofty and glowing passages in the sacred scriptures, the full power and majesty of which are never perceived by any mind that is not itself highly endowed with the power of the ideal. There are themes of sacred oratory,

which no man can properly touch whose soul is not itself elevated, and in a sense inspired, by this superior power.

There are some minds that Nature has formed as dry as summer dust — unpoetic, pragmatic; to whom a cowslip on the river's brim, a yellow cowslip is, — and nothing more. Devout minds, they may be, and eminently so; learned even, for learning dwelleth ofttimes in dry, and desert places; but hard and stiff and angular and horny, and of cuticle thicker than the rhinoceros; with little perception of the beautiful in nature or art, and lightly esteeming the little they do perceive. Such minds have their sphere. In the stern conflicts of opinion, in the controversies of the time, in the elaboration and defence of dogmas, in the laboratories and dusky mines, where heavy blows are to be struck, they are in place and at home. But in the wide realm of the imagination, the serene firmament of the ideal, they are wholly out of place and utterly lost. To such minds no small part, not of nature merely, but of revelation, must of necessity be essentially a sealed book. They lack that fine perception and quick sense of the beautiful which would fit them to be true interpreters, whether in the realm of nature or of the spiritual. We comprehend only that to which there is something respondent in our own nature; and the greater the correspondence the fuller the sympathy and appreciation. It takes a Goethe to understand a Goethe; it takes a Caesar to do justice to a Caesar; Napoleon III is by position, and career, and character, better fitted to write the life of Caesar, than Guizot, or Thiers. To view a mountain rightly you must be yourself among the mountains, and not on the plain. One gets the true idea of Mont Blanc, not from the Vale of Chamouni, but on the summit of the Tete Noir, or the Col De Baume. To comprehend the full majesty of the Jungfrau you must take your station on the Great Scheideck.

It has been felt as a serious defect in many of our biblical interpreters that they lack the ideal element. Profoundly versed in the minutiae of verbal and grammatical science, they seem profoundly insensible of anything higher, and fail

to comprehend the majesty and beauty of the loftiest strains of David, and Isaiah, and John. They interpret the song of Miriam at the Red Sea, the psalm of Moses, or that grandest of all dramatic poems, the Apocalypse of John, with as little feeling, as little appreciation of the real beauty and majesty of the work, as if they were expounding the genealogical tables commencing with the names Adam, Seth, Enos. I would by no means be understood as depreciating the science of biblical criticism. Precision and science are necessary in the commentator; but so, also, is some degree of soul. Napoleon placed the leading mathematician of France at the head of an important bureau in his government, but was disappointed in the result. He found him, as he expressed it, always dealing with the infinitely little. It can hardly be denied that the tendency of modern biblical criticism is to minuteness of detail, often to the loss of the spirit and breadth and power of the argument or the passage as a whole. We must have precision and philological acumen; but we must have something more. We must have grammatical science, but let it keep its place. When Isaiah sits down at the grand organ, and its notes come rolling through the centuries, we care not to pause in the midst of some triumphant anthem, to discuss the propriety of a dagesh-forte; and when the great artist unrolls the mysterious canvas of the future, and describes the New Jerusalem coming down from God out of heaven, there is something of more importance to be considered, just then, than the accent of an iota, or the necessity of a paulo-post future.

For this reason we should prefer the comments of a Goethe, a Milton, a Burns, on some passages of scripture, to those of a DeWette, or a Meyer; Sir Walter Scott might hit the sense, we doubt not, in some cases, where his namesake misses it; Tennyson, and Bryant, and Whittier might tell us some things that Robinson, Ellicott, and Alford have failed to see. It was the rare charm of that accomplished biblical scholar, the late Bela B. Edwards, that his soul was in sympathy with the beauty and majesty of the inspired word. He sat at the

feet of the old prophets and singers of Israel, as the young artist at the feet of Michael Angelo. Nor was this the least excellence of the noble Stuart, that prince of biblical scholars. To peruse with him the pages of inspiration was like wandering with Church among the Andes, or with Ruskin among the stones of Venice.

What has been said of the biblical interpreter may with perhaps equal truth be affirmed of the theologian. Something of the ideal faculty is needed, something of the creative power, something of the quick sense of the fit, the harmonious, the symmetrical, in order to adjust the truth in its right proportions, and grasp in thought the completeness and grandeur of the Christian system. For lack of this there is something defective about many of our systems of theology. They are one-sided, disjointed, inharmonious; or they are narrow and incomplete. They fasten upon some one truth in some one of its many aspects, and make it stand for the whole; as if a fly, alighting on some one of the ten thousand pinnacles of the Milan cathedral, should say: This then is the celebrated temple — this marble statue on which I stand, though I do not see that there is anything so very wonderful about it; it looks to me very much like the figure of a man. Poor fly, so it does; but if you *could* only see the *temple itself!*

Of all theologians Calvin is perhaps the least imaginative. Dwelling on the shores of that most beautiful of lakes, beneath the shadows of the Jura, and in full view of the snowy summit of Mont Blanc, neither the grandeur nor the beauty of nature seems to have touched any corresponding chord in his bosom. We find in his pages no allusions to external nature, no illustrations borrowed from the magnificent scenes around him. With Luther it is quite otherwise. He has a poet's heart in his bosom, and, with a poet's sensitive nature and quick eye for the beautiful, responds at once to whatever is fitted to awaken aesthetic emotion. The system of the former stands like the rocky cliffs of Sinai in the desert, grand in outline, and stable in its eternal foundations, but

frowning and sterile. That of the latter, while not less lofty and profound, is clothed with verdure and vocal with songs.

The complete theologian would be one who should unite in himself many and various qualities. He must be many men in one — logician, metaphysician, psychologist, linguist, student of law, student of natural science, student of history, student of men and manners; these he must be, and, not least of all, there must be in him something of that ideal power which inspires the poet and the artist, and which elevates the mind to its highest and purest quality of action. Augustine, with that beautiful simplicity which characterizes his Confessions, makes penitent admission of the fact that in his youthful days he found more delight in the Aeneid of Virgil, than in the multiplication table; a sin, if it be one, in which, I doubt not, many of us have participated. "'One and one, two'; 'two and two, four'; this was to me a hateful sing-song; 'the wooden horse lined with armed men,' and 'the burning of Troy, and Creusa's shade and sad similitude,' were the choice spectacle of my vanity." But had it been otherwise with the boy, we should have missed something that now charms us in the man; something of that mingled strength and grace, those bold and fervid utterances, those life-like delineations which command the listening ear of centuries, and which are due in no small degree to the existence and activity of the ideal faculty in that remarkable mind. He was not the worse, but the better theologian in his maturer years, for that poetic sensibility which led him, when a boy, to weep over the sad story of the Carthagenian queen.

I have mentioned certain respects in which imagination may be of service to the preacher. If I mistake not, these considerations derive additional force from *the character of the present time*. Our religion, as was said at the outset, deals largely with the invisible and intangible. It looks not chiefly at the things that are seen and temporal; its grand realities lie beyond the horizon of the present; it walks by faith, not by sight. It belongs to the spiritual, and not to

the material and the sensible. But the tendency of the times is strongly to the opposite of this; men believe in what they see and handle, and little else; ours is an intensely practical age. We belong to the indicative mode and present tense of things; we are struggling for liberty and just law, fighting for national existence, digging for gold. The problem with us is to live; the actual present fills our thoughts, and the material world is all the world we know or have any evidence of. In theory and in practice, in philosophy and science, and in the actual conduct of life, we are fast drifting to materialism.

The great question to be settled, the great battle to be fought by the Christian church and ministry for the next half-century, is not whether this or that particular dogma of our ancient faith is defensible, this or that particular statement of Moses, or some other sacred writer is reliable, but have we a revelation, and have we a God? Is there anything beyond Nature, and her eternal irrevocable laws? It is not the scepticism of Colenso, or even of Renan, that is to give us the most serious trouble, but the scepticism, more insidious and more formidable, because more in harmony with the tendencies of the age, the scepticism of Comtè, and Spencer, and Lewes, and Mill, in philosophy, and of men among the very chiefest in natural science. The battle is between the natural and the supernatural, the material and the spiritual.

He who, in an age so practical and material, is to present to men for their acceptance and belief truths so spiritual, a religion of faith and not of sense, the religion of the future, and the supernatural, has need to arm himself not only with the weapons of reason and a sound philosophy, but also to call to his aid that power by which he shall be able to seize the invisible and the spiritual, and make them stand forth as realities to the awakened perceptions of his hearers. A bold and fervid imagination is needful for this. Platitudes and abstractions will not do. The powers of the world to come must take form and shape; the hand-writing of im-

pending doom must come out upon the wall, visible to the dullest eye.

Here lay in no small degree the secret of Payson's peculiar power as a preacher; the definiteness and reality which his vivid imagination imparted to whatever truth he would present, and the strong light in which it enabled him to place the realities of the invisible and spiritual world before his hearers. The most effective pulpit orators of the present day are, almost without exception, men largely gifted with this power.

But why refer to other examples, when the discourses of him who spoke as never man spake afford the richest illustration of our theme? How full of imagination those discourses; how rich and varied the imagery; his very words are pictures; he speaks to the eye of the hearer; he utters the most profound truths, but, clothed in the forms of sensible representation, they become, like himself, incarnate. He teaches not so much by argument as by metaphor and illustration. His sermons are parables; and a parable is a little poem. If called upon to specify the one distinctive feature of our Saviour's discourses, I should name this — the predominance of the ideal element. When he would inculcate the lesson of reliance on Divine Providence, he reminds us of the lilies which toil not, neither do they spin; and of the sparrows that alight not without our Heavenly Father's notice. When he would teach us of how little moment are the distinctions of earthly rank and condition, he shows us the rich man in his palace, and the beggar lying at the gate; then presently that beggar in Abraham's bosom, and that rich man calling in vain for a drop of water to cool his tongue. When he would teach us to be doers of the word, and not hearers only, he builds a house upon the sand, and the rains descend, the winds blow, and the floods beat upon that house, and it falls, and great is the fall of it. In his vivid presentation the future suffering of the ungodly takes shape and realization under the figure of the worm that dieth not, and the fire that is not quenched. To express the lesson of

unreserved consecration he does not say, my disciples must make my service paramount to all other considerations, but he that cometh after me, and *hateth* not father and mother and sister and brother, yea, and his own life also, cannot be my disciple. So vivid and intense become even the most abstract and universal truths when brought under the burning glass of his fervid imagination. It toucheth the mountains, and they smoke.

He who in this most pragmatic, unbelieving age, would seize the truths of the invisible and spiritual world, and make them stand forth as realities to the apprehension of men, has need in no small degree of this same faculty which characterizes so remarkably the discourses of the Great Teacher, and which imparts to them at once so much of beauty and of power.

What was said of the theologian is even more true of the preacher, who is the theologian in the pulpit; he has need to be many men in one. He has occasion for qualities and powers the most diverse; he must discard no one of the faculties which God and nature have given him; he needs them all. Least of all, perhaps, can he afford to dispense with that of which I have been speaking. He must draw his illustrations from all surrounding objects, and each passing event must be made tributary to his purpose. From nature, from art, from science, from the living world as it surges around him, from the heavens above, and from the earth beneath, and from the waters under the earth, must he seize and press into his service whatever can illustrate, whatever can enforce or adorn. As the fabled Orpheus, by the sweet touches of his lyre, drew the wild beasts of the forest, and even inanimate objects, around him at his pleasure, so must the christian orator, by the power of his imagination, be able to command the presence and the service of things animate and inanimate, visible and invisible, in the onward march and progress of his thought. Not rocks and trees and wild beasts alone, but angelic and spiritual forms must come at his call, — beings that "walk the earth unseen, both when we awake

and when we sleep." As the prophet of Israel touched the eyes of his servant, and showed him the mountains round about him filled with angelic warriors and chariots of fire, so must he who speaks for God to this unbelieving world be able to draw aside at times the thin veil that hides the invisible, and show his astonished hearers the dread realities that lie so near to every one of us. As in the contest of Greek and Trojan story, over the embattled hosts upon the plain, the gods themselves were fighting for and against the mortal combatants below, so must the dull worshipper of mammon and of sense, as he comes to the house of God, be made to see that the very air above him and around him is full of armed warriors in fierce contest over a prostrate soul, — and that soul *his own!*

ARTICLE V.

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF JERUSALEM.

BY REV. SAMUEL WOLCOTT, D.D., CLEVELAND, OHIO.

In a former Article (Vol. xxiii. pp. 684–695) we reviewed the theory of the Topography of Jerusalem propounded by James Fergusson, F.R.S., an eminent British architect, and published in Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, and gave some reasons for dissenting from it. After the Article had been printed, we met for the first time with a pamphlet of seventy pages, published by Mr. Fergusson subsequent to his Article in the Dictionary, entitled, "Notes on the Site of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, in answer to the Edinburgh Review." In our previous Article, written with a desire to compress the argument, in reply to the points brought forward in the Dictionary, into a brief compass, with as little of a controversial aspect as possible, we find that we passed over some points which did not seem to us essential to a

correct judgment of the question, but on which Mr. Fergusson lays special stress, and which in the pamphlet before us he reiterates and presses into the foreground as conclusive and unanswerable. Without going over ground already traversed, believing that our former argument offers a sure foundation for the convictions of those who accept it, we feel constrained to resume the discussion, and take up every point not already disposed of, and not belonging to his profession as an architect, which Mr. Fergusson deems important. This service we attempt the more readily, because in the judgment of so respectable an authority as Mr. Grove of Sydenham — one of the few biblical scholars who seem to treat his speculations with favor, — "his arguments have never been answered, or even fairly discussed" (Smith's Bib. Dic. Vol. ii. p. 696). There were two references in our previous Article which first demand a brief explanation.

After quoting the point taken by the Edinburgh Review, that Mr. Fergusson failed "to account for the building reared by Abd el-Melek," we remarked, "It may be added that he equally fails to account for the present Church of the Sepulchre" (p. 694). To the issue raised by the reviewer, he replies that he finds the Khalif's building in the Mosque el-Aksa; and had the fact been in our mind, we should have stated it or omitted the reference. The issue which we raised in the above sentence we shall present again.

Next to the Bible, our most important witness on the Zion question is Josephus. Our citations from this author in our former paper, relative to the successive sieges of Jerusalem, were given without explanation, our object being to show that the royal palace and original citadel were in the upper city and on the western hill, and this appears on the face of the narrative. The Asmonean dynasty, about 165 B.C., while retaining the royal residence in the upper city, erected a fortress or acropolis near the northwest corner of the present Haram area, which Herod subsequently rebuilt, and which from the days of Nehemiah appears to have been a fortified point for the protection of the temple. This fortress figures

in the narrative of the sieges by Pompey and Herod. The former had to subdue it after he had gained possession both of the upper city and palace and of the temple; and it was from this that Antigonus descended when he surrendered to the latter. This later citadel is not to be confounded with (and in our previous paper should have been expressly distinguished from) the ancient tower of David and its successor, the apparent site of which is that of one of the towers built by Herod in the northwest part of Zion. With this explanation we take leave of Josephus.

Mr. Fergusson has not renewed in his Notes the discussion of his theory respecting Mount Zion, and we have no more scripture testimony to examine; but we inadvertently overlooked a verse cited in the Dictionary (Neh. iii. 16), which he pronounces "important." It is as follows: "After him repaired Nehemiah the son of Azbuk, the ruler of the half part of Beth-zur, unto the place over against the sepulchres of David, and to the pool that was made, and unto the house of the mighty." These localities, with many others named in the chapter, can only be fixed conjecturally. On the face of the passage they accord well with the received theory respecting Mount Zion, with which locality Dr. Barclay, after carefully examining the matter on the ground, associates them, and represents the wall here described as running "along the precipitous brow of Zion" (Jerusalem, pp. 126, 155). From this chapter, as from the scripture quotations cited and examined in our previous paper, Mr. Fergusson's theory derives no support. This disposes of the Biblical testimony.

But we cannot take leave of the theory without adverting to the confusion which it has introduced into the Dictionary, — the weak point in this great work — through the necessary failure of the attempt to harmonize it with the facts of history and topography. It was the evident intention of the editor that the Article on Jerusalem should be coherent and consistent; and the writers of the historical portions (Messrs. Grove and Wright) have passed over to their fellow contribu-

tor (Mr. Fergusson) most of the topographical points. We now propose to exhibit the position in which they have left this question, and will begin with Mr. Grove's "rough sketch of the *terrain* of Jerusalem" (i. 985).

The city occupies the southern termination of a table-land, a promontory, with deep, precipitous, trench-like ravines on the west, south, and east, and an open plateau on the north (*ib*). This promontory which forms the site of the city, is itself divided by a longitudinal ravine, running up from south to north, east of the centre, and gradually rising to the high level on the north, dividing the promontory into two unequal portions, making it, in fact, a double promontory (*ib.*)

This general outline is sufficient for our purpose. The western ridge was divided by a subordinate ravine running east and west, making two summits, of which we hold that the southern was Zion, and the northern Akra. The eastern ridge was also divided by a tributary ravine, running east and west, making two summits, of which we hold that the southern was Moriah, and the northern Bezetha. Mr. Fergusson holds that Akra was the northern point of Moriah, and the summit which we call Akra he leaves without a name (p. 1025). We waive this question, and we waive all discussion of secondary valleys and minor points; our sole object is to ascertain the true site of the ancient Zion, as exhibited in the Dictionary.

Let the reader, then, imagine or sketch the promontory on which Jerusalem stood, with deep valleys on three sides, and an internal ravine dividing it into two ridges, eastern and western, nameless as yet, and let him, as we proceed, fix the leading localities. We will quote fairly, without comment, in the order in which we find them in the Article on Jerusalem — numbering them for convenient reference — the sentences which ought to enable him to do this intelligently. It may require a little patience, and we invoke it, for the question is one of some importance and interest, and it is time that it were settled.

(1.) "Of these two [portions of the city] that on the west — the 'upper city' of the Jews, the Mount Zion of modern tradition — is the higher and more massive; that on the east — Mount Moriah, the Akra or 'lower city' of Josephus, now occupied by the great Mohammedan sanctuary — is at once considerably lower and smaller." — p. 985.

(2.) "The tombs of the kings were in the city of David; that is, Mount Zion, which was an eminence on the northern part of Mount Moriah." — p. 987.

(3.) "As long as the upper city remained in the hands of the Jebusites, they practically had possession of the whole." — p. 989.

(4.) "As before, the lower city was immediately taken and, as before, the citadel held out. The undaunted Jebusites believed in the impregnability of their fortress. A crowd of warriors rushed forward, and the citadel, the fastness of Zion, was taken. It is the first time that that memorable name appears in the history. David at once proceeded to secure himself in his new acquisition. He enclosed the whole of the city with a wall, and connected it with the citadel. In the latter he took up his own quarters, and the Zion of the Jebusites became the city of David." — pp. 989, 990.

(5.) "An embassy arrived from Hiram the king of Phenicia, offering artificers and materials to erect a palace for David in his new abode. The palace was built and occupied." — p. 990.

(6.) "The arrival of the ark was an event of great importance. A new tent had been spread by David in the fortress for the reception of the ark, and here, 'in its place,' it was deposited with the most impressive ceremonies, and Zion became at once the great sanctuary of the nation. In this tent the ark remained until it was removed to its permanent resting-place in the temple. In the fortress of Zion, too, was the sepulchre of David, which became also that of most of his successors." — p. 990.

(7.) "Antigonus got into the city, and reached the upper market-place, the modern Zion, without resistance." — p. 1005.

(8.) "Then the outer court of the temple and the lower city, lying in the hollow between the temple and the modern Zion was taken, and the Jews were driven into the inner parts of the temple, and to the upper market-place, which connected therewith by a bridge." — p. 1005.

(9.) "Herod occupied the old palace of the Asmoneans, which crowned the eastern face of the upper city, and stood adjoining the Xystus, at the end of the bridge between the temple and the upper city." — p. 1006.

(10.) "Herod built a new and extensive palace immediately adjoining the old wall, at the northwest corner of the upper city." — p. 1007.

(11.) "Archelaus despatched the horse-soldiers by a detour round the level ground north of the city, to surprise the pilgrims on the eastern slopes of Moriah." — p. 1007.

(12.) "Agrippa added an apartment to the old Asmonean palace on the eastern brow of the upper city, which commanded a full view into the interior of the courts of the temple. This view the Jews intercepted by building a wall on the west side of the inner quadrangle." — p. 1010.

(13.) "The temple was at last gained; but it seemed as if half the work remained to be done. The upper city, higher than Moriah, enclosed by the original wall of David and Solomon, and on all sides precipitous, except at the north, where it was defended by the wall and towers of Herod, was still to be taken. Titus first tried a parley, he standing on the east end of the bridge, between the temple and the upper city, and John and Simon on the west end." — p. 1013.

(14.) "Upper market-place" — the western hill, or modern Zion.— Plate I. Topography of Josephus.

(15.) "The 'upper market-place' was called the 'citadel' by David" (p. 1024.) "The citadel was still the 'virgin daughter of Zion.'" — p. 994.

(16.) "Ahra was situated on the northern side of the temple, on the same hill, and probably on the same spot occupied by David as the stronghold of Zion." — p. 1025.

(17.) "The citadel, or upper market-place of Josephus was the *modern* Zion, or the city enclosed within the old wall; Akra was the *ancient* Zion, or the hill on which the temple and the city of David stood." — p. 1025.

(18.) "It is quite clear that Zion and the city of David were identical, for it is said, 'David took the castle of Zion, which is the city of David; and David dwelt in the castle, therefore they called it the city of David." — p. 1026.

(19.) "There is no passage in the Bible which directly asserts the identity of the hills Zion and Moriah, though [there are] many which cannot well be understood without this assumption. The cumulative proof, however, is such as almost perfectly to supply this want." — p. 1026.

(20.) "City of the Jebusites," the western or modern Zion hill. "City of David," the eastern or temple hill. — Plate II. Topography of the Bible.

(21.) "Old Jerusalem," the western hill; "New Jerusalem," the eastern hill. — Diagram, Fergusson's Notes, p. 47.

These extracts are all from one Article; and who can reconcile them with any theory, or find in them an intelligible topography? We have just tried the experiment on an intelligent gentleman, who at our request took a sheet of paper and drew with his pencil a rough outline of the city, and then, as we read sentence by sentence, sought to fill out

the sketch; and after a persistent effort, before we had finished, he laid the pencil upon the paper with a bewildered look, equivalent to saying: "The mountains skipped like rams, and the little hills like lambs." On a topic which to some minds is of more interest than any other in the Dictionary, the Biblical student turns to a work containing the latest and richest fruits of learned investigation only to be baffled and perplexed. Instead of a description of the city which he hopes to find so clear that a blind person might walk through it, he meets with a theory which entangles him at every step, and causes him to "stumble at noonday." Before quitting the theme, let us gather into one sentence from these conflicting statements such points as are consistent with each other and with known facts and probabilities.

The city or stronghold of the Jebusites was the southern portion of the western ridge, the highest, most inaccessible, and easily fortified ground in the city; conquered by David, it became his fortified abode; his castle or citadel was here, and remained here; his palace was built here, and through successive reigns and dynasties, down to the Christian era, it continued to be the royal residence; it was the ancient as it is the modern Zion, enclosed by the old wall, the original wall; it was the upper city, the upper market-place; it was here that the ark abode until its removal to the temple; the royal sepulchres were here; and Moriah was the southern portion of the eastern ridge, and on this the temple was built. This statement, embodying, we believe, the truth of history, agrees with, and is supported by, the above extracts numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, and 21, and portions of 1, 2, 17, and 20; and with these extracts, and with the statement which rests on them, the extracts numbered 16 and 19, and portions of 2, 17, and 20, are in irreconcilable conflict. With this we close the discussion of the site of Mount Zion.

We will now proceed to the discussion of the site of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. "Who has ever doubted," exclaimed Dr. Robinson, in 1838, "the identity of the pres-

ent site with that selected by Constantine?" (Biblical Researches, ii. 71.) The architect who transfers Zion to the eastern hill, transfers the Church of the Sepulchre to the same summit. These are twin theories.

We said in the former Article that Mr. Fergusson's theory fails to explain the present church, a building of great intrinsic and historic interest. When, and by whom were its early foundations laid? Who built up its original walls? For how many centuries has it been palmed upon the public as the church of the sepulchre? Has the largest and most remarkable Christian sanctuary in the East, planted in the very centre and confluence of Christian devotion, come down to us without a chronicle or even an intimation of its origin? We repeat that the early history of such an edifice could not, since the Christian era, and in the most conspicuous spot in Christendom, have faded into utter oblivion, like that of some temple of the Old World, around which the sands of the desert had gathered for ages before Christ.

Mr. Fergusson's theory, while failing to account for the existence of the most imposing church in the East, fails also to account for the disappearance of every vestige of another church of imperial magnificence. This argument, like the preceding, is collateral, and we do not offer it as independent proof. Church edifices in Palestine, large and small, have been destroyed by violence, or have crumbled by decay. Some of them have been rebuilt or repaired, and perpetuated on their present sites, like that of the Nativity in Bethlehem, or that of the Sepulchre in Jerusalem; and others are clearly traceable, if not impressive, in their ruins, like that of the Baptist in Samaria, that of St. George in Lydda, that of St. Anne in Eleutheropolis, and the ancient cathedral church in Tyre. But what church of the largest class has had a history which corresponds with this theory? The emperor Justinian had a passion for church-building, and decorated his metropolis with a majestic temple, which is still its boast. He erected another in Jerusalem, which he designed to be worthy of "the City of the Great King," and of the Virgin mother,

in whose special honor it was built, "on which great expense and labor were bestowed to make it one of the most splendid in the world." It does not appear to have been disturbed by the subsequent convulsions of the country; writers who describe the injury done to the Church of the Sepulchre in the sack of the city by the Russians, and under the Fatimite Khalifs of Egypt, so far as we know, are silent respecting this edifice. The Mosque el-Aksa, which in accordance with prevalent tradition, is almost universally regarded as the original church of Justinian, Mr. Fergusson appropriates as the Mosque of Abd el-Melek. This leaves the church to be provided for, and in the plan of the Haram area, which he has introduced into the Dictionary and republished in his Notes, he places the church of Justinian, and sketches its walls, where not the slightest trace appears of a foundation ancient or modern. It is purely a conjectural site, demanded by the exigencies of his theory, according to which the solid walls, pillars, and arches of a church described by a contemporary historian, and sketched by Mr. Fergusson as four hundred feet in length and one hundred and more in breadth, have vanished as utterly as if they had been pulverized and scattered to the winds. It has disappeared, withal, from a quarter of the city which was never needed nor used for other purposes, where no dwellings could have encroached upon it, and where no rubbish has accumulated. Considering the character, the location, and the dimensions of this building, and the date of its erection, we hazard the assertion that no parallel to such complete annihilation can be found in the East.

The Mosque of Omar near it, Mr. Fergusson claims to have been converted by the Muslim conquerors into a mosque from a church; we advance the same claim for the Mosque el-Aksa; and there were similar transformations, as is well known, of the Church of St. John in Damascus, and of the Church of St. Sophia in Constantinople, built also by Justinian. Instead of converting to the same use the substantial and splendid church which the same emperor had erected

here, what could have prompted the Muslims to obliterate every memorial of it? Within the same enclosure, according to Mr. Fergusson, the "great Anastasis of Constantine," the present Mosque of Omar, built two centuries earlier, survives in all its essential features. "The walls of the octagon still remain untouched in their lower parts; the circle of columns and piers that divide the two aisles, with the entablatures, discharging arches, and cornices, still remain entirely unchanged and untouched; the pier arches of the dome, the triforium belt, the clere-story, are all parts of the unaltered construction of the age of Constantine" (Notes, p. 29). The Mosque of Abd el-Melek, the present el-Aksa, abides within the same enclosure in its original strength. "Its whole architecture is that of the end of the seventh century" (Dict. i. 1033). But the church of Justinian, standing by their side in rival glory, mysteriously passed away from that open area — wall and column and arch and architrave — from foundation to top-stone, smitten like the psalmist's bay tree:

> "And lo, it vanished from the ground,
> Destroyed by hands unseen;
> Nor root, nor branch, nor leaf was found,
> Where all that pride had been."

Mr. Fergusson's theory leaves the later history of the church of Justinian enveloped in the same darkness as the earlier history of the Church of the Sepulchre.

The rejecters of his theory recognize this ancient house of worship in the building adjacent to the southern wall of the Haram, two hundred and eighty feet long by one hundred and ninety broad, and which, with later appendages, both Christian and Saracenic, answers to the description of Justinian's Mary Church, and whose vaulted passages below, from which Christian visitors have long been excluded, are among the impressive objects which it was our fortune to examine in Jerusalem.

What has been said of Justinian's church may be repeated on his theory respecting the church which he affirms that

Constantine built within the same enclosure, whose walls he conjecturally traces in the same way, with no more signs of a foundation or site, and which has vanished in like manner, except a festal entrance which he identifies with the present Golden Gateway in the eastern wall of the Haram area.

We will now examine the contents of Mr. Fergusson's last pamphlet. The subject is treated methodically under the four heads: "The Personal Argument; The Architectural Evidence of the Buildings; Eusebius; The Medieval Historians." — p. 16.

Under the first head, he argues that his personal acquaintance with the localities is not a disqualification for writing about them, and reaches the comfortable conclusion, "that my [his] not having visited the place is a positive advantage for the elucidation of the truth." — p. 20.

The argument under the second head is beyond our province; but he introduces an extraneous paragraph which we can appreciate:

"Before concluding this part of the subject I must mention that one o the reviewer's happiest hits is taunting me that I cannot produce a record of the transference of the Sepulchre. I shall return to this presently. For our present purpose it is sufficient to know that the Sepulchre once stood on Mount Moriah, and now stands in the middle of the town. I did suggest a mode in which the transference might have taken place, but am quite willing to adopt any better that may be suggested. But can he be serious in asking for a *record?* Does he not know that the very essence of a fraud is concealment? If a record is made, it ceases *ipso facto* to be a fraud, and becomes a fact. Surely he hardly expects that those men who substituted the new sepulchre for the old, would proclaim to all the world what they were doing! I presume the reviewer does not believe in all the legends and miracles recounted in the 'Legenda Aurea,' and other books of the Middle Ages; yet I defy him to produce a single record of the mode in which any one of the thousand and one pious frauds of that age were produced. The record is not made till the fraud is detected; and that we are now engaged in doing." — p. 42.

The full difficulty of such a transaction, accomplished without detection or suspicion, has not been stated. Not the Christian world alone, on this hypothesis, but the Muslim world likewise, has been imposed upon in this matter, and

by parties who could not have concocted the fraud together. And all this has been done subsequent to the seventh century. So late as the close of that century, if this theory is true, all Christians and all Muslims, who knew anything about Jerusalem, knew that the present Mosque of Omar was not then a mosque, and never had been; and that the present Church of the Sepulchre, or one on its site, was not *the* Church of the Sepulchre. On both sides they have since that date been misled by designing men. In his Notes Mr. Fergusson is even tempted, on the authority of a Greek writer, to bring down the date of the imposition to the seventeenth century, or later; but seeing the contradiction and confusion in which this would involve him, at the period (A.D. 1697), when Henry Maundrell was minutely describing the Church of the Sepulchre on its present site, and the ceremonies of Easter Sunday as still performed, and two centuries after Kadi Mejr ed-Dîn (A.D. 1495) had minutely described the present Mosque of Omar as a mosque, he dismisses his witness with the remark: "Of course he was wrong, if he is to be understood as speaking of things as they existed in his time"; thus stultifying the testimony, and defeating the object for which he professed to cite it, which is stated in these words: "Even the last assertion, that the [current] tradition has been constant for fifteen hundred years, will not bear examination, as may be seen from the following extract from Dositheus, an author who wrote in the seventeenth century, and died 1709" (p. 59); and after thus quoting and discarding his witness, he adds, "the argument does not stand in need of any such assistance" (p. 60). Whatever may be the date of the fraud, the double fact remains on Mr. Fergusson's theory, that all Christians, residents in Jerusalem, and visitors, so far as is known, have from the first ascribed the site of the present church to the emperor, and all Muslims, residents in Jerusalem and visitors, so far as is known, have from the first ascribed the present mosque to the Khalif, and yet in all these centuries they have alike been the dupes and victims of a double delusion and impo-

sition, commencing we know not when. Can this fact be matched, either in historic annals, or in the fabulous legends of the Dark Ages?

An incident in the Mohammedan conquest of the city, narrated by both Christian and Arabian writers, may properly be cited in this connection. We quote from the historic portion of the Article on Jerusalem in the Dictionary, furnished by Mr. Wright, of Cambridge University: "The Khalif, after ratifying the terms of capitulation, which secured to the Christians liberty of worship in the churches which they had, but prohibited the erection of more, entered the city and was met at the gates by the patriarch. Omar then, in company with the patriarch, visited the church of the Resurrection, and at the Muslim time of prayer knelt down on the eastern steps of the Basilica, refusing to pray within the buildings, in order that the possession of them might be secured to the Christians. Tradition relates that he requested a site whereon to erect a mosque for the Mohammedan worship, and that the patriarch offered him the spot occupied by the reputed stone of Jacob's vision," etc. (i. 1016). Passing by the tradition, we have the historic fact that the Khalif declined entering the church, for the reason above given, stated in almost the same words by another writer: "In order that his followers might have no pretext to claim possession of the church after his departure, under the pretense that he had worshipped in it" (Biblical Researches, ii. 37). Yet if we may believe Mr. Fergusson, this plighted faith, understood alike by both parties, and on the testimony of both scrupulously respected at the outset, was afterwards violated without any known protest or remonstrance or condemnation on the part of Christians, we know not when, history and tradition being both as silent respecting this transaction as in regard to the "pious fraud" by which the homage of Christendom was subsequently transferred to another locality.

Under the third head he refers to the passage which we cited in our former paper as disproving his theory, namely,

the existence of "a broad market-place" in front of the Basilica of Constantine's church, and to Professor Willis's criticism that this would be "ludicrously impossible" where he locates the building, he replies: "There is now an extensive cemetery on the spot in front of this gateway; and where men can bury they can buy; where there is room for tombs, there is room for stalls" (p. 50). With reference to this locality, we quote the following from Mr. Grove: "The main cemetery of the city seems from an early date to have been where it is still, on the steep slopes of the valley of the Kidron. Here it was that the fragments of the idol abominations, destroyed by Josiah, were cast out on the 'graves of the children of the people' (2 Kings xxiii. 6), and the valley was always the receptacle for impurities of all kinds" (Dict. i. 987). Connect with this the fact that the spot was then, as it is now, outside the city, and on its least populous side, and we leave the reader to judge what element of absurdity is lacking in Mr. Fergusson's supposition.

The passage on which he places his main reliance, under this head, is contained in the following extracts. The *italics*, in all his quotations, are his, and not the author's:

"The 33d chapter is the most important of the whole, as containing the only topographical indication. 'Accordingly on the very spot which witnessed the Saviour's sufferings a new Jerusalem was constructed, *over against* the one so celebrated of old, which, since the foul stain of guilt brought upon it by the murder of the Lord, had experienced the extremity of desolation. It was *opposite* the city that the emperor began to rear a monument to the Saviour's victory over death, with rich and lavish magnificence.'

"To this we may add the passage from Socrates referred to by the reviewer, in which he says, 'The mother of the emperor built a magnificent house of prayer on the place of the sepulchre, founding a new Jerusalem opposite to the old and deserted city.'

"To my mind this is in itself sufficient to settle the whole question; but as every one is not familiar with the plan of Jerusalem, the annexed diagram will make it clearer.

"There can be no doubt whatever that at the time of the destruction of the city the whole part shaded was covered with houses, and must in Constantine's time have been covered with ruins; while, from the incidents

'of the siege — such as the people on the walls of the Temple watching the review of Titus's army on Bezetha, and the mention of their being no obstacles on the north of the Temple — we may feel certain that that part, on the other hand, was clear of houses. It appears as clear as the sun at noonday that Eusebius and Socrates meant to describe the sepulchre as opposite to, and not in, the old city. The Dome of the Rock is opposite; the present church is in the city. There is no doubt or difficulty about the translation of the passage, but till it is got over the argument halts. Since I pointed it out writers have carefully avoided it. The reviewer is the first who boldly quotes it — and, with a daring worthy of a better cause, quotes it against me. Did he never see a plan of Jerusalem? or did he merely trust to others taking his assertion for granted?" — pp. 46, 47.

We shall examine this testimony presently.

Under the fourth head we give his main argument in full; not suppressing the reference to American literature and to Dr. Robinson, as our nerves can bear it, and it is a fair specimen of his style.

"The first in order of time is the Bordeaux Pilgrim, A.D. 333. His testimony to the locality is, that, passing *outwards* from the Sion Gate, a person going to the Neapolitan Gate, *outside the wall*, 'foris murum,' has the house of Pilate 'down in the valley on the right, and the sepulchre and Golgotha on the left,' — thus confirming my views to the fullest extent. Dr. Robinson gets over this difficulty by leaving out the words 'foris murum,' and making him pass inside the town! and this, with the addition of definite articles to the text of Eusebius, he thinks a sufficient answer to so elaborate an argument and to all the architectural evidence adduced above.

To any one not acquainted with American literature this might appear a most inexplicable phenomenon. The fact however is, America has no architectural style of her own; her children see nothing but that jumble of styles which is found in all modern countries, and when, in after life, they come in contact with true styles few of them appreciate the fact of their importance, and no American writer I know of has taken the trouble to study the rudiments of the art, much less to master its significance. The consequence is, as far as the learned Doctor is concerned, unless he finds it written in his text-books, he never can tell whether a building was erected by the Saracens or the Crusaders. A Jewish or a Roman building is all the same to him, and whether Constantine or the Crusaders built the Holy Sepulchre, can in his opinion, only be decided by the *litera scripta*.

"That such a man should look on my book as he would at an arrow-headed inscription is not to be wondered at. Anything is good enough

for one who has knowledge which is, to the Doctor, 'foolishness,' and two most slovenly mistranslations were, in his opinion, sufficient to upset an argument based on reasoning which was utterly unintelligible to his mind. When his error was pointed out to him in the 'Athenaeum' of 1856, he wisely took no notice. If he does not answer now, the world will probably consider that he cannot, and most men will think he has acquired but little honor in the contest.

"Next in order of time to the Bordeaux Pilgrim is Antoninus Martyrus, who visited Jerusalem between the time of Justinian and the Mahometan conquest. Among other things we find the following unconscious testimony to the truth of what has been stated above. After describing Golgotha and the altars of Abraham and Melchisedec, he goes on to say, 'Near the altar is a crypt, where, if you place your ear, you will hear the flowing of water; and if you throw in an apple, or anything that will swim, and go to Siloam, you will find it there.' It need not be added that such an expression is absolutely inexplicable if applied to the present church, where there is no well and no connection with Siloam, and no tradition of any having ever existed. In the crypt under the Dome of the Rock there is a well called the Bîr Arroah, and, immediately south of it, Dr. Barclay recently explored a great excavated sea, having connection with that well and all the watercourses of the Haram area, and of which the overflow is to Siloam. It is therefore a fact at this hour, that, if you throw into this well under the Sakrah anything that will swim, it will be washed down to Siloam, as in the time of Antoninus.

"In order not to be too lengthy, I will only allude to one more circumstance. The French Bishop Arculfus, who visited Jerusalem in the last years of the seventh century (Willis says 'circa 697,' and he is probably correct), not only describes minutely all the Christian buildings in Jerusalem, and gives plans of four of them, but he mentions also 'that on the site of the Temple, the Saracens had then (nunc) erected a *square* house of prayer, capable of containing about three thousand persons;'[1] and adds other particulars, describing most minutely the Aksah, which had been erected nine or ten years previously; but the important point is, that neither directly nor indirectly does he allude to the Dome of the Rock, which then was, and now is, by far the most conspicuous and important building in Jerusalem, *if* the theory is correct that the present church then existed.

[1] Ceterum in illo famoso loco ubi quondam Templum magnifice constructum fuerat in vicinia muri ab oriente locatum, nunc Saraceni quadrangulum orationis domum quam subrectis tabulis et magnis trabibus super quasdam ruinarum reliquias vili fabricati sunt opere ipsi frequentant; quae utique domus tria hominum millia simul ut fertur capere potest. — Lib. de Loc. Sanct., Mabillon, p. 504.

"It has been attempted to assert that the little cell of Omar is the square building he referred to. That, however, is a small vaulted apartment, which could not contain thirty, certainly not three hundred persons, and does not answer the description in any respect. The only possible solution, so far as I can see, is that he had described the Dome of the Rock as the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and that there was not then, as there are now, two great domical buildings in Jerusalem.

"In so far as the argument is concerned I would be prepared, if necessary, to waive the architectural evidence altogether, and to rest the proof of what is advanced above on any one of the following four points:

"1. The assertion of Eusebius that the new Jerusalem, meaning thereby the buildings of Constantine, was opposite to, and over against, the old city.

"2. The position assigned to the Holy Places by the Bordeaux Pilgrim.

"3. The connection pointed out by Antoninus between the Bîr Arroah and Siloam.

"4. The assumed omission by Arculfus of all mention of the Dome of the Rock, and, I may add, the building of a Mary Church by Justinian within the precincts of the Haram area.

"No solution beyond the merest assertion has been proposed to any one of these difficulties, but they must all be answered before the title of the present church can be considered as good. And even these are not one-half of the case. But till they are answered, which I have no fear of their being, they alone suffice." — pp. 52–55.

We welcome the closing summary which covers both the third and fourth heads, and presents us with tangible ground. We will take up in their order and fairly examine the "four points" here named, with which Mr. Fergusson agrees to stand or to fall.

"1. The assertion of Eusebius that the new Jerusalem, meaning thereby the buildings of Constantine, was opposite to, and over against, the old city."

The statement referred to is quoted above. "The old city," in respect to its dwellings, was divided into two parts, "the upper" and "the lower." The former was on Mount Zion and the latter on Mount Akra (anciently separated from each other by a valley of which no trace appears in the Fergusson "diagram"), and in the adjacent valleys. The site of the Mosque of Omar is directly opposite to the latter, or to the site of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which "stands

directly on the ridge of Akra" (Biblical Researches, i. 391). The site of the Temple and that of the church lie "over against" each other. These are the points which Eusebius is comparing. He does not refer directly to the ruined dwellings of either the upper or the lower city; he refers especially to the deserted ruins of the Temple. By "the new Jerusalem," says Mr. Fergusson, he means "the buildings of Constantine." Exactly — he means these and nothing else. And by "the old Jerusalem" he means the buildings of the Temple, neither more nor less. Or rather, while the primary meaning is on each side thus restricted, he intends to designate by the latter the ancient city, of which the Temple was the crown, and by the former, the modern city, of which the church was to be the future glory. The antithesis is complete. The other interpretation makes the comparison incongruous — the old city meaning a collection of dwellings, and the new city meaning simply a church. Dr. Stanley has justly observed: "Whatever differences of opinion have arisen about the other hills of Jerusalem, there is no question that the mount on which the Mosque of Omar stands, overhanging the valley of the Kidron, has from the time of Solomon, if not of David, been regarded as the most sacred ground in Jerusalem" (Palestine, p. 177). This is the fact which the Christian Fathers recognize, using each locality as, in a religious sense, the representative of the city, when they say that the emperor Constantine, "founded a new Jerusalem, opposite to the old and deserted city," a phrase, withal, more applicable to the eastern hill, which was burned over, swept "clear of houses," and was still forsaken, than to the western hill which had never been thus completely desolated, and was still inhabited. Opposite the deserted site of the Hebrew Temple Constantine reared the Christian sanctuary. This is our interpretation of Eusebius and Socrates; and we shall not accept as an answer to it the question with which Mr. Fergusson retaliated on his reviewer: "Did he never see a plan of Jerusalem?" This disposes of the first point.

"2. The position assigned to the Holy Places by the Bordeaux Pilgrim.',

His testimony is quoted in full, in our former Article, commencing, "Inde ut eas foris murum de Sione euntibus ad Portem Neapolitanam," which is, says Mr. Fergusson, "that passing *outwards* from the Sion Gate to the Neapolitan Gate, *outside the wall*," etc. Shall we incur the risk of being set down as "slovenly" translators, in company with our countryman, Professor Robinson, if we suggest to this bland scholar, that *one* "outwards" or "outside" is an adequate rendering of "foris," and that there is not an allusion here to the Zion *Gate?*

Mr. Fergusson assumes that the phrase "foris murum" requires us to believe that the visitor's course, here described, from Zion to the Neapolis Gate (called Neapolis then, for the same reason that it is now called Damascus), lay outside of the wall. If so, the reference is to the inner wall along the brow of Zion, the first of the "three walls" which surrounded this part of the city. This may be the meaning of the barbarous Latin of the old Pilgrim, which Professor Robinson unfortunately slurred, but far more probably, we think, he means simply what we suggested in the previous Article. There never was a road from Zion southward, and no suggestion could be more improbable than that of plunging from Zion into the lower Tyropoeon, outside the city, ascending the opposite slope, and making the long detour by the northwest corner of the city to reach the gate named. The point of destination was northward from Zion, and the Pilgrim says that one who would go beyond the wall, or outside of the city, passing from Zion to the Neapolis Gate, would see the objects described, on the right and left. The peculiar construction of the sentence favors this rendering of "foris murum," and we have an authority for it, exactly in point. "*Foris;* in late Latin, with the accusative — *beyond.* 'Constitutus si sit fluvius, qui foris agrum non vagatur'" (Andrew's Lexicon, *in loc.*). Either of these interpretations we claim to be more natural and probable than Mr. Fergusson's, for the reasons already given. This disposes of the second point.

"3. The connection pointed out by Antoninus between the Bîr Arroah and Siloam."

This testimony will be found above. Quoting the same in the Dictionary, Mr. Fergusson says: "In so far as we know," the connection exists; meaning merely, We do not know that it does not exist. In the Notes before us, he says: "It is, therefore, a fact at this hour," that the connection exists. Without any new light upon the subject, in the interval between the publications, the absence of knowledge to the contrary has, by a law of its own, developed into an ascertained present "fact." The positive assertion is a random and rash assertion. The connection has not been established, and the subterranean watercourses of Jerusalem are still involved in much uncertainty. The witness cited in support of the alleged fact pronounces directly against its probability, and in favor of the opposite theory. Dr. Barclay, who has been a most thorough explorer, gives his reasons for believing that the subterranean conduit of Hezekiah was brought down on the west side of the valley running south from the Damascus Gate, and says that on this hypothesis "it would pass just by the rock Golgotha," the traditionary site of the sepulchre, as described by Antoninus (Jerusalem, 94, 300). Furthermore, in examining the fountain of Siloam, he found a subterranean channel which supplied it, and which he traversed for nearly a thousand feet; and on locating its course, he was "perfectly satisfied that this subterraneous canal derived its former supply of water, not from Moriah, but from Zion" (*ib.* 523). He also says: "If this channel was not constructed for the purpose of conveying to Siloam the surplus waters of Hezekiah's aqueduct, then I am unable to suggest any purpose to which it could have been applied" (*ib.* 309). So little countenance, so palpable a contradiction, rather, is given to the "fact" by the witness cited to corroborate it. This disposes of the third point.

"4. The assumed omission by Arculfus of all mention of the Dome of the Rock, and, I may add, the building of a Mary Church by Justinian within the precincts of the Haram area."

We do not see the bearing of the last-named particular. Churches in honor of the Virgin were erected in many localities, and it is not necessary to account for the selection of this site, though it were easy to conjecture a reason. It proves nothing.

The remaining specification, like the other, is an argument drawn from silence and conjecture, and rates no higher as proof. It runs thus: If this building were then in existence, this visitor must have described it; the building was in existence, and the opposite theory assumes that he did not allude to it; therefore, the current theory is false. We cannot but be struck with the difference between this position and the principle with which Mr. Fergusson professedly started, of "admitting nothing which cannot be proved, either by direct testimony or by local indications" (Dict. i. 1018). There is no pretense that this argument rests on either of these; it rests on nothing but an unaccountable "omission." And this silence is offered as not merely corroborative evidence, but as vital proof. Mr. Fergusson adduces this as one of four points, "any one" of which establishes his theory beyond question. As if the existence of St. Paul's in London, or of St. Peter's in Rome, at any period, would be absolutely disproved by the silence of a visitor respecting either, in a professed description of the objects of interest in the city. At the best, it could only be a natural inference; it could never be proof positive. And here we might rest; for if we proceed no further, Mr. Fergusson's last point is disposed of, and his claim is prostrate.

But we join issue with him, and affirm that what Arculfus describes as the Church of the Sepulchre, was the building standing on the site of the present church, and not the Mosque of Omar, or any part of it. Neither could "the square house of prayer erected on the site of the Temple," have been, as he alleges, the Mosque el-Aksa. The phrase "vili fabricati sunt opere," could never have been applied to this structure. The immense quadrangle, rudely built with beams and planks over the remains of ruins, as described by

the bishop, would seem to be a natural account of the building erected by the Khalif Omar over the rock es-Săkhrah, as Dr. Barclay suggests, "which in the course of half a century gave place to the present elegant octagonal edifice, erected by Abd el-Melek" (Jerusalem, p. 336). If the assigned date of the completion of the latter edifice is correct, this would serve to fix more definitely the date of Arculfus's visit which is only known to have been "in the latter part of the seventh century" (Wright's Introduction, p. xii, Bohn's ed.).

We pass now to the bishop's description of "the Church of the Holy Sepulchre," and whatever other changes may have taken place, we have a crucial test of the identity of the building described with the church or the mosque, in the account of the cave which was the reputed tomb of the Saviour. Arculfus says: "In the middle space of the inner circle is a round grotto, cut in the solid rock, the interior of which is large enough to allow nine men to pray, standing, and the roof of which is about a foot and a half higher than a man of ordinary stature. The entrance is from the east side, and the whole of the exterior is covered with choice marble, to the very top of the roof, which is adorned with gold, and supports a large golden cross. Within, on the north side, is the tomb of our Lord hewn out of the same rock, seven feet in length, and rising three palms above the floor." These measurements were taken by Arculfus with his own hand. "This tomb is broad enough to hold one man lying on his back, and has a raised division in the stones, to separate his legs. The entrance is on the south side, and there are twelve lamps burning day and night, according to the number of the twelve apostles. Internally, the stone of the rock remains in its original state, and still exhibits the marks of the workman's tools" (p. 2, Bohn's ed).

With this account of Arculfus, the reader will now compare that of Willibald, a few years later — A.D. 721–727.

"And near at hand is the garden, in which was the sepulchre of our Saviour, which was cut in the rock. That rock is now above ground, square at the bottom, but tapering above, with a cross on the summit, and

over it there is now built a wonderful edifice. And on the east side of the rock of the sepulchre there is a door, by which men enter the sepulchre to pray. And there is a bed within, on which our Lord's body lay, and on the bed stand fifteen golden cups with oil, burning day and night. The bed on which our Lord's body rested, stands within the rock of the sepulchre on the north side, to the right of a man entering the sepulchre to pray. And before the door of the sepulchre lies a great square stone, in the likeness of the former stone which the angel rolled away." — Travels, p. 18, Bohn's ed.

We will next quote the testimony of another visitor — Saewulf, A.D. 1102:

"In the middle of this church is our Lord's Sepulchre, surrounded by a very strong wall and roof, lest the rain should fall upon the Holy Sepulchre; for the church above is open to the sky. This church is situated, like the city, on the declivity of Mount Zion." "We descend from our Lord's Sepulchre about the distance of two arbalist-shots, to the Temple of the Lord, which is to the east of the Holy Sepulchre, the court of which is of great length and breadth, having many gates; but the principal gate, which is in front of the Temple, is called the Beautiful," etc. "In the middle of which Temple is seen a high and large rock, hollow beneath, in which was the holy of holies." — Travels, pp. 37, 39, 40, Bohn's ed.

From this it appears that the surreptitious transfer of site, for which Mr. Fergusson contends, made after the close of the seventh century, was unsuspected at the commencement of the twelfth.

The sepulchral cave of the church, above described by Arculfus and Willibald, Mr. Fergusson claims to have been the cave in the rock es-Săkhrah, beneath the dome of the present Mosque of Omar. This rock has been the most stationary landmark in Jerusalem, and has probably changed as little as any other object. We will quote such accounts as have reached us of the cave within it. The first is from a Muslim, written about A.D. 1150:

"Beneath is the rock tomb; this rock is of quadrangular form, like a buckler; one of its extremities is elevated above the ground to the height of nearly half a fathom; the other adheres to the soil; it is nearly cubical, and its width nearly equals its length; that is to say, nearly ten cubits. Beneath is a cavern or a dark retreat, of ten cubits in length and five in width, and whose height is more than a fathom. One cannot penetrate its darkness but by the light of torches." — El-Edrisi, p. 12, Rosen. ed.

The next is from the fullest Arabic description which we have of Jerusalem, written by Kadi Mejr. ed-Dîn, A.D. 1495.

"Beneath the rock is a cave on the south, to which is a descent by stone steps. The steps are intercepted in the middle by a small bench excavated in the rock on the east side, where the pilgrims rest. Here is a marble, the base of which stands on this bench, joined on the south to the side of the cave; the capital supports the side of the Săkhrah, as if to prevent it from leaning towards the south side, or in any other way." — Quoted by another from Williams's Holy City, to which we have not access.

The last is from a recent Christian visitor who has seen it, and who was permitted to examine it at his leisure :

"The shape of the Săkhrah is irregular; it is about sixty feet in length from north to south, and fifty-five in breadth. In the southeast portion of this rock is a small room, irregularly square and roughly finished, about eight feet in height and fifteen on each side — 'the Noble Cave.' Its ceiling is about four or five feet below the upper surface of the rock, from four to six feet thick, and pierced with an oval-shaped hole about three feet in diameter. A hollow sound being emitted on striking the northern side, shows undoubtedly, that vacant space is beyond. On stamping upon a circular stellar-constructed piece of variegated marble about the centre of the floor, sonorous reverberations are emitted, clearly evincing the existence of a large excavation below this stellated slab, which they say, closes the door to Hades. This is the Bîr Arraoh, or 'Well of Souls,' which was formerly kept open for the convenience of holding intercourse with departed spirits. Is this the '*Lapis pertusus*' of the pilgrim fathers, that the Jews so much venerated? Access is had to this room by a pair of steps cut in the native rock, just above which, on entering the door of the room, is a tongue very highly revered by good Muslims." — Barclay's Jerusalem, pp. 497, 498.

The question here asked is one which Dr. Robinson raised in 1838, and was disposed to answer affirmatively in 1852. (Biblical Researches, p. 236). The Bordeaux Pilgrim in the fourth century describes a "perforated rock," on or near the site of the Temple, to which the Jews came annually with lamentations. If its identity with this rock is established, it proves that Constantine's church was not erected upon it. Waiving this point, we ask the reader to compare the description of Arculfus with the last two descriptions. It is not credible that they all refer to the same excavation. His account can be adjusted to the present Church of the Sepulchre

and its reputed tombs, making due allowance for the changes wrought by the destruction of the building. But by no practicable change, by no possibility, can the narrative of Arculfus be adjusted to the rock es-Sākhrah and the cave beneath it. And this disposes of the fourth point.

We have now completed our examination of Mr. Fergusson's "four points" — his "Quadrilateral." He offered to "rest the proof" of his theory "on any one" of them; and we have shown that on a fair investigation not one of them sustains his theory in a single particular, and for the most part they pointedly refute it. His plea that "no solution, beyond the merest assertion, has been proposed to any one of these difficulties," must now be withdrawn in respect to each of them; and if he abides by his offer, his case is lost. That he does not intend to abide by it is plainly indicated, we think, by his closing remark: "And even these are not one-half the case; but till they are answered, which I have no fear of their being, they alone suffice." These words, if we understand them, are prophetic of a retreat into his architectural castle, whither few, comparatively, can follow him. He may ensconce himself within that; and we take leave of him on its threshold, with the friendly suggestion that he cannot prudently venture a foot beyond it in any direction.

ARTICLE VI.

THE ATONEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF CONSCIENCE.

BY REV. LEMUEL S. POTWIN, BOSTON, MASS.

Salvation by the atonement, whatever else may be true of it, is certainly *right*. This is the least that can be said in its favor. Yet on this very point our theories of the atonement present the greatest difficulty. They do not commend themselves plainly to the *conscience*. But no theory can stand without this endorsement of our sense of right. If the conscience is not satisfied the reason cannot be.

The strength of the Old School theory of the atonement lies in its seeming response to the demand of conscience, that *sin must have its desert*. Premising that the desert can come only by punishment, and then conceiving of a penalty *per se* that can exhaust itself upon the intrinsically innocent, the advocates of this theory satisfy themselves that sin has, in the person of Christ, received its penal desert. What sin really deserves we will consider further on; but it seems to us self-evident that sin cannot be punished without the punishment of the sinner. Hence, speaking for ourselves only, the theory under notice cannot satisfy our conscience, because the conscience cannot be satisfied by what the mind sees to be absurd.

But we are no better satisfied with any theory that leaves out of account the intrinsic desert of sin. We may see, with Dr. Bushnell, how the atonement satisfies our highest conceptions of love; but this makes more intolerable the want of a correspondingly full satisfaction of the sentiment of justice. The conscience is set for the defense of justice, and, though dazzled for a while by the overpowering rays of love, it never quite loses its hold on the idea of desert.

What is called the "governmental theory," but which ought, we think, to be called the "manifestation theory," is

often presented in such a way as to leave conscience and its demands very much out of sight. Dr. Taylor made the support of *authority* to be the end of both punishment and atonement. "When applied to denote the attribute of a perfect moral governor, justice is a benevolent disposition on his part to maintain by the requisite means his authority, as the necessary condition of the highest happiness of his kingdom." [1] But how can authority be maintained to any good purpose by punishments that are in the view of conscience unjust? Although, as we hope to show, the atonement does more than meet the ends of punishment, yet to do as much as that, must it not satisfy the sense of desert? In other words, if punishment must have such a relation to sin as the unperverted conscience pronounces *just*, why must not the atonement, if atonement takes the place of punishment, wholly or in part in the divine government? Here we discover the weak point of the governmental theory, or at least in many expositions of it. It is easy to discern in it the reforming power of the atonement, but not so easy to see its absolving power.

Without any further statement of difficulties, let us take up two questions which lie at the foundation of the subject:

I. What, in the view of conscience, does sin deserve?

II. What does a sinner deserve?

I. What does *sin* deserve? The answer may be embraced in one word — CONDEMNATION. But we must unfold that word to discover the complete answer. This condemnation must be unqualified, effective, and supreme; unqualified, because sin and righteousness are incompatible; effective, because to pronounce a thing condemned is nothing, unless it is reprobated with such force of character as to be effectually branded as vile and abominable, and utterly expelled from the sphere of goodness; supreme, because if the condemnation is reversible by any higher will or character, it is not effective. The last court of appeal has more weight than all others together.

[1] Moral Government, Vol. ii. p. 280, Essay on Justice.

It is apparent, then, that repentance cannot satisfy the conscience for past sins. How can a feeble, finite creature, who is sinning every day, make any condemnation of sin that the conscience looks upon as effective? And how infinitely below the supreme condemnation does it fall! Conscience, as we have said, looks after desert. What boots it that you and I, and ever so many sinners in our poor, halting, self-justifying way loathe sin? Does this brand sin as it deserves, so that the moral universe can look on and say: "Behold how this curse and shame is crushed and made abominable for ever and ever?"

We may find an illustration, on a low plane, in our attitude toward ordinary crimes. Would the conscience be satisfied by the repentance of all criminals, without any punishment? We say nothing about what the interests of society require, nothing about authority; we inquire whether there is a voice of our moral nature which demands something more than repentance. When a criminal repents, will any right-minded person assert that sin has received its *due?* Certainly not. And why? Because crime is not thereby adequately condemned. The extorted testimony of the culprit, even if perfectly sincere, has but a feather's weight compared with that overwhelming burden of reprobation which sin and crime deserve.

We may illustrate further the demand of conscience for effective condemnation. Would it be satisfied by any declaration of the magistrate, condemnatory of the crimes brought to his notice? Most certainly not. Because his personal testimony is just as inadequate as that of the penitent criminal. Even if we grant that the judge, as a representative of the moral sentiment of the state, pronounces the judgment of the whole body, we are but little nearer the desert of sin. If sin escapes the condemnation of the Supreme Judge it is forever uncondemned and triumphant.

Where then can conscience and justice find satisfaction under human law? *In God's ordinance of punishment.* Punishment is God's mode of condemning crime in human

society. Though not always effectual in *preventing* crime, it is effectual in bringing it under the law of condemnation. It is executed by human hands; but its range of results, as seen especially in capital punishment, is far beyond human calculations. It is a divine sanction.

We are brought by this illustration to our second question: What does a *sinner* deserve? Let us take the simplest answer of conscience, and then try to interpret it. Conscience says: The sinner deserves punishment. This seems to shut the door of investigation, and make it impossible for a sinner to be saved with any satisfaction to the sense of justice. But the door opens to us again when we consider the relation of the two testimonies of conscience to each other. Are the two propositions, "Sin deserves condemnation," and "The sinner deserves punishment," logically independent of each other? It can hardly be so. Are they identical? Obviously not. What then is their mutual relation? Is it not twofold, as follows: The sinner deserves punishment because, (1) Sin deserves to be condemned. In all the ordinary categories of human action punishment is an indispensable means to condemnation. The history of the world exhibits but one example of the fact that a general offer of pardon is compatible with the condemnation of sin. Now the testimony of conscience which we are considering is obviovsly *not* delivered with any reference to the unique example of atonement. We may wonder at this, but it will hardly be denied. When conscience says: "A sinner deserves to be punished," it unites an acknowledged means with its own end. In a word, punishment as the desert of a sinner is not a first principle, like condemnation as the desert of sin. Punishment is an expedient; and it is solely *as such* that conscience and justice are satisfied by it. The sinner also deserves punishment because (2) *his* sin deserves to be condemned. This is the personal end of punishment; and although it may thus be expressed in few words, it will be seen to cover the whole ground of sin as a personal matter.

We have thus given comprehensively what we understand

to be the testimony of conscience respecting the desert of sin and sinners. Sin deserves the effective condemnation of supreme righteousness, and the sinner deserves punishment considered as the means of carrying out that condemnation.

Now is there anything that can take the place of punishment so that sin can be condemned and yet the sinner escape? Here we reach the blessed atonement. If the dreadful difficulty is not beyond the power of infinite wisdom and infinite love we shall find it overcome here. And who that believes in the Deity of Christ can doubt that sin is condemned, most unqualifiedly, effectively, and with supreme authority in the work of our Lord Jesus Christ? Consider the infinite abasement of that life in which, amid incessant and awful trials and temptations, he exemplified a perfect righteousness. Consider that in this and in the ignominy of his death he incurred the bitterest woes sent upon our race for sin, thus endorsing in blood its penal desert. Consider the unveiling of human sin produced by contact with Jesus's holy life — a contact ending in the blackest of human crimes, because the darkness could not endure the light by which it was revealed. Consider that sin, in all the forms in which it can assail a moral being, was met and vanquished. Sin as enthroned in Satan; sin as actuating sinful men; sin as doing its last and worst through death; sin as casting upon him the very curse under which sinners lived — this sin was vanquished, and thus condemned with an emphasis vastly beyond that which the obedience of a race, or the punishment of a race, could have produced.

If then, sin, considered by itself, deserves condemnation, there is no question that it has received its desert, strictly and fully, in the atonement. The whole human race may say with one voice: "Our eternal punishment could never brand sin as the 'blood of Jesus' has." And each sinner can say: "So far as my eternal punishment is the means of condemning sin, there is no need of it. That work is done. 'God sending his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh.'"

But how does the atonement answer the other question: What does the sinner deserve? The *general* end of punishment has been fulfilled by the cross; but how is the personal end fulfilled? In order to accomplish this, two things seem to be requisite.

1. We must be marked as sinners. The punished culprit, willingly or not, is the marked man; the one in whom that abominable thing to be condemned has been found and acted out. Now by faith we come to Christ as a Saviour from sin. The act of coming gives us our place as sinners. What the culprit does whether he will or not, the believer does freely. He says: "I am the sinner, else I would not be here with my Saviour."

2. We must be directly involved in the condemning of our sin. The culprit is by punishment made the means of condemnation; his pains, privations, disgrace, or death are indispensable to condemnation by punishment. Now by faith we come to Christ not only as a Saviour from sin, but as a condemner of sin. Hence in this respect we do freely what the culprit does generally of necessity. But let us see clearly that this is not mere repentance. The part which a culprit bears in the reprobation of crime is not dependent on his repentance. Repentance condemns sin in our own name. This is a small matter. But the atonement condemns it in the name of God, and with all the force of the highest possible manifestation of God's character. Faith accepts this import of the atonement. Faith is sometimes called "taking God at his word"; but the atonement is the mightiest word of God respecting sin, and each one's sins. To take God at this word of his is to acknowledge and adopt God's own condemnation of sin, and of *our* sins. Here is the deepest point in the relation of faith to absolution. By this faith we lay our sins upon the Lamb of God; or rather, the Lord hath already laid upon him our iniquities, and what he asks of us is to own that they *are* ours. We do not suffer condemnation, but we accept it as a thing accomplished by another. If we suffer forever we can make no valuable addition to

that condemnation. The work is done, and by faith our interest in it is as intimate as if we had borne the full penalty of our sins. A fully punished sinner, if such there can be, has no advantage over a believing sinner. All that either can say is: "Sin has been fully condemned as sin, and as *my* sin." With this conscience and justice are satisfied.

We have thus tried to show that the atonement, by itself, answers the general end of punishment, and "through faith" answers the personal end of punishment. We may add here that if the atonement, by itself, answered *all* the punitive demands of justice, both general and personal, then faith would not be essential to salvation. But according to the view we have taken, the sense of justice cannot be satisfied in the salvation of any individual, in a condition of responsibility, without faith. If, instead of exercising this faith, we reject Christ, it is plain that we deserve a greatly aggravated punishment.

The satisfaction of conscience, which we have all along considered as practically equivalent to the satisfaction of justice, is evidently quite consistent with pardon. It is not only safe, but altogether right, to pardon with an atonement. Sin being already under the deepest possible condemnation, no plea can be put in at the bar of conscience why pardon should not be freely granted, if individuals are in a proper condition to receive it, i.e. if they have faith. Thus the same faith that fulfils what we have called the personal end of punishment prepares the soul for pardon. The pardon is genuine, because it is the bestowal of grace by the Sovereign upon the guilty. It is right, because it belongs to a system that satisfies justice.

We turn now to consider very briefly the idea of reward as found in the atonement, and as viewed by the conscience. This idea seems to have fallen into the background in the later New England soteriology; but why should it? Is not the idea of atonement incomplete without it? Not that there are two distinct lines of efficacy, one of which terminates in pardon and the other in reward; but there is a twofold

efficacy throughout, corresponding to the twofold need of sinners. We need not only a removal of God's disfavor, but his positive approbation. How can such sinners as we are get it? How, in the view of conscience, can it be right for us to have it?

In answering these questions we will pursue a path similar to the one followed in treating of punishment, but leading, of course, in the opposite direction.

I. What does righteousness deserve?

II. What does a righteous man deserve?

Righteousness deserves APPROBATION, unqualified, effective, supreme. Whether a reason can be given for this or not, conscience affirms it with the clearness and quickness of intuition. This is enough for our present purpose.

What does a righteous person deserve? He deserves a *reward;* but, as we have said in regard to punishment, only as a means — the means of making approbation effective and personal.

Now if righteousness, considered by itself, receives an adequate seal of approval through the atonement, then the general purpose of rewards is fulfilled. And who can doubt that it has received such a seal? Who can doubt that the perfect rectitude of all human beings, followed by the rewards of heaven to their merits, would have been a less powerful approbation of righteousness than the manifestation made by the Incarnate Son, and the eternal glory that follows? But we need not put the choice between rewarding all, on the one hand, and the incarnation, on the other. Man having fallen, any suitable rewards were impossible. Where was the righteousness to reward? God could give a law, but who would keep it? He could fully show his approbation of righteousness only by the appearance of his beloved Son, in whom he is well pleased. Thus "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness." Sin so deep as man's was is as fatal to a system of rewards as to a system of punishments. The atonement was needed to fulfil the end of the former as much as of the latter.

But how about the personal ends of rewards? How is this reached in the atonement system? We answer: *By faith.* Just as the sinner says: "I do not suffer for the condemnation of my sins, but I humbly accept the condemnation that comes through the sufferings of Christ," which is faith "resting in the blood"; so, in view of Christ's righteousness, he says: "I possess no righteousness that can be rewarded, but I endorse, and love, and trust in that righteousness which is worthy of the highest reward," which is faith resting on the righteousness of Christ. By faith we trust in Jesus, not as a mere person, but as the one who possesses a pure and spotless righteousness, the only one who *deserves* heavenly bliss. When we think of heaven as a reward, we think of Jesus, and of his transcendent worth. Then it is right for us to enjoy heaven because we accept it as the reward of righteousness. Our acceptance of Christ points us out as proper participants in the glory which is his well-earned reward. The righteousness is not ours by achievement, but ours by dependence. The position of a sinner enjoying the fruits of Christ's merit is nowise repugnant to conscience, for there is a reason for it. It is not a case of partiality. He stand among the lovers of righteousness, himself not righteous inherently, but in the depths of his soul, *adherent* to righteousness and the righteous Lamb of God. For no other sinner would it be right, even if it were possible, to enjoy that bliss which is the reward of Jesus. Thus "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth."

We close with a few words on the satisfaction of divine justice. The human conscience, if it is anything, is a copy of the divine conscience. We are like God in our perception of right and wrong and our sense of justice. This is our foundation for the knowledge of God's moral attributes. But we must be sure to draw our conclusions from an unperverted conscience. If we have done so in the preceding pages, it follows that the satisfaction which divine justice receives in the atonement arises from its overwhelming con-

demnation of sin, and a corresponding approbation of righteousness; sin being reprobated with a moral force exceeding that which would attend the everlasting punishment of all sinners, and righteousness being vindicated with a glory that could hardly beam from rewarding a universe of righteous men. Here is one of the wonders of redemption, that even salvation can be made to satisfy justice. The Eternal Monarch, humbling himself to save rebels, accomplishes in his infinite condescension more for justice than if he had bared his right arm for justice without mercy. The loving heart, shrinking from the pain of punishing, accepts the pain of humiliation, and saves the lost.

Is not then God's so-called "obligation" to make atonement just this, that being able to satisfy his attribute of justice by the atonement, it cannot be that his other attribute of love should fail of the satisfaction of saving sinners? It must be that he who can, *will* make atonement. In other words, the atonement is God-like.

ARTICLE VII.

CONSCIENCE, ITS RELATIONS AND OFFICE.

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We are sometimes startled by the profound significance of words, by the precision with which they etymologically penetrate to the root of the idea indicated, and lay open its essential features. It seems, either as if those who first applied them must have possessed wonderful insight into things, or as if, by some force or law of growth in themselves, they had come to cover and hold with strange perspicuity the germs of knowledge. Thus the word "consciousness" expresses a sort of double knowing — a knowing with one's self, a knowing that one knows, which is the essential feature of what it designates. This two-sided character of knowledge, by which

it awakens the mind to the inner and the outer at once, by which, in the same act, it contains both the object and subject of thought, and is able thus to resolve the simple phrase "I know," into the two "I know," and "I know that I know," is the peculiar and subtile feature of mental phenomena. Herein are not two acts of knowing, but each act, that it may be an act of knowledge, implies the recognition by the mind of its own processes, a union of these inward to the centre of thought, as well as outward to its object — a knowing together, a bi-polar knowledge pointing in two directions.

From this word another, closely allied, yet radically distinct, has sprung by gradual separation — conscience. Designating the faculty by which we discern right and wrong, it also implies a second or double knowing, a knowing of action in its moral as well as in its natural qualities. There is here even more perfect accuracy of thought than in the word "consciousness." There is strictly no additional, no second act of knowledge in consciousness. We merely mark by the word one of the two aspects which belongs to every simple act of knowing or of feeling. The conscience, on the other hand, does give a second, a more penetrative perception ; we know within ourselves, with ourselves, that an action, previously seen by the eye and recognized by the intellect in its motives and consequences, is right. This idea of conscience, testified to by the etymology of the word, as that of a power which imparts a direct knowledge of moral quality, we accept ; and proceed to inquire into the relations and offices of this faculty.

The first of these relations is that of conscience to our moral nature. This power by which we perceive the right, is the foundation of morals in our constitution, — is that, and that only, which imparts moral quality to our actions and to our feelings. Without this perception, moral action or affection is impossible ; with it, a moral element enters freely into our whole intellectual and emotional life. The perception itself, though simple, has both an intellectual and an emotional element. These are inseparable. The oughtness and

the rightness are but the two phases under which the one idea develops itself — the expression of the effect of the moral quality of action on the feelings and perception respectively. The sense of obligation cannot exist, cannot arise, without the intuition to which it is attached; the intuition cannot be present without bringing with it the obligation. The only oughtness, the only coercion of law and interior pressure of authority, is that of conscience. The only intuition which reveals duty, declares what it is, and guides us into it, is that of right given by the conscience.

This faculty, so single in its perception, gives a law to action, and thus through disobedience, the occasion of the feelings of guilt, shame, apprehension, remorse; and through obedience a sense of approval, of ineffable satisfaction. In the disobedience of another, it gives the occasion of contempt, dislike, indignation; in the obedience of another, of admiration, trust, sympathy, love. So far as this quality is present, and it pervades all rational action, it furnishes the ground for a new, a moral element in our feelings; and thus these become affections instead of mere passions. Love without the beauties of moral worth to call it forth and sustain it, is a passion; with these, an affection. Our moral nature, our moral affections are not, then, so much a certain portion of our faculties as our whole nature made capable of a moral mood by the possession of the one faculty, the one power of perception expressed by conscience. This one faculty at once lifts our entire nature into a higher realm, makes it capable of new perceptions, new judgments, new feelings, brings it under a nobler law, lays upon it great responsibilities, and wraps up in its ordinary action issues of infinite compass and reach.

A second relation of this power is to our intellectual nature. The conscience is an intellectual faculty; its action is one of knowing. Of it itself, little more needs to be said or can be said, than that it is the ability of directly perceiving a single, simple, original quality. It does, however, stand in peculiar relations to the other intellectual faculties, quicken-

ing and calling them forth in an unusual degree. The conscientious man, one in whom conscience finds full activity, cannot be otherwise than the thoughtful, reflective man. The action of conscience is, indeed, a second knowing, and must be preceded, therefore, by a first knowing. Right is not perceived in actions as actions, but in them as rational actions; that is, as springing from certain motives and leading to certain consequences. As it is this rational element alone that makes them capable of the quality, right, and determines in each given instance its presence or absence, the perception, the intuitive action of conscience, must be preceded by a thorough inquiry into the motives and results of action before it can safely pronounce a verdict. This investigation is not the very act of conscience, but furnishes the knowledge preliminary thereto; and, as it extends over the whole field of human conduct, over all the direct and indirect consequences of action, the theories and experiences of individual and social well-being, of present and future, of physical and spiritual good, conscience necessarily calls forth and greatly quickens the other intellectual faculties. Self-interest even is not so broad, persistent, and exacting in its inquiries as the fully aroused conscience. For the mind to fall short of faithfulness in the inquiries it prosecutes at the bidding of conscience is not loss merely, but sin. To neglect another's interest is equally fatal as the neglect of one's own. It is the conscience, above all faculties, which puts every kind and form of knowledge into immediate use in solving those problems of private and public good with which it is constantly compelled to busy itself. The conscientious mind is the most thorough, painstaking, and scrutinizing of all minds, since every faculty becomes at once and perfectly instrumental.

Even more intimate is the relation of conscience to the will. The presence of the perception of right implies, calls for, and helps to give, the concomitant power of choice. It implies it, since no action is capable of a moral quality that is not free. Freedom is the antecedent condition without

which no course of action comes under the supervision of conscience. No one, therefore, could use this perception as regards his own or another's conduct, except as the power of choice had preceded it. The moral law also calls for freedom, since it waits for adoption, and furnishes by the blessings attendant thereon a compensation for all the risks of liberty, for all the evils of sin. Still further, this perception of right in some measure gives liberty, or rather, the conditions of choice. Between things like in kind there is no opportunity for the exercise of choice. Five dollars cannot be chosen instead of ten dollars, considered simply as so much purchasing power, as commanding, the first, half, the second, twice, the pleasures of the other. To take the five in place of the ten would be caprice, not liberty. Thus all things which can be brought to the simple standard of pleasure, of sensibility gratified, admit of definite comparison, and therein exclude freedom. There is no possible motive for accepting the less in room of the greater pleasure, considered simply as a pleasure. A power to do this would be one of the most worthless and fortuitous of faculties. No wonder that those who accept happiness as the only aim of action usually deny true liberty to the will. Right, on the other hand, is able to present to the choice a real alternative. We may choose those actions which contain it, an indulgence of those affections which give play to it, as opposed to any and every other form of enjoyment. The two objects compared can no longer be brought to a common standard, and there pronounced upon as greater or less, thereby excluding a choice between them. We cannot compare odors by length nor colors by weight; no more can we measure obligation on the scale of the intensity of organic impression — the degree and duration of the accompanying pleasure. Right remains incomparable with all other things, unmeasured by them, unexpressed in them, and thus open to choice as opposed to less or more of them. The moral quality of a feeling separates it utterly from any appetitive and passionate pleasure, and enables it to present a true, a rational alternative of choice

to any and every form of indulgence. Thus right and liberty are reciprocally conditions of each other; each nugatory without the other, and together constituting the very centre and framework of our spiritual manhood.

It is through this connection with the will that conscience becomes the strength and support of character. A yielding to appetite and passion is, indeed, a surrender of the will. The power of choice is laid aside, and the mind is left the sport of impulses, carried whithersoever these bear it. Only is will, true choice, called forth when the moral alternative is presented. Herein is the true, the only exercise of liberty, and the conscience consolidates character, erects and guides the manhood, because it gives just and constant discipline to the will, and confers on choice the regency of the impulses. Only on condition of taking wisdom and virtue to its counsels can the will itself reign; otherwise its dominion is quickly lost amid the clamor of fitful appetites, dominant passions, and desires fortified by habit. The true foundations of strength, therefore, are found in the conscience.

A fourth relation of conscience is to our physical faculties. There is the semblance, and only the semblance, of human in brute action. Instincts and appetites, gauged with precision to the wants of the animal, constitute almost exclusively its impelling and governing powers. There is left little demand or play for reasoning. The laws of association do, indeed, seem to hold in the brute mind, enabling it to receive a limited measure of instruction, to form habits, and to present the appearance of reflection and judgment where these are not present. An oversight of the effects of this primary and simple law of mental phenomena leads to some strange misinterpretations and exaltation of the actions of animals. The fact that a dog, punished for an act, manifests on its repetition a sense of fear, skulking from the presence of his master, is made the ground on which to ascribe to it a sense of guilt with the shame consequent thereon. We might as well refer fear to the aspen, because its leaves tremble.

The incitements and checks of the animal organism are

mainly placed in itself, acting, if not mechanically yet spontaneously, for the government of its life. When, then, we find in man a moral law, with the power of choice to make it effective, we expect to see it superseding this pupilage of instincts and balanced appetites, and claiming for itself that guidance, that control, which is its primary function. There is, therefore, attendant on conscience a loss of instincts, a limitation of the organic guidance of appetite, the opportunity, and thus the necessity, of inquiring into and enforcing the laws of individual and social life. This regal power of conscience enters our constitution with displacement and modification of those blinder and more mechanical forces which hold sway in lower life.

But the immediate physical consequences of moral power are not less important than these its antecedent conditions. Habits are spoken of as constituting a second nature. The expression is apt, not merely as showing their force, but also their relation to ourselves. They are indeed a *second* nature. They are the settling down of government into fixed authoritative forms. By them we pass from an incipient to a completed, from a germinant to a developed, state. They take action out from the constant arbitrament of choice, from under the judicial decision of judgment and conscience, and, with an organic power like that of precedent, cause it to assume a constant, reliable form. The judgments of the mind, the lines of action it accepts, are thus issuing physically in those habits which assume the organic control of a second nature, not easily modified or resisted. We may thus say that conscience is making for us a new physical manhood, better or worse than our first nature, according as its authority is the lapse and defeat, or the victory of wisdom. If we add to this voluntary nature and increasing hold of habit the belief that the spirit is ultimately to receive new physical habiliments in keeping with its character and power, we arrive at the conclusion that the body that is here given us, is but a loaned capital, does but afford standing, by means of which our truer selves, our moral and voluntary faculties,

win and shape the instruments of a fuller, more enduring life. The body is said to outgrow disease. The purified spirit outgrows the body in its evils and limitations, and is ready by its own action under divine law for more perfect physical faculties. The life of the individual is not so short but that something of this tendency is often, in spite of physical decay, revealed; while a truly moral community, expounding and enforcing with thorough and conscientious inquiry all God's laws of life, would, in a succession of generations, exhibit physical results even in this limited field, revealing the close dependence of the lower on the higher.

Nor are the external relations of conscience less important than those now presented. From it arises that sense of justice which is the chief support of law. The adjective and the noun, just and justice, have a broader and a more limited meaning. In the first, they signify that which is equal, fit, right, and are essentially synonyms with right and righteousness. Thus the righteousness and the justice of God are spoken of as interchangeable ideas, and when the second term is felt to be somewhat more limited in its application, the nature and extent of the restriction are often not clearly seen. If we would assign each class of words a definite office, we shall be able to do it only in their connection with law. In addition to its scientific use, by which it signifies an order of action among natural forces, law has two allied but diverse meanings in morals. The law of conscience and the law of God have this in common, that each indicates and enjoins a certain line of action; and this difference, that the one makes no mention of penalties, and that the other is enforced by penalties and rewards, directly mentioned or tacitly assumed. In the stricter sense, law is a command enforced by sanctions; in the broader sense, a simple command, though left only to intrinsic rightfulness and natural results for its exposition and authority. Righteousness is the obedience of law in its broad, moral sense. Justice pertains to the establishment and enforcement of wise law in its more restricted, its governmental sense.

The strictly natural penalties of moral law, the rebuke of conscience, the sense of shame, of remorse, the obliquity and depravity of nature and consequent suffering which follows sin, are hardly thought of or spoken of as just or unjust. These consequences are looked on as inevitable. The connection is said to be one of nature, and is rarely regarded as such a direct ordination of God as to call forth the judgment of just or unjust. The word "justice," when we are seeking for its strict and peculiar meaning, is found to pertain to law in its limited sense as a command with declared sanctions. Concerning such a law the question of justice may arise at two points: as to the right of the lawgiver to command at all, to lay any penalty; as to the fitness of laying the very penalty laid. In answering the first inquiry, the rightfulness of the authority whose commands are under discussion, we are thrown back on purely moral grounds, on the decisions of our moral nature as to duty under the relations which we sustain to our fellow-men and to God. Here again, therefore, justice and righteousness mean the same thing, and to say of a government that it is just, is the same as to say of it that it is righteous — that its existence and claims are in accordance with our moral constitution, in accordance with individual and social exigencies, and that its action, therefore, has the sanction of conscience.

When we speak of the justice of a particular law, we refer to the wisdom of the end it proposes, and of the means, the penalties by which it seeks to reach that end. If it goes beyond the wants of the parties concerned, if it imposes a penalty disproportionate to the exigency, we say that it is an unjust law. Here evidently the question is one of wisdom; whether the particular government in itself just, has wisely settled its own province, defined its own duties, and sagaciously, with due moderation and severity, fitted its motives to the results to be reached, bringing sufficient incentives to the individual and sufficient safety to the community.

Here also, as in the previous case, the sense of justice rests back on the sense of right. We have not merely to do

with correctness or error, as in a mathematical solution, but with the moral obligation of the lawgiver to be wise, correct in his command. If the given law falls short of its office, or overpasses it, there is wrong with the ruler — that failure in duty to which we give the particular name of injustice; and the law which reveals this delinquency, we call an unjust law.

Our sense of justice, then, is nothing more nor less than our sense of right called into exercise in connection with law in its limited, civil meaning. When we evoke the authority of law, of immutable justice, of human or of divine government, we do but take an appeal under other words to our moral nature, — to that sense of right whose sanction it is that converts the wise into the obligatory way, gives to words new authority, and presses the mind with a feeling of unmeasured dangers and unescapable guilt.

Law and justice would be merely words with no more reverberation in them, no more searching power in awakening and multiplying the echoes, the responses of the spiritual nature, than the catchwords of the market, than price and profits, if it were not for their latent hold on the conscience, compelling us to feel that obedience is not bought or sold — is not measured by the attendant sanctions; that these are rather the signals lifted up, held forth, to indicate the sacred character of the law, of whose presence they warn us, and whose authority they bid us honor. They are regal insignia, not royalty itself.

It is the prior existence of a moral law in our constitution, able to brand disobedience with guilt, to give an undeniable and inalienable character to moral action, which imparts to the precepts of parental, civil, and divine law, that authority whose existence we recognize in the word "justice." Without this the penalties of law, social and civil, would have only the character of that pain or pleasure which follows the violation or observance of a natural law. The punishments of the state would no more beget the sense of criminality, than do the sufferings of indigestion or the smart of a

wound. They would be looked on as simply artificial guards and guides to those laws of action which the social health requires, as the indications of our nerves of feeling are to those of physical well-being.

So strong is the claim which justice establishes, that some have supposed it an immutable one, not to be remitted without violence to our moral constitution. This is an error in exactly the opposite direction from that which regards it as merely a retaliatory impulse without peculiar authority. If the relation now pointed out between our conscience and justice is correct, if the sense of justice is only the approval which our moral nature gives the particular law, or the given penalty, then there is no such thing as an absolute, immutable claim of justice which must under all circumstances be met. The law, the penalty, are correct, because fitted by a legitimate authority to a desired end; and it is the nature of the end, and the circumstances under which it is to be secured, which determines the wisdom of the law and of its penalties. A law is a method of meeting a moral, a social, a governmental exigency, and has no other intrinsic fitness or authority than that which springs from the office it discharges. Mercy not only may, but ought to, supersede its penalty, if this can be done in consistency with the interests protected, the objects aimed at.

The claims neither of justice nor mercy are imperative, undeniable. Both admit of consideration, are submitted to the exigencies of the particular case, interpreted by wisdom, and enforced by conscience.

That the sense of justice is only the sense of guilt springing from our moral constitution, brought in to aid the enforcement of law, removing the feeling of cruelty, harshness, hardness, in needful punishment, and giving the judicial process the sanction of profound approval and of great interests, is apparent when we look at the relation between guilt and punishment. There is no parity, no basis of comparison between them. A certain amount of physical or mental suffering, a year's imprisonment, or an hour's expos-

ure in the stocks, have no connection with one degree of guilt more than with another. Who can say what measure of crime finds a natural, a precise equivalent in forty stripes? The two elements of moral quality and suffering are unlike, are incomparable, not open to the judgment of equal or unequal. It is not till we introduce a third element that there is any combination between them, any expression of the one in the other. The moment we consider the end for which punishment is instituted, disciplinary or civil, we have that by which we may grade it to guilt. The fine of one hundred dollars may be a motive sufficient to restrain one class of crimes, while solitary confinement or death itself may be required to check another. The punishment is now regarded as a motive designed to act on the minds of a certain class of persons, and its efficiency or inefficiency admits of an adequate test. The penalty which is sufficient, and no more than sufficient, to accomplish the purpose for which it is instituted, is the just penalty, that is, the penalty whose infliction our moral nature approves, and comes in to soften to our feelings, to grace, to honor with the dread dignity of a moral necessity.

There now springs up the opportunity for a rough, numerical relation. If one year's confinement as the penalty of a given crime is taken as the unit of comparison, then we may affirm that six months or two years belong to other offences, as in our judgment they fall below or transcend in guilt the crime whose punishment has been already fixed. Yet this calculation, so pleasing to our mathematical faculties, which seems about to reduce justice to a standard of weights and measures, suffers speedy arrest even in the coarse exigencies of civil society.

It is found necessary to treat a crime like smuggling with great severity; not because of any peculiar moral obliquity it involves, but because of the unusual facilities afforded for it. Here again, the test of the adequacy of punishment afforded by the end in view comes forward, and severe penalties are threatened as the only sufficient motives to arrest

an action for which there are peculiarly inviting opportunities. The heavy penalty stands as a simple counterpoise in the mind to strong temptation.

If there were any such thing as accurate and absolute justice, a universal and constant claim on the mind for so much suffering as a compensation for so much sin, how must this great, exacting, and profound feeling be tortured by all that is occurring in the discipline and government found in the world; like penalties bestowed on parties of very diverse character and guilt, on the ground of a formal, external agreement of action; and the same punishment to the physical eye resting with very unequal weight on guilty parties, the callousness of repeated transgression enabling some to bear the infliction with little feeling, and the sensitiveness of comparative innocence leaving others to be touched to the very quick by the inflictions of law, and to fret into their very flesh its tough thongs. For a keen, precise sense of justice to deal thus in human pains, to match guilt and suffering in this gross way, would be as unfitting as to traffic in precious stones on the rough scales of the provision market. Such a sense in a world like this, would be, could be, only a sense of suffering, — an eye so laid open to coarse contact that, for the tears with which it was constantly bedewed, and the pain it perpetually felt, it could see to no practical purpose. Such an exact, absolute, and unyielding sense of justice is altogether fanciful, would stamp absurdity and iniquity on God's government, and present a most painful and impossible standard of excellence. Even the doctrine of limited atonement, while retaining a part of such an idea, yields the greater share.

How inadequate also is such a form of justice for the ends of discipline. The sensitiveness of the individual may render punishment unnecessary, or his hardness require it to be greatly increased. It is the character to be acted upon, the diverse effects of diverse treatment on different temperaments, the motives to be overcome, that define the wise, the right way of discipline, of stimulus and restraint, and not the

inherent guilt of the action treated. An accurate sense of what is sometimes called justice, that is the notion of precise and measurable ill-deserts in every sin, requiring equally definite amounts of punishment, would tend, in a large measure, to dispense with wisdom, with mercy, patience, love, and make government a mechanical contrivance of exact compensations regularly and unscrupulously administered. The modicum of truth on which such a notion of law and justice rests is, that guilt, moral quality, is always one of the weighty elements to be considered in discipline, yet to be treated in each case according to the end proposed, and the means at hand for reaching it. To make the sense of justice exact and imperative, is as fatal a mistake as to ascribe the same quality to mercy, and insist on constant and absolute forgiveness. Every impulse must submit itself ultimately to the government of wisdom and conscience. An authority which should insist on its penalties after the occasion for them was past, would be as unjust and tyrannical as one which should in the first instance establish and inflict them without occasion. The first justification and the exclusive support of a penalty is the purpose it subserves in individual and social discipline, while the sense of justice is the approval which our moral nature gives to such penalties. That there must be fixed amounts of penal suffering because there have been certain amounts of sin, is a pure fiction of our logical faculties under a perverted rendering of our moral nature, and a notion as practically absurd and impossible to be realized as it is theoretically false. If such a virtue as this imaginary justice could exist, it would only be by the entire exclusion of our nobler affections and sympathies, and by the exclusive devotion of omniscience and omnipotence to its execution.

If, however, we look upon the administration of justice as a protective and disciplinary process sustained by conscience, its defects and irregularities, so far as they indicate no overlooking of crime, no disregard of it, are of little account. Very diverse portions of pain and pleasure enter into the

training of different individuals with such varying opportunities and liabilities, as often show the apparently more favorable position hardly, after all, to be chosen. The varieties of suffering, therefore, which come to us in a penal way are scarcely to be regretted, provided they express in a clear form the moral quality of conduct, and thus enter as healthy constituents into a course of training. Growth is not so delicate a process that a large variety of circumstances may not contribute to it, many minor conditions be overlooked by it, many unexpected compensations be developed through it. The granite foundations, then, of government, of justice, rest on conscience, yet foundations not so immovable that they cannot be shaped to the superstructure, broadened and contracted as the exigencies of the entire plan require.

Justice applies only to a portion of the acts that are righteous; namely, those which pertain to the enforcement of law. It is neither more nor less pliant than righteousness, being in its true form a phase of righteousness. Regarded as a simple impulse to execute righteous law, it must submit to correction and guidance, like every other impulse. Righteousness is an aspect of conduct most flexible, since it faithfully considers and suffers itself to be affected by every variety of circumstances and change of relation. To put out the eyes of justice, and fill its mouth with a stubborn clamor for blood, as for a debt incurred and impossible to be cancelled, is to divorce it from righteousness, in wedlock with which alone has it any authority.

A second external relation affected by conscience is that to God. It is his and our moral nature which is the ground of our intimate connection with God and our peculiar duties to him. It is this that lays deep in our very constitution a sense of the obedience which we owe to his law, and makes the accusation of guilt before him so appalling to us, an attitude so dread, so disastrous, beyond all compare of calamity. It is thus that the judgment rendered of God against us makes provision in our condemned hearts for its own fearful execution, becomes by its moral power like a

barbed and poisoned arrow rankling in the soul, piercing more deeply with every remorseful throe in our effort to escape, — with every burst of impatience in the sullen struggle of endurance. The sanctions of the divine law, without this hold on the conscience, without this ultimate appeal taken in the very soul against the soul, would resolve themselves into a simple series of physical disasters, pitiful, but not dreadful; miserable, but not execrable.

So also the moral nature of God, his holiness, is the ground of worship. Power, knowledge, wholeness of intellectual attributes may evoke admiration, but nothing save a still higher wholeness, save holiness, can call forth worship. It is the moral nature which gives character that absolute excellence, to which it is our highest duty, and most expressive of our worth, to bow the head in adoration. Wonder is displaced by love, admiration changes into adoration, reverence into worship, as the eye, passing beyond the attributes, rests on the righteousness of God.

Conscience also is a chief means of revealing God to us. Skill, contrivance, adaptation, might show themselves in his works; intellect might answer to intellect, but the weightier aims, methods, and discipline of his moral government would be hidden from us but for conscience. Sinai would have no thunder tone, and Calvary no still voice to move forever, like the breath of heaven, on the depths of the spirit. The deep and the gentle surges of the soul would fall to sleep, the whole nature be choked and shallowed by slimy and sensuous deposit. The voice of heaven is gathered and echoed in the chambers of conscience, and thus it becomes the ear opening outward and sending inward the sharp command and cheering approval.

Conscience is the power which enables us to apprehend the holiness of God; to hold any doctrine, to entertain any belief concerning his character, decrees, actions, that violates our sense of right, is as wrong as to suppose that we understand his methods and government when they present themselves to us as unwise and irrational. Human reason enables

us to comprehend the rationality of divine action, conscience its righteousness. When his conduct seems to us unreasonable or his judgments unjust, we may be sure that the adjustments of the instruments of our vision are imperfect, that we have not brought the intellectual or the moral telescope to a perfect focus, and hence the obscurity and contradiction. To say this is God's way, while the traces of folly or of wrong remain in it, is to check inquiry and mar truth; is to exculpate God by the plea of omnipotence; is to suppose it among the immunities of Deity to be permitted to do less well than man; is to sanctify tyranny by its grandeur and power, or to atone for the laxity of justice by the generous prodigality of grace. Conscience is the only glass in which God's moral character and government can be mirrored; and in proportion as this is brought to a perfect surface and complete reflection will all his ways be found fit and proportionate. Divine wisdom and law will reveal themselves in the soul according as it holds to the heavens a pure and unsullied conscience.

The moral nature of God is also the condition of our faith and love. It is the characteristic of integrity that there is in it an implied pledge and promise of what will under all variety of circumstances be done. Physical forces hold in themselves, as causes, future results. So far as we are able to anticipate these effects, to read them in the agents now at work, we call our conclusions our belief. When, however, the ground of our judgment is not physical facts, but character, the trust-worthiness of an individual, we call the feeling of repose, faith. Faith, then, is an adjunct of our moral nature. It is the righteousness of God on which faith rests; the soundness of his moral health, on which he would have us pillow our spiritual hopes. Thus it is that faith is antecedent to love, to every perfect form of moral feeling, since it implies always the recognition of integrity, of that sound, moral life which is afterward ready to give complete and sympathetic play to every affection. Faith is the key-note of that harmony in which all pure spirits unite.

We only wish further to point out the connection of conscience with science and philosophy. There is a scientific spirit which, having made great conquests in the physical world, overlooks the impassable gulf which separates this from the strictly intellectual region, and expects, by kindred research, by investigation of the instruments and adjuncts of mind, of brain, nerve, and cranium, of organic development, to reach equally important and reliable results in philosophy. It is not within the scope of comparative anatomy or natural history to determine man's rank in the spiritual world. The scalpel, however skilfully plied, can neither lay open or approximate mental action; it is not in physiology to settle the problems of ethics and religion. It is a small step toward determining his true rank to classify man by physical characteristics in the genus bi-mana. In the lower kingdom of organic life he may fall there, but in the higher kingdom of spiritual powers he may rank a little lower than the angels.

The problems of mind can only be settled within their own province, in the metaphysical region to which they belong; and he is both blind and impotent who strives either to find or solve them elsewhere. They can no more be felt on the head, searched out in the physical framework, seen in the brain, laid open with nice dissection, picked up with delicate nippers, traced in embryonic growth, or discovered in the stages of organic progress, than can be thus treated the existence and attributes of God.

We might as well say that the inspiration of a prophet, or the divinity of Christ is a question of physical formation and scientific classification, as that the rank of man is thus to be assigned him. In claiming the heirship of faith, we simply laugh at the weapons of the anatomical room. In this regard, it matters very little whether we "have ever seen the human brain" or not, as in it is to be found neither the mind, nor any representation, map, or feature of it. Let the students of science cut away diligently, compare men and apes; it is pleasant to know the kith of the body and its

relations as a physical structure. This knowledge we appreciate; but let them not fancy that herein they answer, or even reach, the questions of philosophy. If metaphysics is an obscure and uncertain region, so much the worse for all of us, for here, and here only, can the questions most intimate to man be answered. The conceit of philosophy may be astonishing, but it is modesty compared with the conceit of science, which grazing the field of facts with prone face, neither looking inward nor upward, yet ventures to declare the laws and mode of the invisible mind and the infinite God.

More wisely and more fatally do those proceed who, like Mill, Bain, and Spencer, strive in the realm of mind itself to reduce its moral phenomena to reflection and association, to the conscious and unconscious results of purely perceptive, intellectual processes. The conscience, with its direct, indisputable, original authority, with its unique and weighty intuition, with its control and modification and exaltation and spiritualization of the entire intellectual framework, is thereby lost. It can serve no longer as the nucleus of an wholly new character, as the ground of a position in classification removed by a heaven-wide space from that occupied by every animal destitute of that faculty. Here lies the gulf between the brute and man, one not to be bridged over or gone round by a stroke of science, an estimate of the length of the arms, of facial angles, or the cubic inches of sand that can be poured into skull-cavities.

If the possession of conscience, with the power and relations now assigned it, can be established in philosophy, it affords the condition of a new and nobler being. It constitutes a difference not of quantity, but of quality, not of degrees, but of kind; cuts man off from the highest of sagacious brutes, and unites him to spiritual beings, those who inhabit the realms of duty and worship.

The intellect is simply instrumental, a noble instrument truly, yet working for earthly purposes, and giving no sure promise of anything beyond them. The conscience is not

instrumental, it lays an absolute and unqualified law on the soul, not based on present and transient conditions, not a mere adaptation of means to ends, but with a scope and stretch like that of eternity. Is it strange that that which is the central power of our spiritual constitution should afford the best argument for immortality? The moral kingdom is here and now incomplete, chaotic; hence the undeniable inference that we wait another, a moral creation. Nor is the argument less weighty, that the law of conscience is not fitted as instinct or interest for the brief circle of this life, but demands longer periods to bring round its results. It works with an authority and scope of method that would be both fatal and ridiculous if it contemplated only a few dozen of years. What sublimity of folly in the attitude of every martyr, if the law which compels death has in it no promise of life, if it simply supplies the soul with one mighty purpose wherewith to dash itself on annihilation, and have an eternal end! What an absurdity, a law whose very victory is extinction; which fortifies the mind with the sense of immutable necessity, of God-like obedience, only thereby to thrust it the sooner into nonentity. This is to suppose that the breath of holy and devout impulse, which fans the soul as from the presence of God, is here only to wreck it the more quickly on the rocks of time.

While the intuition of right is by no means the only point at which insight is claimed for the mind, it nevertheless is more influential and central in determining the nature and assigning the rank of man than any other original idea. Of the remaining intuitions, some do but complete and make rational our perceptive processes: Such are those of existence, number, space, time. Others accompany and give play to this intuition of right: Such are liberty and the infinite. Without the perception of right, all our higher intuitions would have no power radically to modify our constitution, or make of us new creatures with new objects and characters. Without the law of right, liberty would be aimless and worthless, the perception of beauty have no purifying influence,

the knowledge of God no redemptive power. Conscience, then, we say, is the central feature of philosophy, and the grand spiritual attribute of man. To assault this faculty from the physical world is absurd; to confound its perceptive with the reflective processes, its authority with the blind, irrational influence of association, the most grievous of philosophical mistakes, the most perverse of moral errors. All our faculties, thereby, like those of the brute, sink into simple instruments wherewith we provide our pleasures. The only difference is in the breadth of forecast, the diversity of resources, the variety of choices. Love no longer casts out fear, but sinks as a motive to a level with it. As it is equally just to save a dollar and to make one, so it becomes alike noble to shun the suffering of punishment, and to gain the pleasure of virtue. All that manhood requires is to keep the intellectual scales adjusted and dusted, weighing to a grain of happiness the pleasures of appetite, passion, and affection, of body and of soul, of conviction and of delusion, of love and revenge, of the present and the future, and, footing the columns and finding remainders, to make them the guides of life, till the fruits of some new experience, falling into the scale, give the lie to past calculations.

The chief advantage of this boastful mechanism of rational guidance over the simple, unerring instinct of the beaver, would seem to be in self-consciousness, yet a consciousness forever vexed with the labor, perplexity, and futility of its reasonings; a sensorium habitually pained by the processes that bring it into play, yet more often leave it baffled and disappointed.

Such is the nature, the internal and external relations of conscience; we have only to speak further of its office and method of cultivation. Beginning with that which is most obvious, yet, perhaps, less intimate and essential to the very faculty itself than those which remain, we mention guidance as its first office. Conscience does not take the place of wisdom, does not limit or render unneedful the fullest play of all intellectual faculties. Quite the reverse. It makes

thorough and sincere inquiry obligatory, as also its conclusions, and thus puts the processes and results of investigation under profounder motives and weightier sanctions.

Conscience neither renders wisdom superfluous nor is itself rendered superfluous by it. It is essential to wisdom, since it quickens thought, makes it a duty, and lends authority to its judgments. Thought is essential to conscience, as it does not discuss the quality of right in the dark, but in the light, in action unfolded in all its relations and bearings. The perceptions of conscience and the results of reflection more and more perfectly blend as the healthy mind grows in strength; and the wisdom and rectitude of action become as closely united in the spiritual life as light and heat in the sun's rays.

Yet conscience as a guide is not restricted in its penetrative power to the simple processes of reflection. Actions reveal their character to this faculty beyond the power of the mind distinctly to trace their consequences. The moral feelings, the affections, serve as delicate tests of the moral quality of courses of conduct. While we cannot see by our emotions, we can by means of them. There is a sympathetic echo and response of the affections to the qualities of an act which often constitutes a safe test of its character. The feelings may be likened to the mirror by which light is thrown on the object in the focus of the microscope, enabling the eye to penetrate it more deeply, and see what is in it more perfectly. The moral emotions light up the mind, and enable it, with less difficulty and more certainty, with an instinctive sympathy, to discern the moral quality of actions. Conscience, therefore, is a more correct guide than simple wisdom can be, though dependent upon the reflective faculties for all its steps of investigation.

The second office of conscience is to confer a high and peculiar pleasure, even that pleasure which is the chief reward of holiness, which is the full compensation for all that has been or can be endured in the pursuit of right. Without this moral faculty, we can have no transcendent

reward. Prudence will bring a prudential return, wisdom, the consciousness of skill, but only right, the sense of integrity, of moral soundness, of complete manhood. Sink the moral nature to an inquiry after the useful, after happiness, though in the broadest and best sense, and you can, as the result of the establishment and observance of the wisest precepts, only congratulate yourself on your sagacity. If there has been no transcendent law, then there has been no high-toned obedience. If there has been no voice like the voice of God urging you on, then there has been no heavenly virtue. The merit must correspond with, cannot in character surpass, the tone and authority of the faculty whose behests are obeyed. As wisdom is only means to the end of good, it can bring no other satisfaction than that of success.

The most central and essential office of conscience is to construct, to constitute character. Without authoritative law, there can be neither obedience nor disobedience, sin nor holiness. The trial and development of character can only be instituted at this point. Some command somewhere must spring up to call the choice into action, and compel the determination of the man, freely and understandingly, in what we term character. The prohibition of an apple may be sufficient, but some injunction at some point must be found to reveal the soul to itself, and show what it will do. Now, there can be no such law without conscience. There may be commands with threats, but these can offer no other than prudential considerations till they secure a hold on the mind through the conscience, grapple it with moral force, and put distinctly before it in the simple, profound, and unmistakable meaning of the words, the question of obedience or disobedience, right or wrong.

And herein, we think, we see that the accuracy, the absolute correctness of conscience as a guide, is a point, not only not to be insisted on, but one of no great intrinsic moment. If conscience is a mere means, like knowledge, of reaching ends, then, so far as I am misdirected by it, the mistake is calamitous and without compensation; but if it is the primary office

of conscience to give a law to all my faculties, to put them in the compact embrace of character, and under the handling of a moral personality, then the precision and accuracy of each step are of little moment. If my sole object is to get wealth, then every blunder in business is by so much a pure loss; if it is an equal, a superior object to enlarge personal power and develop character, then my errors may be as fruitful to me as my best judgments, and the end of manhood be pursued as prosperously amid disappointments as successes. The entire accuracy of a moral judgment is not the consideration of moment, but that such a judgment has been made, the soul been put under its authority and its discipline, and been started on the career of correction and growth. Indeed, we do not see how it is either possible or desirable that a faculty perfect in its judgments should be associated with faculties imperfect and nascent. The eye even cannot see to purpose till it has been taught by developed scientific thought how and what to see. The conscience cannot discern perfectly the qualities of actions but partially known. Nor does the soul require, nor could it well use, a faculty absolute and complete in its guidance, since, between the partial defective judgments of conscience and its ultimate, its complete decisions lies all that path of growth which every faculty of man's nature requires. That the mind should be put under obligation so to unfold actions as to make its moral decisions correct, perfect, is of infinitely more value to it, than the immediate possession of an accurate conclusion without the growth and discipline of its attainment. Look at literature, look at life, — wherein lies its dramatic power, its liabilities, its hopes and fears, its convergence of motives, but in the moral forces everywhere at work, requiring skilful, adroit, faithful handling? Life is not a primary school under the simple rigor of plain law, following by rote the rule of virtue, but lays upon its pupils the further claim of honesty and thoroughness in their every step of reasoning, of responsibility and growth in the exposition of the very law itself, thus making the response to duty intelligent and

spontaneous. This is the great office of conscience. It puts man upon proof, and gives him the possibility of character, of moral manhood. It tests him by the presence of a command, uncovers sin and defect, pursues him momentarily with the sense of duty, compels him to feel the need of strength, rewards and encourages him in obedience, gives play and firmness to the will, imposes the claim of faithfulness and honesty, supplies the conditions of growth, and, a schoolmaster, leads the harrassed and fretted soul to the bosom of Christ.

The means of cultivating conscience need detain us but a moment. They are indirect. All those inquiries which reveal the results of action, which follow out the ramifications of influence, and trace in detail the consequences, direct and indirect, of conduct, prepare the way for the just decisions of conscience. It is a large part of the office of ethics to establish those principles which enable us with rapidity and precision to determine the bearings of specific acts, and readily assign them to their class. All intellectual discipline, then, and more especially that which reveals the relation and consequences of human conduct, is disciplinary to this faculty.

From the connection of the affections with conscience, we see that all which promotes their health and activity will aid its judgments. Perverted feeling is sure to lead to unfair and partial statements of the bearings of actions, and thus to an unsound estimate of their moral quality. Those affections which make us alive to the interests of others, truly sympathetic, at one with every just and generous impulse, so direct and quicken the intellectual eye, as to enable it to discover readily and certainly the significant features in the solution of moral problems.

The chief discipline of conscience, however, is its constant use in connection with those perfect precepts wherewith the word of God guides and stimulates it. Thereby the faculties instrumentally necessary to it are trained, the heart purified and made to transmit clear light, and the will strengthened

to bring into easy and habitual use the powers in their moral action. The conscience is the centre of the soul and grows with it. No part of our nature can be impaired without throwing weakness in on this seat of life; no part find development under its own law without furnishing strength and light. It belongs to secondary powers and faculties to suffer detached training; the conscience is cultivated by all that develops the soul; it has an interest and a part in the entire circle of growth and discipline.

Such are some of the connections of conscience — of that second, that inner, higher knowing, which rises above the plane of sense, opens to us the spiritual world in the great law of its life, and makes us a part thereof by putting us under the same bonds of duty, partners of the same hopes and fears, with the sons of God, able like them to obey, love, and worship.

ARTICLE VIII.

BIBLICAL NOTES.

BY H. B. HACKETT, D.D., PROFESSOR IN NEWTON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

1. Situation of Haran.

A CONTROVERSY has recently sprung up respecting the situation of the patriarchal Haran, which is not without interest to students of the Bible. It seems that there is a Hârân el-Arwamâd, a little village about four hours east of Damascus, on the border of the lake into which the Barada (Abana) flows. Dr. Beke, an English scholar and traveller, in his "Origines Biblicae" (published in 1834), threw out the idea that the scripture Haran was not in Mesopotamia as generally supposed, but must have been near Damascus. He now maintains, since the unexpected discovery of this Hârân between "Abana and Pharpar, rivers of Damascus," that it must be the identical Haran (or Charran) of the Bible in Aram-Naharim, i.e., Aram of the two rivers (as rendered in the Septuagint, Mesopotamia, Gen. xxiv. 10; Deut. xxiii. 4). In 1861 Dr. Beke made a journey to Palestine, chiefly in order to examine this question on the ground. The argument on which he mainly relies, or at least the one that is likely to impress the reader most, is the fact that Laban in his pursuit of Jacob appears to have travelled from Haran to Gilead on the east of the Jordan in seven days (Gen. xxxi. 23), whereas the actual distance of Haran from Gilead is about three hundred geographical miles, and would make in that country an ordinary journey of fifteen or twenty days. An Arab tribe on its ordinary migrations moves from twelve to fifteen miles a day, and a caravan, from twenty to twenty-three miles a day. On the other hand, it is not a little remarkable that Dr. Beke himself went over the ground, step by step, between Hârân el-Arwamâd and Gilead, and found the time to be five days, which proves to be very nearly the time that Laban was on the way before he overtook Jacob in Gilead.

It must be owned that the rapidity of Laban's pursuit from Haran is not a slight difficulty, and requires for its removal various suppositions which the scripture text may allow, but does not directly suggest. First, we may assume that Laban, taking with him only some of his sons or other near kindred ("his brothers," see Gen. xxxi. 23), was unencumbered with baggage or women and children, and hence moved with all the celerity of which Eastern travelling allows. One party was fleeing and the other pursuing. The chase was a close one, as all the language indicates. Jacob complains that Laban had "followed hotly" after him. The swift dromedaries would be brought into requisition, if the ordinary camels were not swift enough. The speed of these animals is such, says Sir Henry

Rawlinson (who has seen so much of the East), that they "consume but eight days in crossing the desert from Damascus to Baghdad, a distance of nearly five hundred miles." He thinks it unquestionable that Laban could have "travelled the entire distance from Haran to Gilead in seven days" (Athenaeum, April 19, 1862). For examples of the capacity of such camels for making long and rapid journeys, see the Cyclopaedia of Useful Knowledge, Vol. vi. p. 191.

Secondly, the expression (which is entirely correct for the Hebrew) that Laban's journey before coming up with Jacob was a "seven days' journey," is indefinite, and may include eight or nine days as well as seven. "Seven," as Gesenius states, is a round number, and stands in the Hebrew for any number less than ten." A week's time in this wider sense, would bring the distance still more easily within an expeditious traveller's reach.

But whatever may be thought of the possibility of Laban's making such a journey in such time, the difficulty in the case of Jacob would seem to be still greater, since, accompanied as he was with flocks and herds, and women and children, he must have travelled much more slowly. It may be replied to this statement, that the narrative, on closer examination, does not restrict us to the three days which passed before Laban became aware of Jacob's departure, added to the seven days which passed before he overtook Jacob in Gilead. It is very possible that Laban, on hearing so suddenly that Jacob had fled, was not in a situation to follow at once, but had preparations to make which would consume three or four days more; so as in reality to give Jacob the advantage of five or six days before he finally started in pursuit. It is altogether probable, too, that the wary Jacob adopted measures before setting out which would greatly accelerate his flight (see Gen. xxxi. 20). Mr. Porter, who is so familiar with Eastern life, has drawn out this suggestion in a form that appears not unreasonable. Jacob could quickly move his flocks down to the banks of the Euphrates, and send them across the river, without exciting suspicion, since then, as now, the flocks of the great proprietors roamed over a wide region (Gen. xxxi. 1–3). In like manner, before starting himself, he could have sent his wives and children across the river, and hurried them forward with all the despatch which at this day characterizes the Arab tribes fleeing before an enemy (vs. 17–18). All this might take place before Laban was aware of Jacob's purpose; and they were then at least three days distant from each other (vs. 19–22). The intervening region between the Euphrates and Gilead, a distance of two hundred and fifty miles, is a vast plain, with only one ridge of hills; and thus Jacob could now "march forward straight as an arrow." If, as supposed, his flock and family were already in advance, he could travel for the first two or three days at a very rapid pace. "Now I maintain," says this writer, "that any of the tribes of the desert would at this moment, under similar circumstances, accomplish the

distance in ten days, which is the shortest period we can, according to the scripture account, assign to the journey (vs. 22, 23). We must not judge of the capabilities of Arab women and children, flocks and herds, according to our Western ideas and experience" (See Athenaeum, May 22, 1862).

Dr. Beke's other incidental confirmations of his theory are less important. It is urged that unless Abraham was living near Damascus, he could not have had a servant in his household who was called "Eliezer of Damascus" (Gen. xv. 2). The answer to this is that the servant himself may possibly have been born there, and have wandered to the farther East before Abraham's migration; or more probably, may have sprung from a family that belonged originally to Damascus.[1] Mr. Porter illustrates this latter import of the expression from his own experience: "I knew well in Damascus two men, one called Ibrahim el-Halcby, 'Abraham of Aleppo'; and the other Elias el-Akka, 'Elias of Akka,' neither of whom had ever been in the town whose name he bore. Their ancestors had come from those towns; and that is all such expressions usually imply in the East, in Arabic as in Hebrew" (Athenaeum, Dec. 7, 1861).

The coincidence of the name proves nothing as to the identification in question. The name (if it be Arabic) means "arid, scorched," and refers no doubt to the Syrian Hârân, as being on the immediate confines of the desert. The affix Arwamâd, i.e. "columns," comes from five Ionic pillars, forty feet high, which appear among the mud houses of the village (see Porter's Hand-book, ii. p. 497).

Again, the inference from Acts vii. that Stephen opposes Charran to Mesopotamia in such a way as to imply that Charran lay outside the latter, is unnecessary, to say the least; for he may mean equally as well that Abraham was called twice in Mesopotamia, i.e. not only in the part of that province where Charran was known to be, but still earlier in the more northern part of it, known as "the land of the Chaldees," the original home and seat of the Abrahamic race. Not only so, but the latter must be Stephen's meaning, unless he differed from the Jews of his time, since both Philo and Josephus relate that Abraham was called thus twice in the land of his nativity and kindred, and in this view they followed the manifest implication of the Old Testament, as we see from Gen. xv. 7 and Neh. ix. 7 (compare Gen. xii. 1–4).

Dr. Beke found "flocks and sheep, and maidens drawing water at Hârân el-Arwamâd, and felt that he saw the scripture scene of Jacob's arrival, and of the presence of Rachel with "her father's sheep which she kept" re-enacted before his eyes. But this is an occurrence so common in Eastern villages at the present day, especially along the skirts of the desert, that it can hardly be said to distinguish one place from another.

But the reasons for the traditional opinion entirely outweigh those

[1] The "born in my house" of the A. V. (Gen. xv. 3) mistranslates the Hebrew, which means only that Eliezer belonged to Abraham's household.

against it. (a.) The city of Nahor or Haran (Gen. xxiv. 10) is certainly in Aram-Naharim, i.e. "Syria of the two rivers" (in the Auth. Ver., Mesopotamia). This expression occurs also in Deut. xxiii. 4 and Judges iii. 8, and implies a historic notoriety which answers perfectly to the Tigris and Euphrates, but not to rivers of such limited local importance as the Abana and Pharpar, streams of Damascus. (b.) Aram Dammesek (the "Syria Damascena" of Pliny) is the appellation of southern Syria, (see 2 Sam. viii. 6 and Isa. vii. 8), and is a different region from Aram-Naharim, where Haran was. (c.) Jacob in going to Haran went to "the land of the people of the East" (Gen. xxiv. 1), which is not appropriate to so near a region as that of Damascus, and one almost north of Palestine, but is so to that beyond the Euphrates. In accordance with this, Balaam, who came from Aram-Naharim, speaks of himself as having been brought "out of the mountains of the East" (Deut. xxiii. 5; Numb. xxiii. 7). (d.) The river which Jacob crossed in his flight from Laban is termed הַנָּהָר i.e., "the river," as the Euphrates is so often termed by way of eminence (Gen. xxxi. 21; Ex. xxiii. 33; Josh. xxiv. 3, 4, etc.). (e.) The ancient versions (the Targums, the Syriac and the Arabic Pentateuch) actually insert Euphrates in Gen. xxxi. 21, and thus show how familiar the authors were with the peculiar Hebrew mode of designating that river. (f.) The places associated with Haran, as Gozan, Rezeph, Eden (2 Kings xix. 12; Ias. xxxvi. 12) and Canneh (Ezek. xxvii. 23) point to the region of the Euphrates as the seat of this entire group of cities. (g.) Incidental allusions (as in Gen. xxiv. 4–8; xxviii. 20, 21) show that Haran was very far distant from Canaan, whereas Damascus is upon its very border. So too Josephus (Antt. i. 16, § 1) not only places Haran in Mesopotamia, but sets forth its great distance from Canaan, as making Eliezer's journey thither to procure a wife for Isaac, formidable and tedious in the highest degree. (h.) The living traditions connect Abraham's life in Haran with Mesopotamia, and not with Damascus. Mr. Ainsworth, who visited Hârân, says that the people there preserve the memory of the patriarch's history; they tell where he encamped, where he crossed the Euphrates, and how he and his herds found a resting-place at Berôea, now Aleppo.

2. Glorious View from Nebo.

It has been usually thought that the description given of the view which Moses had from Nebo, the top of Pisgah, just before his death, was one addressed to the imagination and not to the eye. Some of the points mentioned may have been seen, it is said, but the others were only suggested. Dean Stanley, among others, has placed the matter in this light. One reason for this impression has been that no summit of the Moab mountains, the Abarim, opposite Jericho, was known to furnish a prospect like that represented as visible from Nebo: "And the Lord showed him all the land of Gilead unto Dan; and all Naphtali, and the land of Ephraim, and

Manasseh; and all the land of Judah unto the utmost sea (the Mediterranean); and the south, and the plain of the valley of Jericho, the city of palm trees unto Zoar" (Deut. xxxiv. 1–3). Hitherto but few travellers comparatively have gone into this trans-Jordanic region. It is surprising how little we have known from actual trial of the possibility of seeing with the natural eye the magnificent panorama which Moses is said to have seen, in his survey of the Promised Land from Nebo. But this question at length has been put to the test. Mr. Tristram, in his recent exploration of a part of the Belka (Land of Israel, 1851), ascended one of "the brows there overlooking the mouth of the Jordan, over against Jericho," from which he beheld a landscape which corresponds remarkably with the biblical representation.

It must be left to his own words to describe the scene: "The brow cannot be less than four thousand five hundred feet, so completely does it overlook the height of Hebron and of central Judea. To the eastward, as we turned round, the ridge seemed gently to slope for two or three miles, when a few small, ruin-clad 'tells' or hillocks (Heshbon, Maîn, and others) broke the monotony of the outline; and then, sweeping forth, rolled in one vast, unbroken expanse, the goodly Belka — one boundless plain, stretching far into Arabia, till lost in the horizon — one waving ocean of corn and grass. Well may the Arabs boast, 'Thou canst not find a country like the Belka.' As the eye turned southwards toward the line of the ridge on which we were clustered, the peak of Jebel Shihân just stood out behind Jebel Attarus, which opened to reveal to us the situation of Kerak, though not its walls. Beyond and behind these, sharply rose Mounts Hor and Seir, and the rosy granite peaks of Arabia faded away into the distance toward Akabah. Still turning westward, in front of us, two or three lines of terraces reduced the height of the plateau, as it descended to the Dead Sea, the western outline of which we could trace in its full extent, from Usdom to Feshkah. It lay like a long strip of molten metal, with the sun mirrored on its surface, waving and undulating in its further edge, unseen in its eastern limits, as though poured from some deep cavern beneath our feet. There, almost in the centre of the line, a break in the ridge and a green spot below marked Engedi, the nest once of the Kenite, now of the wild goat. The fortress of Masada and jagged Shukif rose above the mountain-line, but still far below us, and lower, too, than the ridge of Hebron, which we could trace, as it lifted gradually from the southwest as far as Bethlehem and Jerusalem. The buildings of Jerusalem we could not see, though all the familiar points in the neighborhood were at once identified. This must have been from a slight haze or want of power in our glasses, as the point where we stood is certainly visible from the roof of the English Church at Jerusalem. There was the Mount of Olives, with the church at its top, the gap in the hills leading up from Jericho, and the rounded heights of Benjamin on its other side. Still

turning northward, the eye was riveted by the deep Ghôr, with the rich green islets of Ain Sullân and Ain Dûk — bright twins, nestling, as it were, under the wall of Quarantania (the traditionary scene of Christ's temptation). There, closer still, beneath us, had Israel's last camp extended in front of the green fringe which peeped forth from under the terraces, our foreground. The dark, sinuous bed of the Jordan, clearly defined near its mouth, was soon lost in dim haze. Then looking over it, the eye rested on Gerizim's rounded top; and, further still, opened the plain of Esdraelon, the shoulder of Carmel, or some other intervening height, just showing to the right of Gerizim; while the faint and distant bluish haze beyond it told us that there was the sea, the utmost sea. It seemed as if but a whiff were needed to brush off the haze and reveal it clearly. Northward again, rose the distinct outline of unmistakable Tabor, aided by which we could identify Gilboa and Jebel Duhy. Snowy Hermon's top was mantled with cloud, and Lebanon's highest range must have been exactly shut behind it; but in front, due north of us, stretched in long line the dark forests of Ajlun, bold and undulating, with the steep sides of mountains here and there whitened by cliffs, terminating in Mount Gilead, behind Es-Salt. To the northeast the vast Hauran stretched beyond, filling in the horizon line to the Belka, between which and the (Bashan) there seems to be no natural line of separation. The tall range of Jebel Hauran, behind Bozrah, was distinctly visible."

Moses died in the full possession of his powers, as the historian informs us, and though he mentions as one of the proofs of this that the patriarch's "eye was not dim" at his advanced age, it is striking to observe that he mentions the fact immediately after describing this wide scene which Moses had compassed with his natural eye. Thus, as it were, without thinking of it, he has forestalled an objection which might be supposed to arise in the mind of the reader.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT GERMAN PUBLICATIONS.

FROM OUR GERMAN CORRESPONDENT.

Beginnings of Reformatory Movements in Spain, under Charles V., exhibited from Original Documents of the Inquisition of Toledo.[1] — Some years ago a number of folio volumes of original docu-

[1] Franzisca Hernandez und Frae Franzisco Ortiz: Aufänge reformatorischer Bewegungen in Spanien unter Kaiser Karl V. Aus originalacten des Inquisitionstribunals zu Toledo dargestellt. Von Dr. Edward Böhmer. Leipzig: H. Hassel; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1865. Price, 2 thaler 20 sgr.

ments, recording the proceedings of the Spanish Inquisition, especially in Toledo, fell into the hands of Dr. Edward Böhmer of Halle; and from these he has drawn, among other things, the materials for the work whose title is given above. We have ourselves seen several of the volumes in question, and can testify to their deeply interesting character. Among other documents is a letter addressed by a "heretic" to Philip II. of Spain, with marginal notes in the king's own hand-writing. Franzisca Hernandez and Franzisco Ortiz, concerning whose life-relations to each other and treatment by the Inquisition Dr. Böhmer gives an excellently written account, with numerous incidental notices of other matters, giving evidence of as much learning in this department as he has shown in so many others, were respectively a female mystic and a Franciscan monk. The former seems to have had decided Protestant leanings, and exercised a remarkable evangelical influence on all who came into closer contact with her. The latter was one of the most popular preachers of his time, who suffered much because he maintained the purity of Franzisca's character and the excellence of her influence. An appendix contains numerous beautiful extracts from the mystical *Abecedario espiritual* of Franzisco de Osuna, teacher of St. Theresa, and a disciple of Franzisca Hernandez.

Lectures and Treatises on Historical Subjects.[1] — Dr. Zeller, Professor of Philosophy in Heidelberg, is the author of the celebrated History of Greek Philosophy. The treatises contained in this book were published originally in Sybel's "Historische Zeitschrift" and in the "Preussische Jahrbücher." The subjects discussed are the following: The Development of Monotheism among the Greeks; Pythagoras and the Traditions about him; Defence of Xanthippe; The Influence exerted by the Platonic State on the Mind of later Generations; Marcus Aurelius Antoninus; Wolff's Expulsion from Halle; the Struggle between Pietism and Philosophy; Johann Gottlieb Fichte as Politician; Friedrich Schleiermacher; Primitive Christianity; The Tübingen Historical School; Ferdinand Christian Baur; Strauss and Renan. We have seldom taken up a German book which we have read with greater interest. Dr. Zeller writes an excellent German style and very clearly. We do not, indeed, agree at all with the views he advocates and describes, so far as they bear upon Christianity, but there can be but one opinion as to the ability and clearness with which they are set forth. Of special interest are those which relate to the Tübingen school, of which Zeller is a distinguished member. They give a careful, accurate, and popular summary of the principal results arrived at by Baur and his several pupils. The essay in defence

[1] Vorträge und Abhandlungen geschichtlichen Inhalts. Von Edward Zeller. Leipzig: Fues; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1865. Price, 3 thaler.

of Xanthippe is amusing and clever. Dr. Zeller urges in her defence, that her husband's peculiarities were of such a nature that few women could fail to be wroth with him; he was ugly in looks, negligent in dress, careless about earnings, and not particularly affectionate, as his behaviour just before death shows.

The Holy Scriptures of the New Testament Connectedly Investigated. Division II.; Subdivision 2. The Second Epistle to the Corinthians.[1] — This is part of a work that bids fair to be of great size, and which, if its idea be realized, will be of the utmost importance. It is to be feared, however, that the plan is too extensive ever to be fully carried out. The individual parts, however, hitherto published, are considered by competent judges to be very valuable contributions to the better understanding of the New Testament as a whole and in its several sections. The leading idea of the work is, by an investigation of the historical characteristics of each separate writing, to establish its authenticity and antiquity, and to show it to form a necessary link in the whole chain of the record of revelation. One fault Dr. Hofmann is exposed to fall into — that of too great subtilty; but this is amply compensated by the novel points of view which he opens up, and the suggestiveness which marks every page. This and his other works ought to be better known to our theological readers than they are; but they require hard study.

Examination of the Most Important Critical Questions raised at the Present Time relatively to the Fourth Gospel.[2] — This little work is a German translation of part of a Commentary on the Gospel of John, published in French. We have read it through and can fully subscribe to what Professor Riggenbach of Basle says in his prefatory introduction. "He who reads the present portion will desire to possess the entire work. What we have here is a fragment; but it is a very valuable fragment." In six chapters the following subjects are discussed: 1. The facts confirmed; 2. The genuineness; 3. The credibility of the discourses; 4. The circumstances of composition; 5. The preservation of the text; 6. The certainty of the Gospel history. The treatment, though very brief, is clear, sober, and frequently both very novel and very acute. M. Godet tries to show in particular that a main and conscious design of John was to supplement and in part correct the

[1] Die heilige Schrift des neuen Testaments zusammenhängend untersucht. 2 Theil, 3 Abtheilung: Der Zweite Brief an die Corinther. Von Dr. I. Ch. K. v. Hofmann. Nördlingen: Beck'sche Buchhandlung; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 50 silbergroschen.

[2] Prüfung der wichtigsten Kritischen Streitfragen unserer Tage über das vierte Evangelium. Von Godet. Zürich: Carl Meyer; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866.

synoptics; the latter being in his view three branches of one traditional stem, and therefore related to John as one to one, and not as three to one.

System of Christian Doctrine for Educated Readers of all Ranks and Denominations.[1] — A popular system of theology from the strict Lutheran point of view. It is divided into three great sections entitled: 1. God and the world in their original union; 2. God and the world in their antagonism; 3. God and the world in their re-union. The first section treats of God prior to the world; creation as a free act of God; the world as God's creature; the relation of God to the created world as its Creator; the mission of the creature in its state of innocence. The second section, of the present state of the world; the doctrine of the devil; the doctrine of sin; the doctrine of death and corruption; the reciprocal relations of God and the fallen creature. The third section, of the divine preparations for re-union; the person of Christ as the real centre of the re-union of God with the fallen world; the work of Christ; the nature and attributes of the Christian church; the equipment of the church by its Head with divine powers, offices, and gifts; the life of the church in its members; the complete re-union of God and the world in the church triumphant.

The work is marked by one great defect, — it is too exclusively German; i.e. the author writes as though all the possible forms of church life and developments of doctrine had been exhausted in Germany; America and England are never alluded to. Otherwise the compendium is a useful one.

Saint Augustine's Speculative Doctrine of God the Triune.[2] — Professor Gangauf is a Roman Catholic, but a man of learning and liberal spirit; his work is one of a series on the philosophy and theology of St. Augustine. The present treatise was suggested by the Protestant Professor Thomasius, of Erlangen. Its design is to supply scientific evidence of the objective reality of the Trinity from the writings of St. Augustine, in opposition to the unbelief of the age, with its pretendedly philosophical objections to this article of the Christian faith. After an introduction on the general character of St. Augustine's treatise *De Trinitate Dei*, he discusses his subject under four heads: 1. The existence of God; 2. The nature of God; 3. Analogies of the Trinity in the creature; 4. The divine subject-objectification (Subjectobjectivirung) St. Augus-

[1] Christliche Glaubenslehre für gebildete Leser aller Stände und Bekenntnisse. By Dr. Wangemann, Inspector of Missions, Berlin. Berlin: Haupt Verein; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1865.

[2] Des Heiligen Augustinus speculative Lehre von Gott dem Dreieinigen. Von Theodor Gangauf, Professor of Philosophy at the Lyceum of Augsburg. Augsburg: B. Schmid; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866.

tine's works will ever be a mine of thought on all the points of Christian theology into which students should industriously dig; and every contribution to the better knowledge of him, whether supplied by Catholics or Protestants, must be welcome; especially when they furnish the materials for forming an independent judgment, as Professor Gangauf's work does, in the numerous extracts it gives. The four hundred and forty-eight pages consist, indeed, — and we commend the book in saying so, — principally of quotations. Dr. Gangauf was formerly, and probably is still, an admirer of Günther's philosophy, one of the recommendations of which was that it was condemned at Rome.

History of Christian Doctrine During the Patristic Period, from 325 till 787 A.D.[1] — Dr. Schwane is also a Roman Catholic; and we are glad to chronicle the appearance of able books by Roman Catholic theologians, because investigation must eventually lead to light; and his Dogmengeschichte, notwithstanding its Romish coloring, is an able work. The first volume, treating of Christian doctrine during the Ante-Nicene period, was noticed with considerable praise by Protestant Reviews at the time of its appearance, the chief fault found with it being the result of the author's ecclesiastical position. As representing in the best way what the Romish church in Germany is doing in this direction, the present work is worthy of attention. The present volume embraces the first section, and treats of the doctrine of God.

The Epistle to the Galatians in Greek and German, with an Explanation of the more difficult Passages, and an Essay on Chap. iii. 20.[1] — So far as we have examined Dr. Matthias's Commentary, it does not seem to us a very great advance on previous works. The translation where new, does not strike us as happy. Take as a sample chap. i. 4, where the author connects πονηροῦ with the following words κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ, instead of with the foregoing words, ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος αἰῶνος, translating, "to deliver us from the present world, evil according to the will of God." The rendering is new, but scarcely true. Fifty-two pages are occupied with an excursus on the term μεσίτης which occurs in chap. iii. 20. The older commentary of Usteri is still one of the best in the German language, though, owing to the marked Schleiermacherian leanings of the author, not in every respect satisfactory.

[1] Dogmengeschichte der patristischen Zeit. Von Dr. J. Schwane, Professor of Theology in Münster. Münster: Theissing; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 40 sgr.

[2] Der Galaterbrief griechisch und deutsch nebst einer Erklärung seiner schwierigeren Stellen und einer Abhandlung über, Cap. iii. 20. Von Dr. G. W. Matthias, Director of the Gymnasium at Cassel. Cassel: Theod. Kay; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1865. Price, 25 sgr.

Hand-book of the History of the Christian Church, from the earliest period down to the present day.[1] — Any work by the late Professor Niedner will be regarded with special interest at Andover, for his valuable collection of books now forms an important part of the Seminary Library. But even where there are no such associations to invest his productions with interest, their high intrinsic value will recommend them. It is not a value, indeed, which lies exactly on the surface, which a superficial reader is likely to discover; but for the conscientious, painstaking, digging student, both old and young. The judgment of men who may be regarded as the compeers of the late Professor is, that his works are strong meat for anybody. Niedner was a philosopher, theologian, and historian. His library bears traces of his devotion to these three branches of study. He was a deep thinker, close observer, and very learned. The work whose title we give above, is the ripest fruit of his prolonged study and instructions as Professor; but while giving evidence on every page of close thought and immense reading, it bears abundant traces of the very marked idiosyncracies of the author. Professor Niedner was a thorough oddity; and the truth of the maxim "the style is the man," is thoroughly confirmed in his case. His style is full of corners, angles, extraordinary combinations of words and clauses; and the whole book makes the impression of having "grown," instead of being "made." The first edition — the present is the second — was bought up and destroyed after a short time by its author, because he felt its deficiencies, though theologians of all classes had pronounced most favorable judgments on its merits. He commenced a new work — of which the present is a revision — in 1858, when called to Berlin to succeed Neander; but refused to publish it though it was printed, and delivered sheet by sheet to his students alone, as they required it. So much about the author and the general features of the work.

Dr. Niedner commences with sections on the idea of the church and of a history of the church, specially in relation to the compass, sources, and aids of the latter. He then narrates the introduction of Christianity into the world, describing the contemporary religions, the natural religions of the East and West, Hellenism considered as philosophy, and the Jewish religion; the Life of Jesus, and the age of the apostles. Afterwards come the struggles of Christianity with, and its victories over, the heathenism of Greece, Rome, and Germany. A second division of this first part discusses the constitution of the church; a third, its doctrines and institutions. The same method is pursued during the subsequent periods. The compass of the Hand-book is nearly one thousand large octavo pages; a pretty

[1] Lehrbuch der christlichen Kirchengeschichte von der aeltesten Zeit bis auf die Gegenwart. Von Dr. C. W. Niedner, late Professor of Theology at the University of Berlin. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben: London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. pp. 978. Price, 4 thaler.

good index is appended; the notes, containing often brief characteristic extracts and numerous references to the best works for consultation, both ancient and modern, on all sorts of subjects that bear on church history, are very extensive; the text, though gnarled, is concise and pregnant; the spirit in which those are judged from whom the author differed, both ecclesiastically and doctrinally, is generous and Christian, and the information seems to be accurate; such qualities are enough to recommend any work.

Critique of Dunasch Ben Labrat on single Passages from Saadia's Arabic Translation of the Old Testament.[1] — Dunasch ben Labrat Levita, or as the Jews called him, Adonim, lived about the middle of the tenth century, in Fez, and wrote remarks on passages from Saadia's Arabic translation of the Old Testament, to which a double interest attaches: first, they contain not a little that throws light on Hebrew grammar and the Old Testament; secondly, they bear witness to the state of thought and learning among the Rabbis of Spain and Northern Africa, in the tenth century. The text, which is now published for the first time, from an old manuscript, is given in the present book; Dr. Schröter intends to publish shortly an introduction and translation.

The Godman, the Image of the Invisible God. A contribution to Christology.[2] — This is the second volume of a larger work. The first appeared under the titles, "Man the Image of God, his Relation to Christ and to the World," and "The Account of Creation and the Doctrine of Paradise," and was very favorably noticed by several eminent theologians. The present volume treats of the following subjects: The Invisibility of God; The Image of the Invisible God, and the First-born of all Creation; The Brightness of his Glory, and the Image of his Essence; The Logos; Christ in the Form of God; The God of Israel and the Cherubim; The Son of God and the Son of Man; The God-man; The Glory of God and Christ; The Holy Spirit and the Seven Spirits; The Doctrine of the Trinity; The Doctrine of the Good Angels; The Doctrine of Satan and his Angels; The Doctrine of the Exaltation of Christ; The Church in Christ." One of the writer's peculiarities is that he believes in the pre-existence of Christ as God-man; not merely in the pre-existence of his divine or human nature, but of his divine-human nature. The work is well worth reading.

[1] Kritik des Dunasch ben Labrat über enizelne Stellen aus Saadia's arabischer Uebersetzung des Alt. Test. Von Dr. R. Schröter. Breslau: Skutsch; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866.

[2] Der Gott-Mensch, das Ebenbild des unsichtbaren Gottes. Ein Beitrag zur Christologie. Von P. F. Keerl. Basel: Detloff; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 2 thaler.

Biblico-Theological Lexicon of the Greek of the New Testament.[1] — Licentiate Cremer's conviction is, that the Greek Lexicons of the New Testament heretofore published, overlook too much the "*language-moulding power of Christianity*," as Schleiermacher termed it; and his intention is to supplement this lack. Christianity, as the purest spiritual religion, and the Greek language as the organ and reflection of an unusually full and rich, merely natural life, must stand in strong antagonism to each other. Consequently the latter must have undergone great modifications in becoming the dress of the former. The author wishes to bring this clearly out. He has been working nine years at his book. The words are not arranged alphabetically, but according to derivation and composition. An excellent feature of the present attempt is, that the passages referred to, both in the classics, in the Septuagint, in the Apocrypha, and in the New Testament, are mostly adduced in full; a sign that the author has worked for himself; for nothing is easier than to pile up a heap of second-hand references. The print is very clear; the form is octavo; the whole will contain from five hundred to six hundred pages. So far as we have been able to examine, the treatment of the words seems to be natural and careful. The author's theological position would seem to be that of an orthodox, but mild Lutheran.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Dr. James Freeman Clarke on Orthodoxy.[2]

"'Soleo enim in aliena castra transire, non tanquam transfuga, sed tanquam explorator' (Seneca, Epistolae, 2). 'Fiat lux. Cupio refelli, ubi aberrârim; nihil majus, nihil aliud quam veritatem efflagito' (Thomas Burnet, Arch. Phil.)." These are the two mottoes prefixed to this able volume. Its author says: "The peculiarity of the book now offered to the religious public by the government of the American Unitarian Association, is this — that it is an honest attempt to find and state the truth contained in the doctrines of their opponents. It is, perhaps, something new for an

[1] Biblisch-theologisches Wörterbuch der neutestamentlichen Gräcität. Von Lic. Hermann Cremer. Gotha: F. A. Perthes; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. First Half. Price, 1 thaler, 10 sgr.

[2] Orthodoxy; its Truths and Errors. By James Freeman Clarke. 12mo. pp. 512. Boston: American Unitarian Association; Walker, Fuller, and Co.; New York: James Miller. 1866.

association established to defend certain theological opinions, and baptized with a special theological name, to publish a work intended to do justice to hostile theories. The too usual course of each sect has been, through all its organs, to attack, denounce, undervalue, and vilify the positions taken by its antagonists. This has been considered as only an honest zeal for truth. The consequence has been, that no department of literature has been so unchristian in its tone and temper as that of sectarian controversy. Political journals heap abuse on their opponents, in the interest of their party. But though more noisy than the theological partisans, they are by no means so cold, hard, or unrelenting. Party spirit, compared with sectarian spirit, seems rather mild" (pp. 1, 2). "We stand in the Unitarian position, but shall endeavor to see if there be not some truths in Orthodoxy which Unitarians have not yet adequately recognized. To use the language of our motto — we come 'not as deserters, but as explorers,' into the camp of Orthodoxy. We are satisfied with our Unitarian position, as a stand-point from which to survey that of others. And especially are we grateful to it, since it encourages us by all its traditions, by all its ideas and principles, to look *after* as well as before — to see if there be there no truth behind us which we have dropped in our hasty advance, as well as truth beyond us to which we have not yet attained" (pp. 2, 3).

We find in this volume many candid admissions, many luminous statements, many forcible paragraphs. We see no evidence of intentional unfairness or of designed misrepresentation. Dr. Clarke, however, cannot expect that the Orthodox divines will be satisfied with all his portraiture of their system. We think that he has unintentionally omitted some explanations which should have been inserted, and unintentionally added some representations which should have been omitted. We think also that he has proposed some mediating theories which are very far from any true medium between the Orthodox and Unitarian theories.

Without attempting a thorough review of his volume, let us first glance at his fourth chapter, entitled "Truths and errors as regards miracles."

The great question respecting a miracle is whether it be wrought by the immediate and mere volition of God, interposing and violating the laws of created nature, as they are viewed in their established method of operation, or whether it be wrought by some force and law in created nature without any immediately interposed volition of God, or without any other divine volition than that which sustains created nature with its forces and laws.

We do not say with M. Renan that the biblical miracles are "special interventions, like that of a clock-maker putting his fingers in to remedy the defects of his wheels," for it is not a *defect* in the physical laws that they are interferred with by their preserver; it is rather a designed excellence in them and in their relation to God that they can be thus interferred with. Neither do we merely say, with a critic of M. Renan (Edinburgh Review, No. 254, p. 461), that miracles are "the arrange-

ments by which, at crossing-places in their orbits, man's world is met and illuminated by phenomena belonging to another zone, and moving in another plane"; for we believe that if there be no immediate intervention of God, there are no miracles, and if the raising of the dead be analogous to the approach of a comet, then the raising of the dead is nothing supernatural, and is no proof of a supernatural religion. But we do say that a miracle is such an interposition of the divine will as could not be foreseen or calculated upon by any observer, however intelligent and sagacious, of the forces and laws of the natural world.

The theory that a miracle demands no direct interposition of the Creator's will, is illustrated in a passage quoted by Dr. Clarke on pp. 64, 65: "A story is told of a clock, on one of the high cathedral towers of the older world, so constructed that at the close of a century it strikes the years as it ordinarily strikes the hours. As a hundred years come to a close, suddenly, in the immense mass of complicated mechanism, a little wheel turns, a pin slides into the appointed place, and in the shadows of the night the bell tolls a requiem over the generations which during a century have lived and labored and been buried around it. One of these generations might live and die, and witness nothing peculiar. The clock would have what we call an established order of its own; but what should we say when, at the midnight which brought the century to a close, it sounded over the sleeping city, rousing all to listen to the world's age? Would it be a violation of law? No; only a variation of the accustomed order, produced by the intervention of a force always existing, but never appearing in this way till the appointed moment had arrived. The tolling of the century would be a variation from the observed order of the clock; but to an artist, in constructing it, it would have formed a part of that order. So a miracle is a variation of the order of nature as it has appeared to us; but to the Author of nature it was a part of that predestined order — a part of that order of which he is at all times the immediate Author and Sustainer; miraculous to us, seen from our human point of view, but no miracle to God; to our circumscribed vision a violation of law, but to God only a part in the great plan and progress of the law of the universe" (Ephraim Peabody).

The theory of Dr. Clarke is thus stated: "I. There is in man a power, as yet undeveloped, and only occasionally seen in exceptional conditions, of overcoming the common laws of nature by force of will; and this is sometimes voluntary, and sometimes involuntary.

II. This phenomenon takes these forms: A. *Power of the soul over the body* (*a.*) *to resist pain*, as in the case of martyrs, who are burned alive without any appearance of suffering; (*b.*) *to resist physical injury*, as in the case of the Convulsionists; (*c.*) *to dispense with the usual service of the senses*, as in the case of the girl at Worcester Insane Asylum, Massachusetts, under the care of Dr. Woodward, who could read a book in a per-

fectly dark room and with bandaged eyes; (*d.*) *to give a preternatural energy and strength to the body.* B. *Preternatural knowledge* — such cases as that narrated by Dr. Bushnell, of Yonnt, in California; or *knowledge through dreams*, waking presentiments; cases of *foresight*, or prophecy; of *insight*, or knowledge of what is passing in other minds; of *clairvoyance*, or knowledge of what is happening at a distance, of which multitudes of facts are narrated in such books as the "Seeress of Provorst," Mrs. Crowe's "Night Side of Nature," Robert Dale Owen's "Footfalls from the Boundary of the Unseen World," which, after being sifted by a fair criticism, will leave a large residuum of irresolvable facts. C. Higher than these is a preternatural elevation of the whole character, as in such cases as that of Joan of Arc, where a young girl, ignorant, a peasant, destitute of all common means of influencing any one, by the simple power of faith, because she believed herself inspired and commissioned, succeeded in gaining the command of the armies of France, and then of achieving a series of victories, equal, on the whole, as mere military exploits, to those of the first captains of the world.

In all these cases we see manifestations of a power in the soul over nature, body, men, and the laws of time and space. So we say, secondly:

III. This power was possessed in the highest degree known in this world by Jesus of Nazareth, and it differed in him from these other cases in these points: 1. It was always voluntary in its exercise, never involuntary. He was not possessed by it, he possessed it. He used it just when and where he chose to use it. It was always at his command; he never appears to have tried to work a miracle, and failed. So, 2. It was in him constant, and not occasional. In other cases where the miraculous element appears, it seems to come and go; but to Jesus the spirit was not given by measure. He had it always. 3. This power in him was total, and not partial. It was therefore harmonious — in harmony with all his other qualities. He had power over diseases of the body, and also those of the soul. He knew what was in man, and what was in nature — in the present and in the future. There was nothing ecstatic, enthusiastic, nothing of excitement, about him; but everything denoted a fulness, a pleroma, of this spiritual life. 4. The exercise of this power in Christ was always eminently moral, never wilful. The one or two seeming exceptions, as, for example, the cursing the fig-tree, and the causing the evil spirits to go into the swine, ought to be explained in harmony with the vast majority of his actions, which always are guided by love and justice and a holy sense of what is true and good. 5thly, and lastly. The miracle power of Jesus reached a higher point of development than in any one else. The raising of the dead to life, and the mysterious power over nature indicated by the turning of water into wine, by the miracle of the loaves and fishes, calming the storm, if facts, are facts unparalleled in any other biography, but seem possible, however unintelligible, when considered as emanating from such a masterly and commanding spirit as that of Jesus" (pp. 78–80).

The miracle of the resurrection of Jesus is explained by Dr. Clarke in this manner: "But perhaps, after all, the resurrection may have been an example of a universal law. Like other miracles, which are sporadic instances, in this world, of laws which may be the nature of other worlds, so the resurrection may have been as natural an event as any other in the life of Jesus. Perhaps it is a law of nature that all souls shall become disengaged from the earthly body on the third day after death. Perhaps they all rise in a spiritual body, substantial and real, but not usually perceptible by the senses. Perhaps, in the case of Jesus, that same superior command of miraculous force which appeared during his life enabled him to show himself easily and freely whenever he would. What became of the earthly body we do not know; it may have been removed by the priests or soldiers to prevent the disciples from getting possession of it. The body in which Christ appeared differed evidently from the earthly body in various ways. It came and went mysteriously; it was sometimes recognized, and sometimes not; and it ascended into the spiritual world instead of passing again to death and the grave. Perhaps, therefore, it may be a universal law that souls rise out of the material body into a higher state, clothed in another body, substantial and real, but not material. The essence of the resurrection is this: resurrection is not coming to life again with the same body, but ascent into a higher life with a new body" (pp. 83, 84).

The final result of Dr. Clarke's examination is given thus: "1. We may believe, on the testimony of history, that through Jesus of Nazareth there entered the world a great impulse of creative moral life, which has been, and is now, renewing society. This new impulse of life may be regarded as miraculous or supernatural. 2. We may believe, though perhaps less strongly, but still decidedly, that during the stay of Jesus on earth many extraordinary phenomena took place, such as the sudden healing of the sick, the raising of the dead to life, a display of miraculous insight and foresight, or knowledge of the present and the future, and some influence over organic and material life, and over the lifeless forces of nature. The precise limits of this we do not know, and need not pretend to define. We need not think it essential to fix the boundary. It may be interesting as speculation, but it is not important as religion. 3. For, in the third place, we may say that these miracles of Jesus have very little direct bearing on our religion. As they illustrate his character, they are valuable, and also as they help us to believe that the laws of nature are not stiff and rigid, like the movement of a machine, but that there is force above force, a vortex of living powers, in the universe, rising higher and higher towards the fountain of all force and life in God. All portents and wonders are useful, as they shake us out of the mechanical view of things, and show that even the outward, sensible world is full of spiritual power. 4. We may also believe the miracles of Jesus to be natural in this sense—

that under the same conditions they could have been done by others, and that they are probably prophetic of a time in which they shall be done by others. Looked at as mere signs or portents, he himself discouraged any attention being paid to them. Looked at as logical proofs to convince an unbeliever, he never brought them forward" (pp. 85, 86).

The Orthodox divines, although not exactly unanimous in adopting any *theory* of miracles, will be well nigh unanimous in rejecting this theory proposed by Dr. Clarke, and will be dissatisfied with his manner of representing them. For instance, he describes it as one "*essential*" point of the Orthodox view, that a miracle is "the *only* logical proof of the divine authority of the miracle-worker" (p. 61). A miracle is regarded as an *important* proof, but by no means as the *sole* proof of such authority. Dr. Clarke fails to notice the great stress which the Orthodox divines lay upon the internal evidence of the Bible, and he seems himself, however unintentionally, to disparage this evidence. He appears to think that, were it not for the "Christian prepossession" in favor of the Bible, were it not for the antecedent belief that the Bible has a divine origin and purpose, "it might be occasionally read by a student in the interest of science, but never by the mass of the community" (p. 123). We believe, however, that if the manuscripts of the Bible were now discovered, after having been long forgotten and lost, they would force their own way, by their intrinsic excellence, upon the attention and into the affections of men, and would be read not only "as Plato is read, that is, by one man in a million," but also by the million. The character of the Bible is its own momentum.

Passing to the fifth chapter, we are not satisfied with Dr. Clarke's statement of the Orthodox views in regard to the inspiration of the scriptures. He says that, according to these views, "every word which really belongs to these [canonical] books is God's truth, and to be received without question as truth, no matter how much it may seem opposed to reason, to the facts of nature, to common sense, and common morality" (p. 88). This *implies* that, according to the Orthodox view, when the Bible speaks of the "sun rising," this *word* is to be received without question of its truth, no matter how much it may seem opposed to the astronomical discoveries. In apparent opposition to the Orthodox theory, he says, "Moses was not inspired to teach geology or history." But is it not a common remark of Orthodox divines, that the Bible was not inspired to teach secular science? What remark is more common?

On the subject of inspiration, Dr. Clarke fails to recognize some distinctions which are commonly made by the Orthodox. There is a distinction, for example, between infallibility as the impossibility of erring, and infallibility as the certainty of not erring. Dr. Clarke, speaking of a certain character in Cooper's novels, says: "He is an authority to them, a perfect authority; for they confide in him entirely, without a shade of doubt. But no one thinks him infallible, nor supposes it necessary to

believe him infallible, in order to trust him entirely" (p. 114). Now if we believe a man to be a *perfect* authority whom we can trust *entirely*, we do believe him to be infallible in the sense of being *certainly* free from error, although not infallible in the sense of incapable of committing an error.

There is a distinction between the accuracy of inspired men in saying what they intended to teach as truth, and their literal accuracy in saying what they did not intend to teach as truth. When our Saviour stated that "the grain of mustard-seed is the least of all seeds," he did not mean to announce this as a fact of botanical science; and if the statement be scientifically inaccurate he was yet infallible in the designed instruction which this figurative statement was intended to illustrate. The alleged errors of the Bible are generally such as the writers of the Bible never meant to teach as truths.

There is a distinction between the knowledge of a doctrine and omniscience in regard to that doctrine. It is affirmed by the Orthodox writers, that what the inspired men intended to teach they knew, but it is not affirmed that they knew everything respecting it. Dr. Clarke says: "A Frenchman knows the French language; still he may make mistakes in speaking it. The man from California knows that country, but he may be mistaken about it" (p. 121). So far as a man makes mistakes about a thing, can he be said to know the thing? and so far as he knows it, can he be said to be mistaken about it? What the sacred writers intended to teach they knew; and how could they be mistaken in what they knew? So far forth as they were mistaken in their astronomy, they did not know the astronomical truth, and we do not suppose that they meant to teach, or to be considered as teaching, anything about it. Dr. Clarke uses language which seems to imply that a man may know that which he does not know. Thus he says: "And so Paul and John look steadily at the Christ formed within them till they see clearly what is Christ's thought concerning every question, every subject. ..... For the truths seen by Newton, Milton, Descartes, and Columbus were not inventions of theirs, but divine realities shown to them by God" (p. 104). "It was an inward sight of Christ, an inward sight of his truth and love, which enabled them [the apostles] to speak and write with authority — the authority of those who saw what they said, and knew it to be true. 'We speak what we know, and testify what we have seen'" (p. 107). "Jesus sees so plainly all that he says — there is no hesitation, no obscurity, no perhapses, in his language. He is like one describing what is before his eyes, what he knows to be true, because he sees it while he is saying it. It is, in short, the authority which always attends knowledge. He who knows anything, and can speak with certainty, carries conviction with him, though we do not suppose him to be infallible, nor is it thought necessary to believe him so, in order to give to him this authority" (pp. 115, 116). Now when we affirm

that a man sees *clearly* what is Christ's thought concerning *every* question, every *subject;* that he *speaks what he knows to be true;* that he utters with *certainty* what he *sees* to be *divine realities* which are *shown him* by God, we affirm herein that the man does not err, and in this sense is infallible. When Dr. Clarke says, (p. 121) that "inspiration gives knowledge," and that "knowledge is not infallibility," he must mean that the knowledge of one thing is not knowledge of another thing; that accuracy in seeing some truths is not accuracy in seeing some other truths. Subjective knowledge is the correlate of objective certainty, and really to know truths which are certain, is the same thing as not to err, and in this sense to be infallible in regard to them.

It may be said that Dr. Clarke supposes the inspired man to have a knowledge which is infallibly accurate, but to express what he knows in language that is inaccurate. Sometimes this may be his meaning (pp. 104, 105). But at other times he obviously means that the subject of the doctrine and the statement of it are both accurate. "The authority of the Spirit in the Bible," he says, "is that it awakens and appeals to whatever spiritual element exists in our soul, and compels it to feel and admit its truth" (p. 115). If we are *compelled* to admit the truth of the Bible, we must believe its *statements* to be true.

But are all of them true? All of them which the writers intended to teach *as true.* But do all of them give internal evidence of their accuracy? The statements either give this evidence or are so connected with other statements which give it, that they all stand or fall together. Dr. Clarke will admit this principle *in some degree*, for he says: "The writings of Paul are so intimately connected with the rest of the New Testament, that it is not easy to reject them, and yet to believe the rest. It can be done, no doubt; but it is done with difficulty. It is as if one part of the foundation of the house had given way: perhaps the house will not fall; but it has become unsafe. It is as if a part of the wall of a city had been battered down: the breach may be defensible from within; but it is also practicable from without. At all events, we miss the satisfaction of a complete faith, perfect and entire, round and full" (p. 211).

In the eighth, ninth, tenth, and sixteenth chapters, describing the Orthodox theories of the person and work of Christ, and of the Trinity, we find various statements which seem to misrepresent these theories. The author has failed to notice one distinction, which, we think, suggests a sufficient reply to some of his objections. He says: "the heaviest charge against the Church doctrine of the Trinity is, that, driven to despair by these difficulties, it has at last made Orthodoxy consist, not in any sound belief, but only in sound phrases. It is not believing anything, but saying something, which now makes a man Orthodox. If you will only use the word 'Trinity' in any sense, if you will only call Christ God in any sense, you are Orthodox" (p. 428). In harmony with these remarks our author thus

condemns one Orthodox theory of the Trinity: "'The three Persons are three somethings, which cannot be defined. It is a mystery. It is above reason. There is mystery in everything, and there must be mystery in the Deity.' So Augustine said, long ago, 'We say three Persons, not because we have anything to say, but because we want to say something.' [Dictum est tamen tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ut ne taceretur,' Aug. de Trin., quoted by Hase, Dog. § 238.] But if one uses the phrase 'three Persons,' and refuses to define it positively, merely defining it negatively, saying, 'It does not mean this, and it does not mean that, and I dont know what it does mean,' he avoids, it is true, the difficulties, and escapes the objections; but he does it by giving up the article of faith. No one can deny that there *may be* three unknown distinctions in the divine nature; but no one can be asked to believe in them, till he is told what they are. To say, therefore, that the Trinity is a mystery, is to abandon it as an article of faith, and make of it only a subject of speculation. We avoid the contradiction; but we do it by relinquishing the doctrine. This fact is not sufficiently considered by Trinitarians. They first demand of us to believe the doctrine of the Trinity, and, when pressed to state distinctly the doctrine, retire into the protection of mystery, and decline giving any distinct account of it. Now, no human being ever denied the existence of mysteries connected with God, and nature, and all life. To assure us, therefore, that such mysteries exist, is slightly superfluous. But, on the other hand, no human being ever *believed*, or could *believe*, a mystery, any more than he could see anything invisible or hear anything inaudible. To believe a doctrine, the first condition is, that all its terms shall be distinct and intelligible" (p. 431).

The simple distinction between a positive and a negative object of thought suggests a sufficient answer to the preceding objection. A negative idea is not *no* idea, but it is *an* idea; as a negative answer to a question is not *no* answer, but it is *an* answer. A negative object of thought is a real object of thought. It is one of which the mind can judge what it is *not*, but cannot judge what it is; or, one of which the mind can judge *that* it is, but cannot comprehend *what* it is; or, one which in each of its moments can be apprehended, and the moments can be judged to be compatible with each other, but the manner in which they are compatible cannot be comprehended. If we are asked what is the substratum of mind as distinct from its qualities and powers, we cannot tell; we have no positive idea of it; but we do not "give up the article of our faith," that there is a mental substance distinct from the mental powers and attributes. If we are asked what is the substratum of matter as distinct from its properties, we can give no positive answer; *what* it is we have no positive idea; but *that* it is we know. We disbelieve the assertion that a man cannot be required to believe in a physical substratum as distinct from physical qualities, until the man is told *what* the substratum is. The *being*

of an object as distinct from the *object* being is apprehensible by the mind; but the mind has no positive idea of *being*, as distinct from an *object* being. We may say with Hegel that "Sein ist Nichts," but the nothing is a moment of which we have some idea, at least a negative idea; else we could say nothing about it. The substance apart from the properties of matter and of mind, the being of a thing apart from the thing, are "mysteries"; still we believe in them, and reject the statement that no human being ever *believed*, or could be required to *believe* a "mystery." "No one can deny," says Dr. Clarke, "that there may be three unknown distinctions in the divine nature." No one then can *deny* the Trinity. But "to *believe* a doctrine," says Dr. Clarke, "the first condition is that *all* its terms shall be *distinct* and *intelligible*." They must suggest an idea, *distinct* from all other ideas; that is, we must be able to say, this idea is *not* that or that other. They must suggest an idea, intelligible in the sense of being apprehensible, so that we can affirm that the idea is *not* the same with other ideas into which the imagination may resolve it. But to affirm that in order to believe a doctrine "all its terms must be" *positively* "intelligible," is to overlook one distinction between *apprehending* and *comprehending* an object, and to affirm that we have no right to believe in an infinite space, or infinite duration, unless we have a positive comprehension of what is admitted to be incomprehensible. To say that an object is incomprehensible, is not to say that it is in all senses unknown; imperfect knowledge is not nescience, as knowledge is not omniscience.

In the tenth chapter we find various inadequate statements of the Orthodox doctrine of the atonement. After describing its three prominent theories, Dr. Clarke says: "In each of these three theories there is one constant element. And it is due to Orthodoxy to state it. This element is, that the necessity of the death of Christ lay in the divine attribute of justice. According to the first theory, Christ died to satisfy what was due by God to the devil; according to the second, he died to satisfy what was due by God to himself; according to the third, he died to satisfy what was due by God to the moral universe. Divine justice, in the first theory, owed a ransom to the devil, which Christ paid; in the second, it owed a debt to the divine honor, which Christ paid; in the third, it owed protection to the universe from the danger of evil example. The difficulty to be removed before God can forgive sin lay, according to all of these theories, in the divine justice. Christ died to reconcile justice and mercy, so as to make justice merciful, and mercy just. But, in opposition to this view, the Unitarian argument is so formidable as to seem quite unanswerable. On grounds of reason, the Unitarian maintains that there can be no such conflict among the divine attributes, waiting till an event should occur in human history by which they should be reconciled. That God's justice and mercy should have been in a state of antagonism down to A.M. 4034, when Jesus died, is an incredible supposition. No event

taking place in time and space can be the condition *sine quâ non* of divine perfection. And any struggle or conflict like that supposed implies imperfection" (pp. 261, 262).

But where do the advocates of the third theory say in unqualified words that "Christ died to satisfy what was *due* to the moral universe," if by the universe he meant the creation, or that the atonement was simply an act of justice which *owed* protection to the universe from the *danger of evil example?* Where do Orthodox divines speak of an antagonism in the divine nature enduring until A.M. 4034, and then ceasing? Is it proper to make such representations, and to conceal the familiar principles of Orthodoxy, that God sees the end from the beginning; that he acts in regard to the future as if it were past; that he looks on a thousand years as one day, and one day as a thousand years; that the atonement as predicted, promised, prefigured, is an atonement, so that Abraham rejoiced to see the day of Christ and saw it, and was glad; that we are redeemed, not by an influence beginning in the year 4034, but by "the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, who verily was fore-ordained before the foundation of the world, but was manifest in these last times?"

Similar criticisms might be made on Dr. Clarke's representation of the Orthodox doctrine concerning Sin, Regeneration, Decrees, etc., but our limits forbid further remarks. We regard his volume as an important and valuable one, giving evidence of a truth-loving and conscientious spirit, as well as of a vigorous and acute mind. It is difficult for any man to describe satisfactorily the system of his opponents, especially his theological opponents, unless he describe it in their own chosen words with all their qualifying adjuncts.

Cowles's Commentary on the Minor Prophets.[1]

To write a good commentary on the Minor Prophets is an arduous work. Some portions of them, as, for example, Hosea, Nahum, Habakkuk, and parts of Micah and Zechariah, present a Hebrew text which is of difficult interpretation; and where the literal interpretation is plain and simple, the true scope and meaning are sometimes obscure. In proof of this we need only refer to the discordant views of the commentators on Joel, where it would be hardly candid or modest for one writer to assume that all who do not follow his line of interpretation are under the shackles of prejudice — *befangen*, as our German friends say. The author of the present commentary proposes to give, in general, the results, not the details, of historic investigation, "aiming to meet the wants, not of Hebrew scholars only or

[1] The Minor Prophets, with Notes, Critical, Explanatory, and Practical, designed for both Pastors and People. By Rev. Henry Cowles. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1866.

chiefly, but of all English readers." He makes an exception in the case of "points of great practical interest and value, e.g. those prophecies respecting the Messiah and his kingdom which yet remain in part to be fulfilled"; which he proposes to discuss "fundamentally and thoroughly." The question is how ably and faithfully he has carried out his plan.

With regard to the main body of the work, in which he gives the results of historic investigation, a writer in the New Englander, who criticises the work with a severity which seems to us unjust, says: "The first sense of the prophet's words, together with the connection of thought, is in general correctly given." This testimony is true, and it covers ground of great importance. We know of no commentary designed for readers generally, and not specially for students of the original Hebrew, in which the first sense, with the connection of thought, is brought out more plainly. We do not affirm that he has never missed the true meaning (this could be affirmed of no commentator on the Minor Prophets with which we are acquainted); but we think that, in general, he has succeeded very well in giving the literal sense with the connection of thought in the context, and that, in this respect, the work deserves commendation to "all English readers."

But a commentary on the Minor Prophets must, of necessity, bring out the writer's views of prophecy also; and here the reviewer will approve or condemn according to the school to which he belongs; for on the question of the nature of prophecy there are at the present day different schools, and some of them widely divergent from each other.

There is, first, the rationalistic view, which, either openly or in a more or less covert way, resolves all prophecy into mere human anticipation, — that presaging (*Ahnung*) of great coming crises in the course of human affairs which belongs to gifted minds. This view eliminates from prophecy all that is divine, except so far as the human mind may be supposed to contain in itself a divine element, and it utterly denies a supernatural revelation from God to man of future events; being, in truth, part and parcel of a system of religion from which all that is properly supernatural is excluded. This view of prophecy all evangelical men reject utterly.

But among supernaturalists there are different views of the nature of prophecy. There is certainly just ground for charging upon many of the old interpreters the error of transferring the prophets themselves into the future, and making them see the events which they predicted with all their details in the light of coming history. This we hold to be inconsistent with the divine representation, according to which the ancient prophets "inquired and searched diligently" concerning the meaning of their own utterances, "searching with reference to what or what sort of time (εἰς τίνα ἢ ποῖον καιρόν) the spirit of Christ which was in them, made revelation (ἐδήλου) when it testified beforehand the sufferings pertaining to Christ (τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα) and the glories after them (τὰ-

μετὰ ταῦτα δόξας). These words give with great clearness the scriptural idea of prophecy. It is a revelation made by the spirit of Christ — the Holy Spirit employed by the Father and the Son in the work of redemption — in the mind of the prophet. And precisely because it is not the product of his own mind, but is given to him from above; and given, moreover, as a general rule, only in outline, without specification of "times and seasons," he cannot understand, any more than his contemporaries, its full import, but is under the necessity of inquiring and searching diligently concerning it. The apostle adds: "Unto whom it was revealed that not unto themselves, but unto us they did minister the things which are now announced (ἀνηγγέλη) unto you by them that have preached the gospel unto you with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven; which things the angels desire to look into." The apostle certainly does not mean that the prophets ministered no instruction and comfort to themselves and their own age. "Comfort ye, comfort ye my people," is the burden of all prophecy; and this comfort pertains to the generation that receives the prophecy and to all following generations till its fulfilment. His meaning plainly is that the "good things to come" which the prophets foretell, are fulfilled, not to them, but to a future age — in the case of the Messianic prophecies, to the age of the apostles. Joel's prediction, for example, of the pouring out of the spirit in the last days upon all flesh, was a comfort to him, and a comfort also to the people of God in his own day and onward. But the *blessing itself* he ministered to the generation which witnessed the day of Pentecost, for they received it.

From this view it follows that God is himself the interpreter of prophecy; that is, that God alone can reveal the full meaning of what is contained in the prophetic utterances. His people can know beforehand the general purport of a given prophecy, and derive therefrom strength and comfort. But its fulfilment will shed upon it a flood of new light. God interprets prophecy, generally, by the events of history; more specifically, by subsequent revelations. So the explanations given by Christ and his apostles of previous prophecies are of the highest authority, and from them there is no appeal.

From this view of prophecy it follows, again, that the various portraitures given by the ancient prophets of the Messiah are not a shifting sand-bank of merely human conceptions, that vary radically from age to age; but that all of them, from first to last, find a true fulfilment — not a fulfilment by accommodation merely — in the historic Christ of the New Testament. One of these portraitures, like that, for example, in the second psalm, may give one side of his office, and that, too, in theocratic drapery; another, like the passage in Isa. xi. 1–9, may give a second side; another, like that in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, a third side. One portraiture may be more dim, another more distinct. But since they all proceed from God, they must all have a real fulfilment in our Saviour; else his constant

appeals to them, in which he is followed by his apostles, are only "pious frauds," well suited to the character of Jesuits, but most abhorrent to that of Jesus of Nazareth and his holy apostles. The appearance of the Son of God in human nature is, then, both the *fulfilment* and the *interpretation* of the preceding Messianic prophecies.

So far as we have examined the commentary under consideration, its view of prophecy agrees, in general, with that which has now been given, and which we regard as the scriptural view. There are indeed particular points on which we should differ from the writer. We should, for example, with the reviewer in the New Englander, interpret the word מוֹרֶה, Joel ii. 23, to mean *the early rain*. Such dissent in particulars is incident to any commentary on the Minor Prophets that has for its author an uninspired man. It is not inconsistent with commendation of the work as a whole; and such commendation, we think, the present commentary may justly claim. The author's candid remarks on Haggai ii. 7, וּבָאוּ חֶמְדַּת כָּל־הַגּוֹיִם, rendered in our English version after the vulgate: "And the desire of all nations shall come," show that it is not his plan to force a passage into a Messianic meaning in violation of grammatical laws. He has also avoided, in general, the particularism so characteristic of Henderson's interpretation of prophecy. In the celebrated prophecy of Joel, for example: "And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh," etc., chap. iii. 1–5 (in the English version, chap. ii. 28–32), he justly sees a progressive fulfilment extending through the whole Christian dispensation, and having its culmination in ages yet future. We hope that this commentary will have an extensive circulation among the Christian readers for whom it is designed.

The Book of Proverbs, in an Amended Version; with an Introduction and Explanatory Notes. By Joseph Muenscher, D.D. 12mo. pp. 265. Gardiner, Ohio: Western Episcopalian Office. 1866.

The author of this volume was graduated at Brown University, in 1821, was connected one year with the class which left Andover Theological Seminary in 1825, and has been a Professor of Biblical Literature at Kenyon College, Ohio. In the preparation of this volume he acknowledges his chief indebtedners to Poole, Geier, Piscator, Schultens, Holden, Rosenmüller, Boothroyd, Noyes, and Stuart. He prefaces his Commentary with fifty-three pages of Introduction, which we have read with great interest. The Commentary itself is judicious and instructive. "In the preparation of the notes he has endeavored to meet the wants both of the scholar and of the plain English reader." He has succeeded admirably, we think.

Dr. Muenscher is also the author of a volume published in 1865, containing 318 pages, 16mo., entitled, Manual of Biblical Interpretation. It is replete with sound thought, and shows that he has evidently studied the

science of Hermeneutics with great care. He would have enriched his work if he had appended a full index to it. He has left it difficult to ascertain *where* he has treated particular topics.

THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES: an Exegetical and Doctrinal Commentary. By Gotthard Victor Lechler, D.D., Ordinary Professor of Theology, and Superintendent at Leipsic; with Homiletical additions by the Rev. Charles Gerok, Superintendent at Stuttgard. Translated from the second German edition, with additions, by Charles F. Schaeffer, D.D., Professor of Theology in the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical Lutheran Church at Philadelphia. 8vo. pp. 480. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1866.

This is the fourth volume of Dr. Schaff's edition of Lange's Commentary on the Holy Scriptures, Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical. Dr. Schaeffer has performed his part of this work with great skill and fidelity. He has noticed many of the important "various readings" which Lechler did not specify, and has introduced many of these "readings" from the Codex Sinaiticus of Tischendorf, has inserted geographical and philological notes from English and American authors, and has added Dr. H. A. W. Meyer's "large chronological chart, presenting a full synopsis of the dates which he himself recognized, and also of those which the most eminent chronologists and commentators had respectively adopted." Dr. Schaeffer has obviously translated the volume with great accuracy and conscientiousness.

COMMENTARY ON THE SONG OF SOLOMON. By Rev. George Burrowes, D.D., Professor of Biblical Instruction in Lafayette College. Second edition, revised. 12mo. pp. 454. Philadelphia: James S. Claxton. 1867.

Dr. Burrowes contends with honest zeal for the allegorical interpretation of this book. He would have done a better service to the cause of truth if he had been more accurate in the statement of the opinions held by other commentators, and if he had manifested more of a scholarly and less of a partisan spirit. His volume, however, contains many wise sayings, and suggests many profitable trains of reflection.

GREAT IN GOODNESS: a Memoir of George N. Briggs, Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from 1844 to 1851. By William C. Richards. With illustrations. 12mo. pp. 452. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Co.; Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard and Co. 1866.

Governor Briggs was noted for his sound sense, sterling honesty, and childlike piety. His intellectual character was remarkable. He was a self-made man, and he was a *man*. The present memoir is faithful and

true. Mr. Richards has given a very instructive account of the political career of Governor Briggs, and an affecting narrative (pp. 396–411) of his death. The volume deserves a place in every Christian family. Why should not such a biography be as interesting as the majority of religious novels? What fictitious scene is more thrilling to a rational observer than that indicated on page 432 of this narrative?

The History of Christianity from the Birth of Christ to the Abolition of Paganism in the Roman Empire. By Henry Hart Milman, D.D., Dean of St. Paul's. 3 Vols. New York: W. I. Widdleton; Boston: W. H. Piper and Co.

This is a new and revised edition of a work first published more than twenty years ago. Like all the writings of Dean Milman, it is temperate, moderate in tone, popular in character, and at the same time sufficiently learned, written in a style occasionally somewhat formal but clear, easy, and often picturesque, and affording to the common reader an excellent and safe introduction to the early history of the religion which we believe. The form of this edition is much to be preferred to that of the first. It is convenient for reading, and the disposition of the notes and appendices is such as to bring the subjects easily under the eye.

History of England, from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth. By James Anthony Froude, M.A. Vols. V. and VI. New York: Charles Scribner and Co.; Boston: W. H. Piper and Co.

These two volumes well sustain the fresh interest of this important history. They embrace the period from January 1547, when the Earl of Hartford was made protector of the realm, to the death of Queen Mary, in November 1558. This period, though less brilliant and imposing than many others in the annals of England, is among the most important, because covering the last nearly successful struggle of the Papacy for supremacy in that country. We have portrayed here the protectorate, the administration and execution of Somerset, the conspiracy of Northumberland, the intrigues by which one of the most beautiful, accomplished, unambitious, and devoutly good women of England, Lady Jane Grey, was placed upon the throne for a few brief days, on her way to the scaffold, which she consecrated by her blood, the cruel reign of Mary, the reconciliation with Rome, the martyrdom of the Protestants, and the downfall of the Papal power in England. A new interest is thrown over these events by the free use of original materials, often *ipsissimis verbis*, and by a style of narrative singularly clear and forcible. The author finds no occasion to impugn the general judgment of history, as in the case of Henry VIII., but he evidently aims to be just, and to separate private character from political action. The following is his brief judgment of Mary: "No English sovereign ever ascended the throne with larger popu-

larity than Mary Tudor. ..... She reigned little more than five years, and she descended into the grave amidst curses deeper than the acclamations which had welcomed her accession. In that brief time she had swathed her name in the horrid epithet which will cling to it forever; and yet from the passions which in general tempt sovereigns into crime she was entirely free; to the time of her accession she had lived a blameless, and in many respects a noble life; and few men and women have lived less capable of doing knowingly a wrong thing." Four more volumes we believe, will complete the reign of Elizabeth. We congratulate the enterprising publisher on the beautiful style in which the book is printed, leaving so little to be desired for the gratification of the eye and taste in general.

THE SCIENCE OF WEALTH: A Manual of Political Economy, embracing the Laws of Trade, Currency, and Finance. By Amasa Walker, Lecturer on Political Economy in Amherst College. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1866.

This work is the product of patient study. The author was for many years a merchant in Boston, and was led by his occupation to reflect upon the nature and laws of wealth. For more than twenty years, since his retirement from the city, he has been a lecturer on Political Economy, in several of our public institutions, mostly in Amherst College. We have therefore in the work before us the result of forty years observation and reflection.

The treatise is restricted to Political Economy in the narrow sense of the term — to "the laws by which the production and consumption of wealth are governed." As a designation of the subject, "Science of Wealth" is preferred to "Political Economy," because the latter may include the expediencies of politics or the moral interests of civilization, matters which can here claim consideration only as they aid in the production of wealth or regulate its proper consumption.

A marked trait of this work is the author's unflinching confidence in the laws of which he treats. To his view they maintain an unbending steadfastness in peace and war, regardless alike of aid and opposition. For example, he says: "The great principle of value is, demand creates supply; supply satisfies demand. They are measured against each other and found equal. There is no supply which demand does not call for; there is no supply which is not enough for demand. And the reason for this perfect equality is, that value cannot exist without labor" (p. 155).

He would be ready at once, and in advance, to condemn all forms of credit currency on the principle here stated. They have no value, therefore do not obey the laws of value, therefore are not trustworthy. His remarks upon usury laws, and upon the futility of philanthropic efforts to increase the wages of females, are other illustrations of the trust which he reposes in the laws of wealth.

It would be more correct to say that this work is in advance of the age, than that it falls in with the tendency of the age. The most liberal sentiments in reference to international amity and commerce are inculcated. The old theory that national wealth consists in the possession of gold is summarily dismissed thus: "Let it be said to the shame of mankind that the mercantile theory was undoubted till the middle of the last century; proclaiming as truth and pursuing as policy, the world over, the double lie that the only wealth is gold and silver, and that what one people gains in wealth another must lose" (p. 54).

The present treatise favors the most perfect freedom of trade. The author considers foreign nations as neighbors who do us a favor if they furnish us a market, and not the less if they supply our own.

The subject to which Mr. Walker has given his most careful attention, studied most minutely, is the currency. He has devoted to it one hundred and seventeen pages in a work of four hundred and seventy, and has added numerous tables illustrative of the views which he adopts. His fundamental position is that money should have value — cost, in ordinary business, the same labor as the thing for which it is paid. A mixed currency he considers as having none of the virtues of a value currency; and as being, in case of panic, a most potent engine of evil, convertible only when no one needs the specie, a huge lever of oppression when the specie is withdrawn from the country, a false and variable standard of value, a temptation to speculators, a lure to adventurers, a fraud upon invested property, unsettling salaries and deranging prices, it is, as he argues, the chief source of our financial woes. With credit money an increase of circulation is a decrease of the incomes of laborers, capitalists, small tradesmen, and salaried men. It is therefore the interest of the vast majority of the people to banish a fluctuating currency. Agents, office-holders, pastors, teachers, all know that nothing is so variable as a *fixed* salary. Of the interests of the agriculturist the author reasons thus: "Unfavorable as the influence of mixed currency is upon all branches of industry, the agriculture of the United States is especially injured by it, because, as a people, we have a large surplus of agricultural products that must find sale in foreign markets. Whatever such surplus is worth for export determines the price of the whole crop; and the value or price is determined by the value or price of gold. The produce of the farmer, then, must be sold at a gold standard; but all he purchases for himself and family is bought at currency prices. How much difference this may make is seen at the present time, when commodities in general are one hundred and twenty per cent above par, while gold is but forty" (p. 205).

The book contains many other instances of acute observation and ingenious reasoning, but we have not space to notice them.

The work to which we have now called attention, is well adapted to the use of students in our institutions of learning. It is clear, full, without

being voluminous, and orderly in arrangement. Many will object to some of its theories, but a teacher may modify or refute, where he does not approve. A text-book should lay the proper subjects fairly before the mind of the pupil; this, we believe, "The Science of Wealth" will successfully accomplish.

AMERICAN ECCLESIASTICAL LAW: The Law of Religious Societies, Church Government, and Creeds, Disturbing Religious Meetings, and the Law of Burial Grounds in the United States, with Practical Forms. By R. H. Tyler, Counsellor-at-Law. 8vo. pp. 539. Albany: William Gould. 1866.

Mr. Tyler affirms in his preface: "*No work of this kind has heretofore made its appearance,*" etc. With due deference to this authority we must reply that in the Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. xxiii. p. 352, is a notice of "Massachusetts Ecclesiastical Law, by Edward Buck, of the Suffolk Bar. 12mo. pp. 310." Mr. Buck's volume *made its appearance* some time before Mr. Tyler's, and treated of the same topics; namely, Religious Societies, Church Government, Creeds, Disturbing Religious Meetings, the Law of Burial-Grounds, Meeting-Houses, Pews, etc. Mr. Buck's volume states the ecclesiastical laws of Massachusetts, but contains frequent allusions to the statutes and usages of other States. It abounds with references and condensed statements of cases, no small part of which make their appearance in Mr. Tyler's volume; many novel features in the plan of Mr. Buck's work are also introduced into Mr. Tyler's. We have discovered a striking similarity between the train of thought adopted on some topics by Mr. Tyler, and the train of thought previously adopted on the same topics by Mr. Buck. We think we are not mistaken in affirming that the name of Mr. Buck or of his interesting treatise *does not appear* in Mr. Tyler's five hundred and thirty-nine pages; and it may be said of these pages, as of the creation itself, "that things which are seen were not made of things which *do appear*." But although the title of Mr. Buck's Ecclesiastical Law *does not appear* in Mr. Tyler's pages, the genius and suggestions of it are there; and the following columns contain only a few of the proofs that Mr. Tyler's pages have a mysterious agreement with a treatise which he himself could never have perused, for he takes especial pains to announce that "no work of this kind has heretofore made its appearance," although he confesses that the want of such a work has been long *felt*.

BUCK'S Ecclesiastical Law.

"At the discovery of our *continent* Columbus *consecrated it to religious uses*," etc. Here follows a quotation from "*Select Letters of Columbus*," *page not stated* (p. 15).

TYLER'S Ecclesiastical Law.

"It may also be asserted, that this *continent* has been *dedicated to the uses of religion*. When *discovered* Columbus caused," etc. Here follows the substance of the quotation from "*Select Letters of Columbus*," page not stated (p. 18).

"*Admirals of the* established *Church of England were* no less *elaborate in their rites and ceremonies in the countries which they discovered at the* far *north.*" *After a storm, etc.*,—quoted from *Z. Hakluyt*, 116 (pp. 15, 16).

"But all *these questions* as to modes of swearing, and the quantity of *belief necessary* to make *a witness competent* — keenly discussed heretofore in civil and criminal cases, are much relieved *by the General Statutes of* 1860, *by which* '*every person,*'" etc (p. 202).

Mr. Buck, speaking of "*the colonists of Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay*, who came to found a '*plantation religious,*'" quotes "*an ordinance of* 1679, *requiring the council or county courts to appoint an able and discreet committee,*" etc.; here follows the ordinance (p. 17.)

"*The burial-ground in Massachusetts generally belongs to the town*, and by statute towns are allowed the charge of it. It *was* commonly *a part of* '*the meeting-house lot.*' There are instances where the burial-ground *belongs to the parish or religious society, rather than the town, by reason of the original grant or deed being made to the parish or the precinct, which is the equivalent of a parish.* To whomsoever this *sacred enclosure,*" *etc.* (p. 157.)

"*The General Court*, in the year 1717, *appoint a committee with power to grant and lay out the whole of the lands of* the *township to such persons* 'as the committee in their wisdom think most likely to advance the set-

"It appears that the *Admirals of the Church of England were* also *elaborate in their rites and ceremonies in the countries which they discovered at the north.* "*After a storm*" *etc.* — quoted from *Z. Hakluyt*, 116 (p. 19).

"But *this question* as to the religious belief necessary to render a witness competent, so much *discussed heretofore* by the Massachusetts courts, is now set at rest *by the General Statutes of* 1860, *by which* '*every person,*'" etc. Here follows the same quotation as that in the left hand column (p. 26).

Mr. Tyler, speaking of "*the colonists of Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay*," says: "*In* 1679 *an ordinance was passed by the council or county courts to appoint an able and discreet committee*," etc. Here follows the ordinance as quoted by Mr. Buck. These colonists came to New England "for the purpose of founding a '*plantation religious*'" (p. 19).

"*In the State of Massachusetts the burial-ground generally belongs to the town.* At an early day it was *a part of the meeting-house lot*, laid out in the immediate vicinity of the house, and almost uniformly belonged to the town, and was subject to its exclusive care and control." "In some cases *this sacred enclosure belongs to the parish or religious society, rather than the town, by reason of the original conveyance being made to the parish or the precinct, which is equivalent to the parish*" (p. 454).

"And in most cases *the General Court* would *appoint a committee with power to grant and lay out the whole of the lands of* a *township to such persons* 'as the committee in their wisdom think most likely to

tlement of the place, provided the committee, within three years, have there at least forty families, with an Orthodox minister.' Also *provided a lot* as large as may be *convenient*, in their judgment, *be laid out to the first settled minister; also a lot for the ministry, and another for the use of schools.* With modifications, this was the provident, careful method of founding towns very early adopted" (p 149).

"Following still the precedents of the ecclesiastical law of England, *all landholders, resident or non-resident, Christian* or not *Christian, were taxed, though they never saw the minister or entered the meeting-house. All corporations holding lands within the parish were also taxed* for the support of public worship until 1831. The Court listens to no arguments of counsel founded on the fact that the chief design of public worship was to save souls; the Court rather gave heed to the east parish of Amesbury, *that so-far as the community* is *concerned, public, religious, and moral instruction* is *intended for the prevention of crimes, not the salvation of souls. After* 1811 *the non-resident's land-tax went to support the minister of his denomination, if there was one in the town"* (p. 27).

advance the settlement of the place, provided the committee, within three years, have then at least forty families, with an Orthodox minister'; *and provided a lot of convenient* size and location be *laid out to the first settled minister, and also a lot for the ministry, and another for the use of schools.* This shows the care with which the people, from a very early period, secured the maintenance of the institutions of religion" (p. 176).

"*All landholders, resident and non-resident, Christian* and un*christian, were taxed, though they never saw the minister, or entered the meeting-house;* and *all corporations holding lands within the parish were also taxed*, upon the principle *that, so far as the community* were *concerned, public, religious, and moral instruction* was *intended for the prevention of crimes*, and *not the salvation of souls. After* the year 1811, *the non-resident's land-tax went to support the minister of his denomination, if there was one in the town"* (p. 177).

A NOTE is due here to Dr. W. M. Thompson in explanation of a reference (in the July Number of the Bibliotheca Sacra, p. 519) to his Land and Book, I. 544. He was understood to concede to Dr. Robinson his two positions on the point there in question, and to deny only his conclusion from them. But perhaps his "we may admit," etc., should be taken merely *e concesso*, and in that case he gives no opinion of his own as to whether the *coracimus* is found in the Round Fountain or not. It is understood that the English exploring party in Palestine place Capernaum at Tell Hûm, as Dr. Thompson maintains in opposition to Dr. Robinson. H.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE.

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In speaking of the philosophy of a thing, or in saying that it is philosophically considered, we generally mean that it is regarded from a higher or interior point of view; a point from which the principles by which it is governed and its interior construction become visible. In treating of the philosophy of language we must, therefore, so proceed that the interior things contained therein may become apparent, and that we may get a full view of it in all its bearings.

At first appearance language looks, indeed, simple enough, and by most people it is regarded as a mere instrument for giving vent to their feelings, expressing their ideas, and holding intercourse with their fellow-men. By the more intelligent among men, however, it is held in higher esteem, and even regarded with profound reverence, as by its means they obtain access to all the intellectual treasures of mankind, and in it they see the medium by which God has communicated his word for the salvation of the human race. Beyond this, however, their interest in language rarely extends, and the sole purpose for which, until very recently, it has been made a subject of diligent study, was that of possessing the ability to converse with people of different nations, and of

having access to the literature of olden and modern times. Language was regarded as a mere handmaid, valued only for the sake of the rich presents she bore in her hands, and which she lavished upon all who did not shun the labor necessary for their acquisition.

It is a discovery of quite modern date that language is not a menial handmaid, but instead, a noble organism, full of beauty and wisdom, with liberty reigning in its every particle, and with the charms that render a subject fascinating in the eyes of the student abundantly scattered over its surface. Indeed, modern investigations have proved most triumphantly that language is not only the most comprehensive of all sciences, but with regard to the positive information it offers respecting the intellectual organization of man, full worthy of taking the lead among its sister sciences. This honor also has already been accorded to it by history and natural history, and its oracles are profoundly listened to by each of these sciences, when the former desires to be enlightened respecting the ante-historical ages of mankind, and the latter to have correct ideas respecting the affinities existing among the human species.

A few remarks on the nature of language will show us in what particular field these discoveries have been made, and why it was that mankind so long remained in ignorance of its true character.

Every thing that proceeds from or is produced by man opens a field of investigation in two directions, according as it is regarded, either as a means of usefulness or as illustrating the genius and character of him whose production it is. For every thing that a man does bears the stamp of his mind —it is the natural expression of energies working in his breast, and bears witness of them. So the house or temple he builds can be regarded either in its capacity of serving as a house or a place of worship, or else as a means of illustrating the character and qualification of its builder. Sometimes indeed, the former is entirely lost sight of, and the latter only is taken into consideration, as is the case with all

the buildings and ruins of buildings preserved to us from ancient times, which are prized less on account of the shelter they afford, than because they offer us a deep insight into the state of religion and civilization among by-gone nations. As it is with buildings, so is it with the inventions of men and the books they write; they serve two purposes, that of performing a use to mankind, and that of shadowing forth the characters and abilities of those who produce them.

All that has been stated respecting the works of man in general applies in an eminent degree to language. For language also is a production of man, or rather an emanation from him. It is the natural expression of his thoughts and feelings, by means of which he holds intercourse with his fellow-men. This is its first use. It exceeds, however, all other human productions in the preciseness and completeness with which it reflects the whole human mind, and presents its very complex form to the scrutiny of the understanding. For even as man himself can be viewed, either as an individual or as a member of a nation, or of a whole race of men, or, finally, as a part of mankind in general, so also can we distinguish in every human mind: 1. *Universal* qualities, which it has in common with all mind; 2. *General* qualities, which it holds in common with the mind of the race to which it belongs; 3. *Particular* qualities, which are common to certain nations; 4. *Singular* or *individual* qualities, by which it is distinguished from other minds of the same nation or family. These several features are most beautifully represented in human language, and, by subjecting its organism to a close philosophical analysis, we are enabled to arrive at a full knowledge of them.

For a long time language was regarded merely as the expression of the thoughts and feelings of the individual; and, although it was well known that every nation has a language of its own, still this was not usually regarded as the expression of its national character and mind; and, while a vague feeling prevailed at all times that more things are contained in the words we employ in common talk and writ-

ing than appear on the surface, still the words of language were not used as means of inquiring into the workings of the human mind. In this particular region of the study of language, by which it is placed on an equal footing with the noblest sciences, and in which its lofty and high-born nature is fully recognized, the many brilliant discoveries have been made to which we have alluded above.

As to the reason why men so long remained in ignorance with respect to the true nature of language, it may be remarked that the knowledge of language like that of all other subjects has been progressive, and that men always proceed but gradually from the consideration of the outer parts of a subject to an examination of its inward parts. So in the study of nature, men began by noticing the outer covering of the earth; they saw upon it plants, animals, and men. They admired their beauty, tested their usefulness, and lauded the transcendent skill with which the Creator had arranged them into one harmonious whole. In the course of time, however, animals and plants were arranged into species and families, their interior structure was revealed by the microscope, and the composition of their particles by chemistry. Geology and geognosy descended into the earth and told its history; meteorology ascended into the air and examined the clouds and the fluctuations of the atmosphere; and astronomy, aided by mathematics, attacked the very skies, and made the sun and stars tell their motions. Philosophy, finally, brought up the rear, and with an inspired voice proclaimed the universe to be the word of God manifested in his works. Standing on the shoulders of mathematics and the natural sciences, in its large sweep over the universe, it divides the whole of it into sun and earth. The earth it proves to have been formed from the sun through the atmospheres, and after the creation of the earth, it affirms that by the combined action of the sun, earth, and atmospheres, its surface was covered with plants, and peopled first with animals and afterwards with men.

The development of the knowledge of language took a

parallel course. For language also has its sun and earth, and on the surface of the latter its organic life. Thoughts animated by feelings or affections are the sun in language, even as the sun in nature is light animated by heat. As the sun in nature procures a resting-place for itself in its earths, in which it concentrates its powers, and whence, as from new centres, it creates paradises for the habitations of men, so the thoughts animated by affections create a resting-place for themselves in the words of language, in which they concentrate their powers, and of which in delightful books and brilliant orations they construct intellectual paradises for the enjoyment and uses of human minds. Witness the sunny influence of a kind word,—how it dispels gloom and darkness, and causes the tender flowers of innocence and truth to open their buds; how it irradiates the countenance, as with the beams of a rising morning sun, and presses the pearly dew from the eye. As in nature the charms of the earthly paradise first enchanted the eyes of men, so also in language, conversations first, and afterwards books, occupied their attention. They were completely satisfied with the present meaning of words, and cared not for their origin, even as they enjoyed themselves for a long time on the surface of the earth before they dug into it to examine its strata. However, the nature of man is such that he cannot be contented with mere facts for any length of time, but in the end is irresistibly drawn towards the investigation of causes. So with regard to nature; men were not satisfied with enjoying her bountiful riches, and dwelling on her surface, but they were inflamed with a desire of penetrating into the mysteries of her economy and of the creation of the earths; and in language they could not be satisfied with the mere use of words, and with admiring the beauties of composition, and endeavored to reach the source whence they sprung, and to see them revealed in the inner meaning of their life. This desire to enter into the causes of words gave rise to *etymology*, or the science of tracing words to their origin. In the beginning its derivations were often arbitrary and

highly fanciful, and never, indeed, has a science been so much abused and treated with such violence as etymology. It was regarded as the field in which the learned were allowed to amuse themselves and display their antics. Each endeavored to surpass the other in extravagant and impossible derivations, and the more he did violence to the spirit of language the surer was he of being applauded and believed. Language, in the meantime, like a defenceless maiden, had to suffer all this abuse, and watch her chance of making her escape out of this den of robbers and thieves. The day of deliverance finally came, but it was long after all the other sciences had broken the fetters by which they were chained to the Middle Ages. Etymology was not placed upon a solid scientific basis until within the last thirty or forty years. Since that time, however, it has been steadily advancing, and, under the fostering care of comparative philology, it has contributed a large share towards the enlightenment of the human race.

There is one circumstance, however, which contributed, perhaps, more than language unaided could have done, towards placing it in its proper position among its sister sciences.

After men, in the course of time, had begun to inquire into the causes of things, they indeed first commenced with classifying and investigating the subordinate parts of nature, as animals, plants, minerals, etc.; but gradually their ambition took a higher flight, and they commenced to gather information about man himself. At first they instituted a systematic search after the human soul, by cutting open the human body and dissecting it in every direction, thinking that they might discover it through material channels. This search proving futile, some drew comparisons between animal and human bodies, and in their haste to find similarities failed to see distinctions, and thus came to assert that man draws his origin from the beast. With this preconceived idea they entered upon the natural history of mankind, and arranged them into families and species, with a view of proving their relationship to the beast. Others, however, started from the

principle that the soul of man is separated from the human body, as the Creator from creation; and that as the Creator reveals himself to the rational eye of man in his works, so also the human soul is revealed in every function of the body. Scientific men were thus from the very beginning divided into two hostile armies, one of which contended for the animal origin of man, and the other declared his independence of the beast, and his creation as a man by the Creator. These two armies frequently had hot encounters, but without any distinct results. In the course of time the defenders of the human origin of man again divided into two parties, the one asserting that all men have descended from one human pair, the other attributing a distinct origin to each separate race of men.

With this last party the defenders of the animal origin united themselves, and thus two new parties arose, one of which advocates the theory of one Adam, and the other, of several Adams. In this state of affairs the eyes of the combatants were drawn upon language, which on its resuscitation had made a few bold assertions on the subject under discussion. Thus far it had not been used by either party to fortify its position, and both, therefore, sought its alliance in the hope of ensuring a preponderance in the contest. Upon a clear sifting of the claims of language, they came to the conclusion that it alone is enabled to decide scientifically the question of the plurality or unity of the human race. By common consent it was therefore made umpire, and since that time the most zealous of either parties have buried themselves deeply in the labyrinth of languages, and are there busily engaged in digging, comparing notes, and retracing their steps. Among these party-workers there are some stern laborers, who, perfectly familiar with the ways of language, and filled with an almost parental affection for it, because they have rescued it from its low and degraded condition, keep a sharp look-out in their field, and see that those working under the influence of a party-spirit, do not form their judgments too hastily, and pronounce unfounded opin-

ions. Among these we may mention Bopp, the founder of comparative philology, and Pott, the greatest philologer of the age. With such care the science of language has reached, in the short space of thirty or forty years, a high state of development, and the harvest which it will yield after all its fields shall have been brought into a state of cultivation, will be immense.

From this general view of language let us descend to the more refreshing consideration of its details.

Little more than what appears at first sight can be said of language, regarded as the mere vehicle of the thoughts and the expression of the *individual human mind*. Still, even in this respect, we detect in it much that is interesting and worthy of notice. For, while the accuracy and pithiness with which it expresses our every thought and gives its minutest shades must excite the admiration of the learned, the facility with which it chimes in with all our states, weeps with us when we are sad, laughs when we are gay ; and the ambiguity of its terms, which furnishes an endless source of sport and merriment in the form of charades and puns, make it a most delightful companion for men in general. Still as regards puns they are an abuse of language at best, and are with a better grace pardoned in others than perpetrated by ourselves. Nor is the virtue of language as a safety-valve, at all to be underrated, by which men when they are heated and angry are able to let off some of their superfluous steam. Indeed, the complete adaptation of language to the use for which it has been created, namely, that of expressing alike the feelings and the thoughts of men is truly astonishing. This is illustrated also by the immense quantity of books written on all subjects which could possibly occupy the attention of man, and by the fact that every man, no matter how high his sentiments and abstruse his thoughts, or how low his desires and corporeal his ideas, ever finds a sufficient stock of words with which to clothe them, so as to make them intelligible to his fellow-men. In regard to the perfect harmony of its parts, their remarkable fitness, and the facility

with which they can be brought into any connection whatever, as well as in regard to the absolute sway which man exercises over it at all times, language is second only to the wonderful organism of the human body itself, and its complete adaptation to all the uses of the soul.

Another pleasing feature in language is its riches. It is not compelled to usher a thought into the world naked, or but scantily clad; it can build gorgeous mansions for its reception, and dress it in the most sumptuous garb. At the touch of the poet it even yields music; for its organism is subject to the same laws of rhythm as the atmosphere by which we are surrounded; both thus giving evidence of their heaven-born nature. However, it is with the economy of words as with that of all other possessions. Some of those who are rich in words but poor in thoughts, like those that are rich in money but poor in sense, often build large houses and make many pretentions and great show, but they make much ado about nothing. Others, again, are rich in some kind of thoughts, but of a different order, which they offer in the form of the lighter novels and romantic tales. Generally they even do it in a handsome and very captivating style, appealing to the feelings of men rather than to their understandings; they lavish their words, and calculate everything for effect; these are they in society, who have a certain "*savoir vivre*," are rich, fond of society, keep a large, open house, and are for this reason loved and respected by almost everybody. Separated from these, in the literary as well as in the social world, are those men of sterner mould, who first look to the substance, and then consider the form. Like a good and faithful steward, a man of their stamp ascertains that he is right, and that the thoughts he wishes to express by words are true, and adapted to promote the happiness of his fellow-men, or to advance the cause of science. When his mind is satisfied on that score he goes resolutely to work, and embodies his thoughts in words. As the occasion requires he presents it in bold, laconic terms, or else produces it in a milder form, and enlivens it by the genial warmth

of genuine humor, or else dresses it in magnificent colors, and decks it with all the charms of consummate art, or finally he presents it in an abrupt and threatening aspect, should his object be to destroy a deeply-rooted, detestable falsehood, which he explodes by cutting sarcasms, and annihilates by a stern exposure to the refulgent and searching rays of truth. Inasmuch as he is master of his thoughts, which he reduces into a clear and definite shape, he is also master of his language. For every word in a man's memory has an innate tendency to clothe a thought, just as the human body has a tendency to clothe the soul; and from the very first, when the rudiments of a thought are laid in the mind, the words from the memory begin to flock around it, and become more ardent in their desire to clothe and cover it the more clearly it is brought out and the more definitely it is shaped. Indeed, the thoughts are the plastic force in language, and the more a man possesses of this force, or in other words, the more his faculty of thinking is developed and concentrated, the more easily will he wield language, and out of a few simple words chisel a most lovely image of his thoughts.

In order to write well you must think well. First get your ideas, then write. All your dictionaries, models, and rhetorics will prove unavailing unless you know how to think. We must have food, in order to turn our skill in dressing and preparing it to some account. It is very well that in youth we should be made acquainted with the graces of a good style, but unless we learn how to think at the same time, all our accomplishments will be to no purpose. As in the conclusions of modern science are contained all the results at which the learned have successively arrived through the course of thousands of years, so also in every thought of man are contained the ideas which he had previously stored up in his memory; and thus his thought will be free, true, and independent in the degree in which these ideas are well digested and well arranged in his mind; and his power of illustrating and communicating them to others will be com-

mensurate with the extent and depth of his knowledge. In order to write well we must therefore know a great deal, and what we know must be well arranged and digested in our minds. Besides, we must not forget the effect which is exercised upon our thoughts by the state of our feelings; for what we love, that we think. It is our love which invades and rouses up our memory, and thence produces thoughts; and it is from a soul well animated by noble impulses that burst forth those spontaneous flashes of eloquence which kindle the masses and make every word a flaming sword and resistless power.

In comparing the language of different individuals, we find next that the same words can be made either very strong or very weak. Thus, when a man like Laplace or Humboldt uses the word "universe," it has quite another meaning than when it is used by a narrow-minded individual whose ideas never extended beyond his own immediate, contracted circle. The word "God" also, has one meaning, when spoken by a sincere believer in the Divine Being, and quite a different one when it is employed by a man who has destroyed the idea of God in his mind by blasphemous scepticism and irrational philosophy. The word "wife" also has quite a different meaning when issuing from the lips of a happy husband and when pronounced by those of the solitary bachelor; and the word "home" comes with a great deal more expression from the former than from the latter. The words "ethnology," "entomology," "etymology," have an indifferent and even disagreeable sound to such as know nothing about these sciences, while they touch quickly a responsive chord in the minds of those with whom they are favorite studies. The reason of this is evident. The words we use in speaking and writing are the representatives of our knowledge, and according as our knowledge of a thing is correct, clear, and full, we are enabled to handle the word by which it is expressed with ease and facility, and to apply it in its proper place. In speaking, also, we pronounce it with the proper emphasis and animation; for the feeling of freedom

which we experience, when we have fully mastered a subject, gives us security, and allows us to articulate distinctly and without hesitancy. But when a word is comparatively empty in our minds and void of meaning we bungle in the use of it, and are very apt to become "*malaprops*." Words filled with knowledge are our own property, for we have honestly acquired them; but mere empty words are borrowed. So long as man in speaking or writing confines himself to the use of such expressions as are really his property, his style will be clear and transparent; but when he deals in words which by right do not belong to him, because he has not acquired their meaning, he becomes unintelligible, and generally makes himself ridiculous. Indeed, this incongruity is as striking as that of a simpleton's wearing the badge of a judge, or of a servant's dressing in the clothes of her mistress. This counterfeit use of words is therefore very readily recognized, because in this instance they do not fit the thoughts which they are used to express. It is, however, quite different where the language is created into a complete likeness of the thoughts it expresses, as is the case in the word of God, where the ruling thought can be pursued into the very words which compose its expression, and new treasures are gathered the further we descend. Such essays and compositions also as are made up with the help of dictionaries and collections of synonyms, are widely different from those which are the spontaneous products of our minds; for their whole frame is frigid and stiff, and they bear evident traces of the painful exertions and convulsive efforts which their writers have made with a view of reaching the height of their subject. Indeed, the peculiar grace and fitness of words, as well as the so-called happy expressions with which we meet in the writings of our first authors, are never drawn from dictionaries and grammars; as little as the sublime paintings of Raphael were drawn from treatises on painting, in which the beautiful, the doctrine of perspective and of shades, and the mixing of colors were discussed.

Such are the phenomena noticed in language when it is regarded as the mere tool for the expression of the individual human thought. But as every man has his own peculiar thoughts by which the contents or the substance of his speech differs from that of all other men, so also has he a peculiar accent in pronunciation, and a peculiar style in writing, by which he is as easily recognized by the adept as by his hand-writing. It is for this reason that Buffon said: "Le style, c'est l'homme" — the style is the man himself. However, this style of man, as well as his peculiar hand-writing, do not make their appearance until he has fully become a man, and is his own master, both in thinking and writing.

From this consideration of language as it is animated by the affections and thoughts of the individual, let us turn to the interior structure of its organizm, in which it reflects the character of the *human mind in general and the national mind in particular*. We have henceforth less to do with the contents of language than with its outward form or shell.

Here the philosophy proper of language takes its rise, and lays open to our astonished eyes its hidden treasures. If, from its sublime seat, we take a collective view of all the parts of language as they are spread out before our gaze, we see that everything in existence, from the Creator to the least particle of creation, every feeling in man, and all his actions, every motive power in nature, together with all the relations exhibited in the universe, and the qualities of the single objects of which it is composed, are parts of language, couched in the form of words; and the thought suddenly flashes upon our mind that language, as the most exact counterpart of the world within us and the world around us, is a universe in itself. It is, as it were, man's own version of the universe, and serves as a connecting link between himself and the universe. While he is busy in the universe, his thoughts really yearn for the words of language which are contained in his memory, in order that they may come into a state of greater fulness, and be brought into a more definite shape. Indeed, unless man thinks very deeply about ends and the

causes of things, it is utterly impossible for him to keep the words of the universe out of his thoughts.

And now, from the considerations that have been advanced, we may be justified in asserting more boldly, that language, because it is the most universal of the sciences, is also worthy to take the lead among them. Indeed, this conviction grows stronger as we behold the immense influence it exerts upon the other sciences. To all others it is the means of access, inasmuch as they cannot even take hold of their materials without calling them by such names as language gives them; and still less can they treat of them without drawing largely upon all the stores of language. Nay, it is more; it is in the place of a mother to all the sciences; into her lap they pour all their riches, and to her safe-keeping they entrust all their inventions and discoveries. For the name of a thing is not merely an instrument by which to handle it in speech, but it serves also as an enclosing tunic which fixes the knowledge of it permanently in our sight, and prevents its escape. Thus, unless language had existed, the wisdom of former ages would have been completely lost to us. Without it men could never expect to have their names immortalized, and the past would appear to us as a large, incomprehensible mass of darkness. Wherefore, language cannot be styled merely the guardian of science, and its indispensable helpmeet, but also the bond by which the present and the past are knit together, and the past made the supporter and fructifier of the present, and the treasurer of the present for the use of the future.

On the other hand, an entire new world begins to dawn before us when we come to consider the individual words; for, though they appear extremely simple on first sight, we still find upon clear inspection that a whole mine of metaphysics is contained in each of them. In order to work this mine, and expose its hidden treasures, we have to descend to the root of the word, where it was first conceived, and thence follow its growth among the series of languages through which it extends its branches. Then we shall see

that the surface of language like that of nature, is covered with a multitude of plants, which are larger or smaller, according as their original roots possess more or less of vitality. We shall find also, that during its vegetation each root develops a tendency to leave the realm of low, earthly significations, and, like the butterfly, to flit into the higher regions of mental and spiritual significations. And lastly, we shall see that some of the tribes of words, like some evergreen plants, preserve their leaves and branches entire through the whole of their onward growth, while others, every time they are transplanted from one language into another, are stripped of some of their limbs, and have their places supplied by graftings which have shot forth from a more significant or appropriate root. Indeed, in studying the anatomy and physiology of language, if we may be allowed to use these expressions, we see so many wonderful and profoundly wise developments, that if our eyes are but a little opened by the light of truth, we cannot help tracing in their creation the finger of our allwise Creator. Truly, in the formation of words, he first acts upon the intelligence of a man, and through him produces the word, whence man is very apt to look upon himself and his ancestors as the founders of language, while the whole of language is laid out with such transcendent skill, and there is so much vitality in its well-balanced and profusely supplied organism, which, in this respect, completely emulates nature, of which it is the counterpart, that we must regard it eminently as the work and gift of God.

There are two ways by which we may be brought to a knowledge of the creation of words. In the one we follow and expand the data which are furnished us in the divine record, and in the other, which is more circuitous, we gather together all the languages that are spoken on the globe, dissect them and compare their structure, as we do with the subjects in natural history, arrange them into species and families, and trace them up to their common origin, if we can.

In the holy scriptures we read that in the beginning God created man into his image, after his likeness. How sublime must have been the state of man as long as he was the image and likeness of God! How quick must have been the penetration of his mind, and how large his capacity of learning! His body, beautiful in the extreme, because he then lived according to the laws of order, must have been perfectly adapted to the uses of the soul. Nothing at all would impede it in its intercourse with the body, because of a necessity, not only a man's soul, but also his body were created into the image and likeness of God. How clearly the eyes and the expression of the mouth must have then told of everything that passed within the soul, and how instinctively must the thoughts have flowed into such language as expressed most clearly their sublime ideas. Happy men! They were never at a loss for any word; as the images and likenesses of God, they must not only have had an interior understanding and appreciation of nature, of which we cannot form any idea, but also an intuitive perception of the peculiar meaning of every vowel and consonant, and of the words that were compounded of them. Wherefore every man must have understood the language of his fellow-men, without being obliged first to learn it. As the children of God, and with their minds moving in a higher atmosphere, they were not obliged, as we are, to toil in the sweat of their brow, for each crumb of scientific knowledge. They were truly the lords of nature then, and knew the names of all the beasts of the field; that is, they had an acute perception of their uses and qualities expressed by their names. Their minds being thus free, they could regard and contemplate the higher spiritual truths that were taught them by God, who, as we are informed, then spake with man. But man, thus created perfect, fell, and, instead of listening to the word of God, hearkened to the voice of his senses, which spake to him under the symbol of a serpent. In the degree in which the image and likeness of God was destroyed in the breasts of men, the acute perception which they had of

nature and of sounds in language died away; and, although the highest wisdom was locked up in the words which they inherited from their ancestors, they became to them mere dead, inanimate forms, until finally primeval language itself passed away, and its place was taken by a coarser structure supplying the coarser wants of men. As a remnant of primeval language appear the Semitic languages of the present and past years, whose roots are not so readily penetrated by the modern scholars, as those of the Indo-European stock to which our own and the modern European languages belong.

The scientific investigation into the original meaning of the words of the latter class of languages has lately been very successfully carried on by the school of comparative philology. By following up the modern European languages to the Himalaya mountains in Central Asia, their birth-place, and by establishing the long chain of Indo-European languages, it has been proved that the roots of the nouns and adjectives, in these languages at least, are mostly verbs or activities. In fact, our nouns and adjectives seem nothing else but precipitated verbs. A great number of substantives may be traced to verbs belonging to our native tongue, but by far the greater part we have to trace to our ancestral languages, the Anglo-Saxon, Old Saxon, Gothic, Old Norse, and Indian or Sanscrit, which abound in original verbs, now extinct.

As an illustration of the generation of nouns and adjectives in the Indo-European languages, the following examples drawn from the results at which comparative philology has arrived, may not be uninteresting, as they prove the verbal source of many nouns which we least expect to be so derived. Among these examples there are some which show that different nations, according to their genius and manner of perception, chose different roots to express the same word. So with the people in the North of Europe, *God*, according to some, is goodness, virtue, purity, derived from the primitive verb

çudh to purify[1]; according to others he is the shaker or concussor, Sanscr. *dhâti*, from the root *dhu*, to shake[2]; while the people of the South take their word *Deus*, which is identical with *Zeus*, or *Jupiter*, *Deus-pater*, from the verb *div*, to shine or to glitter,[3] the original form of which is still preserved in the adjective *divine*, from Latin *divus*. The northern *moon* is that which measures (Sanscr. *mâ*), and the southern *luna*, French *lune*, that which shines, from the verb *lucēre* to shine. The English *day*, Goth. *dags*, dates back to Sanscrit *dah*, to burn,[4] while the Latin *dies* is derived from Sanscr. *div*, to shine.[5] Other words again are drawn by the northern and southern languages from the same fountains. So Lat. *stella*, Engl. *star*, and Greek ἄστρον are derived from Sanscr. *as*, to throw;[6] Lat. *dens* and Engl. *tooth* from δά-ω, δα-ί-ω, to divide;[7] Lat. *ventus* and Engl. *wind* from Sanscr. *vâ*, to breathe, Germ. *wehen*[8]; Lat. *pes*, and Engl. *foot*, from Sanscr. *pad*, to go[9]; Lat. *labium*, Engl. *lip*, from Lat. *la*[*m*]*bere* and Engl. *lap*, to sip.[10] Without entering for the present into any detailed comparison of the northern and southern tongues of Europe, we will simply point out the roots

[1] See "F. W. Eichhoff, Vergleichung der Sprachen von Europa und Indien, aus dem Französischen von J. H. Kaltschmidt," p. 115.

[2] See Schleicher in Kuhn's "Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung," Vol. i. p. 158. In the same Magazine, Vol. vii. pp. 12–18, Leo Meyer endeavors to derive *God*, Germ. *Gott* from the Sanscrit *jut* to sparkle, which is a later form of *dyut*. This word itself dates back to the simple verb *dyu*, which is identical with *div* to shine; so that, according to Leo Meyer, *God* and *Deus* are derived from the same root.

[3] *Div* (*dju*) to shine, to sparkle; (also heaven) *djâu-s* heaven, the god of heaven, *divja-s* heavenly, *dêva-s* God. See G. Curtius, "Grundzüge der griechischen Etymologie," Vol. i. p. 201.

[4] See Ahrens in "Zeitschrift, etc.," Vol. iii. p. 166.

[5] See Curtius in l. c.

[6] See Benfey "Wurzellexicon, pp. 661–662, and Kuhn in "Zeitschrift, etc.," Vol. i. p. 540.

[7] See Hugo Weber in "Zeitschrift," Vol. x. p. 244, where he opposes Curtius's derivation of this word from ἔδ-ω, Sanscr. *ad-mi*.

[8] See Curtius, "Grundzüge, etc.," Vol. i. p. 354.

[9] See Curtius, Vol. i. p. 209.

[10] See Lottner in "Zeitschrift," Vol. vii. pp. 184–185.

of some of the most common words in the English language Of nouns and adjectives which find their radical verbs in the English language, we may mention the *fly* from to fly, the *duck* from to duck, *the crow* from to crow, the *crab* from to creep, the *snake* from to sneak, the *sled* from to slide. Of adjectives may be noted *low* from to lie, *full* from to fill, *fat* from to feed, *great* from to grow, *bitter* from to bite. Of other words, the roots of which occur principally in the Sanscrit language, the following may be mentioned:[1] *fire* from to burn (Sanscr. *prush*, *plush*, No. 385); *stream* from to flow (Sanscr. *sru*, *srav-â-mi*, I flow, *srô-t-as*, stream, etc., No. 517); *yeast* from to ferment (Old High Germ. *jes-an*, *ger-j-an*, Mod. High Germ. *gähren*, *Gäscht*, No. 567); *timber* from to build (Greek δέμ-ω, I build, No. 265); *hut* from to hide (Sanscr. *gudh*, to dress, Greek κεύθω, to hide, No. 321); *flail* from to beat (Greek πλήσσω, Lithuan. *plak-u*, to beat, Old High Germ. *fleg-il*, No. 367); *dust* from to agitate (Sanscr. *dhû*, *dhû-no-mi*, commoveo, agito, *dhû-li-s*, pulvis, Greek θύω, to rage, to roar, No. 320). *Son* means one born (Sanscr. *su*, *sav-â-mi*, *sâu-mi*, gigno, pario, *sû-nu-s*, filius, No. 605); *goose*, to gape (Greek χαίνω, I gape, χήν, goose, No. 190); *mouse*, to steal (Sanscr. *mush*, *mush-nâ-mi*, I steal, *mûsh-a-s*, mouse, No. 482); *sow*, to generate (Sanscr. *su*, *sâu-mi*, gigno, pario, Nos. 579, 605); *wolf*, to tear, according to Schweizer (Zeitschrift, etc., Vol. vi. p. 444); this word is derived from Sanscr. *vraçé*, to tear, *vṛka-s*, wolf; *lynx*, to see (Sanscr. *lôk*, *lôk-â-mi*, video, Lettish *lûkô-t*, to see, Nos. 548, 87); *arm*, to fit (Sanscr. *ar*, to contrive, to reach, *ara-m*, fitting, quick, *êrma-s*, arm, Greek ἀραρίσκω, to fit on, ἁρ-μός, link, shoulder, etc., No. 488); *finger*, to seize (Germ. *fangen*, to catch); *word*, to say (Goth. *vaur-d*, Lat. *ver-bu-m*, Sanscr. *brû*, *brav-i-mi*, I speak,

[1] These words are mostly drawn from G. Curtius, "Grundzüge der Gricchischen Etymologie, Vol. i., 1858," which contains a most careful digest of all Greek etymologies which have thus far been reliably established by the school of comparative philology. The numbers in brackets have reference to those used by Curtius. [Since writing the above a new and improved edition of this valuable work has been published.]

Greek ἐρ, Fερ, ἐρέω, εἴρω, I say, No. 493); *lust*, to desire (Sanscr. *lash*, *lash-â-mi*, I desire, Lat. *las-c-êvu-s*, No. 532); *feather*, to fly (Old High Germ. *fedara*, *fedah*, wing, Lat. *pet-o*, *im-pet-u-s*, *pen-na*, Old Lat. *pes-na*, Sanscr. *pat*, *pat-â-mi*, I fly, *pat-a-tra-m*, *patra-m*, wing, Greek πετ, πέτ-ο-μαι, I fly, πτε-ρό-ν, wing, πτ-ίλο-ν, feather, No. 214); *wool*, to cover (Sanscr. *var*, to cover, *urâ*, sheep, *ûr-na*, wool, Greek ἔρ-ιο-ν, wool, Lat. *vell-us*, *vill-u-s*, No. 496). Among adjectives *thick* means to thrive, to accumulate (Goth. *dîhan*, Germ. *gedeihen*; see Grimm's Wörterbuch); *thin*, to stretch (Germ. *dehnen*, to stretch (Sanscr. *tan*, *tan-ô-mi*, extendo, *tanu-s*, thin, Lat. *ten-d-o*, *tenu-is*, Greek τά-νυ-μαι τείν-ω, No. 230); *few*, to cease (Goth. *fav-ai*, few, Lat. *pau-l-us*, *pau-cu-s*, Greek παύ-ω, No. 351); *much*, to increase (Old Norse, *miök*, very, Goth., *mik-ils*, great, Lat. *mag-nus*, Greek μέγ-ας Sanscr. *mah*, *mah-â-mi*, augeo, *maḥ*, *maḥ-â-mi*, cresco, No. 473.)

From these few examples, which allow us some insight into the interiors of words, the reader may imagine what great help language affords us in investigating the peculiar cast of mind which characterizes a nation. For language, indeed, is man's version of the universe; but as every nation has a language of its own, so there are as many versions of the universe as there are nations. By comparing the roots which each of these nations employs in naming the objects and agencies in nature, we may see whether they take a more superficial or deeper view of their subject, and may thus form some idea of the peculiar method of observation which characterizes each nation. But, as in judging an individual by his language, we not merely take into consideration the substance of his speech or writings, but also the form in which he expresses himself, the method which he pursues, and the degree of lucidity or obscureness which prevails in his writings and speech; so also in fixing the philosophical standard of a nation we must likewise take into consideration their grammar, or the form into which their language is cast, both as regards the etymological means or grammatical forms which they employ, and the syntactical order in which they

arrange their sentences. The etymological part of grammar, or that which treats of declensions and inflections, in the light which has been shed upon it by comparative grammar, is the severest test by which the affinities between languages, and consequently between nations, is now determined. Languages which differ in their grammatical structure cannot lay much claim to a mutual affinity; and whenever the grammatical structure of languages differs we may be sure that their lexicographical portion also differs. There may be assonances in some words, but no affinity; and deriving words of a language from another with which it has no grammatical affinity is now considered as simply absurd.

It would lead us too far to attempt now to give a sketch of the genesis of the grammatical forms of our languages; we will only say, that the endings of the Latin and Greek verbs, and the remnants of endings in the modern languages are pronouns, together with the substantive verb *to be;* in Latin and Greek also there has been used a suffix, which means *endowed with*, (*va*, *vat*, *vant*) as has been shown in an earlier number of the Bibliotheca Sacra, in a review of Bopp's comparative Grammar; and in some of the modern languages *to have* has been added, and in the Germanic tongues *to do*. The endings of Latin and Greek nouns are articles, which originally were suffixed, as in the Latin, but afterwards when the fact of their being articles was lost sight of, were also prefixed, as in Greek; the article itself, however, is first obtained from the demonstrative pronoun. But abandoning the ground of grammar, we now wish to direct attention to the relations which the individual holds to the general language of his people.

As the thoughts which man utters in language are the expression of his own individual mind, so language itself is the grand expression of the national mind. It is like an atmosphere breathing out of a nation, for the purpose of expressing the thoughts and ideas generated in its bosom. As it is essential that it should be of a nature to accommodate all the minds of a nation, it was cast by the Creator in a

form to fit the whole nation. Its texture is such that, while it is a faithful reflection of the national mind, it is general enough to allow each member to shape it into his own image and likeness. Neither is it a stereotype expression of the national mind as it was, or as it should be, but it is elastic and free, like all the works of God, and always takes its form from the nation as it is in the present. It is uncouth and rough with the barbarian, and polished and refined with the cultivated.

Inasmuch as language is the common expression of a nation, it cannot be arbitrarily changed by individuals. They might as well set themselves up to remodel and change the ruling customs and habits of a nation, who think that they can change and trim up a language as they would an old garment. It is nevertheless true that language is constantly changing — that it receives new words and throws out old ones, or else varies their meaning. And how could it possibly be otherwise? for the people whose idea of the universe it represents are themselves continually advancing in wisdom and intelligence, and having new forces set free by new inventions and by the influence of the spirit of the times. But how are these changes in language produced? Is it by the lexicographers, and their critical examination of the faults and beauties of each word decorating its vast organism — by their plucking out such as have become vulgar or obsolete, or according to their opinion disgrace the appearance of language? Is it by inserting in their places other words, borrowed from foreign languages, and studding them up as Johnson did his English dictionary? Or is it by the grammarians making the model form of language, into which, according to their opinion, every language ought to be forced, in order to approach nearer to perfection? No, it is not by such means that language is advanced and ennobled. No word can be called a part of language unless it is first digested in the common stomach of the nation, saturated there with its national spirit, and produced by one of the master minds best representing its genius. It is by such master

minds who enter fully into the spirit of the language, fill every word of it in their minds with its respective meaning, and in writing books for the people, pour their whole soul into them, that language is rendered flexible, its individual parts expanded, and its whole standard raised. As for grammarians attempting at any time to improve the grammatical structure of a language, by altering the position of the words in the sentence, or introducing a change in the inflection of the nouns and verbs, it is absolute high-treason against language, and nothing short of it. The grammatical rules of a language are the current in which the national thoughts flow, and to endeavor to disturb this, would be to bring disorder into the whole structure.

It is customary to look upon lexicographers as those to whom the advance and development of a language is mostly due; but this is a mistaken idea. Lexicographers, as we have already seen, are not producers, but convenient, and sometimes inconvenient, treasurers of language. Others coin the gold, but they preserve it, and by them foreign words are changed into such as are current in their own language. Such is their legitimate profession.

It will no doubt be said that Webster did much towards placing the English language on a firm footing, by purging it from abuses and settling and defining its words. So he did; but we nevertheless persist in saying that he did not enrich the English language. He may have introduced and collected a thousand words that were scarcely seen in the language before; but unless they have first passed through the minds of the people, and come into currency among its writers, they are not a part of language, because not yet adopted by the people. As to his improvements in spelling, they were adopted so far as the people were ready to receive them, and he acted in this particular as their representative, through whom the improvements were introduced; as to the rest they fell to the ground, because they were not the expression of the people.

In regard to the external form of language by which it is

impressed upon our senses, we distinguish in it two principles: its pronunciation and its orthography. These principles in some languages agree, as in the Hebrew, German, and Greek, and in others they disagree, as in the French and English. The question now arises, when they disagree is it right for us to force them into an agreement, by making orthography take the form of pronunciation? This must be answered decidedly in the negative. The same power which gave origin to the spoken word also provided for its written form. These two agree and fit each other admirably. The written form of a word contains its whole history; by it we can trace it back through the most tortuous windings into connate languages, and obtain a clue to its original meaning. If this external continent of language, upon which a nation has stamped its own likeness, and upon which its whole building rests and supports itself, is destroyed, how can the philologist after that, by removing skilfully its outer covering, penetrate to the inner kernel, to which a word owes its signification; and how can he upon this basis any further expand and develop the meaning of a word, if he is deprived of the means whereby to measure the ground that can be legitimately covered by a certain word? Is not this preparing death to a language? Or what would you think of a man who, in order to make your countenance appear more like other countenances which he considers normal, so covers it up and distorts its expression as to disguise you completely? Phonography, therefore, considered in the light in which it kills the language under its care, can never be expected to be adopted, either with regard to the English or any other language.

Nations do not form detached parts of mankind, as little as the countries they inhabit form detached parts of the globe. Nations are members of races, as countries are parts of continents, and races constitute one mankind, as the continents form one continuous earth, although they are separated on their surface by the oceans. The number of races, however, is not determined by the number of continents, for

we find the members of races, at the present day, scattered indiscriminately over the whole surface of the globe.

In order to throw light upon the question concerning the human races, we have to take into consideration all those points which we regard when we wish to have a correct idea about an individual man. As we do not form our conclusions concerning him merely by examining his skull, his complexion, and the cast of his features, but take also into consideration his religion, language, deeds, his dress and whole mode of living, so also in drawing conclusions concerning the genius of the different human races, and their connection with one another, we have not only to take into account the formation of their skull and the shades of their skin, but also the state of their religion at all times, their deeds which are recorded in history, and the men they have produced in science, literature, philosophy, art, and politics, their language in which their mode of thinking is delineated, and their dress and whole mode of living. Although each of these points, when scientifically treated, sheds light on this question, still the conclusions drawn from language seem most important, for the very reason that we are more apt to arrive at a just conclusion concerning the character and mode of thinking of an individual man, by analyzing his thoughts as they are expressed by his language, than by simply inspecting his skull, features, dress, and mode of living. The record of deeds, it is true, speaks even louder than language; but then it must be observed that history does by no means reach down as far as the flood, and even the whole of antiquity, including that of the Greeks and Romans, is more or less shrouded in darkness.

To language, then, is left the task of reducing the various nations into races. Very much has been done by comparative philology during the last thirty years in order to settle this question, but it has not yet arrived at any distinct results. In a late resumé of the labors of comparative philology, Prof. Steinthal reduces all languages spoken on this globe into nine groups, of which five are found in Europe

and Asia, two in Africa, two in America, and one in Australia. By others, as by Professor Max Müller and the late Chevalier Bunsen, they are reduced into three large races, the Arian, Semitic, and Turanian races, and so on.

So much is at all events proved by comparative philology, that the languages composing the Indo-European group of languages are an organic whole, so that the nations which speak these, may be regarded as a distinct race.

In taking a survey of this race, and comparing its history with other races which are not yet so distinctly developed by science, we arrive at this conclusion concerning races in general: that each race is a particular type of man, and that it passes through stages analogous to those of the individual man; namely, the stages of childhood, youth, manhood, and decrepit old age. These stages are clearly represented by the languages spoken by the members of each race at different times.

The childhood of the language of a race is the time of its growth, when it acquires its words. All its energies are then turned in that direction. It has no time to devote to its grammatical constructions, and uses its words in mere juxtaposition, without inflecting them and without using any articles, prepositions, or any other grammatical conveniences. In the Indo-European chain of languages there is none that has remained in the state of childhood; but we can see this state illustrated by the Chinese language, which is composed of mere roots, with no grammatical forms whatever. In the time of its youth and early manhood, language expands the roots it acquired during its childhood, into stems and branches; it inflects its nouns and verbs, and makes them fit to take places in elaborate sentences; just as man, when he merges out of the state of youth into manhood, digests the materials he acquired during his youth, arranges them, and subjects them to the laws of thought. In this state of its grammatical development, language wears its most brilliant aspect; it unfolds like a rose, and enchants the eye by its rational beauty. The state of its youth and early manhood our race celebrated in

the Sanscrit, Greek, and Latin languages, which in the redundancy and richness of their grammatical forms, and the apparent ease and facility with which they can be worked up into gorgeous sentences, far surpass all modern languages.

Each of their sentences is a little world ; and it is not without some weighty reasons that such an important place has been allotted to the study of the Latin and Greek languages in our colleges and universities; for it quickens the understanding of the student, and besides introducing him into antiquity, and making him feel perfectly at home there, by which the sphere of his mind is immensely extended, it gives him the habit of being constantly on the look out for the first thing in order, and of separating it from secondary matters, just as while studying his classics, he must be constantly on the look out for the nominative and verb, by which he obtains a clue to the understanding of his sentence.

As to the Indian or Sanscrit language, it first became known to the Europeans after the conquest of India by the English. Its discovery dates about the year 1780, when its treasures were brought to light by Warren Hastings, and after him by Sir William Jones, "the father and oracle of Indian erudition." He introduced it to the notice of the learned in the following words: "The Sanscrit language, whatever be its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure, more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs, and in the forms of grammar than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong, indeed, that no philosopher could examine them all three, without believing them to have sprung from some common source which no longer exists." The Sanscrit, as the oldest language of the Indo-European race of which any traces are left to us, is the key-stone by which the Indo-European chain of languages is held together, and on account of the prominent place which it occupies for this reason in comparative philology, there is now almost in every large university of Europe a chair for the Sanscrit language and literature.

In its third state of development, or in that of full manhood, language abandons the elaborate forms of grammar by which it was decorated in the bloom of its youth, and is distinguished by a noble simplicity. Its nouns and verbs lose their power of being inflected, the cases of nouns are expressed by prepositions or modulations of the articles, and the tenses by auxiliary verbs. However, what it loses in the richness of its form, it gains by drawing nearer, as it were, to the thoughts, and becoming more spiritual. In the second state of language it required almost as much skill and attention on the part of the writer or orator to express a thought elegantly by words, as it took him to procure the thought itself; but now it is different, the grammar being simplified, and only so many of its forms retained as are absolutely necessary for a fit expression of all thoughts, the mind is at liberty to indulge with its full powers in the realm of thoughts, without troubling itself at all with the grammatical arrangement of the words in language.

The languages of the second age are all doomed to pass away. The Arian language, which is a term given in common to all languages belonging to the Indo-European stock, in its onward struggle towards manhood, has left behind the Latin, Greek, and Sanscrit as memorials of its beautiful youth, and by sublimating these old languages, or introducing new original forms, it has produced the modern European languages as the expression of its manhood.

Among these the English language is the most highly sublimated and purified of all unnecessary forms. In it, as in a rarified atmosphere, the thoughts can soar up to a higher altitude than in any other language, and upon descending flow into a clear and closely fitting garb. The English, on account of its brevity and precision, is eminently the language of common sense; and as in its organism the German and French are blended together, and it thus contains both the depth of the one and the facility and ease of the other, it cannot but follow that in its construction it must be superior to all other European languages, of which the German and French serve as types.

The German language is the primitive Anglo-Saxon, developed without any foreign admixture. It is eminently a philosophical language. Its words are not closed up and narrowly defined, but they are free and open, and can be expanded in a thousand directions. It is the only language, including the Dutch and Scandinavian tongues, in which the intercourse between the roots, the stem, and the branches is kept open, and for this reason it can create for every idea a most fitting word from its own bosom, without drawing upon any other language. On this account, too, it is chiefly adapted to accompany the philosopher in his researches, where for every new discovery he makes, he can immediately coin a suitable word which everybody may understand, and which will take up and contain his ideas and prevent their evaporation, while in other languages he is frequently at a loss how to name his child after it is born, and is obliged to ransack the Greek and Latin languages for technical terms.

The French is the modern representative of the Latin, animated by a lively Germanic tribe, the Franks. They acted as the resuscitators of the Latin, and moulded it into that pleasing, flowing ripple, which we admire so much in the French language. This language is peculiarly adapted to the lively expression of the affections, which it derives from its German ingredient, and to the discussion of all matters of science, and particularly of the higher mathematics. This feature it draws from the Latin, which is renowned for the conciseness and precision of its terms, and the clear, exact style which we notice in all its writers.

The Spanish is an eminently formal and ceremonious language, in which the calmness of the Moor is combined with the excitability which we observe in all the scions of the old Roman people.

The Italian language is the pleasing, melodious warbling of a little rivulet, in which, however, no such immense waves can be raised as in the German.

With this short sketch of the most remarkable languages spoken on the globe, we close this dissertation. We have

said enough however, to show that there is a philosophy of language, not included in our idea of grammar, and that the subject opens out into rich and inexhaustible fields of vast extent, inviting to all truly philosophical minds, whether linguists, historians, or natural philosophers.

ARTICLE II.

JEPHTHAH'S VOW.

BY SAMUEL WARREN, M.D., BOSTON.

A vow is a promise made to God, to do or to give something in the future, most commonly for success in an undertaking, or for deliverance from danger. The occasions of vows are given us in many places of scripture. They are always voluntary; no one being ever called upon to make a vow if he does not so incline. But having made one, the Bible is very strict to hold him to the performance of his vow, because God is always a party to a vow, and no inconsiderate conduct is to be allowed in dealing with God.

As it is of the first importance that our intercourse with God be regulated according to a prescribed manner, and as God foresaw that men might often find themselves inclined to make vows to do or to give something if God would encourage them that he would do something for them which they could not do for themselves, therefore he condescended to give directions concerning the making of vows, and regulations for the due and proper execution of them. We find several kinds of vows spoken of in the Bible, which are called by different names. The most ancient, as well as the most common, kind of vow was made when persons were in quest of success in an undertaking, as by Jacob when he went into Mesopotamia; or when earnestly seeking deliverance from danger, as by the ship's crew on board the vessel with the

prophet Jonah. Of this kind of vow we have many instances in the Bible. Another kind of vow is called *cherem*, by which persons and things are devoted to utter destruction. One of the earliest instances of this kind of vow is found in Ex. xvii., where Jehovah declared to Moses that he would put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven for making an attack on the rear of the camp of Israel, among the defenceless women and children. In Numbers Israel makes a vow of this sort to destroy Atad, one of the kings of Canaan, and all his people ; but they were authorized to do so by Jehovah, who had promised to deliver the Canaanites into the hand of Israel. So Jehovah pointed out Achan to Joshua, and commanded him to destroy Achan and all that belonged to him, for his deliberate transgression. No person had a right to make a vow of this sort unless authorized to do so by Jehovah himself, who is proprietor of all things and persons. A third kind of vow we find in Lev. xxvii., which in this place alone is called a *singular* vow, by which a person devoted himself or his child or some part of his property to the service of Jehovah. This vow, called singular, differs from the vow of a Nazarite, in that a person gave up another, it might be, to the service of the Lord, instead of, or as well as, himself. It is here to be observed that Moses did not encourage the making of vows, but when made, he urged a scrupulous fulfilment of them. We may conclude, from the many and greater other follies into which the Israelites often fell, that persons not unfrequently made vows inconsiderately, improvidently, and under an impulse of zeal, and subsequently, on more sober reflection, wished themselves rid of them. Therefore Moses gave directions whereby such persons might redeem their vows, adding a fifth to the valuation of whatever might have been devoted in the vow, by way of fine for their rashness.

We may now ask, which of these vows did Jephthah make, and what did he purpose in his heart to do in fulfilment of his vow ? We think he made a great mistake, and did not know himself very definitely what he engaged to do. If he

had carefully studied what is contained in the law of Moses on the subject of vows, he need not have fallen into a mistake on so important a subject, a mistake which probably embittered the remainder of his life, and that of his daughter too. Perhaps this may be said in justification of Jephthah, if he made a mistake, as is here assumed: From the time of Joshua to the time of Jephthah, something more than two centuries, we find but little said about vows, compared with what we find in the time of Saul, David, and Solomon, and onward to the captivity. So Jephthah had not the opportunity and advantage of seeing on what occasions others had made vows, and how they kept them.

We find vows made in scripture by almost every sort of characters, from the humble and devout Hannah to the ambitious and corrupt Absalom. By having many instances of vows made by others before one, with their results, one might be guided when and how to make a vow for himself, and how to fulfil it. Jephthah had no such advantage, and therefore had to be guided by his own interpretation of the law concerning vows, and in view of the trouble he got himself into by making a vow, we may conclude he did not very thoroughly understand the subject. We think he made a mixture of the vow called *singular*, and the one called *cherem*, which devotes to utter destruction. Very likely he had in his eye Lev. xxvii., more especially verses 28, 29. Perhaps it should for another reason not seem strange to us that Jephthah should make a mistake in such an important matter, for we are told how he was banished from his paternal home, and what his manner of life was from that time to the time he was invited to become leader of his own people in delivering them from their oppressors. We may well ask, what opportunity he had to be instructed in things of a religious nature? Indeed we may ask: Did he have a manuscript copy of the law in his possession, which he might read at his leisure? We know that in his day copies of the law were scarce and not a little expensive. We are to bear in mind that there was nothing in the form of print in the

days of Jephthah, nor any writing except the law of Moses; at least none that we know of, which would be reliable and safe for giving religious instruction. As Jephthah seems, however, to have been well acquainted with the book of Moses, as shown by the message he sent to the king of Ammon, we must conclude he had seen and read, or at least had heard, what is contained in the law concerning vows, and the fulfilment of them. But the commentators agree in saying that he seems better acquainted with the historical parts of Moses than with the preceptive. Let us, then, proceed to look at the record in the book of Judges (xi.), and see how this narrative of Jephthah and his vow is presented to us. When Jephthah had been duly chosen by his people to become their leader in the work of delivering them from their oppressors (vs. 4–11), when Jehovah had confirmed the choice by giving of his spirit to qualify and encourage him for the undertaking (vs. 29), and moreover when Jephthah had humbly and sincerely sought guidance and success from the Lord (vs. 11, 27), then he paused very unnecessarily to make this vow which cost him so much trouble, and has perplexed the world ever since to know what he really meant. He makes his vow and says: "If Jehovah will give success, then the comer-forth out of my house to meet me on my return in peace shall surely be the Lord's, and I will offer a burnt-offering." Thus the vow stands while he is gone on his expedition, which probably did not occupy many days. He returns, having had great success. The daughter meets him with the liveliest expressions of joy. The father rends his clothes, and says: "Alas, my daughter!" Who shall account for the entirely opposite feelings expressed by them on such an occasion? Can we suppose the daughter knew anything of the vow of the father? Did not the father know what he had purposed in his heart from the first to do? Had he not had time to think of the possibility that his daughter might meet him first? Why, then, is he so agitated and sad? Why should he be shaken in his purpose if it was a good one? What can he mean when he says concerning the

daughter, thou hast brought me very low? He cannot mean that he was brought low by being overpowered and subdued by his enemies. Such a meaning the word has in some places, as in Deborah's song. Was he not thinking of being brought low by having his name cut off in the earth by leaving no posterity? Was not this considered a being brought low in his day by every one, and dreaded as a great misfortune? What can Jephthah mean by saying of his daughter thou art one of them that trouble me? She surely meant no such thing, but manifestly the opposite. Was Jephthah thinking of having the hope of happiness with his daughter dashed as in a moment when he thought of his vow? The Hebrew word here used to express trouble is not the one Job used when he said trouble came to him though he was trying to live religiously in the sight of his Maker, nor like that used when it is said: "man is of few days and full of trouble." It is a word expressive of trouble arising from sin on our part, as when Achan proved a trouble to Israel by what he did in bold transgression of what had been expressly forbidden; and as Saul troubled Israel and endangered the life of his son Jonathan by his rash words. Jephthah says he had opened his mouth to the Lord, and he could not go back. He had indeed opened his mouth, but was it done wisely? Moses opened his mouth at one time, and it went very ill with him in consequence of what he said. Elihu charges Job with opening his mouth in folly, and uttering words without knowledge. The word here used by Jephthah is the same as used by Elihu in speaking of Job's opening his mouth in folly

Perhaps Jephthah began to be conscious that he had not been wise and considerate in what he had said, and used one of the words commonly used to express hasty and forbidden speech. There are three such words in Hebrew, occurring a few times only. The daughter seems not to know what the father had said in opening his mouth to the Lord, until this point of time. It is probable the father now informed the daughter of the substance of his vow. How he explained

the vow and how she understood it, is not very clear to us. The fact that the daughter demanded two months for consideration before anything further was done, would seem to show that she was not absolutely at the father's disposal. Did the daughter expect that at the end of two months her life would be sacrificed, and did she spend those two months in composing her mind to peace in view of that great and most solemn event; or was her purpose to consider whether to submit to the vow or not? At the end of the specified time the daughter returns with her mind made up; but what was done next is the important thing to decide. It is said the father fulfilled the vow which he had made concerning the daughter; but the question is, what had he vowed to do with her? All the commentators agree in saying, she was an amiable, dutiful, and pious daughter. We accept the statement as true. Such being the fact, what lawful right had the father to take the life of such a character? We should bear in mind that the vow devoting to destruction, applied only to the wicked. Such a vow was designed only for the most wicked, who were thereby made an example to others not to transgress, and fall victims to such utter destruction. Is there an instance in all the Bible of an intelligent Israelite, a true and sincere worshipper of God, such as Jephthah in the chapter before us seems to have been, doing such a thing as to make a vow of this destructive sort? Long after this we read of king Manasseh doing something like this, but he is strongly reproved in the Bible for what he did. We read also of a king of Moab who offered his oldest son a sacrifice on the city wall; but this was not done to Jephthah's God, and it excites in us no other feeling than horror and disgust at the cruelty and the sin of the unnatural deed. Milman, speaking of Jephthah, calls him a barbarous and fierce freebooter. Professor Palfrey, speaking of Sampson, calls him a wild compound of the buffoon and the profligate. Perhaps it is not well to speak thus of scripture characters, after we have the decision of the Most High (see Heb. xi. 32) that he accepted them at last, notwith-

standing all their faults and follies. In the scripture record, Jephthah stands between Gideon and Sampson; and their most prominent and public acts seem to be under divine direction and guidance. Why may we not conclude the same of Jephthah, and that he would not be left to do a thing often forbidden in scripture? Milman, John Scott, the Comprehensive Commentary, yea, the stream of interpreters say, that *if* Jephthah sacrificed his daughter, it is a solitary instance in the Bible. On the supposition that Jephthah made a sacrifice of his daughter, will the commentators tell us with some definiteness when it was done, and by whose hand it was done? Did he go to Shiloh, as Elkanah did, and make his offering at the tabernacle, as the law prescribed to all who would fulfil their vows acceptably? Did he engage a priest to make the offering for him, or did he do the thing himself? We know what was done to king Saul for assuming the office of priest, and also to king Uzziah; but Jephthah did not know of these unlawful acts, and so could not be warned by them. But if this transaction was done at the tabernacle, and Jephthah engaged a priest to make his offering, the priest would have known how an offering should be made in order to be acceptable to God. The question is: Would an intelligent and devout Hebrew priest make an offering to God of such a person as we suppose the daughter of Jephthah to have been? Can one show us anything approaching to it in all the Bible? If this was not done at the tabernacle as the law prescribed, but in some irregular and unprescribed way, then how can we suppose that it met with any favorable regard from God? Is it said, in reply, that the patriarchs erected altars on their own premises, and made offerings to God, and that he signified his acceptance of them? The answer is: Jephthah was not a patriarch, nor did he live in the patriarchal age, but under the Mosaic dispensation, according to which offerings to God were to be made at the tabernacle and temple, and by a priest, in order to be accepted. Milman lays stress on the fact that Jephthah would not be likely to go to the tabernacle then at

Shiloh to consecrate his daughter to the service of the high priest, because he was at that time in deadly hostility with the tribe of Ephraim; but he would be equally unlikely to go there to offer her as a burnt-offering, so that the objection proves nothing against the supposition that she was thus consecrated. Moses, on the other hand, lays stress on the fact that no one could lawfully make an offering to God in any other place except at the tabernacle (see Deut. xii. 6, where offerings in fulfilment of vows are specified among others). As Jephthah had recently gained a signal victory over the Ephraimites, is it any more unlikely that he should go among them, if he wished to make a religious offering, than it is to suppose that he would find at the tabernacle a Hebrew priest who would make an offering to Jehovah of a human being of such character as we all suppose Jephthah's daughter to have been? We are therefore forced to the conclusion that she was sacrificed, a burnt-offering, neither by Jephthah nor by a priest at the tabernacle.

But again, it is said the father fulfilled the vow which he had made concerning his daugher; but does the scripture decide that Jephthah's daughter was to be the offering which he purposes in his heart to make in fulfilment of his vow? We think not. Most of the commentators hitherto have relied on the last clause of verse 31, on verse 39, where it is said Jephthah kept his vow, and on verse 40, the mourning of the daughters over her, for the view they take of this vow, and the way it was kept. We, on the other hand, rely on the same passages for the view we take, with only a slight alteration in the translation, which we feel justified in making, in addition to what we have already offered. We feel justified in saying that there is an ellipsis of the preposition in the last clause of verse 31, which if supplied would free the passage from its present uncertain meaning. Whoever will read the Hebrew Bible, with paper and pencil in hand, will find many instances of ellipses of the preposition, where we cannot translate without supplying one in English. For instance, Job says: "Thy terrors array themselves me;"

"against" is not in the Hebrew. Again Job says: "I would shake my head them." We must supply "at" in our idiom. So Isa. xlii. 16: "I will do them;" "for" them we must say. So here, "I will offer to him (Jehovah) a burnt-offering as the law everywhere prescribes." It is taking no ungrammatical or unauthorized liberty with the text thus to translate (see Louth's Isaiah, p. 367, where may be found a valuable note on this very text about Jephthah's vow; also another relating to the subject of ellipsis, p. 421). Further, on the supposition that Jephthah took the life of his daughter and made an offering of her, why is the short phrase introduced, "And she knew no man?" Is this said in her favor or to her disadvantage? If it had been untrue, would it not make her an unfit subject to offer to God? Again if it had been true, then it seems like an attempt to justify her from suspicion which might rest on her; which at best is to her disadvantage. On the other hand, if we suppose it was the purpose of Jephthah to devote his daughter to the service of God at the tabernacle, then this clause has great significance, and shows that she submitted to live a single life without hope of leaving a name behind in the earth. This no good person desires to do. The closing verse of the narrative tells us that it was a custom in Israel for some of the daughters of Israel to go yearly to do — what? Our version says to lament; but the word here used nowhere means to lament. In Deborah's song the word is used to express the joyful rehearsing of the mighty doings of Jehovah in delivering his people from oppression; and in Proverbs it is used to express praise to the virtuous woman for her many virtuous deeds. Such a meaning well suits the connection in this story of Jephthah and his daughter. We may well suppose that the same companions who roamed with the daughter of Jephthah on the hills for two months, came yearly to her to express sympathy, and to praise her for the life she was living. Did some of the daughters of Israel go yearly to lament over one of their number who was passed away from the earth, or to rejoice with one who was alive and not leading an unhappy

life? We need not suppose that the number who thus gathered was large, or that it continued for a long series of years. We said above that there is often found an ellipsis of a preposition in Hebrew where we cannot translate without supplying one; so, on the other hand, there is often found a preposition in Hebrew which is suppressed in our version, and which, if brought out, would contribute to the clearness of the meaning. It is so in this last verse of the narrative. To offer praise to the daughter of Jephthah, is the way we understand the verse. To lament over would require different words from what are found in the text. Finally, if we conclude that Jephthah sacrificed his daughter, then it seems to make him a heathen as to religious knowledge, no better than the king of Moab, who sacrificed his oldest son on the city wall. This is placing Jephthah in an attitude where we do not like to leave him. Nor does Paul thus believe him. In Heb. xi. Jephthah is accounted worthy of mention, by name, along with Jacob, Joseph, and Moses, as well as Gideon and Sampson, among the ancient worthies who wrought righteousness and obtained a good report. This, in addition to what has already been said, seems clearly to prohibit the opinion that Jephthah in person offered *his daughter*, a *human* sacrifice, to Jehovah, at a time when *any* sacrifice was forbidden, except at the tabernacle and by the hand of a priest. On the other hand, if we suppose him mistaken as to the nature and obligation of a vow, this need seem no strange thing, for even Aaron made a mistake in performing his duties soon after the tabernacle was set up, and on one occasion the whole congregation made a mistake, and had to offer a trespass-offering, as directed by Moses. The daughter, too, shows herself but poorly acquainted with the law of Moses if she submitted to the vow of her father, as commonly interpreted. If she was so worthy and so pious as the commentators make her, we see not how she could be so ignorant of the revealed religion of her nation. Those who are willing to do right in matters of religion are commonly guided and kept from making great mistakes. Such is the divine promise to

us all. We therefore conclude that Jephthah and his daughter were kept from doing anything which would disgrace either their religion or their characters in the estimation of the righteous of their day. This belief we shall hold till we are shown that we cannot scripturally hold it.

ARTICLE III.

THE GREAT CREVASSE OF THE JORDAN AND OF THE RED SEA.

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In the Researches of Dr. Robinson a letter is inserted from the "distinguished geologist," Leopold Von Buch, "whose researches have been particularly directed to the phenomena of volcanoes." This letter is, in part, as follows:

"The valley of the Jordan is a fissure, a *crevasse* which extends from Mount Lebanon to the Red Sea without interruption. Such, it seems to me, is the result of your researches, as well as those of M. de Bertou, and of Callien, who nevertheless finds fault with Ritter for having said the same thing. These long fissures, especially frequent among limestone mountains, give the configuration to our continents. If they are very large and deep they afford passage for the primitive mountains, which, for that reason, form *chains* in the direction which the fissure prescribes. We might therefore expect a greater development of the volcanic agents at the bottom of this fissure than upon the heights."[1] To the same effect is also the opinion of the late Dr. Hitchcock: "The valley of the Jordan, extending from the Red Sea to Mount Lebanon, was probably a fissure, along which volcanic agency may have been more or less exerted from time to time."[2]

[1] Vol. ii., p. 606 (1st edition). [2] Geology of the Globe, p. 51.

"The whole of Syria is cleft from north to south by a straight crevasse of moderate width, but extending, in the southern portion of its centre division to a truly remarkable depth, two thousand six hundred and twenty-five feet below the sea-level. This crevasse, which contains the principal watercourse of the country, is also the most exceptional feature of its geology. Such fissures are not uncommon in limestone formations, but no other is known of such a length and of so extraordinary depth, and so open throughout its greatest extent. It may have been volcanic in its origin, the result of an upheaval from beneath, which has tilted the limestone back on each side, leaving this large split in the strata, the volcanic fire having stopped short at that point in the operation, without intruding any volcanic rocks into the fissure. This idea is supported by the crater-like form of the basins of the Lake of Tiberias and of the Dead Sea (Russegger, pp. 206, 207), and by many other tokens of volcanic action, past and present, which are encountered in and around these lakes, and along the whole extent of the valley." [1]

"The grand geological feature of Palestine is the central valley or chasm. Hugh Miller has said, 'the natural boundaries of the geographer are rarely described by straight lines. Whenever these occur the geologist may look for something remarkable' (Old Red Sandstone, p. 120). No better proof of this could be found than the Jordan valley. It runs in a straight line through the centre of Palestine. Its formation was probably simultaneous with those volcanic agencies that created the eastern and western lava-fields. It is a tremendous rent or fissure, a hundred and fifty miles in length, rending asunder the whole limestone formation from top to bottom. Its extreme depth, from the lips of the fissure to the bed of the Dead Sea, is above four thousand feet, no less than two thousand six hundred and twenty-four of which is beneath the level of the ocean. Such a cleft in the earth's crust is without a parallel." [2]

[1] Grove, in Smith's Biblical Dictionary, article Palestine.

[2] Professor J. L. Porter, in Kitto's Biblical Cyclopaedia, — Palestine.

None can intelligently examine this remarkable region of country without a profound conviction that the entire valley of the Jordan from its highest source to the southern extremity of the Dead Sea, is, according to the opinion of these distinguished geologists cited above, a vast crevasse without a parallel. But does it end here? The immense cleft of the Arabah, which runs one hundred miles farther to the Ailanitic Gulf, the eastern arm of the Red Sea, is only a continuation of the same fissure, with the same geological features. Neither is this the end of the crevasse. As the waters of the Lake of Galilee and of the Dead Sea occupy a portion of the bed of this immense chasm, so those of the eastern arm of the Red Sea lie imbedded in a continuation of the same fissure, ninety or one hundred miles farther, where this gulf opens out into the Red Sea, at the southern extremity of the Peninsula of Sinai.

Thus, from the highest source of the Jordan to the Red Sea, a distance of three hundred and fifty miles, we have one uniform continuous chasm in the earth's surface, deep, dreary, desolate, mysterious, presenting throughout the same geological features, and evidently caused by the same convulsions of nature. It is a vast crevasse, without any parallel; a rent of stupendous dimensions in the surface of the earth, which opens a channel for the river Jordan and the bed of the Dead Sea, one hundred and fifty miles; beyond this, one hundred miles in a direct line, the chasm of the Arabah separates the waters of the Dead Sea from the Ailanitic Gulf, which sets back more than one hundred miles from the opening of this crevasse into the Red Sea.

But does this vast rent in the surface of the earth end even at the Red Sea? Or is the valley of this sea itself only a more tremendous expansion and extension of the same fissure, which, for more than a thousand miles, has by this immense chasm sundered from each other the kindred continents of Asia and Africa? We venture with diffidence to propound for the consideration of the learned the theory that these continents were once united by a broad isthmus

from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, at the northwest angle of the Indian Ocean, to the Mediterranean Sea. We respectfully submit, for the consideration of the geologist, the theory that the entire valley of the Red Sea, the Ailanitic Gulf, the Arabah, the Dead Sea, and the Jordan are but continuous parts of one and the same immense fissure or crevasse, opened by some tremendous convulsion, or series of convulsions, from the Indian Ocean to the mountains of Lebanon.

To others better versed in these awful arcana of nature, we submit the inquiry by what particular agency this stupendous rent was opened up through the solid earth the distance of one thousand five hundred miles in length between Asia and Africa, and one hundred miles or more in width. Is this great crevasse the result of a long line of volcanic agencies, whose effects are so impressively manifest from the beginning to the end? The eminent authorities cited above distinctly intimate that this crevasse from Lebanon to the Red Sea, may be the result of "volcanic action." The tokens of such volcanic agency are equally clear and impressive along the whole line of the Red Sea itself; and as conclusively indicate that these tremendous internal agencies may have been alike effective in cleaving the earth asunder along the whole line of this crevasse. In this connection it may be pertinent to notice the indications of volcanic agencies which in various unmistakable forms are scattered along the entire line of this supposed crevasse, without advancing any theory as to the specific agency of volcanoes and earthquakes in producing the great phenomenon under consideration. Whatever may have been the cause, we cannot doubt that at some time, far back in the absorbing periods of the past, unrecorded, unknown, this enormous cleft was opened by some stupendous convulsion of nature, occasioned chiefly or in part by volcanic agencies. With this view, let us note some of the indications of these agencies along the line of the Jordan and of the Red Sea.

This sea itself occupies the bed of an immense longitudinal valley between parallel ranges of volcanic mountains.

Aden, the mart near the strait, is nestled in the crater of an extinct volcano. The islands that line the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb are all volcanic, as is also the adjacent coast, and the entire promontory. Several of the largest islands in the Red Sea, at distant intervals, are of volcanic origin. Niebuhr also describes "a mountain situated in the middle of the sea, said to have been formerly a volcano, and which is probably the burning island placed by Arrian and Ptolemy in these latitudes."

A long line of volcanic mountains runs parallel with the African shore of this sea. In these mountains porphyry and greenstone particularly abound. The adjacent desert in various places is strewn with vast, round basaltic boulders or balls, denominated by the author of Frost and Fire "volcanic bombs," which by some terrible volcanic enginery must have been shot out of the earth. This portion of the desert has not been sufficiently explored to indicate accurately its geological characteristics, but so far as is known they are eminently volcanic.

Upon the eastern shore of the sea are found coral reefs, many feet above the sea, in which they must have been formed. Coral also is said by Lieutenant Wellsted "to enter largely into the composition of some of the most elevated hills" on the Arabian side of the sea. At Kahme near Beit el-Fakkih, basaltic columns were found by Niebuhr, like the giants causeway, "so uniformly regular that they might be mistaken for works of art." And he adds: "Piles of the same kind of rocks are found in many other parts of Arabia." On the way from Mocha to Sana, the capital of Yemen, "the rock which first occurs is porphyry, fractured so regularly into columns that the steep cliffs sometimes present the appearance of organ pipes; trap-rocks with basalt occurred, and at Sana the common building stone is lava. Mount Saben, likewise, is an immense mass of trachyte and other volcanic rocks." Ali Bey also in going from Djedda, the port of Mecca, to that city, passed "between some volcanic mountains covered with black lava." This traveller and

Niebuhr both report mines of native sulphur in the same region. Mineral salt is also a production of the country, "still worked near Loheia and several other places." At a place called Jedeida travellers also report seven groups of volcanic hills. At Medina "a layer of volcanic rock also occurs, and on the Hedjaz, the route of pilgrims to Mecca, hot springs are reported "at almost every station."

The entire Sinaitic group presents the most impressive indications of the terrible convulsions by which its labyrinth of mountain heights has been rent and torn since its first upheaval. From the summit of Mount Serbal, as from a watch-tower in high heaven, one looks down upon a perfect sea of mountain ridges, often precipitous, always intensely steep, and culminating in a sharp edge at the height of two, three, or four thousand feet from their base. The entire lines of these mountains is seen to have been rent transversely by clefts from the base to the summit, filled with injections of basaltic rocks, striping the mountain on each side with black bands. The whole assemblage is a perfect ganglion of ridges thrown up in wild confusion, with its strata dislocated, disjointed, dipping in all directions and at every angle from horizontal to perpendicular. The mountains of Sinai form no system, no regular ranges like the Alps, the Appenines, Pyrenees, or the mountains of America.

Jebel Hŭmmâm and the hot springs at its base, forty-five miles below Suez, and the hot springs at Tur, near the southern extremity of the western arm of the Red Sea, are significant indications of the fires that are still burning within. On the western shore of the Ailanitic Gulf, nine miles from the southern angle of the peninsula, Burckhardt reports the existence of "volcanic rocks." "For a distance of about two miles the hills presented perpendicular cliffs, formed in half circles, none of them being more than sixty or eighty feet in height; in other places there was an appearance of volcanic craters." The disruptions, faults, and dykes along the mountain heights on the whole line of this gulf, with the frequent occurrence of porphyry and greenstone, and

occasionally of chalk, bear unequivocal evidence of volcanic agency. These disruptions open passes singularly wild, between perpendicular bulwarks of rocks, which frequently compress the passage into a gateway ten and twelve feet in width, leading from the platform of the desert down to the shore of the gulf. Toward the northern extremity of the gulf for several miles, a line of basaltic cliffs advances quite up to the sea, leaving only a narrow pathway for the camel; then jutting into the sea, compelling us to pass them by a toilsome detour around and over their heights. Burckhardt, with his customary accuracy, has noted this geological formation. "We followed a range of black basaltic cliffs, into which the sea has worked several creeks, appearing like so many small lakes with narrow openings toward the sea. They are full of fish and shells."

The indications of similar convulsions again become exceedingly impressive about the base of Mount Hor, at Petra, in the mountains of Edom. In addition to the famous fissure which opens a wild pass from the high plains on the east down to the rocky abyss occupied by the old city itself, one as wild and extensive runs up towards the rock-hewn temple known as ed-Deir, the convent. And an unexplored fissure again breaks down through the mountains several miles to the valley of the Arabah. None can mistake the geological indications of this region. Further north, in the mountains of Edom, fifteen or twenty miles southeast of the Dead Sea, the indications of volcanic agency become more marked. A group of four mountain heights is reported by Burckhardt and by Irby and Mangles, composed entirely of basaltic rocks, lava, and other remains of extinct volcanoes. Similar volcanic indications are found in Wady Ahsy, east of the southern extremity of the Dead Sea, and again at Kerek and on the river Arnon. Above this river, on the shore of the sea, Lieutenant Lynch reports "huge black boulders lying confusedly on the shore, which proved to be trap interspersed with tufa. The whole mountain, from base to summit appeared to be one black mass of scoriae and

lava."[1] Further north, about the hot springs of Callirrhoe, "veins of gray and black trap cut through the sandstone. Between this point and the plain of the Jordan volcanic eruptions have produced immense flows of basaltic rock, portions of which had been overflowed into the valley of the Jordan. Among other smaller basaltic streams, three were found bordering on the eastern edge of the Dead Sea to the south of the little plain of Zarah."[2]

A series of hot springs on either side of the Dead Sea still attests the presence of internal fires. In the Wady Ahsy southeast of the sea, in Wady Hamâd, north of Kerek, these springs are found. The hot springs of Callirrohe, further north, discharge into the sea a heated stream twelve feet wide and ten inches deep, rushing on with great velocity. On the western side of the Dead Sea two hot springs are found above Engedi, about six miles apart, one "a copious fountain," the other discharging "an enormous quantity of hot water into the sea." South of Engedi, at the distance of two miles, are hot springs on the beach and under the water. Further south, near Um Baghek, is "another hot sulphur spring, which spreads its suffocating odors around." And again in the fords from the western shore to the promontory of el-Lisan are found hot springs welling up from the bottom of the sea.

At Gerasa, east of the Jordan, and again at Jermuk, southeast of the Sea of Gallilee hot springs occur, the last, ten in number, "fountains of immense size," and of a high temperature. On the western shore of Gennesaret are the famous hot springs of Tiberias, varying from 136° to 144° of Faranheit; after a course of many rods, discharging a stream of hot water into the lake painful to the hand and foot immersed in it. The copious salt and tepid fountains of Tabighah above Khân Minyeh, are also worthy of special consideration in this connection.

"The northern shore of the lake is covered with basalt, lava, and other volcanic productions." Safed, near the lake,

[1] Expedition to the Dead Sea, p. 369.

[2] Journal of Sacred Literature, July 1865, p. 496.

was entirely destroyed by an earthquake in the year 1837, and many thousands perished in the ruins. Not less than three extinct volcanoes are found in its immediate vicinity. The great fountain, Tel el-Kady, twenty-five miles further north, gushes out from the crater of an extinct volcano. Two or three miles northwest of this fountain the ground for a great distance is strewed with large basaltic boulders, "volcanic bombs," which must at some times have been discharged from the tremendous battery of a volcano. At the termination of this great crevasse near Hasbany are found mines of bitumen, brilliant as the purest obsidian. Trap rocks and a hot spring are also reported in the same vicinity.

The whole of ancient Bashan is volcanic. East of the Jordan above the Sea of Gallilee and the lake Huleh, these volcanic indications are exceedingly impressive. "The phlegean fields, and all that can present an idea of volcanic destruction, form but a feeble image of the frightful country through which I passed this day. From the bridge of Jacob to Sassa, the whole ground is composed of nothing but lava, basaltic, and other volcanic productions; all is black, porous, or carious. It was like travelling in the infernal regions.

"Besides these productions which cover the country, either in detached masses or in large strata, the surface of the ground is entirely covered with loose volcanic stones, from three or four inches in circumference to a foot in diameter, all equally black, porous, or carious, as if they had just come out of the craters. But it is particularly at the approaches to Sassa that the traveller meets with groups of crevices and volcanic mounds, of so frightful a size that he is seized with horror, which is increased if he allows his imagination to wander to the period when these masses were hurled forth with violence from the bowels of the earth. The holes and crevices, which are to be met with continually, contain water as black as ink, and almost as fetid. There are evident signs that all this country was formerly filled with volcanoes, for we beheld several small craters in traversing the plain." [1]

[1] Ali Bey's Travels, Vol. ii. pp. 24, 25.

"The molten lava seems to have issued from the earth through innumerable pores, to have spread over the whole plain, and then to have been rent and shattered in the act of cooling."[1]

The Lejah, the ancient Argob, is described as an "ocean of basaltic rocks, and tossed about in the wildest confusion, and intermingled with fissures and crevices in every direction." Black basaltic rocks were the building materials of the ancient inhabitants of Bashan. Whole cities are found there, totally deserted, in which the houses are as fresh and entire as when occupied by the first inhabitants two or three thousand years since. The walls are built of large squared blocks of basalt, almost as hard as iron; the flat roof is composed of long slabs of the same material, neatly hewn and closely fitted; the doors are also stone, from six inches to a foot in thickness, and hung on pivots projecting above and below, and working in sockets in the lintel and threshold, like all the gates in Syria."[2] This basalt, Burckhardt remarks, "forms a principal feature in the mineralogy of eastern Syria."

An Arabian author of a large geographical lexicon asserts that between the Haurân and Bab-el-Mandeb there are no less than twenty-eight distinct volcanic regions, and gives a specific description of each locality, with the indications of its volcanic character.[3]

Thus for one thousand five hundred miles along the entire line of this stupendous fissure, from the straits of Bab-el-Mandeb to the mountains of Lebanon, the margin and the bed of this crevasse are marked with impressive, appalling indications of those tremendous agencies which God must have summoned into action when in times past he arose to shake terribly the earth. At some remote period, by some stupendous convulsion, we must believe that this immense fissure was formed, rending the broad isthmus by which Asia

[1] Porter's Hand-Book, Vol. ii. p. 465.

[2] Hand-Book of Syria and Palestine, p. 501.

[3] Jâkûts in Wetzstein's Reisebericht über Haurân u. die Trachonen seit, 98.

and Africa were originally united, and opening up between them the great gulf of the Red Sea. By the Peninsula of Sinai this sea is divided into two divisions, one of which runs up the Gulf of Suez, until it is lost in the sands south of the adjacent parts of the Mediterranean Sea. The other division takes the direction of the Ailanitic Gulf. Then succeeds the deep, barren bed of the Arabah, the deeper basin of the Dead Sea, and the valley of the Jordan, to its highest source between the mountains of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon.

The mighty convulsions and throes of the earth which formed a rent in its surface of such vast dimensions, running the last hundred miles almost parallel to the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean Sea, and terminating fifteen or twenty miles from the coast, might be expected to wrench violently the intervening strata and cause a transverse fissure towards the sea. Here our theory is true to fact. The great chain of Mount Lebanon at this point is cleft by a transverse fissure, which opens through the deep, dark masses of the mountain a passage for the Litâny, the ancient Leontes. It is a wild gorge, between cliffs "from eight hundred to twelve hundred feet in height," sometimes perpendicular, always precipitous. For some two hundred and fifty feet it is only from six to twelve feet in width. At one place it is barely three feet, so that one on the brink may reach with his hand the opposite precipice. At times the branches of the trees from either side unite and form a canopy over the dark abyss. Then again the cliffs form an eyry, where the eagles securely rear their young.

But the most majestic part of this wonderful chasm is near the entrance, where the banks, a thousand feet in height, and parted only just enough for the passage of the stream, exactly correspond in the strata and cleavages of the rocks. No depression or breakage of the margin is noticed the most of the way as you approach the brink of the chasm. The undulations of the surface on each side are the same, so that the unwary traveller would suppose the whole to be one continuous, unbroken surface. At another place a large

fragment or boulder has fallen in and lodged in the cleft of the rock, forming a natural bridge one hundred and five feet above the stream. The whole combination forms a scene inexpressibly wild, majestic, sublime. Here the Litâny, as if startled from its quiet course between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon, by some terrible catastrophe dashes wildly up against the mountain, and tears on through the wild chasm several miles, leaping, roaring, writhing, as if in agony to escape from this devouring abyss to rest in the still waters of the Mediterranean.

Precisely what may be the relation of these volcanic indications along the entire line of this vast fissure in the earth, to the theory under consideration, we undertake not to determine, but respectfully submit them to the attentive consideration of the reader. May not the great depression of the Dead Sea indicate the result of volcanic action subsequent to the formation of the great crevasse by which a deeper abyss was formed as a fit receptacle for the waters of this mysterious sea of death? The vast mountain of salt, the bitumen of the sea, the bituminous rocks, the lava, scoriae, brimstone, and saline deposits upon the shores remain impressive memorials of the terrible scene when "the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrah brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven." "The bottom of the sea," says Lieutenant Lynch, "consists of two submerged plains, an elevated and a depressed one; the last thirteen, the former about one thousand three hundred feet below the surface. Through the northern, the largest and the deepest one, in a line corresponding with the bed of the Jordan, is a ravine, which again seems to correspond with the Wady el-Jeib, a ravine within a ravine, at the south end of the sea."

Between the Jabbok and this sea, we unexpectedly found a sudden break-down in the bed of the Jordan. If there be a similar break in the watercourses to the south of the sea, accompanied with like volcanic characters, there can scarce be a doubt that the whole Ghôr has sunk from some extraordinary convulsion, preceded most probably by an eruption

of fire and a general conflagration of the bitumen which abounded in the plain. I shall ever regret that we were not authorized to explore the southern Ghôr to the Red Sea."[1]

The lack of information implied in the regret of this distinguished explorer is supplied by Dr. Robinson, whose researches fully sustain the sagacious conjecture of Lieutenant Lynch. A "break-down" south of the Dead Sea is found corresponding remarkably with that on the north, except that the southern break is more marked and decisive. At the distance of eight or ten miles from the sea, a line of high cliffs of chalk and marl runs across the gulf constituting the ascent to the higher plains of the Arabah. These cliffs "form an irregular curve, sweeping across the Ghôr in something like the segment of a circle, the chord of which would be six or seven geographical miles in length, extending obliquely nearly from northwest to southeast."[2] These cliffs "vary in height, from fifty to one hundred and fifty feet. The face of them, though very steep, is not perpendicular; and they are much furrowed by the rains, so that the upper part presents a jagged appearance." They are doubtless the Akrabbim, scorpion rocks, which marked the southern boundary of the tribe of Judah. In a geological point of view they are of great interest. Compared with the northern offset described by Lieutenant Lynch, they exhibit "like volcanic characters" and geological features. In the neighborhood of the northern "break-down," chalk formations are found on either side of the Jordan, corresponding to the chalk cliffs of the southern break. We may therefore regard these corresponding offsets as marking the limits of a great convulsion of earthquake and volcano, which may have sunk the sea itself, with the cities of the plain, into that deep and dreadful abyss in which they now lie, at the depth of more than one thousand three hundred feet below the level of the Mediterranean Sea, and four thousand feet below the city of Jerusalem.

In this connection the discovery of a late English traveller

[1] Expedition, pp. 378, 379. [2] Researches, Vol. ii., p. 501 (1st edition).

becomes exceedingly pertinent and significant: "At the northern end of Jebel Usdum, the mountain of salt, is the Wady Muhawât which exhibits some very remarkable features. Its sides are cliffs of old limestone, showing here and there traces of post-tertiary marl; but since the marl has been washed out, there has been a second filling in of an extraordinary character, which is only now in a course of denudation. There are exposed on the sides of the wady, and chiefly on the south, large masses of bitumen mingled with gravel. These overlie a thick stratum of sulphur, which again overlies a thicker stratum of sand, so strongly impregnated with sulphur that it yields powerful fumes on being sprinkled over a hot coal. Many blocks of bitumen have been washed down the gorge, and lie scattered over the plain below, along with huge boulders and other traces of tremendous floods. The layer of sulphurous sand is generally evenly distributed on the old limestone base; the sulphur, evenly above it, and the bitumen in variable masses. In every way it differs from the ordinary mode of deposit of these substances as we have seen them elsewhere. Again, the bitumen, unlike that which we pick up on the shore, is strongly impregnated with sulphur, and yields an overpowering sulphurous odor; above all, it is calcined, and bears the marks of having been subjected to extreme heat."

This discovery of our traveller is exceedingly interesting and important; and his remarks upon it will be read with the deepest interest by all students of the Bible: "So far as I can understand this deposit, if there be any physical evidence left of the catastrophe which destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, or of similar occurrences, we have it here. The whole appearance points to a shower of hot sulphur, and an irruption of bitumen upon it, which would naturally be calcined and impregnated by its fumes; and this at a geological period quite subsequent to all the diluvial and alluvial action of which we have such abundant evidence. The catastrophe must have been since the formation of the wady, since the deposition of the marl, and while the water was at

its present level; therefore, probably during the historic period." [1]

If we may accept the theory here proposed respecting this great crevasse of the Jordan and of the Red Sea, it must stand acknowledged the most extensive and extraordinary on the surface of the earth. What a sublime conception it gives of those stupendous convulsions by which our globe must have been rent and torn in the remote periods of its geological formations.

The writer is not a proficient in the details of geological science. With great diffidence he proposes this theory respecting this great crevasse, awaiting, respecting it, with profound deference, the opinions of the learned, more worthy of public confidence. The crude conception of this vast fissure was suggested several years since, while traversing the desert of Sinai, and alternately the bed and the margin of the chasm itself. Reading and reflection have matured this hypothesis into a settled conviction, to which expression is given in this form to invite the consideration of those who are more competent for such profound, recondite speculations. What then of the theory under consideration? Is it altogether fanciful and unfounded, or may it claim some consideration among the generalizations of science for which that of geology is so remarkable?

[1] Tristram, The Land of Israel, pp. 355–357, cited in Kitto's Biblical Cyclopaedia, Vol. iii. p. 797.

ARTICLE IV.

GNOMOLOGICAL VERSES.

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PREFACE.

EXAMPLES of gnomological of poetry have been handed down to us from antiquity. It is not more true that mankind have delighted to record their moral observations in proverbs than it is that they have endeavored to preserve those observations in verse. There is a collection of such γνῶμαι from the Greek poets, called Gnomici, in which vitae praecepta utilissima traduntur, which have a point and a pith to them always interesting. They are to be distinguished from the epigrams, though they often resemble them, the border being somewhat indistinct and varying. Indeed the ancient and modern epigram differs. In modern times it must have wit; it must convey a sarcasm; it must raise a smile; but among the ancients it was only a well-turned sentiment, concisely expressed. One of the most beautiful of the old epigrams is the following; it is what almost every worldling has experienced: "When I was young I was poor; when old I became rich; but in each condition I found disappointment. When the faculties of enjoyment were bright, I had not the means; but when the means came, the faculties were gone." Which may be thus versified:

> O life, unfriendly still to human joy,
> How do thine arrows every stage annoy!
> In youth my passions were by want restrained,
> And passion died in age when wealth was gained:
> Through joys half finished all our days are run,
> And closed in disappointment, as begun.

The following may serve as an example of a modern epigram. A poor man had his Bible stolen from him. The following lines appeared, addressed to the thief:

"You saint and scamp! In vain my fancy tries
To find the true meridian of your zeal:
How could you steal a book you did not prize?
And if you prized the book, how could you steal?"

We have specimens of gnomological verses, modern as well as ancient. There used to be a book taught in the schools called Cato's Distichs, of which the following is a specimen:

"Donec eris felix, multos numerabis amicos;
Tempora si nubila, solus eris."[1]

Some of Dr. Franklin's versified proverbs in Poor Richard's Almanac are examples:

"I never saw an oft removèd tree,
Nor yet an oft removèd family,
That throve so well as those who settled be."

The homeliness of these lines is intended, and increases the beauty, for they have a true proverbial dress. Some of Trench's are exquisite, as the following:

"When you have most explored your winding heart,
Set down as unknown land the largest part."[2]

Many of the poets whose intention has not been directly to produce gnomological verses or epigrams, have come very near this kind of writing. Thus Shakespeare:

"To mourn a mischief that is past and gone,
Is the next way to bring new mischief on."
OTHELLO, Act i. Scene 3d.

So Bishop Hall in one of his satires:

"Small honor can be got with gaudy grave,
Nor it thy rotten name from death can save.
The fairer tomb, the fouler is thy name;
The greater pomp procuring greater shame.

[1] In a catalogue of books entitled, "Selections from the stock of John Pennington and Son," is the following notice: Cato (Dionysius), Disticha, Graec-Lat. scholiis Erasmi, notis Scaligeri et aliorum, cura Arntzenis. Trag. ad Rhenum, 1735. The book has received the attention of great men; but of its character and history, I confess ignorance.

[2] The thought is in Rochefoucault No. III. Maxims: Quelque découverte que l'on ait faite dans le pays de l'amour-propre, il y reste encore bien des terres inconnues.

Thy monument make thou thy living deeds;
No other tomb than that true virtue needs."

Satire 2, Book ii.

And again,

" Oh the fond boasting of vain-glorious man!
Does he the best that may the best be seene?
Whoever gives a pair of velvet shoes
To th' Holy Rood, or liberally allowes
But a new rope to ring the curfew bell,
But he desires that his great deed may dwell,
Or graven in the chancel window-glasse,
Or in a lasting tomb of plated brasse?" — Satire 4, Book ii.

Again,

" To know much, and to think we nothing know;
Nothing to have, yet think we have enowe;
In skill to want, and wanting seek for more;
In weale nor want, nor wish for greater store.
Envy ye monarchs, with your proud excesse,
At our low sayle and our high happiness. — Satire 6, Book iv.

Some of Dryden's lines are very forcible and condensed, as:

" Faith is not built on disquisitions vain;
The things we must believe are few and plain."

Religio Laici.

" Thus man by his own strength to heaven would soar,
And would not be obliged to God for more." — Religio Laici.

THE INSPIRED WRITERS.

" Whence but from heaven could man unskilled in arts,
In several ages born, in several parts,
Weave such agreeing truths? Or how or why
Should all conspire to cheat us with a lie?
Unasked their pains, ungrateful their advice;
Starving their gain, and martyrdom their price."

Religio Laici.

THE CROSS.

" See God descending in thy human frame;
The offended suffering in the offender's name;
All thy misdeeds to him imputed see,
And all his righteousness devolved on thee."

Pope was very fond of involving his meaning in couplets. Whole poems are little else than a collection of couplets;

hence he is often sententious, and sometimes epygramatic without knowing it; as in the following, from the Essay on Man:

> "Count all the advantage prosperous vice attains,
> 'Tis but what virtue flies from and disdains."

Other examples from the same poem are too familiar to be repeated; but he often writes downright epigrams, as when he gives the reply of the profuse Duke of Buckingham to the frugal Sir John Cutler:

> "His grace's fate sage Cutler could foresee,
> And well (he thought) advised him, 'Live like me.'
> As well his grace replied: 'Like you, Sir John?
> That I can do when all I have is gone.'"
>
> MORAL ESSAYS, Epistle iii. lines 315–318.

Dr. Young, though he writes in blank verse, has much of the versified *gnome* in his poetry, as:

> "God is a spirit; spirits cannot strike
> Our gross material organs; God by man
> As much is seen, as man a God can see."

> "Death's terror is the mountain faith removes."

> "Like our shadows,
> Our wishes lengthen as our sun declines."

> "Your learning, like the lunar beam, affords
> Light, but not heat; it leaves you undevout,
> Frozen at heart, while speculation shines."

The following, from his Satires, is a beautiful epigram

> "Pleasures are few, and fewer we enjoy;
> Pleasure, like quicksilver, is bright and coy;
> We strive to grasp it with our utmost skill,
> Still it eludes us, and it glitters still.
> If seized at last, compute your mighty gains,—
> What is it but rank poison in your veins?
>
> LOVE OF FAME, Satire 5.

Another example:

> "Phillis and her Damon met;
> Eternal love exactly hits her taste;
> Phillis demands eternal love at least.
> Embracing Phillis, with soft, smiling eyes,
> Eternal love I vow, the swain replies.

But say, my all, my mistress, and my friend,
What day next week the eternity shall end!"

LOVE OF FAME, Satire 5.

Another:

"Can wealth give happiness? Look round and see
What gay distress! What splendid misery!
Whatever fortune lavishly can pour
The mind annihilates, and calls for more.
Wealth is a cheat, believe not what it says,
Like any lord it promises and — pays." — Satire 5.

Cowper as a moralist, is of course sententious:

"Search the least path creative power has trod,
How plain the footsteps of the apparent God."

Again:

"How hard a vicious habit to erase;
Fond of the sin, and blind to the disgrace."

Again:

"But haughty still, and loath himself to blame,
He calls on Nature's self to share the shame;
And charged all faults upon the fleshly form
She gave to clog the soul and feast the worm."

This last sentiment was anticipated even by Homer in the Odyssey, Lib. I., line 31–33.

"Perverse mankind, whose wills created free,
Charge all their woes on absolute decree;
All to the dooming gods their guilt translate,
And follies are miscalled the crimes of fate."

The following lines from a poem entitled "The Deity," are eminently beautiful:

"Nor yet thy power thy chosen train forsook,
When through Arabia's sand their way they took;
By day thy cloud was present to the sight,
Thy fiery pillar led the march by night;
Thy hand amid the waste their table spread,
With feathered viands and with heavenly bread;
When the dry wilderness no stream supplied,
Gushed from the yielding rock the vital tide;
What limits can Omnipotence confine?
What obstacles oppose the arm divine?
Since stones and waves their settled laws forego, —
Since seas can harden and since rocks can flow."

Our own poet, Whittier, is far from aiming to write sentences. In him the didactic seems to be lost in the lyrical. He always addresses the heart, and assumes the plainest doctrines, and sings, not their proofs, but their impressions. He is not like the coach-light that flames on the street through which the vehicle rolls, but the red lamp that gleams behind the colored liquid in the apothecary's window. Yet always actuated by a deeply moral tone, he cannot help sometimes deviating into the sententious; as in the following, from the Chapel of the Hermits:

"Just men no longer pine
Behind their prison bars;
Through the rent dungeon shine
The free sun and the stars.

"Earth owns, at last untrod
By sect or caste or clan,
The fatherhood of God,
The brotherhood of man." — p. 66.

"Let us behold
The stone from the mouth of the sepulchre rolled,
And Nature, like Lazarus, rise as of old.
Let our faith, which in darkness and coldness has lain,
Revive with the warmth and the brightness again,
And in blooming of flower and budding of tree,
The symbols and types of our destiny see.
The life of the spring-time, the life of the whole,
And as sun to the sleeping earth, love to the soul." — p. 76.

Again, in the programme of the dedication of the High School, Newbury, Nov. 2, 1849:

"Nor heed[1] the sceptic's puny hand,
While near her school the church-spire stands;
Nor fear the blinded bigot's rule,
While near her church-spire stands the school."

I should be very indiscreet to preface my verses with such fine specimens if I had the least intention of breaking a lance with such accomplished writers. Indeed it is a part of my design that the contrast should be noted. I say at

[1] i.e., our State, old Massachusetts, heed not, etc.

once, see how their gold shines over my dross. My aim is to be simple and plain, to present the beauty of naked truth, and to reach the memory through the heart. I allow that the following lines have none of the attention-distracting beauties of true poetry; but that, like an autumnal apple tree, they may be valued for their fruit, though all their blossoms may have fallen to the ground.

Gnomological Verses.

No. I.

The will of God is secret and revealed,
The precept open and the plan concealed,
The last not contradicted by the first;
The one obedience asks, the other trust.

No. II.

The whole creation is a robe of praise,
In which the architect his skill displays;
The sun, the moon, the planets, and the sea,
In one eviction, one great truth, agree.
The rose a primal beauty may adorn,
Nor is its lesson cancelled by the thorn;
The very ills of life, though we repine,
Evince the fulness of the great design;
The very clouds, that join the throne to screen,
Augment the radiance at the basement seen.

No. III.

All things fulfil an absolute decree,
And yet in all, the will of man is free.

No. IV.

If scripture ever be with profit read,
You must discover first the golden thread,—
The line of purpose and perfection sweet,
Which makes two testaments in union meet.
A Christ foreshadowed and a Christ revealed;
A growing kingdom, though at first concealed.
See how the emblems and the types are used;
See how at last the serpent's head is bruised.
The bold neologist the cord unbinds,
And only fragments in his Bible finds;
See the hid union — make its pages one,
The darkness scatters — 'tis a risen sun.

No. V.

A miracle when seen our faith may move,
But what a not-seen miracle can prove;
What but the high design, well understood,
nd the united faith of all the good.

No. VI.

All men in Adam's guiltiness appear,
However dark the *mode*, the *fact* is clear.

No. VII.

The triune God, to human faith displayed
Upon the sacred page, has light and shade;
Dark is the draught of each interior line,
Yet we can see each person is divine.
The practical, the manifested light
May strike the rudest shepherd's mental sight.

No. VIII.

Of all the sacred teachers which recall
To mind the word of God, I honor Paul;
His zeal, his clearness, his consistent truth,
Shall lead my age, as it impressed my youth.

No. IX.

Yes, all the real saints shall persevere,
Because of falling they have constant fear.

No. X.

The power of meekness, who can ever show,
And who, but he that deeply feels it, know?

No. XI.

The humble mind, though smitten by the rod,
Is the abode of a descending God.

No. XII.

Christ died for all — his righteousness is free;
He died for all, and if for all, for me.

No. XIII.

One sin alone can plunge in endless grief;
A comprehensive sin — 'tis unbelief.

No. XIV.

How will my reasoning to my heart apply,
In that dread moment when I come to die?

How will the products of my tongue, or pen,
My words, my purposes, impress me then?

No. XV.

Whate'er by others done I should condemn,
Let me not think to do the same by them;
Let me perform, with purpose large and free,
Whatever I approve when done to me.

No. XVI.

If duty you regard, the fountain free
From which it flows is God's first love to thee;
And the same feeling in thy heart should spring
To thy Creator, Governor, and King.
Another precept must our minds imbue, —
That loving God, we love our neighbor too.

No. XVII.

Let not thy heart by anger e'er be riven;
Forgive thy foe, and be by God forgiven.

No. XVIII.

A change of will our God can never know,
And yet he wills a change in things below.
His purposes as fixed as fate appear,
And yet for prayer he has an open ear.
Events he changes with a boundless range,
Because his inmost counsels never change.

No. XIX.

The Bible is the oldest book — 'tis true;
And yet the oldest book is always new.

No. XX.

Repentance and remorse are not the same;
That is a heavenly, this an earthly flame:
One springs from love, and is a welcome guest,
And one an iron tyrant o'er the breast.
Repentance weeps before the Crucified;
Remorse is nothing more than wounded pride.
Remorse through horror into hell is driven,
While true repentance always goes to heaven.

No. XXI.

Prayer makes us leave off sin; and sin, though fair
It seems to promise, makes us leave off prayer.

No. XXII.

The wisest sorrow our experience wins,
Is sorrowing for our trespasses and sins.

No. XXIII.

Meekness of wisdom![1] What a phrase divine!
O God of meekness, make the blessing mine.

No. XXIV.

When o'er our faults and miseries we groan,
The present moment never acts alone.

No. XXV.

By the same effort are our faults revealed,
Which most men take to make them more concealed.

No. XXVI.

Our grossest deeds concealed from man may be,
But thought itself, O God, is known to thee.

No. XXVII.

When Peter from his master's presence stept,
Pondering his crimes as bitterly he wept,
Though gloom and sorrow all his soul enclosed,
Had he the wretchedness that he supposed?
His lonely weeping seems, to me at least,
Above the laughter of Belshazzar's feast.

No. XXVIII.

When in obedience to your Saviour-king,
To the baptismal font your babe you bring;
Who knows what benefits may there ensue?
Each sprinkled drop may prove celestial dew;
And the wet forehead to your prayers impart
A future saint — a pure and contrite heart.

No. XXIX.

When the swift day through swifter hours has run,
And the red cloud o'erhangs the setting sun,
Let not thy conscience be compelled to see
That beauteous nature blushes then for thee;
Or, when the dews descend in drops divine,
That pitying planets weep o'er sins of thine;
Or, when the morn exalts her saffron head,
She sheds her radiance round a sluggard's bed,
And bids the world this lesson from thee reap,
That all thy innocence is in thy sleep.

[1] James iii. 13.

No. XXX.

Sorrowing for sin my Christian course began,
Sorrowing for sin through all the progress ran;
Sorrowing for sin I hailed the morning light,
Sorrowing for sin I passed the wakeful night;
Sorrowing for sin restrained my youthful rage,
Sorrow for sin is habit in old age;
And oh how sweetly do the moments move
When all this sorrow is the fruit of love!

No. XXXI.

Gain is not godliness; but it is plain
That — be content — and godliness is gain.

No. XXXII.

GOSPEL PREACHING.

The sum of gospel teaching should be this:
The woe of true repentance leads to bliss;
That sin imparts its sickness to the soul,
And Christ, our great physician, makes us whole.

No. XXXIII.

THE FREE CHRISTIAN.

In bondage? Yes; but then, I feel no pain,
For I am fettered by a red-rose chain.

No. XXXIV.

Old age, advancing on through slow decay
Is somewhat like the setting orb of day:
It has, though losing its meridian height,
A larger circle and a softer light.

No. XXXV.

Self-knowledge (by some lofty minds pursued),
Without religion does them little good.
Rousseau, to whom all winding hearts were known,
And who so skilfully portrayed his own,
In conduct and in life reversed each rule,
And sunk from wisdom to be more a fool.
The same conclusion every reader learns
From Goldsmith, Cicero, and Robert Burns.
Their knowledge was a light-house through the spray,
It shed faint light and led not to the way.

No. XXXVI.

FOR THE GATE OF A GRAVE-YARD.

Remember, ye that hither come to weep,
The wicked die; the pious only sleep.

No. XXXVII.

Why is a terror so peculiar shed
O'er human hearts conversing with the dead?
How can these mouldered hands such tumults weave?
Why do the disbelieving here believe?
And why, as if by heaven's judicial doom,
Is no man atheist, leaning on a tomb?

No. XXXVIII.

Life must present a most contrasted page,
Foreseen in youth and when reviewed in age.
As some bright window ere the day is done,
Shines deeply crimsoned in the setting sun;
The mansion seems involved in streams of fire
All faces brighten and all eyes admire;
But as the sun withdraws his final ray,
The visionary splendors fade away;
And naught remains, these transient glories past,
But the cold night-fog or the whistling blast.

No. XXXIX.

In this condition where afflictions roll,
Religion is an impulse of the soul,
'Tis closely grafted on chastised desire;
Our wants impress it, even our sins inspire,
And sceptic reasoning is a vain employ,
Like reasoning down our agony or joy.

No. XL.

The best impressions, since we know in part,
Are made by forms proceeding from the heart.
The brightest ray that is to man allowed,
Is but a pencil quivering through a cloud.
The light is partial, but enough to guide,
In spite of worldly prudence, pelf, or pride.
When guilt depresses, when with ills we cope,
Without supreme conviction man may hope.

No. XLI.

Religion then, that calmer of our woes,
On two eternal pillars must repose;

Our guilt and misery; when for these we grieve,
Our fears, hopes, sorrows, force us to believe;
For who can question, when his sufferings cease,
The voice that bids him sweetly, Go in peace?

No. XLII.

O precious system! antidote for pain!
Let down from heaven, as by a golden chain,
In mercy to a sin-polluted clod,
God sinks to man, that man may soar to God.
Guilt wears the robe of innocence; the tear,
Once wholly hopeless, turns to rapture here.
The wretched share a part; and round the bed
Where life retires immortal hopes are shed.
Life's disappointments, agonies, and stings,
But add new feathers to Religion's wings.
So in the cell where, stern afflictions prey,
The prisoner weeps his lingering nights away;
Through that dark grate whose iron chords so fast,
Have been the lyre to many a midnight blast, —
Through that dark grate the evening sun may shine,
And gild his crimson walls with light divine.
Some mournful melody may soothe his pain;
Some radiant beam may sparkle round his chain;
Some wandering wind in mercy may repair,
And waft the burden of the blossoms there.

No. XLIII.

Meekness, not strife, should our protection be,
For sands, as well as rocks, resist the sea.

No. XLIV.

That tree there standing, like a saint that's mute,
Has borne last year no blossoms and no fruit;
What has it done? What contribution made
To cheer our earth? A cool and pleasant shade.

No. XLV.

The surest way to stop Ambition's breath,
Is starving — starve the frantic imp to death.

No. XLVI.

The surest way your purpose to refine,
Is bathing — bathe your soul in love divine.

No. XLVII.

If to the cross you go and mean to stay,
Be sure to take old Sinai in your way:
Mercy becomes a source of sweeter trust
When we already see the law is just.

ARTICLE V.

THE STUDY OF MONUMENTS.

FROM THE GERMAN OF PROF. FERDINAND PIPER, OF BERLIN, BY REV. CHARLES M. MEAD, PH.D., PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

[NOTE. — The following Article is a translation of an Address delivered before the Philological Convention held in Hanover in 1864, and entitled, "Ueber die Einführung der monumentalen, insbesondere der christlich-monumentalen Studien in den Gymnasial-Unterricht." The relation between the gymnasia and the universities of Germany being in general similar to that between our colleges and professional schools, Professor Piper's plea for the study of monuments in gymnasia is equally valid for the study of them in our colleges. Much is omitted from the Article which would be of interest chiefly to Germans; but it has been thought best not to change the form of the Address in general, as the reader can readily supply the modifications necessary to make the truths presented applicable to our own circumstances and institutions, and the changes would be likely to diminish the freshness, more than they would increase the pertinency, of Professor Piper's remarks.]

THE question of monumental studies as a part of the course of instruction in gymnasia leads to the consideration of three points: first, the necessity of them as an organic part of the course; next, their place in the course; finally, the requisite conditions of their prosecution.

I. The *necessity* of these studies may be argued from two grounds: on the one hand, the gymnasia have a claim upon them on their own account; on the other, the universities have a right to insist on this preliminary training. The pedagogic and scientific interests therefore coincide; and this very coincidence furnishes a strong proof that the necessity is a real one.

To speak briefly of the latter point, the claim of the university, it is justified by the fact that without this preparation on the part of the students the university cannot properly do its own work. The students need not so much a preliminary knowledge of facts, as that their taste for art and an appreciation of its works should have been awakened and

cultivated; for this is a special faculty, and needs to be excited early. It is clearly too late to begin this cultivation at the age of eighteen or nineteen, after one has finished his academic course. Besides, this neglect easily produces a positive effect: not only is the preparation lacking, but a fatal prejudice against the whole thing may be produced, and that too, much more in the sphere of classical than of theological study, because the gymnasia enter more thoroughly into the former, and aim to confer a classical culture in a certain sense complete. If however this culture is gained only from literary monuments, as if the subject were thus exhausted, the monuments of art are made to seem superfluous and unnecessary. And the consequence is soon manifest: he who in the gymnasium is initiated into the poetry of Sophocles will very likely also read Aeschylus at the university; but he who, though he may have there heard of works of art, has yet acquired no fondness for them, perhaps never enters a museum.

More pressing is the claim which the gymnasium can urge for itself, as the whole object of academic instruction shows. This object may be stated as threefold:

1. It may doubtless be assumed that the higher schools (those which do not aim to educate men for special vocations, but borrow their means of education chiefly from classical antiquity) have to do with the whole man, not with particular faculties of the mind; that their part is rather to develop and train them all. For this purpose, however, as the nature of the instruction requires, the *understanding* is principally appealed to, since the subjects are introduced to the mind in a disintegrated, fragmentary form, one part after another. As a corrective for restoring the equilibrium, it has long been seen that the intuitive faculty must be brought into use. This is already done to some extent, e.g. in the study of geometry by the construction of plain figures, or by the use of solid bodies (regular ones, the cone with its sections, etc.), in geography by maps, in natural history by the exhibition of pictures, or of specimens either prepared or

natural. But this mode of representation is confined to space. A higher form of intuition, one which conducts us from the visible to the spiritual world, is afforded by works of art.

This course is now and then taken, even in instruction in languages, when a piece, after being taught analytically, is brought vividly before the mind as a whole. This is done in the middle stage of instruction by the declamation of poems and prose pieces; and in the higher stage, as the blossom and completion of the reading of classic works, by the acting of a Greek drama. But, as those who take part confess, the scheme often consumes a whole term; and that is a sacrifice which can only rarely be made. Now although in such a way, when one verse after another has been first gone through, a general impression is attained, still there is this drawback, in poetry as well as in music, that we can perceive only in succession. To escape from this there is no way but to have recourse to the works of plastic art.

For these stand still as we contemplate them. But they require us constantly to look beyond the visible form to the thought that lies beneath, and to carry out this thought in our conception of the whole and of each particular; the possibility remaining of a repeated return from one to the other. This way, however, of attaining to an understanding of a work of art is the way in which all knowledge is attained, but can only here be shown with special clearness and practised with safety. Hence it is, in point of method, invaluable. But there are two particulars involved in it:

First. As in poetry and music the first requisite is the art of *hearing*, i.e. the ability to distinguish and measure the rhythm and the tones, so here the first thing demanded is to discern and determine what is *visible*. This is no small art, as is to be seen every day in common life, where eye-witnesses give very different reports of an event, and not only render a one-sided account, but relate what never happened at all. So it is with the monuments of art; men not only see them incorrectly, but see in them what is not there

at all. I witnessed an example at Ravenna. On a piece of the ivory bishop's seat in the sacristy of the cathedral, is represented a female figure sitting on an ass, which is led by an angel; an elderly man is walking by her side, supporting and conducting her. It was said, agreeably to the traditional explanation there adopted: This is the flight into Egypt. By the question, where then was the child, the by-standers were nonplussed, until some one resorted to the shift that it was probably concealed under the mother's garment. But in reality the scene is the journey to Bethlehem, which preceded the birth.[1] As a safeguard against such errors, therefore, is demanded the art of seeing merely what there is to be seen. We have indeed a seemingly opposite direction from the author of Laocoon: "The more we see," says Lessing,[2] "the more must we be able to add in thought. And the more our thought adds, the more must we think that we see." But this relates to another kind of seeing, viz. with the mind's eye — reading, as it were, between the lines. And of this it is indeed true that, the more attentively we contemplate a genuine work of art, the more does it become articulate and speak to us. This leads us to the second point, the art of *interpretation*.

Its field is wide, and it has, according to the nature and design of the monuments of art, various forms, just as have the hermeneutics of literary monuments. Two of these deserve to be specially mentioned, as bearing on the interests of education: the psychological and the historico-religious. The former is to be applied wherever the artist, impressed by his theme, was able to breathe into his work the feelings and mood of his own soul. These become visible in the attitude and bearing of the separate figures, in the relation of the figures to each other, in the whole composition. The introduction to this department of art, to the art of appre-

[1] The false interpretation, with the same shift, is derived from *Bandini*, In tabulum eburneam, etc., Observat. p. 39 (where also a picture of the tablet is given). The correction was made by *Münter*, Sinnbilder, H. II. S. 751.

[2] *Lessing*, Laocoon, Werke, Bd. vi. p. 389 (ed. Lachmann).

ciating that which is full of soul and of detecting false pathos, may of itself furnish a sort of course in practical psychology. By the side of this subjective form stands the objective interpretation, and, as the highest form of this, the historico-religious and theological, in cases where myth or revelation has furnished the subject for the work of art. An example of the former I take from Lycia, where a bright light is thrown on the state of nations hitherto obscure, by the Harpy monument of Xanthos.[1] On the tower-like groundwork rests the monument proper, with the chamber of the dead, which is surrounded with a pictorial frieze. This contains, above the grave door, which at the same time indicates the entrance to Hades, a suckling cow, as a symbol of life-giving force and nourishing care; on the left is the goddess of death, enthroned alone; on the other side, the goddess of life, receiving homage from three women, one of whom holds an egg, another, pomegranate blossoms and fruit. On the adjoining sides four harpies are represented, the upper part of their bodies resembling women, the lower part shaped like an egg, with the wings, tail, and legs of a bird, each of them holding an infant. They have seized the infant, it is true, with the claws, a sign of inevitable fate; but in other respects their expression is mild, and they embrace the child with maternal arms, and it turns trustfully toward them, — an image of the soul and of its fate in death. Herein is expressed the sentiment that death is a passage into life. Thus we have here a witness to the belief in immortality in the lower stages of Grecian art and poetry. In the Homeric narrative also, the harpies figure as the genii of death, but with a fainter significance; the suckling cow is found on the coins of Grecian cities; and the egg, which in the monument of Xanthos is brought to the goddess of life by one of the worshipping women (to say nothing of the bodily form of the harpies), has also a place in the monumental symbolics of Greece and Rome.[1] A monument, however, so unique

[1] I follow the explanation of *Curtius* in the Archäologische Zeitschrift, 1855, No. 73.

in its kind and of such fundamental significance, involving so deep a meaning, and yet containing the key to its own interpretation, should, one might think, not be kept from the youth in schools of learning, and seems pre-eminently suited, as its secret is elicited from it, to awaken a sense for the language of art.

Nevertheless, the didactic use of these works of art extends further than merely to train the faculties and develop the intuitive powers. One cannot take up such images, especially in his younger years, without being captivated by the thing itself, so that the mind is enriched, the feelings refined, and convictions gained and strengthened. And so we find the connection between this and the second object of schools.

2. For though the *formal* object, the harmonious cultivation of the mental faculties, was first emphasized, yet we cannot stop with this. The gymnasium has clearly not only to give a gymnastic training to the mind, but to fill the mind and form the character. And to this end there is no other way than to bring men beyond themselves to archetypal forms, or to the beautiful itself, of which Plato says that he leads no bad life who aspires after it and sees it and holds intercourse with it.[2] But these archetypes become visible in the works of art. The argument for so early an introduction to the study of works of art will however fail, if, following modern speculation, we reckon the aesthetic sense as a middle thing, higher than belief, and lower than the perception of truth, as though these were stages, the lower of which must give way to the higher. On the contrary, all these three elements seek each other and unite together ; for in the seeing of divine things, as the completion of faith, is involved the notion both of truth and of beauty. Art, therefore, when it presents to the eye the beautiful and the

[1] As has since been shown by *Bachofen*, Uber die Gräbersymbolik der Alten, 1859. Cf. *Gerhard*, Das Ei auf Kunstdenkmälern, in the Archäol. Anzeiger, 1859, p. 58.

[2] *Plato*, Symposion, p. 211.

sublime, thus proclaims truth in its aboriginal form. A glance at one of the wonders of Christian architecture, and a poet's utterance, may serve to confirm this. In view of the Strasburg Cathedral, Goethe invites us not only to draw near and recognize in the soul of the artist the deepest sense of truth and of beauty in the proportions; he recognizes also in the structure a monument of eternal life in the master, and confesses that before this work, as before every *great thought of creation*, is stirred in the soul whatever there is in it of creative force.[1] Thus then is expressed the mystery of art, that it is the divine made real to sense. And we should have to deny the work of art as well as the artist, if we would not recognize in both the testimony, nay, the presence, of Him to whose honor it was erected. It is objected that divinity cannot merge itself in the individual phenomena with which art has to do; or, as David Strauss says, that it is not the way of the Idea to pour out all its wealth into one copy (speaking of the person of Christ). But just the opposite is true, as may be proved even from history and in the times before Christ: in creative epochs a new beginning is marked by a fulness of endowment in one person. This is forcibly expressed by the Greeks, respecting the beginning of their poetry, in the epigram: "Nature mused long, and created; and when she had created, she rested, and said: One Homer to the world." And it is now no longer heresy to return to a belief in the essential unity of the Homeric poems. We need not then engage in the controversy respecting the validity of the same law in the history of revelation. But another summit of Christian art may serve as testimony — a work like Raphael's Sistine Madonna, which in its kind stands alone, marked by the loftiness of the mien of the virgin and mother, by the unfathomable depth in the eyes of the child. This the artist never could have painted, if it had not stood before his soul; he could not have had it in his soul, if it did not exist in truth.

[1] *Goethe*, Von deutscher Baukunst (1771). Werke, Bd. xxv. of ed. 1850, p. 7. Dritte Wallfahrt nach Erwins Grabe (1775), ibid, p. 15.

It would seem wise, therefore, to bring such witnesses before the youth; to conduct them to the Strasburg Cathedral, or to some other one, to the Sistine Madonna, or another one, in order to implant in their hearts the seeds of superterrestrial beauty.

3. A third claim can be made upon the schools, growing out of their *duty to the nation* to educate the youth up to the degree and the quality of culture attained by the nation. The proposition will not be contested, that the state of a people's general culture depends, on the average, on the stage of culture attained at the close of the last year in the gymnasia or in the equally advanced polytechnic schools. All men of culture take this course; many go from these schools directly to their particular vocation; and at the university the most devote themselves at once to their special department, so that the advance here made is chiefly in particular lines of study rather than in general culture. Hence results the converse claim on the schools that they make their course of study harmonize with this culture. Thus of late the natural sciences, and subsequently modern languages, have obtained an important place among the studies pursued at the gymnasia. Now, however, interest in monuments of art has become more and more a factor of general culture both in Germany and in other enlightened countries. This is shown by the ambition to erect statues in memory of the great men of the present and the past. It is manifested, furthermore, in the collection of antiquities and the erection of art museums, especially those designed to exhibit objects of national interest, and to be enjoyed by all, even by the working classes. For the latter object, the Kensington Museum at London was founded, and in Berlin the Royal Museum is opened even on Sundays. For the former object, there was not long ago established in the Louvre the Musée des Souverains, in Munich a Bavarian National Museum, and in Hanover the Welfen-Museum.

The schools, therefore, cannot exempt themselves from the duty of awakening and cultivating an appreciation of the

monuments of art, so long as it is expected of every cultivated man not to be a barbarian in this sphere. Following a like standard, we should certainly be surprised if scholars could leave any gymnasium without having heard during the whole course of instruction about America and its discovery. But what shall be said when schools send out young men who have never heard of another world, which stands before everybody's eyes and contains the noblest works of genius of thousands of years ; or who, though the names of Phidias, Erwin, and Raphael may have been handed down to them, yet have not traced out the footprints of their genius?

Here, however, we are met by the objection: "Art, likewise Christian art, is a subject which cannot, like grammar, be imposed upon all men, but must be more or less left to the devoted action of those whose vocation it is." This is certainly true, if the question relates to a virtuososhiip in the understanding and explanation of works of art. But for the measure to be attained in the schools, the difference of natural endowment is of secondary consequence, just as in the case of mathematics it does not prevent the course of study from extending even into the higher sphere. And yet the language of art, which, far from involving mathematical abstractions, everywhere lets the mind appear in a sensible form, is incomparably more comprehensible. Nay, it is comprehensible by every man, as both history and daily experience testify. For the noblest works of art have always been publicly exhibited, for the very reason that they can be understood, at least felt, by all. The Jupiter of Phidias was for everybody, else the Greek who had not once in his life come to Olympia to see it, would not have been pronounced unfortunate. On the other hand, it is seen that the works of art present food for study to men in every period of life, since, according to the subjects and the mode of treating them, they may be studied even in early youth, and yet constantly present new themes for study to one in mature years. Accordingly they are suited to serve as a

means of culture in all stages of an educational system, and further still. This fact, while it strengthens the claim that the study of monuments should be organically incorporated into the course of study, facilitates the execution of such a plan.

II. If this is conceded, the question next arises: What *place* in the course of study should be assigned to the study of monuments? And here we meet at once the objection that the gymnasium is already overburdened with studies, that there is therefore no room for new ones. This objection may be obviated by the statement that no claim is put in for the introduction of an independent branch of study, and for assigning a number of hours especially to it — to which arrangement this study is at this stage not adapted, and could be thus conducted only in exceptional cases — but for a connection with the existing course of study, so that the question does not so much concern the matter as the *method* of the instruction. The claim is, that the study of monuments has a place in all the principal departments of study except natural science — in the teaching of languages, history and religion; not as a sort of appendix, or as a topic to be incidentally touched upon, but as one to which these branches of study, from their very nature, lead, and through which alone they can be methodically completed.

1. Of these three branches, the study of *languages* most of all leads to that of monuments.

For, instruction in the classical languages, although it starts with the grammar, does not stop with the mere form of the language, but the great writers of antiquity are selected and read for the sake of the contents, and not only for their thoughts, but in order by means of them to gain an insight into the whole civilization of antiquity. But, this being so, the monuments of art constitute a series of subjects entitled to equal attention with the monuments of speech. And even when the former cannot yet be studied by themselves, they need still to be considered in connection with the latter. True, it is seldom the case that these conduct directly to

works of art, as e.g. Cicero in the Verrini;[1] for the principal writers of this class, Pausanias and Pliny, are generally not read at the gymnasia. But works of art run parallel with the productions of poets; these are in various ways mirrored in those, nay, are in turn even influenced by them. And monuments are continually coming to light which bear testimony to this point. How could one better understand Homer and the tragedians than when he finds them illustrated by these works?[2]

In the educational use of monuments of art the ancients themselves seem to take the lead. Well known are the various remains of Ilian tables on which scenes from the Trojan war are pictured, with a brief statement of the corresponding passages in Homer. The greatest and best preserved monument of this sort is in the Museum of the Capitol, comprising Homeric and post-Homeric themes, among the latter the departure of Aeneas for the west made prominent, in order to glorify the origin of the Julian race; it was found near Bovillä, in the ruins of a sacrarium which was erected to the Emperor Augustus soon after his death. It may have served to instruct him, inasmuch as, according to a view widely held, all such tablets were designed for the use of the young. In the same place was found the Apotheosis of Homer: the poet sitting enthroned, while the inhabited Earth crowns him with wreaths, ever-during Time publishes his praise, and all the streams of poesy spring from him. This monument has, by a galvano-plastic method of reproduction, been made accessible to all. The contemplation of both these works would seem fitly to close the reading of Homer in the schools, especially as the first also presents continuations of the scenes, drawn from the epic cycle. These are, to be sure, late productions. But the chief one, in the making of which a

[1] The subject is treated in a prospectus of the gymnasium at Jever by Professor *König*, "De Cicerone in Verrinis artis operum aestimatore et judice." Easter, 1863.

[2] Cf. *Friederich's* Winckelmann, 1862, p. 14, where the expectation is expressed that the idea of Winckelmann, to interpret and illustrate passages of ancient writers by means of monuments, will work its way even into the gymnasia

description by the poet (Iliad i. 528 seq.) was before the artist's mind, as he himself testifies, is the Olympic Zeus of Phidias; and, since the nearest approach to this, although a remote imitation, is found in the bust of Jupiter by Otricoli, and a painting from Pompeii, which represents the god on a throne and Victoria crowning him with a wreath, it would seem that casts and copies of these works would be suited to illustrate the poet's idea when this passage is read. Quite as striking is the opposite relation, seen in the case of the tragedians, that a work dating from the remotest antiquity furnishes a theme for their description; I refer to Niobe, especially described by Sophocles in his Antigone (822 seq.) whose fate he compares to hers: "like her who of old was petrified on Mount Sipylos, visible in her stony grave, forever shedding tears." But the image on the north side of the Sipylos, described by Pausanias and recognized by modern travellers, is hewn out of the natural rock — a sitting matron of colossal size, with an expression of grief, the head gently inclined forward and to one side, the hands laid together on her lap.[1] A photograph of it, lately arrived, proves that it cannot be considered a freak of nature.[2] As now the legend mentioned by Sophocles is connected with it, so that image conducts us to one of his sources, and to one of the most remarkable points in the history of religion. As an example of corresponding artistic representation for the two other tragedians from lately discovered or lately explained monuments, we might point, in connection with Aeschylus's Persae, to the great Darius vase of Canosa, which, in the upper part, represents the assembly of the gods with the figures of Hellas and Asia, in the middle part, Darius with his chiefs, and in the lower, subjugated nations; yet this would be less to the point, for it was an error to derive this conception from that drama.[3] Nevertheless it may serve quite well as an illustration of it, since it pictures two of

1 *Stark*, Niobe, p. 42 seq., 98 seq. 442, with copy, Table i.

2 *Gerhard*, Archäolog. Anzeiger, 1862, p. 349*.

3 As Minervini insisted on doing; vid. on the other hand *Welcker* in the

its leading thoughts: one, by the figures of Hellas and Asia, the latter sitting before her threshold, on the point of commencing an attack on the other (respecting which the assembly above is deliberating), while in Aeschylus, in the dream of Atossa, the consequences of an aggressive war of Xerxes are manifested in the same figures; another, by the relation of Hellas, who, threatened and distressed, is put under the protection of the gods, chiefly of Zeus, also of Nice and Athena. This conception of their guardianship and immediate interference runs through all the poetry as well as the history of the Persian wars; and accordingly a grand expression is given to it on that vase by the hand of art.[1] On the other hand, a clear agreement is recognizable between a drama of Euripides, his Phoenissae, and the reliefs of a sarcophagus of the Villa Pamfili, which presents to the eye the three most important parts of the piece in the same succession:[2] the meeting of the brothers and the fruitless mediation of Jocaste; the combat, which ends with the death of the leaders, of whom in the relief are particularly distinguishable Kapaneus climbing up and Amphiaraos descending, also the brothers murdering each other; finally, the command not to bury Polyneices, to which Antigone will not yield — instead of which in the relief, corresponding to the further fiction of the poet in a piece now lost, the burial by night is itself represented.

2. The second place in which monuments should be introduced into the course of study, is the department of *history*, the extent of which in all the stages of academic life furnishes so much opportunity for the use of this aid. And its importance here is least contested, and its claims most regarded. Let me only point to the boundary line of the ages, the turning-points both in secular and sacred history, marked by

Archäol. Anzeiger, 1857, p. 53, with a copy of the vase (then in his "Alte Denkmäler," Theil v.), and *O. Jahn*, ibid. 1860, p. 41 seq., who finds the conception suggested in the Persae of Phrynichos.

[1] Cf. *Curtius* in the Archäolog. Zeitschrift, 1857, p. 116.

[2] Shown by *Petersen* in the Archäol. Zeitschrift, 1861 p. 195 seq.

the fall of Judaism and of heathenism; and to the monuments still standing as lofty witnesses of those events in the ancient capital of the world: the arch of Titus and the arch of Constantine. Copies and photographs of them (the Christian Museum of Berlin has some which for ten years have continued unchanged) are so abundant as to make it possible to impress on scholars a conception of these most remarkable of all works of architecture and sculpture.

3. Less generally acknowledged, yet still more important, is the like claim which may be made in behalf of religious instruction, to which two hours weekly are wont to be devoted throughout the whole academic course; Bern forms an exception, only one hour being allowed. But that time too is so precious that no one would wish it infringed upon by the introduction of foreign matter. The works of Christian art, however, are not foreign to this subject, but intimately connected with it, inasmuch as they testify through so many centuries to the perpetual vigor of Christian inspiration. And, far from contracting this instruction, they add to it an enlivening element, and serve to lighten the responsibility of the teacher.

For this responsibility is indeed greater here than anywhere else. The instruction must everywhere begin with the contents of the Bible — history and doctrine. In the higher stages it advances to the history and doctrine of the church. How can the teacher deem himself equal to the task of making this massive material the property of the youth? Certainly not by a mere traditional communication, as the rules of grammar may be taught, although even this is of no use unless there is also present the linguistic spirit out of which the rules have grown. But especially in the sphere of religion must that which is to penetrate the soul and produce life, itself have life and soul. If now the teacher, having no resource but his own gifts and attainments, distrusts his ability to satisfy the religious needs of the rising generation and to exercise a decisive influence on their lives, he may call to his assistance the gifts of the church, especially the

helps to devotion and insight afforded by her creative epochs. That is done in fact, to mention one example, when he communicates the devotional products of her lyric poetry, the songs of the old heroes of faith. Together with these present themselves the works of the plastic arts, which however have a much wider field, for they embrace in their countless specimens the whole biblical history, and extend even to all the main points of the body of doctrine, since art is able to symbolize even the most ultimate ideas. And, different as are the means employed by art in different periods, yet at all times is to be traced in the works of Christian art the piety of their authors, which cannot fail to exert a quiet and enduring influence. How this helps in the work of instruction, deserves a closer consideration. At present I would dwell on only two points, which concern the basis of this and of every department of religious instruction.

The first point is, that *sacred history* and the *history* of *sacred doctrine* are *identical*, because faith is completely bound to history. This is illustrated by a gypsum cast of an ivory box belonging in the Royal Art Hall at Berlin, and dating from the fourth century: Christ is seen sitting among the twelve apostles; and, as his attitude (in his left hand a scroll, his right raised) and the grouping indicate, he is teaching; but what is he teaching? On the opposite side of the cylindrical vessel is represented the offering of Abraham, which in its relation to the first-named representation affords a most simple example of geometrical symbolics: it is the circle with its points standing over against one another, separated by the diameter, but united by the curved line. So then the offering of Isaac by Abraham, different as being typical, yet kindred, exhibits the sought-for subject of the instruction, namely the person and work of the Redeemer according to John iii. 16. What is here only typically suggested, is presented as reality in another monument, a bronze crucifix of the twelfth century, formerly in Lüneburg, of which the pedestal is still preserved. Resting on four lions, it has above it a canopy, and signifies, according to

the inscription, the terrestrial globe. Upon the top of it lies Adam in a coffin; angels are removing the lid. This is made intelligible by a legend, full of meaning, and widely spread throughout ancient Christendom, in the Grecian church universally adopted, that the first man was buried on Golgotha, in order there to be redeemed by the blood of Christ and to be awakened from death. This is expressed in this monument by the relation of the Crucified to Adam rising out of his grave, as the inscription also declares: Adae morte novi redit Adae vita priori.[1] The same conception with an inscription to the same effect I have found at the foot of a crucifix in the cathedral at Chur. In the first man, however, the whole race is included; there are therefore represented in these pictures the chief epochs and fundamental facts in the history of the race, with their connections, beginning, and completion — the fall, death, and redemption.

The second point is, that *dogmatics and ethics are identical*, in so far as they have a common root. This is likewise shown in numerous representations of the Crucified, which are encompassed either by the three theological virtues (faith, love, hope), or the four cardinal virtues, which are referred primarily to him. In illustration of this may be mentioned a work now in the Welfen-Museum. It is a gold-foil paten, belonging to Bishop Bernward, dating therefore from the beginning of the eleventh century, afterwards reduced to the form of a pyx, with figures engraved in it:[2] in the middle, Christ on the rainbow showing his pierced hands, with the inscription: Huc spectate viri, sic vos moriendo redemi; around him, alternately, the symbols of the four evangelists, and, in the form of female busts, the cardinal virtues. These figures too refer primarily to the person of the Redeemer; but, the vessel being designed for use at the

[1] This pedestal is copied in *Vogell*: Kunst-Arbeiten aus Niedersachsens Vorzeit, H. I. Bl. 3, 4. Vid. also my dissertation: Adams Grab auf Golgotha, in the Evangelische Kalender for 1861, p. 27.

[2] Copied by *Jung:* Lipsanographia s. Thes. reliq. elector. Brunsvico-Luneb. p. 32 Tab. xi.

Lord's supper, they have a significance also for believers, who, if they show forth the death of Christ (1 Cor. xi. 26), ought to believe his word, and to translate their faith into deeds (Gal. v. 6; Jas. i. 22). So they are admonished by the apostle Peter, in opposition to those who are disobedient to the *word*, to show forth the *virtues* of him who has called them out of darkness into his marvellous light (1 Pet. ii. 8, 9), which passage is to be regarded as the theme of this art representation.

Finally, as regards *church history* and its monumental sources, the latter are as necessary for purposes of illustration as in the study of profane history. And not a few monuments belong to both branches; as, e.g. the two above-mentioned arches in Rome mark an epoch in church history as well as in profane history. In connection with these great architectural works we may mention a small work of sculpture, of native origin, which points out not an end, but a new beginning: a monument of the foundation of St. Gallen in the lower leaf of an ivory table dating from the ninth century.[1] In the middle are seen the cross with the relics, as the first sign of the foundation of a monastery; then the bear, which at the command of Gallus is bringing wood to the fire; and Gallus, who gives him bread with the order to avoid the place and retire to the mountains; — according to a pretty legend of St. Gallen. A small beginning, which yet involves the germ of a great historic fact, that by these pious monks, where they erected the cross, the wild beasts were frightened away, deserts were made arable, and their cells became the nurseries of human culture, from which flourishing cities sprung.

III. Having pointed out, in the course of study, the place where the contemplation of works of art should be introduced,

[1] Of the whole diptychon there is a cast in the Christian Museum in Berlin. It is copied in one of the New Year's issues of the Historical Society of St. Gallen, under the title: St. Gallen I. 1863. The above-mentioned division of one table is copied and explained in my essay, Die Herrschaft des Menschen über die Thiere, in the Evangelische Kalender for 1860, p. 35.

we may in conclusion add a word respecting the *execution* of the plan, in relation to the requisite apparatus and the teachers. But before attempting to indicate what is needed, we will first take a view of what we already have, considering the present position occupied by these studies in the schools of learning — as to which my report must be based on what little has been published respecting it, and on what I have learned by personal observation or by correspondence.

1. As to the *apparatus* of instruction, the most favorably situated institutions are those in capital and university cities, where there are either large public collections or at least art museums to meet the necessities of classical philology. In Germany such collections are unconditionally accessible to the gymnasia, e.g. in Berlin, Stuttgart, Gotha (where the control of both is in the same hands), and other places. In Switzerland, where the collections belong to the capital city, but the schools to the canton, it is required that for the use of the educational apparatus belonging to the city the participants must pay an annual contribution, or the canton must pay it for them. The majority of the gymnasia, however, are in a different position, and are restricted to their own educational resources; but these are almost everywhere deficient. And a noteworthy collection of Christian monuments for the purposes of instruction in history and religion seems nowhere to exist.

The *use* of such collections, especially the immediate employment of them in imparting instruction, is of course greatly facilitated when they are the property of the gymnasium and are kept in its buildings. This convenience being almost universally lacking, the scholars in the upper classes in many places, where an opportunity is presented, are conducted to the collection of antiquities belonging to the state or the university. And testimony is given to the lively interest which is wont to be excited by this inspection. In this connection it should also be insisted on that the noble works of mediaeval architecture should not be entirely neglected in

this department of instruction. In Marburg the scholars of the upper classes are sometimes taken by Director Münscher to the Elizabeth Church, a gem of Gothic architecture; and in Stuttgart last summer Professor Wintterlin undertook an excursion to Maulbronn with the members of the second senior class, "in order to give them at least the fundamental ideas of the Roman and German architecture, and create a desire for independent study in this direction."

2. The apparatus of instruction being thus found to be deficient, while yet the need of it is acknowledged, the question follows: What shall next be done? And the answer is obvious. Just this educational apparatus, that is, the foundation of art collections, both classic and Christian, must be procured for the gymnasia. The proper selection is indicated by the object, and can involve no difficulty.[1] The limits to be observed are moreover obvious. But for the modest claims which the cause makes, both money and room are doubtless everywhere to be had. As to the latter point, whenever a new building is erected, it is easy to provide a special room; in other cases, it will always be possible to set up a few gypsum casts, which even tend to ornament any hall; at least every school has a library room, where they might find a place. Furthermore, the matter of expense can hardly be anywhere a hinderance. The well-endowed educational institutions have such considerable funds for the means of education, both for the library, and in particular for the purposes of natural science, that a proportionate endowment for the purposes of the study of art is only a demand of justice. But even when the receipts are less, the arrangement need not fail to be made through lack of funds, since with the present means of multiplying wealth much can be attained by little, and the beginning is that on which everything depends. The most favorable circumstance for appa-

[1] A sketch of a plan for the arrangement of a collection of works of Christian art for schools has been given by me in the essay, Das christliche Museum der Univ. zu Berlin und die Errichtung christlicher Museen für die Schule und die Gemeinde. Evangelischer Kalender for 1857, p. 69 seq.

ratus of this kind is, that, when extraordinary expenditures are needed for any cause, the good will and active interest of the public are most easily enlisted in it.

It may be more difficult in general to find for this branch of instruction the requisite ability to teach — teachers who are at home in the various departments; and I have heard from various sides the difficulty urged, that many gymnasia, in one respect the most of them, are in this feature deficient. And truly what has long been neglected cannot be made up in a moment. Still, where the former demand is met, this requirement will also be satisfied to a reasonable extent, if the claim is fulfilled, that the teachers should not stop with the education obtained at the university. This would imply, in relation to the question before us, that among them both the representatives of classical philology and the teachers of religion, if they have before made themselves familiar exclusively with the literature, should educate themselves further in the monumental branch, of their science. With regard, however, to the filling of vacant places, there are doubtless in the department of philology young men everywhere to be obtained, who are also trained in archaeology. Very favorable for this purpose is the Prussian stipend, established in 1860, which furnishes annually two able young philologists with means to complete their archaeological studies in Rome. A deficiency is more likely to be found in the theological department, owing in part to the faculties, which in monumental theology have been to some extent guilty of dereliction to duty. But if only the gymnasia demand from the universities teachers thus trained, they will soon be sent. For the inward impulse of science, when united with such an outward demand, works in all directions irresistibly.

And this working will also be traceable in the youth. In their instruction, importance should be indeed attached to the matter which they are required to learn in this department, though with the difference that, while at the university it is presented in its proper connection, it comes up in the schools more incidentally and by way of applica-

tion. But the chief advantage of this study I would seek in its moral effect, that there may be awakened in the youth a reverence for the world of mind which is stamped on the monuments of ancient and modern times, and a desire to obtain possession of this wealth; that this desire may spring up as a germ, to find in more mature years full satisfaction.

ARTICLE VI.

CAUSE AND EFFECT.

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, PROFESSOR IN WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

It is not uncommon in philosophy to build structures on foundations whose existence is denied. His action, who, mounted on a pyramid of boxes, requested his companion to pluck away the first and pass it up, that he might by means of it climb higher, though too coarse a joke for practical life, is often realized with the more subtile, illusory supports of metaphysics. The juggler, at the end of a surprising performance, shows his hands still tied as satisfactory proof that he has had no part in it; yet remove him bodily and his tricks are sure to go with him. Many a fine-spun philosophical theory is indebted for its very existence to faculties whose function and office it is its chief business to disprove. Bind the mental powers beyond escape that have played an unobserved part in the construction of these hypotheses, and they would lose all coherence and firmness, and pass from sight like vapor.

The illustration of this class of theories which we have more particularly in mind, is that which denies the validity of the notion of cause and effect; which regards it as merely the unverified force assumed in explanation of the observed fact of stated antecedents. Sequence is all that is seen, all that is known, and any notion of a necessary link between

the consequent and the antecedent, a dependence of the one upon the other, is a mere notion arising in the mind as something beyond what it knows—a fictitious solution which it gives to phenomena in themselves naked and void of the idea. This denial is most essential and central to idealism, and leads to those other denials which so completely divorce this philosophy from common experience, sympathy, and even comprehension. This school of metaphysicians emasculate knowledge at once by this rejection of the primary nexus of things. They may go on with Mill to construct a logic of the inductive sciences; yet these sciences will owe their entire interest and growth to the discarded idea of cause and effect, to a belief in forces that may be known, and whose action may be duly experienced. They may proceed with Herbert Spencer to give first principles, to treat psychology and biology, and still their language will be dripping full of the rejected notion of efficient forces. It is superfluous to give passages from writers of this class implying this idea of force, when their entire works, with the exception of a few eccentric and guarded definitions, are filled with them; when it is impossible for them to use current or to invent and steadily employ a new speech excluding the speech notion of causation.

We may define matter as "the permanent possibility of certain phenomena," but we shall never handle it, use it, scientifically investigate and discuss it, without regarding it as in the exercise of forces which produce these phenomena, without distinguishing between effects and their causes, between sensations and that which occasions them. Take from thought, these, its habitual forms of discrimination, and how instantly would all its subject-matter fall together, collapse into chaos, the waters above and below the firmament rushing again to each other's embrace, surging confusedly and wildly, with no lines or currents of forces, and, hence, with no distinctions by which the mind could grasp and understand the scene before it! We may define mind as "a series of phenomena in consciousness," but the moment we

discuss these phenomena, and combine them into a science, we shall do so by virtue of a permanent interior nexus between them all; we shall think of them as faculties and capacities, the power of something to act and to suffer action. Responsibility, merit, guilt, growth, retrogression, attention, recollection, will all instantly and necessarily cause to appear in our philosophy the idea of an agent whose conditions and acts these are. Forbid us this, and our philosophy flutters a little in a few faint definitions, and then either falls, or surreptitiously slips its wings from their confinement, and soars, forgetful with what it soars. So, too, we may in the frenzy of speculation arrive with Spencer at this definition of life: "A continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations," thus looking at what life does, not at what life is. But this definition will not prevent our speaking a little later of "the connection of cause and effect," our "ascribing results to a play of forces," our adding "to assert otherwise is to assert that there can be an effect without a cause, which is to deny the persistence of force." Science is indeed impossible without the practical recognition of the notion of cause and effect, involving, as it does, that of force. Put in its place that of a fixed sequence, and the calculations of mechanics would rest on a pure fiction; equally would those of natural philosophy be resolved into mere phantoms, shadows of the mind. Astronomy, hydraulics, optics, accoustics, would present no forces, and hence no opportunity for marking the laws of their action. The permanence and transmutations of the power expressed in heat, light, electricity, chemical, mechanical action, would become a delusion. All that would remain to science would be the statics of the world, to mark position in space and time, and external resemblances, while dynamics, — movements, events, and dependences, — as implying occult and denied causes, would be removed beyond its pale. There would be no opportunity to distinguish between conditions and causes, between accidental accompaniments of force and its true exponents. The only query would be the constancy of connections, and this,

not as indicating dependence, but as a mere statement of facts. It is impossible at once to conceive how utterly dissolved and lost thought would be by the practical acceptance of such an hypothesis. A shadow flits on the ground before us; we may not ascribe it to the flight of the bird in the air above. We suffer from a sudden fall; the connection is merely one of time. We send an invitation to our neighbor, and he responds to it; there is, however, no connection between the two events. The link is everywhere lost, and there is no more intrinsic relation in one line of events than another. Iron is not stronger than clay; the sensations which suggest the metal happen to be accompanied by those which suggest strength.

To proceed, then, in an investigation of the inductive sciences while denying the validity of the notion of cause and effect, is to substitute the tricks of a metaphysical juggler for open, sincere effort; is to affirm the value of results reached by faculties whose existence or truthfulness has been denied.

The nature, office, and limits of this important, regulative idea, of which all make use, though many deny its validity, we propose to discuss.

The nature of a cause is essentially that of force. Whenever we observe phenomena we inevitably regard them as effects; that is, as occasioned by something unseen, unheard, unfelt, back of them. Our idea is never exhausted by what is actually lodged in the organ of sense. This is the ground of a further and inevitable conclusion to something which has not itself appeared in sensation, but still beyond and out of the organ, has occasioned the feeling in it. These forces, these causes, are always present, yet always deeper, more central, than the phenomena under which they lie. Of these we never have a direct knowledge. We are immediately cognizant of effects, not of causes. A cause in order to be known must affect an organ, and this effect is not identical with the cause. The sensation is not the very object of perception, but that by which we reach an external cause

not in itself cognizable by sensation. Now, though the same thing is at once cause and effect, — an effect as related to what precedes it, a cause, as to what succeeds it — it does not thence follow that we know it as a cause. Suspend a series of ivory balls in contact, and midway in that series remove one, leaving a vacancy. Now let the outer one be dropped against its fellow; in its motion we see the effects of the force of gravitation, not the force itself. The power passing unobserved through several balls, reaches the one next the vacancy. This swings across it, and transfers the force into the last half of the series. The motion across the interval is an effect in reference to the force entering the ball, and a cause as transmitting that force to the next ball in the series. Now the transfer of force, that by which it is a cause, cannot be seen, while the motion, that by which it is an effect, is visible. Thus under all effects runs a stream of causes, as below the surface of the muddy water pours on the unseen volume of the river.

Some may claim a direct cognition of force in volition. We are conscious of volition, a mental act, but not of the force let slip thereby to play on the physical mechanism of nerves and muscles. The sensations occasioned by this force may appear in consciousness, and we be able distinctly to mark the series of effects which attend its progress, but the force itself, aside from these, its continuous results, we know not. We may observe the path of the electric current by the trail of light it leaves behind; but the very force is no more observed than when it steals along in darkness. Indeed, we cannot always tell whether the volition, however intense it may be, will be followed by the proposed movement. Some paralysis may have intervened, and our effort is a mere experiment, to see whether the hidden connection is restored. So, too, we are conscious of tense, strained muscles in resisting pressure, but not of the opposing force, otherwise than as drawing forth this exertion, and procuring the accompanying sensations. Indeed, volition, sensations, are the limits of our direct knowledge; these alone enter consciousness;

but these are not the force, but the traces and conditions of the force. A philosophy receiving the notion of cause and effect believes in a more hidden, central power connecting these, and rising into consciousness only indirectly, inferentially, through them. Simple sensation is not a thing to be understood without some force occasioning it, and pure force is not a thing to be known, felt, save as it gives rise to a sensation. A surface cannot exist without a body; but the surface hides the body which gives rise to it. Effects cannot exist without causes; but they conceal the causes they express. They are the film for the senses, for sight, touch, and taste, left behind, or rather thrown up and out, in the flow of the true dynamic powers of the world.

Herein we do not recognize the correctness of those who, with Sir William Hamilton, claim an immediate knowledge of matter. Indeed, few philosophers who have recognized intuitive ideas have put them to so little service, have so failed to develop their office, have been so frequently embarrassed by the want of them, or resorted to such poor subterfuges to escape them, as Hamilton. He would displace this fundamental idea of cause and effect by the weakness of the mind, its inability to conceive a beginning or an end, and hence its tendency always to place something before the first and after the last thing. This very inability is itself due to the presence of the notion under discussion, and here again the phenomena resulting from a power are made to discredit the power itself.

We pass the many points of controversy involved in what has been already said, hoping best to meet them by displacement, by constructing and presenting a philosophy strong in itself. The proof of the validity of the original intuitive character of this notion of cause and effect is that relied on for this whole class of ideas, and in this case especially clear, the instantaneous, universal, and inevitable way in which the mind always interjects the notion as a link between consecutive phenomena. No greater and more destructive change could take place in all language and thought, philo-

sophical and common, than this of reducing sequences to a mere connection of time. This hidden framework of force which the mind supplies, which it hides under and in matter, thoughts, events, is the universe as we conceive it. Without it, all is resolved into a wreath of smoke. Even by the criterion of truth proposed by Spencer, that the judgment which returns the most often is the one most to be believed, none can be stronger, more truthful, than this of causation. It accompanies and interprets every event of life, every theory of science, and gives even to fiction its coherence. If, then, a conclusion so constant and universal is yet without foundation, the mind in making this assertion destroys its power of judgment, since no judgment can be more firm or constant in the thoughts of men than the one denied. If I am not to seek for causes, I have cut the thread of the labyrinth of physical phenomena, and may as well go in one direction as another, and whithersoever I go, I can reach no conclusion so strong as the one my scepticism has just snapped asunder. But if this notion is reached at all, it must be reached directly, intuitively. This fact, those who ground knowledge on experience seem generally to acknowledge, by so framing their definitions of matter and mind as to escape its recognition.

Without dwelling longer on the source of the idea, we proceed to point out what it involves, and the office it performs. The notion of causation is briefly expressed in the proposition, that every effect must have a cause. Herein is contained the assertion, that the cause is exactly commensurate with the effect, for if not, some part of the effect is without a cause. The effect, that is, the entire effect, is also the precise equivalent of the cause; were it not, some portions of the force would have been lost, that is, ceased to exist, and that, too, without any phenomena. To assert that this part of the force ever existed would be a judgment without a reason, a conclusion without a premise, since we have no phenomena whatever on which to base our predication. The sameness of forces in their results, that each cause must

in each of several cases be followed by like results, that is, the general uniformity of nature, is also deducible from the above statement of causation. If the same cause is followed by different results in different cases, this change of effects would be without a cause, and the original idea therein violated. Diversity of results implies diversity of causes, and we do not anticipate change, therefore, except as we see reasons for change in a change of causes. The permanence of forces would also seem to be involved in this first axiom of the mind, since the entire force passes without gain or loss into the effect. How far the flow can be reversed, and under what circumstances the force expressed in the effect can return and be re-expressed in the cause, is a matter of experience, and not of *a priori* judgment; exactly as what the given effects of any cause shall be is learned by observation, and not by any intuitive knowledge of the force concerned. This is not directly cognized in its existence or in any of its transitions; it itself is always a matter of inference, and is only known through its effects. The initial starting-points of all things are invisible and intangible, reached by the mind, and not by the senses. The very first phenomena, those with which our senses begin, come to us as a result, a consequent and not an antecedent, an index of something deeper than themselves.

We now turn to the office of this regulative idea, and begin with its chief field, the external, physical world. It is by it that we arrive at matter. All the ingenuity of Hamilton fails to show that we know matter; indeed, the doctrine involves him in contradictions and inextricable confusion. The sensation does not go beyond itself, its own content, the effect on its own receptive surface. Nothing could be well more unintelligible and inconceivable than to suppose this, as has generally been felt. Nothing but a desire to establish the existence of matter in connection with a failure to recognize those ideas on which the proof rests, ever led to the assertion of a direct perception of matter as matter, a statement that is virtually taken back by other doctrines of those

who seem to hold it. A simple sensation is the merest starting-point of knowledge. It exists in very low, if not the lowest, forms of animal life. To transform these sensations into judgments is quite a different thing from experiencing them. A judgment must have two members, and both of them cannot be sensations. Two sensations cannot of themselves coalesce in a judgment. Judging is a deeper, more interior, more intellectual act than simple feeling, belonging to a clam as well as to man. Something must be affirmed of the sensations, some dependence or relation between them, and this something does not come from the sensations, but is brought to them from the mind. A single sensation gives an occasion to rational powers for judgment; first, that it itself is; second, that the person experiencing it is; third, that the object occasioning it is. In forming these propositions, the mind brings forward two regulative ideas, that of existence, and that of cause and effect. Without these notions the conclusions cannot be reached; with them they must be reached. The existence, then, of matter as an external cause of sensations, is a simple, direct, inevitable inference, which the mind makes in virtue of its own comprehending, rationalizing power. It thus ceases to move blindly, instinctively, under sensations as simple effects on itself, but takes up into the light of a reasoning mind the notion of things and of their relations.

The only difference, then, between sensations and perceptions is, that the last are crowded with judgments, while the first are naked phenomena. Nor ought it to surprise us that the first and simplest sensation instantly weds itself to an inference, when our later sensations, like those of sight, are full of instantaneous and unconscious judgments, by which the size, form, and position of surrounding objects are explained to us. If we can at once convert a plain surface, like that of an engraving, into all the innumerable and complex relations of a landscape, and yet not be aware of the process, much more may we enclose in the sense of touch, the simple judgment of an external cause, and still overlook

the mind's action therein. On this instant, inevitable inference we believe the proof of the existence of matter to rest, and to rest as securely as if the eye saw it, or the ear heard it, or the hand felt it. Sensation is but the testimony of a faculty, and this unequivocal, constant, reiterated assertion of the mind itself is nothing less.

One of the distinctions of the qualities of matter much insisted on, and made by Hamilton to assume new importance, is that between primary and secondary qualities. The first are those without which matter cannot exist; the second, its variable attributes. Hamilton also adds, as another distinction, that the first are objects of sensation, the second of perception. If we apply as above the notion of cause and effect, this second distinction at once disappears, since all attributes or forces of matter are objects of inference, that is, of perception. We believe, also, that there is no ground for the first distinction. The qualities usually given as primary, are extension and solidity. Now extension in the abstract does not belong to matter. If it is regarded at all as a quality of matter, it can only be so in some specific, ever-varying, concrete form. Extension as a quality of a rock before me is not the same as that which belongs to the fragment in my hand. Extension in the abstract is not a quality of anything; for an abstract quality, that it may be abstract, is distinguished from every special manifestation of it. The ball has a certain extension, and certainly no other extension as a quality can be affirmed of it. But this extension which belongs to it cannot, if we accept it as a quality, meet the criterion of primary qualities, that they are necessary to the very existence of matter. The ball might be larger or smaller and still retain its being. But we think that use of language bad and deceptive which speaks of extension as an attribute of matter. It is no more so than time. Why do we not enumerate duration as well as extension among primary qualities, since some portion of time, equally with some part of space, is a condition of the existence of anything? The relation which duration and

extension actually sustain to matter is that of conditions of its existence, not qualities. The qualities of matter, whatever in any given case they may be — and no one collection or bundle of them is necessary as opposed to any other collection or bundle, — require as the antecedent condition of their manifestation both space and time. The actual parts of these in any given case occupied are the extension and duration of the thing considered — relations incident to the manifestation of its qualities, but not the very qualities themselves, nor any portion of them. Eighty cubical inches are not an attribute of the book before me, but extension to that degree is a condition of the manifestation of its attributes, precisely as fifty or one hundred years duration, more or less, are also a condition. The regulative idea of space is disguised under the term "extension," and then referred as a quality to matter, whereas extension, a portion of space, cannot be understood without a prior notion of space, and this constitutes a general condition for all existence.

We will simply add in passing, to prevent confusion, that it has recently been asserted in an able Article in the North American Review that we cannot speak of a portion of space. This we suppose to be true, only as we unite another idea with that of space, namely, that of the infinite. We cannot with propriety talk of a part of infinite space, since a part implies a measured whole, and a whole contradicts the idea of the infinite. This fact, however, does not prevent our employing, with significance and propriety, the term "extension," meaning thereby an area of two or three dimensions in space. Contradiction and confusion creep into language only when such an area is spoken of as a part of space in such a way as to involve the inference of a limited whole.

Passing to the second primary quality of matter, solidity, we find it open to much the same kind of criticism. The solidity of steel and air are very different; there is a force of resistance, but a very diverse force, in each. The precise power of steel is the quality of steel, and this in kind is not requisite to the existence of matter, but only to that particu-

lar form of matter known as steel. The abstract quality known as solidity, and supposed to be ever necessary for matter, is in fact found in no one thing, but only some measure of force, some degree of resistance, not necessary to all things, but peculiar to the thing considered. Here, again, a regulative idea has been turned from its precise office, and been attributed to matter. The idea of a cause and of a force are the same. We know both and either only as the active agent of changes, of effects. But the notion of a resisting force is that of solidity. We attribute solidity to matter, only because it develops under pressure the power or force of resistance. We must remember that solidity as a primary quality of matter is an ambiguous word, that it is not opposed to fluidity, but to what may be called compressibility. A body when confined that it may be a body, must show some measure of incompressibility. The piston must not sink in the cylinder containing it without resistance. Now this force of resistance, some measure of which must belong to all matter, that it may show itself as matter, is an inference under the idea of causation, is supplied by the mind as the source or cause of those permanent phenomena which belong to matter. It is not, therefore, so much a quality of matter — one among the many effects produced by matter, and lodged as sensations in some of our various organs — as it is matter itself, inferred from the qualities we have observed. We give more prominence to this notion of resistance because it responds to our last and most scrutinizing search after the subtiler forms of matter. We may infer a force equally from sight, hearing, smell, taste, but these being intermittent phenomena, depending on the presence of certain conditions, do not serve as final tests of the presence of matter. The force of resistance, however, we should remember, is not a matter of sensation, nor frequently even directly inferable from sensation. Solidity, as opposed to perfect fluidity, we test at once by the muscular sense, but the gases offer no resistance till closely imprisoned, and then not to the hand, except through a sliding-plate or

piston-head. Their resistance, then, is most manifestly inferred through a series of phenomena in which sight and muscular effort take part, and many judgments are involved. It is plainly absurd, then, in this case to say with Hamilton, that primary qualities are directly known by sensation.

The true statement we deem to be this: that under the notion of cause and effect, the condition of matter is a force, and the conditions of a force are space and time. Dr. Hickok's definition of matter, that it is a space-filling force, arises under a rigorous and correct use of regulative ideas. As the notion of causation leads us to the idea of matter, it would seem alone capable of guiding us to a conception of its nature. All that we know of it in itself is, that it is the source of our sensations; and as these imply the action of force or forces upon us, that matter is the permanent centre or source of these forces. We are herein guided to a notion of matter which makes it active rather than passive, a perpetual exertion of power. As in the explanation of mental action, we have been misled by the analogies of matter, so in this instance our conception of physical existence has been unfavorably affected by our knowledge of mental states. In these, as far as the will and the mental, muscular action consequent thereon are concerned, there is a series of active and passive states. Repose, a relatively passive condition, seems to be that into which our activities are constantly lapsing, constantly returning. It is to this condition of rest, revealed in consciousness, that we are disposed to resemble the states of matter; and its mere existence therefore does not impress us with a sense of power. A steam-engine in full operation, strained to its utmost limit, the steam hissing with serpent tongue from every crevice, gives an impression of great forces, yet these forces were just as truly in the iron and the brass, just as active there before they were subjected to this strain as after. Matter presents the equilibrium of intense action; it is the interlock of tremendous powers, and a conception of causes, arrived at legitimately in sole and single view of the effects which express them, would lead us

to conceive matter as a permanent putting forth of unmeasurable power. We need force, great force, and nothing but force, to explain the phenomena of the external world, its gravitation, cohesion, chemical affinities, thermal effects. Whatever other conception we strive to form of matter, we must from it develop these forces, and find no use for anything beyond them. Hence the necessary, and no more than necessary, notion of matter, is that of force or forces in the constant creation of its phenomena.

We have dwelt on this idea of matter as developed by causation, because it has important bearings on philosophical problems. Martineau, one of the ablest of the intuitive school, suggests that matter in its primary qualities may be eternal, and that the wisdom and government of God are shown in its secondary qualities, and in its arrangements. We remember also, that from Plato down, the eternity of matter has often seemed an admissible concession. Under the notion of causation we believe it to be wholly and absolutely inadmissible, and that such a surrender would ultimately bring with it the entire independence and self-existence of the physical universe. How the primary qualities of matter, so-called, can exist without the secondary, is certainly a mystery; and if we accept what has been said above, that primary qualities merely mark the general conditions of every form of actual matter, that they should so exist we shall regard an impossibility. We must have concrete, actual matter or nothing, and whatever the form of this matter — solid, liquid, gaseous, or more elementary than anything yet known — it must still possess forces, and these must have their laws, and therein the seed-germ of the universe may be found independently of God. Matter can mean nothing without the qualities of matter, and these qualities are the expression of forces, and these forces, as now locked in the various kinds of matter, are able under their own laws to initiate a universe. If, therefore, matter itself does not require a God, what in the physical creation does require him? Must we be left to the establishment of special providences in order to prove the being of a God?

We need to rid the mind of two notions resting on analogies taken from our own action; that matter is passive, inert, able of itself to be and be forever, — something requiring no explanation; and that God needs something to work with, to work on, and that matter, therefore, is a necessary condition of his activity. If matter does involve an instant and constant expenditure of power, then, above all things, it demands an explanation and source — some being on whom the force can rest back, by whom it can be renewed. If matter in its qualities, forces, involves order, — measured, systematic, related action; if it holds inlocked a physical universe, then, does this thought, this wisdom, uttered in and through matter itself, springing from it centrally, rather than laid upon it outwardly, require explanation, and bear back the mind to a personal, intelligent being, the seat of this reason, the source of the wise way in which these forces are matched one against another, are bound one with another.

Equally also do we need to correct the second anthropomorphitic notion, that God requires something on which to work. This something must have forces, or it would be nothing, and these forces must have a law of action, steady existence, or it would be worse than nothing; and yet so existing and present to the creative hand, it could only be acted on externally, mechanically, as man builds a house of stone. If any new forces are to be added to this crude, original matter, the same power that could do this could have made them all. Thus we are forced to the conclusion, either that this universe whose life, whose laws are in itself, exists aside from God, — unless we except some external shaping which we nowhere find, and nowhere see to be necessary, — that it exists solely through and by God, his wisdom and power and providence interior to it. We cannot combine the two conceptions. The power by which he does a part enables him to do the whole, and compels us to assign the whole to him. A right conception of matter, resting on the notion of causation, we believe most necessary to the argument for the being of God.

There are also theories of life as well as cosmical theories whose fallacies are best seen in connection with causation.

We know causes only through effects; new effects, therefore, demand new, or at least modified causes, that is causes into which some new element enters. To ascribe new effects to old causes is unphilosophical, since such a reference leaves a portion of the phenomena unexplained, and just that portion which is of peculiar interest. The cohesive and crystalline, chemical and vital forces, are not identical, since their phenomena are not so, and there is no advance of knowledge in assigning the higher results to the lower cause, unless that new element or new condition of its action be pointed out, or at the least be fully admitted. Those generalizations which strive to pack and crowd phenomena into receptacles too small for them, to refer them to sources which hitherto and elsewhere exhibit no such results, retard rather than aid science. Doubtless chemical affinity has much to do with vital action, but it is not life, and cannot be made to cover its facts. At all events, till this is done, and chemical action is shown to be equivalent to vital action, a tacit denial of the latter in favor of the former is an ungrounded and delusive generalization. The newness in the effects demands, evinces, a like newness in the causes.

The theories of progressive development would signally fail of some of the purposes for which they are sought and used, if the notion of causation was held in rigid consistency. Spontaneous generation, so-called, if established, would either become a miracle, a case of present creation, or we should be forced to the less easy and natural conclusion, that certain elements of matter held in their original constitution a germ of life. If there appear in these sealed jars, from which all spores have been excluded, infusoria, this is an effect which must have a cause. It will not do by the term "spontaneous" to evade the task of assigning their cause. If there is here an uncaused event, the thread of science is cut, and may pull out through the whole fabric into which it has been so carefully woven by previous investigation. If, as the result

of research, we are at length to arrive at no cause, we might as well have started with no cause, and dismissed inquiry at the outset. We have climbed all the way by these rounds of causation, and now, if the ladder stops in mid-air, we are nowhere, and have our labor for our pains. Or, rather, as that on which we stand is no better than the thin air we grasp at, we ought to fall at once to the ground, and, bruised and confounded, deny the existence of science.

Which, then, of these two alternatives would science accept, if so-called spontaneous generation were established ; instant creation, or the putting forth of a new force, lodged and latent from the beginning in matter ? A new effect is here, and must have a new cause. We may refer it either to the immediate agency of God, or to his earlier agency ; but to this, sooner or later, it must be traced. Those who wish him at the farthest remove, may inject all his works bodily between us and himself. To those who love his presence, it is as optional, as philosophically open, to refer the phenomena to his present agency.

Thus also is it with the later steps of a development theory When a new effect is reached, this is to be explained, and must be explained, by immediate intervention, or by a final reference of the entire, completed results as potentially contained, to the very first of the series of causes. A change of external conditions cannot produce new forms of life, except as the plastic power, life, is such a cause in its first ordination and nature as to be able to concur with the appropriate circumstances in securing all those marvellous results about us. If this theory is thought the simpler and better — that every form of life was contained in the very first germ of life, perfectly enwrapped as in an adequate, an ample cause, a true cause, — very well. The marvel of God's workmanship is not made the less thereby. But do not let us think this, that we can cut away causes by small whittlings, and at length reach little or nothing as the source of all things. Possibly, we believe not, the organic universe admits of such compression that it can ultimately be squeezed into a cell-germ, but be-

yond this we cannot go. We cannot press it out of existence without destroying all our previous work. This germ must be, and must remain pregnant with the organic kingdoms, or the notion of causation is denied. We might as well strive to crowd matter by an hydraulic press into nonentity, as push causation out at the back door of the universe. If the thing pressed comes to nothing, the press itself must keep it company.

Nor can we any more destroy the plan of the universe, the idea of design in it, by the use of such phrases as "natural selection." We may adopt one or another explanation of the forces and order of the universe; these forces and that order are not annihilated by the theory, and must still be referred to adequate and appropriate causes. If we accept the cumbersome notion of progress — that each form of life varies at random, and that consequent varieties are saved and propagated according to their adaptations to the world, their intrinsic power of life under the circumstances, we have yet those chance varieties to account for, and also those circumstances which select the best. These are no more causeless than is the sieve which divides the chaff and the grain. The only difference between this and other theories lies in the directness of the processes involved, their probability and proof. The wisdom and causation are in the universe, and must be accounted for. One farmer fans his wheat in a mill, another may shake it in a pan, or pour it in water that the husks may rise, or drop it in the wind that they may be driven away; we may call the latter processes "natural selection" if we will, but they include design nevertheless. The more obviously would this be true, if the difference of weight, the water, and the wind were ordained by man.

These remote, secondary causes are subjected to a very heavy strain; cells, microscopic and indistinguishable, are made to develop, in a few months, forms of life most diverse and complicated — man in one direction, the fowl, the fish, or the quadruped in another. With what mighty energies are these mere specks of matter charged! What complicated

parts they are to unfold! What new forms of action to assume in different portions and stages of the process! A theory which finds, locked in this infinitessimal cell the whole man, his systems, organs, functions, nay more, perchance, a race, a nation, the inhabitants of a globe, that shall, in successive generations leap from this microcosm, carries to my mind great weight, yet does not, cannot, escape the necessity of complete, adequate causation. We would rather look on life as a subtile, invisible force, moulding the plastic material subject to it, but neither fully contained in or expressed by any or all of that material. It does not so well agree with our notion of causation that the acorn before us may produce a thousand bushels of acorns, each as complete, as powerful, as itself; that a thousand years from now its energies, its mechanical operations, expanded in vast forests, may be expressed in figures altogether beyond our apprehension. Think as we will about this, causation remains, and all effects are to be traced to their appropriate sources.

We now pass to the connection of causation with liberty. Liberty is approached long before it is reached. Causative force is communicated through a nervous system, though this is ultimately to be the instrument of volition. Simple, reflex action, by which a sensation reaches a nervous centre and returns as movement, is as strictly in the line of cause and effect as a telegraphic communication. Nor does the process seem to be modified in character when these ganglions, gathered into one and furnished with many and perfect senses, secure the connection by a conscious recognition of objects of desire. The rush of the animal towards its food is occasioned by subtiler causes, but as truly caused as when he is pushed from it again by a stronger brute. Impressions which pass into consciousness, but execute themselves without the mediation of true volition, are no more free than the involuntary start or closing of the eye in presence of instant danger. Choice arrests sensations in consciousness, cuts them from their appropriate effects, and then takes up their line of action, or substitutes for it another, or withholds its

instruments from all effort. There is in a choice an acting from within on the nervous centre and system, and therein a true origination of movement. The causal chain starts with volition, and is arrested in its backward stretch by it. Sensations, feelings, are occasions, not causes of choice.

If it shall be shown that each thought, resolve, effort, liberates by destruction of nervous tissue just as much force as is used by it, nevertheless, the power to liberate and direct force remains with the will. The manufacturer dips his wheel into the stream, and thus gets force, but he employs that force for what purpose he chooses. The will plays upon the forces subject to it, but in the ways and for the ends it pleases. There is here no measurement of causes by effects. The volition does not, even for that time, measure or express the power lodged in the will. This might have issued in other directions, or more strongly in this direction. The will is not a cause receiving so much power and transmitting as much, but an independent source of movement, measured by the effects neither in the kind or degree of its force.

One other relation of this regulative idea is to God. The argument for a first cause is the one chiefly relied on to prove the divine existence. We believe this proof sound in substance, though not in form. To reach the divine architect we need other regulative ideas than that of causation. By this we can merely travel up and down in the world, not transcend it. When we weary of this, when the mind puts to itself the comprehensive inquiry, whence this universe as a whole, the idea of liberty and of the infinite come forward to make answer. Causation finds arrest in liberty, and a final arrest in an infinite spiritual personality. This motion, brought to the universe itself, gives the same complete explanation that a single cause does to a single effect. It is this idea that is intended by the language, a first-cause, and therefore, in substance, the proof is sound. In form it is false, since a true first-cause cannot be developed out of the idea of causation, and close analysis, therefore, will reveal the fallacies and inadequacy of the argument. Causation is

the regulative idea of physical science, but cannot transcend the world, or float itself in the upper atmosphere of our spiritual life. Here liberty holds sway, and thence lets drop its edicts on the forces beneath.

The creation of God is as diversified as the rational faculties that are to find play therein. The short, close, interlocked steps of reasoning are provided for. The earth is given us on which we may walk; that rings, if we strike it not too thoughtfully, solid beneath our feet; whose paths we can trace and retrace at our pleasure; that imparts through our senses an impression of actuality and debility which it is difficult to attach to the unseen. Here that which is most fixed, slow, and creeping in our endowments is disciplined. Causation, issuing from exact, immediate premises into exact, immediate conclusions, becomes the field of faculties which with microscopic observation push a slow, laborious, yet triumphant, way through the world. But the power to walk does not preclude the power to fly. Intuition and faith have also their element. They can strike an atmosphere felt, yet unseen. Freer connections, conclusions less closely girded in the premises, a spiritual life of more liberal possibilities, are open to them, escaping the steady, successive foot-falls in the sequence of purely physical events. God forbid that in our admiration of the certainty and success of lower faculties we should overlook or despise higher ones, not less just, though more rapid and grand in their movements.

The physical universe is a third thing between us and God, not, indeed, closing the direct path to himself, but lying to one side, as a common field in which we and he work together. Fixed causation enables us to do this, to calculate effects and graduate causes. Without this medium, any permanent communion and partnership with God would seem impossible. The finite, fixed, definite, are the conditions of our labor, and God here furnishes them. Relax the law of causation, and confusion, irresolution, unreliability enter. Make it more severe and extended, and opportunity,

responsibility, virtue, are proportionately lost. Make the dependence of effects on causes fixed and permanent, and faith, prayer, perish. God gives us what we must do, and yet leaves us what we may ask. He sends us into his field, but closes not his ear to the exigencies that arise there, stern exigencies that must be met on both sides with causation and liberty, with work and prayer, with forethought and faith.

Those who humble themselves to the world, measure themselves by it, suffer its forces to run through them, and flood their nobler nature, do, indeed, lose the power to tread the spiritual path to God, lose the ideas requisite for a true apprehension of him; but these forgotten keys are not the less in their bosom, though matter shut them round like dungeon walls. With a little penetration they may reach a stream of forces subtiler than the effects they float; they may find these arrested, turned, impelled, by divine law; above all, they may experience that great need and yearning of their spirits for something stronger, higher, holier, than themselves, pushing them to the last interrogatory: Whence and why all this? But for one who uses the world as not abusing it, who is not smothered by it, who does not suffer its damps to extinguish the clear light within him, no nobler, more heroic discipline and growth can be conceived, than it affords. Rigor and clemency, discouragement and hope, defeat and victory, the natural and supernatural,—an upward way passing more and more into light and life, make it the fitting passage from sin to holiness, a seemly probation for one who is to win and establish a spiritual manhood, a manhood equally of faith as of action.

Wisdom is justified of her children.

ARTICLE VII.

HYMNS, THEIR AUTHORSHIP AND HISTORY.[1]

BY HAMILTON A. HILL, ESQ., BOSTON, MASS.

CHRISTIAN Psalmody has a threefold history. There is the connected record of sacred song from the apostolic age to our own time; there is the personal history of authors, with the circumstances in the midst of which they composed; and there is also the history of particular hymns subsequently to their introduction by the church into its public services, or by individual Christians into their private devotions.

A comprehensive history of hymns, according to our first distinction, would be a history of the Christian church. The purity and fervor of the primitive faith; the persecutions of the early centuries; the outward prosperity which followed the baptism of Constantine; the profound stillness of the Middle Ages; the great awakenings in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the revivals of the eighteenth; and the missionary spirit of later times, — all, in turn, have moulded or modified the expressions with which men have sought to praise the Lord, and it would be difficult to divest these "hymns of the ages" of the social conditions and the experiences which gave rise to them. This is the scope of

[1] I. The Voice of Christian Life in Song; or, Hymns and Hymn Writers of many Lands and Ages. From the London edition. New York: 1864.

II. Historical Sketches of Hymns. By J. Belcher. Philadelphia: 1859.

III. Hymn Writers and their Hymns. By the Rev. S. W. Christophers. London: 1866.

IV. The Book of Praise, from the best English Hymn Writers, selected and arranged by Roundell Palmer. From the London edition. Cambridge: 1864.

V. Dies Irae, in thirteen original versions. By Abraham Coles, M.D. With photographic illustrations. Third edition. New York: 1864.

VI. The Seven Great Hymns of the Mediaeval Church. Third edition. New York: 1866.

VII. The Sabbath Hymn Book; for the Service of Song in the House of the Lord. New York: 1860.

Mrs. Charles's interesting volume, "The Voice of Christian Life in Song," a work which, although less generally known than "The Chronicles of the Schönberg Cotta Family" and "The Diary of Kitty Trevelyan," by the same gifted author, is fully entitled to a place with them in the library of every Christian household. Mr. Christopher's recent publication is a gracefully written and familiar commentary upon hymn-writers and their hymns, containing, as the preface says, "chat about hymns, their birth and parentage, their circumstances, their character, and their influence." Our own purpose in the present Article is similar to this; and while incidentally referring to history and to biography, we desire mainly to allude to the causes which produced and to the occasions which suggested a few of the hymns in use among us; also to notice the associations which in the lapse of time have accumulated about them and enriched them.

The authorship of many of our most familiar hymns is involved in uncertainty.

"Jerusalem, my happy home,"

which has been made the foundation for so many beautiful compositions, is one of these. The version in most common use among us (No. 1231 in the Sabbath Hymn Book),[1] first appeared in 1801, but the writer is not known. A variation of the original appeared in a collection made by David Dickson, and published at Edinburgh in 1662. The original itself is contained in a manuscript volume in the British Museum, the date of which is supposed to be about 1616, and is probably of Queen Elizabeth's time. It is there described as "a song by F. B. P., to the tune Diana." For two hundred years or more this sweet singer has rested in that happy harbor of the saints for which he so ardently longed; his sorrows have long since had an end, and with ineffable joy he has listened to the silver sound of the flood of life, as it flows "quite through the streets" of the heav-

[1] All the numbers in this Article will refer to Hymns in the Sabbath Hymn Book.

enly Jerusalem. His aspiration, in the quaint language of the time, has, as we may believe, been abundantly fulfilled:

> "Ah, my sweet home, Hierusalem,
> Would God I were in thee;
> Would God my woes were at an end,
> Thy ioys that I might see!"

All this we have reason to believe; but who the man was whose initials we have before us, or what was his history, we shall never positively know, until we too shall have reached the beloved, the eternal city. Perhaps, as has been surmised, he was a prisoner in the Tower of London, for the word of God and for the testimony of Jesus Christ. It is pleasant to conjecture concerning him; but this is all that is permitted to us. Such a hymn is like a portrait which has come down to us from the past, without any record of the original. Some of the finest heads painted by Titian, as Mrs. Jameson tells us, remain to this hour unknown; but a careful study of them may convey many vivid impressions respecting the persons they represent, what they were, and what they may have accomplished or suffered. So in an anonymous hymn the temperament or experience of the writer may be depicted so clearly that we shall seem to know all about him; we may trace in its lines the saintly virtues, the heroic conflicts, the exultant hopes, of him whose heart first felt and whose lips first uttered it, and we shall find ourselves drawn out towards him as to a brother. And yet it is true, as a rule, that our pleasure in a hymn is enhanced by our acquaintance with its origin and history; as, in a gallery, we delight most to behold the faces of those whose names and deeds are familiar to us.

A comparison of the life of an author with his hymns will throw a new light upon his character, while it will add to the interest of what he has written. Let us refer, as an example, to Isaac Watts, whom Sir Roundell Palmer calls the father of modern hymnody, and who, as he justly adds, is the author of a greater number of good hymns than any

other writer in the English language. When we sing his plaintive and dirge-like psalm (146),

"Our God our help in ages past,"

or his tender, penitential, Christ-exalting hymn (316),

"When I survey the wondrous cross,"

it is pleasant to know something of the personal history of him who has struck the key-note for the worship of the sanctuary for all time. We like to think of the pious youth, quietly pursuing his studies in his father's house at Southampton, and composing each week a hymn to be sung on the succeeding Sabbath by the congregation with which he worshipped. His first hymn thus used (337),

"Behold the glories of the Lamb,"

still stands in his collection as the first hymn of the first book, and perhaps is hardly surpassed by any that follow it. Looking across to the Isle of Wight, he was led to meditate upon the "land of pure delight, where saints immortal reign." The river between was, to his poet's eye, the Jordan of death, but his cheerful faith was gladdened by the expanding view on the other side, and he wrote (1191),

"Sweet fields beyond the swelling flood
Stand dressed in living green."

We like to follow Watts to Stoke-Newington, where, in the midst of valuable public labors, he devoted himself to "the metrical imitation of David's Psalms into New Testament language," and to the composition of songs and catechisms for children; and we readily agree with what Dr. Johnson says in his life of this excellent man, "he never wrote but for a good purpose"; and again, "every one acquainted with the common principles of human action will look with veneration on the writer who is at one time combating Locke, and at another making a catechism for children in their fourth year."

It is interesting also to read what is told us of the habit of Charles Wesley in the composition of his hymns: "He

rode every day — clothed for winter, even in summer — a little horse gray with age. When he mounted, if a subject struck him, he proceeded to expand and put it in order. He would write a hymn thus given him on a card kept for the purpose, with his pencil, in short-hand. Not unfrequently he has come to the house in the City Road, and having left the pony in the garden, he would enter, crying out, 'Pen and ink! Pen and ink!' These being supplied, he wrote the hymn he had been composing. When this was done, he would look round on those present, and salute them with much kindness."

Particular incidents also are interesting. Sir Roundell Palmer, in a note in the Book of Praise, tells us that Kirke White's lines,

"Much in sorrow, oft in woe,"

were found after his death, written on the back of one of his mathematical papers. They were put into the form of a hymn by Dr. Collyer, and again by Miss Maitland, whose verses are considered the best (896):

"Oft in sorrow, oft in woe,"

is Miss Maitland's version, somewhat altered and abbreviated. An anecdote of the same poet, given in his biography, furnishes another glimpse of his character, so devotional, so chastened, so tender. Rowing with his companions on a summer evening upon the river Trent, he sang his own sweet verses, "The Hiding-place," making them doubly his by his melodious utterance of them; and as he sang on this occasion, he composed the lines which now stand at the close of the hymn:

"Then pure, immortal, sinless, freed,
We, through the Lamb, shall be decreed;
Shall meet the father face to face,
And need no more a hiding-place."

The more we examine the structure and significance of hymns, the more we shall be impressed with the deep personality of a very great number of them; and we shall find also that those have taken the strongest hold upon the heart

of the church which are the most decidedly personal, subjective, and experimental. Nor does an interest of this kind attach only to sacred poetry. It has been said of Byron, that he was "himself the beginning, the middle, and the end of all his poetry, the hero of every tale, the chief object in every landscape." And Southey remarks in his life of Cowper: "There are no passages in a poet's works which are more carped at while he lives, than those wherein he speaks of himself; and if he has any readers after his death, there are none then which are perused with greater interest." In hymns this reference to one's own conditions and feelings may be less obvious to the casual observer than in other poetry, but it will not the less be likely to manifest itself to those whose experiences or sympathies enable them to apprehend it.

John Newton's hymn,

"I asked the Lord that I might grow,
In faith and love and every grace,"

doubtless details a reality in his religious history. No one familiar with the circumstances of the early life of the same composer, will be at a loss to account for his writing the hymn (568),

"In evil long I took delight,"

the second verse of which is,

"I saw one hanging on a tree,
In agony and blood,
Who fixed his languid eyes on me,
As near the cross I stood."

Charles Wesley, we are told, never allowed a birthday to pass, without writing a cheerful hymn. His verses beginning (247),

"O for a thousand tongues to sing,"

were written on the anniversary of his conversion, his spiritual birthday. In his journal Wesley records the labors of a Sunday at Gwennaf in Cornwall, when, as he says, "nine or ten thousand by computation listened with all eagerness while I commended them to God and to the word of his grace. For near two hours I was enabled to preach repent-

ance towards God, and faith in Jesus Christ. I broke out again and again in prayer and exhortation. I believed not one word would return empty. Seventy years' sufferings were overpaid by one such opportunity." After this memorable occasion this faithful servant of the Lord poured out the thanksgiving of his heart in a jubilant hymn:

"All thanks be to God,
Who scatters abroad
Throughout every place,
By the least of his servants, his savor of grace;
Who, the victory gave,
The praise let him have,
For the work he hath done;
All honor and glory to Jesus alone."

Another favorite writer of hymns for the people, Joseph Hart, the author of (518)

"Come, ye sinners, poor and wretched,
Weak and wounded, sick and sore,"

gives us a view of some of the inner experiences which lead to the composition of devotional and penitential hymns. "The week before Easter 1757, I had such an amazing view of the agony of Christ in the garden as I know not how well to describe. I was lost in wonder and adoration, and the impression was too deep, I believe, ever to be obliterated. I shall say no more of this, but only remark that, notwithstanding all that is talked about the sufferings of Jesus, none can know anything of them but by the Holy Ghost; and I believe that he that knows most knows but very little. It was then I made the first part of my hymn on the Passion:

Come all ye chosen saints of God,
That long to feel the cleansing blood,
In pensive pleasures join with me,
To sing of sad Gethsemane."

In such instances as these we see that certain circumstances in the history of the author were indispensable to the production of the songs which he uttered. An outburst of joy, a wail of anguish, an offering of thanksgiving, a tribute of worship, — whatever the nature of the hymn, it had its

origin in some profound feeling of the soul which could not be repressed. "I believed, therefore have I spoken." It might be added, "I worshipped, therefore have I sung." Some Christians have composed but a single hymn, their hearts, like a rare flower, blossoming but once upon the earth; others have left their songs, like scattered fragrance, all along the path of their pilgrimage.

It need hardly be said that, from the very nature of the case, many of the hymns of the class to which we are now alluding could not have been prepared with a view to publicity, or for public use. When Mrs. Brown, a truly pious woman, who died in Illinois a few years ago, wrote with an infant lying upon her lap:

"I love to steal a while away
From children and from care,"

she did not imagine that her verses, with a very slight alteration to adapt them to general use (64), would become a favorite expression of Christian hearts at the devotions of the evening hour. When James Hervey, the scholarly author of "Meditations and Reflections," with his heart disappointed in its tenderest hopes, indited the hymn (242) commencing:

"Since all the varying scenes of time,"

he wrote with a view to his own consolation. But who shall say how many have been strengthenèd in the time of bereavement and adversity by his trustful words:

"Good when he gives, supremely good,
Nor less when he denies;
Ev'n crosses from his sovereign hand
Are blessings in disguise."

This leads us to notice also that our most useful and precious hymns have generally been produced in the midst of trials and difficulties. We should have anticipated, perhaps, that the cloisters of the Middle Ages, and other quiet retreats of pious souls, and the peaceful flow of a calm Christian experience would yield the richest utterances in holy song; but it is not so. "The battle songs of the church," says Mrs. Charles, "are written on the battle-field." For we must not

forget that the healthy condition of the church on earth is not one of rest. The eternal Sabbath-keeping is yet before us in the future. Under the present dispensation the church truly lives and is in health only as it is engaged in conflict with the various forms of evil by which it is surrounded, and the heart of the believer is never so attuned to sweetest harmony as when deeply in earnest in its struggles with indwelling sin or outward corruptions, or as when weighed down under the mysterious and afflictive allotments of divine Providence. Shelley says in one of his best lines:

"They learn by suffering what they teach in song."

"The dear cross hath pressed many songs out of me," said Rist. Of Paul Gerhard it is remarked, "one of his most beautiful hymns,

"Wake up my heart and sing,"

was composed on the steps of the altar at Lübben, after a night of anguish. Every line of it breathes the deepest trust and peace." How many of Mrs. Steele's excellent hymns remind us of the sick chamber to which she was confined for so long a period. She was one of those who are "chosen in the furnace of affliction; and her earnest yearnings for rest and for home took form in such verses as (1236),

"Far from these narrow scenes of night,"

and

"Thou lovely source of true delight."

So deeply experimental has that affecting hymn (966),

"Jesus, I my cross have taken,"

been seen to be, that in the uncertainty which for some time existed in reference to its authorship, it was quite generally supposed to have been composed for the use and support of the devoted missionary, Henry Martyn, and was attributed to Miss Grenfell, the lady to whom he was engaged to be married. It is now known to have been written by the Rev. Henry Francis Lyte, vicar of Brixham, in South Devon, the author of two delightful volumes, "Tales in Verse," and "Poems, chiefly religious." We should be quite sure before-

hand that he who could write the hymn of self-renunciation and of consecration to the Saviour just referred to, must have been called to many and bitter trials and disappointments; and on referring to the memoirs of Mr. Lyte we find that he was, although of good family, somewhat straitened in his circumstances in early life, that he had to struggle hard to obtain a liberal education, that, to use his own language, he was jostled from one curacy to another, and that when at length he was settled in the parish of Brixham, where indeed he was much beloved, he had a great deal to try him in his pastorate, and much to contend with in his own feeble and gradually failing health. Such poems as that now before us, and another, kindred to it, entitled "Submission," beginning:

> "Yet think not, O my soul, to keep
> Thy progress on to God,
> By any road less rough and steep
> Than that thy fathers trod,"

were not composed merely for the pleasure of composition, but they were the breathings of a spirit that must have utterance; the songs of such devoted saints of God are as natural and as necessary as their prayers upon their knees. Under such pressure the psalmist wrote, when he said: "Why art thou cast down, O my soul? and why art thou disquieted within me? Hope thou in God, for I shall yet praise him who is the health of my countenance and my God!" Or when he said: "Surely I have behaved and quieted myself as a child that is weaned of his mother; my soul is even as a weaned child. Let Israel hope in the Lord henceforth and forever."

Times of public calamity also suggest the strains with which holy men seek to guide the metrical prayers and praises of the Christian church. Luther's first hymn is said to have been called forth by the death of two martyrs of Christ, Augustine monks, burnt at Brussells, the earliest victims in the Flemish provinces for the reformed faith. The period of the thirty years' war greatly enriched German hymnology. Several of Charles Wesley's judgment hymns

were written at the close of the year 1755, just when the public mind in England was agitated by the news of the Lisbon earthquake. In this earthquake, and in the fire which swept the city directly afterwards, between thirty and forty thousand persons were supposed to have perished. It would be interesting to quote the details of that awful event, keeping in mind the suddenness of the shock, and the brevity of its duration,— only two or three minutes,— and then to turn to some of the startling verses in which the poet describes the final catastrophe, as, for example :

"Every island, sea, and mountain,
Heaven and earth, shall flee away;
All who hate him must, confounded,
Hear the trump proclaim the day:
Come to judgment,
Come to judgment, come away!"

or again,

"Stand th' omnipotent decree;
Jehovah's will be done!
Nature's end we wait to see,
And hear her final groan;
Let this earth dissolve, and blend
In death the wicked and the just;
Let those pond'rous orbs descend,
And grind us into dust."

Bernard and Tersteegen may perhaps be mentioned as exceptions to the rule which we have sought to illustrate, that a life of conflict and strife is the most favorable for the production of hymns which the church will delight to remember and to use; but we think on the contrary the history of their lives most pointedly confirms it. The former was indeed a monk, but his was no inactive career. He founded, and for nearly forty years, presided over, the Abbey at Clairvaux; he was occupied with many labors, both civil and ecclesiastical; and more than all, by the preaching of the second crusade, he aroused Europe from its lethargy, — intellectual, social, spiritual. He was the great reformer, we had almost said the revivalist, of the twelfth century. And Tersteegen, although he partly preferred retirement, and

adopted the quiet employment of a ribbon-maker, in order that he might pass his time in uninterrupted meditation, was not permitted to indulge himself in this respect. Two quotations will indicate the manner of life of him who wrote the favorite verses, beginning:

"Thou hidden love of God, whose height,
Whose depth unfathomed, no man knows."

He writes at one time: "There is still, God be thanked, a great awakening and stir among the people here; for some weeks together, from morning to night, they were compelled to wait one for another, to have an opportunity of speaking with me. Many were obliged to return five or six times before a quarter of an hour could be found to converse with me alone; and I have occasionally had ten, twenty, and even thirty, anxious souls with me at the same time." And again, several years later: "Last Sunday I had scarcely risen from my bed, when I was obliged to address more than sixty persons who had thronged into the house. After I had done speaking I had to converse with various individuals until evening. And yesterday morning, after I had passed the whole night in a fever, at least two hundred and fifty people assembled in the corn-loft and in the room adjoining, to whom I spoke, with the Lord's gracious assistance. I spoke to-day on the last words of the Lord Jesus, 'It is finished,' and comforted myself with the hope that my toils and troubles would also soon be finished."

Well did Adam of St. Victor sing in his hymn on the martyrdom of St. Lawrence:

"As the harp-strings only render
All their treasures of sweet sound,
All their music, glad or tender,
Firmly struck and tightly bound;

"So the hearts of Christians owe
Each its deepest, sweetest strain,
To the pressure firm of woe,
And the tension tight of pain.

"Spices crushed their pungence yield,
Trodden scents their sweets respire;

Would you have its strength revealed,
Cast the incense in the fire.

"Thus the crushed and broken frame
Oft doth sweetest graces yield;
And through suffering, toil, and shame,
From the martyr's keenest flame,
Heavenly incense is distilled."

A more particular reference to some hymns, interesting from their antiquity, their history, or their authorship, will serve further to illustrate what has already been said. Although not invariably following the order of time, it will be natural to speak first of the oldest hymn in our collections (1084):

"Shepherd of tender youth,
Guiding in love and truth
Through devious ways, —
Christ, our triumphant King,
We come thy name to sing,
And here our children bring
To shout thy praise."

It is found in Greek in the works of Clement of Alexandria, who flourished at the close of the second century. We find it difficult to realize the age of this ancient hymn. It dates from a period long before the unknown author sang his song of Jerusalem; long before the Dies Irae was composed; long before the Te Deum became a part of the service of the church. It takes us back to primitive days, and almost to the immediate successors of the apostles. The following verse, a literal translation, from the "Voice of Christian Life in Song," will convey an idea of its peculiar style and structure:

These babes
With tender lips
Nourished;
By the dew of the Spirit
Replenished;
Their artless praises,
Their true hymns,
O Christ, our king, —

Sacred rewards
Of the doctrine of life, —
We hymn together;
We hymn in simplicity,
The mighty child.
The chorus of peace,
The kindred of Christ,
The race of the temperate,
We will praise together the God of peace."

It is interesting to notice that the first outpouring of Christian souls in sacred song was in language which children may use in their worship of the Saviour. The Alexandrian Clement wrote with a heart full of sympathy for the lambs of the flock. Ephraim the Syrian, the next hymn-writer of whom we know, and who lived a century later, manifested the same interest in the young. And in this nineteenth century, the last hymn written by the sainted Montgomery before his promotion to the heavenly choirs, was for a Sunday-school celebration. Thus we see that although Sunday schools, as they now exist, are a modern agency in the church, the spirit which devised them and which sustains them is the same as that of the earliest days; then, as now, Christians manifested their attachment to the Redeemer by their care for those whom, when upon the earth, he ever regarded with most tender love.

Another ancient hymn deserving our notice, is (1203),

"The pangs of death are near,
Amid the joys of life;
And when in guilty fear
We end our dying strife,
To whom, most holy Lord,
Shall we for succor flee?
O thou most mighty God,
Our help is laid on thee!
Lord Jesus, by thy bloody stains,
Save, save us from hell's bitter pains."

Seven hundred years after the death of Clement, Notker, a Benedictine monk of St Gall, saw some workmen engaged in building the bridge of Martinsbruck at the peril of their

lives. The terrors of the spot and the exposure of the men suggested to the beholder, who is said to have lisped in his speech, but who certainly did not falter in his verses, this hymn, which is called "Media in vita." It was soon set to music, and was universally adopted, first as a battle song, and subsequently as a dirge. Luther's version is spirited and evangelical; in reading it as translated by Miss Winkworth, in the Lyra Germanica, we can almost see the fearful Alpine gorge, the frail overhanging scaffold, and the men with only a rope and a plank between them and eternity; and we experience a like shudder to that which came over the holy man more than nine hundred years ago:

"In the midst of life, behold
Death has girt us round:
Whom for help then shall we pray,
Where shall grace be found?

. . . . .

"In the midst of death, the jaws
Of hell against us gape:
Who from peril dire as this
Openeth us escape?"

His hymn, not in metrical form, is read in the burial-service of the Episcopal church, and will doubtless thus continue in use until the second coming of our Lord to fulfil the promise given ages ago: "I will ransom them from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death; O death, I will be thy plagues; O grave, I will be thy destruction." The celebrated Robert Hall once looked in the Bible to find the familiar words "In the midst of life we are in death," as the text for a sermon. "So venerable," remarks an eminent scholar, "does a Christian hymn become which has lived a thousand years."[1]

In this connection it will be appropriate to refer to Charles Wesley's sublime hymn,

[1] Mr. Christophers mentions this incident in connection with a versicle of the Te Deum. "All the earth doth worship thee, the Father Everlasting."

"Thou God of glorious majesty,
To thee, against myself, to thee,
A worm of earth, I cry;
An half-awakened child of man,
An heir of endless bliss or pain,
A sinner born to die."

In most of our books this first verse is omitted, and the hymn commences: "Lo, on a narrow neck of land" (495). It was written on the Land's End in Cornwall, which is literally a "narrow neck," stretching out into the Atlantic. Dr. Adam Clarke describes the locality in a letter written Oct. 11, 1819: "I write this on the last projecting point of rock of the Land's End, upwards of two hundred feet perpendicular above the sea, which is raging and roaring tremendously, threatening destruction to myself and the narrow point of rock on which I am sitting. On my right hand is the Bristol Channel, and before me the vast Atlantic Ocean. This is the place where Charles Wesley composed those fine lines,

'Lo, on a narrow neck of land
'Twixt two unbounded seas I stand,
Secure, insensible!
A point of time, a moment's space,
Removes me to that heavenly place,—
Or shuts me up in hell.'"

With the danger of our situation thus strikingly and solemnly set forth, who of us can hesitate to join fervently in the prayer,

"O God, mine inmost soul convert,
And deeply on my thoughtful heart
Eternal things impress;
Give me to feel their solemn weight,
And tremble on the brink of fate,
And wake to righteousness."

The psalmist very probably had some such dangerous steep in mind when he wrote: "Surely thou didst set them in slippery places; thou castedst them down into destruction. How are they brought into desolation as in a moment! They are utterly consumed with terrors."

We cannot pass unmentioned the "Dies Irae," the great mediaeval hymn, which has descended to us enriched with the associations of six centuries. Its reputed author is Thomas von Celano, a Franciscan monk. The first line, so startling and solemn, was suggested by the words of the prophet Zephaniah:[1] "That day is a day of wrath, a day of trouble and distress, a day of wasteness and desolation, a day of darkness and gloominess, a day of clouds and thick darkness."

It is justly observed by Dr. Coles, that "of the Latin hymns this is the best known, and the acknowledged masterpiece. There are others which possess much sweetness and beauty, but this stands unrivalled. It has superior beauties with none of their defects. For the most part they are more or less Romish; but this is Catholic, and not Romish at all. It is universal as humanity. It is the cry of the human soul. It bears indubitable marks of being a personal experience."

The translations of this hymn into German and English are almost numberless. It has also been translated into other languages, and recently into modern Greek, by an English missionary in the East. Excellent however as many of these translations are, it is declared by those capable of judging, that not one of them does justice to the original. In the Latin the rhyme is double, and the cadence particularly solemn and affecting. Boswell tells us that Dr. Johnson, who was fond of repeating this hymn, frequently burst into tears when he came to the following stanza:

"Quaerens me sedisti lassus,
Redemisti crucem passus,
Tantus labor non sit cassus!

Archbishop Trench, who has given us the closest of the English versions, translates these lines thus:

"Tired thou satest, seeking me,
Crucified to set me free;
Let such pain not fruitless be!"

[1] Zeph. i. 15, which in the Vulgate reads, "Dies irae, dies illa, dies tribulationis et angustiae," etc.

Sir Walter Scott has given us a paraphrase of the opening verse, in some lines of great power and solemnity, in the Lay of the Last Minstrel, which are frequently used in our churches (1283). They are introduced thus:

"The mass was sung, and prayers were said,
And solemn requiem for the dead;
And bells tolled out their mighty peal,
For the departed spirit's weal;
And ever in the office close
The hymn of intercession rose;
And far the echoing aisles prolong
The awful burden of the song.
Dies irae, Dies illa!
Solvet soeclum in favilla.

"While the pealing organ rung, —
Were it meet with sacred strain
To close my lay so light and vain, —
Thus the holy fathers sung:

"That day of wrath! that dreadful day
When heaven and earth shall pass away!
What power shall be the sinner's stay?
How shall he meet that dreadful day?

"When shrivelling like a parched scroll,
The flaming heavens together roll;
And louder yet, and still more dread,
Swells the high trump that wakes the dead!

"Oh, on that day, that wrathful day,
When man to judgment wakes from clay,
Be thou the trembling sinners stay,
When heaven and earth shall pass away!

Sir Walter, in his last days of life and reason, was frequently overheard quoting this hymn, with portions of the old Scotch Psalms and of the Scriptures. An earlier poet, the Earl of Roscommon, a serious-minded and accomplished man, uttered in the moment he expired (1684) with great energy, two lines of his own translation of the "Dies Irae," excelling all others, it has been said, in the fervor of its devotion, to be found in some of our books (1282),

"My God, my father, and my friend,
Do not forsake me in the end!"

Upon this impressive hymn, Mozart founded his celebrated Requiem, the last he ever composed.

Among the many noble hymns, for which we are indebted to the great Protestant Reformation on the continent of Europe, that known as the battle-song of Gustavus Adolphus, has perhaps the most interesting history (899):

> "Fear not, O little flock, the foe
> Who madly seeks your overthrow;
> Dread not his rage and power:
> What though your courage sometimes faints,
> This seeming triumph o'er God's saints
> Lasts but a little hour."

In the Lyra Germanica this is attributed to Altenberg, but its authorship is by some ascribed to the great Gustavus himself, who is said to have given it in substance to his chaplain, by whom it was moulded into verse. Every line is characteristic of the great warrior, whose piety was almost as remarkable as his military prowess. The grandson of Gustavus Vasa — the first Protestant prince who had worn the regal diadem, — he devoted himself, from the day he ascended the throne, to the cause of civil and religious liberty. Not only as a soldier and a statesman, but as a Christian, his ideas were far in advance of the age in which he lived; for in 1627 he proposed opening trade with the West Indies, partly for purposes of commercial enterprise, and partly for spreading the sacred truths of the gospel over those then uncultivated and unenlightened regions.

When meditating the invasion of the empire, he said: "If it is the will of the Supreme Being that Gustavus must die in the defence of his country, he pays the tribute with thankful acquiescence; it is a king's duty and religion to obey the great sovereign of kings without a murmur." This spirit of submission to and reliance upon the Most High he manifested throughout those memorable campaigns. His first thought upon landing in Germany, was to commit himself and his army in prayer to God. At Leipsic he gave the battle-cry "God with us"; the noblest ever adopted by a Christian hero.

This hymn, now before us, was his favorite battle-song; and the account which the historian gives of the last occasion upon which he used it belongs to the annals of sacred song.

On the morning of his last battle, November 6, 1632, when the armies of Gustavus and Wallenstein were drawn up, waiting until the morning mist dispersed, to commence the attack, the king commanded Luther's grand psalm, "God is a stronghold firm and sure," to be sung, and then, "Fear not, O little flock, the foe," accompanied by the drums and trumpets of the whole army. Immediately afterwards the mist broke, and the sunshine burst on the two armies. For a moment Gustavus Adolphus knelt beside his horse in face of his soldiers, and repeated his usual battle-prayer, "O Lord Jesus Christ, bless our arms and this day's battle, for the glory of thy holy name." Then passing along the lines, with a few brief words of encouragement, he gave the cry, "God with us"; the same with which he had conquered on the field of Leipsic. Thus began the day which laid him low amidst the thickest of the fight. After being wounded by the imperial cuirassiers, they asked him who he was; he replied boldly, "I am the king of Sweden, and seal with my blood the Protestant religion, and the liberties of Germany;" adding, likewise, "alas my poor queen!" His last words were, "My God, my God!" His body bore the marks of eight wounds, three received previously, the rest upon this fatal day.

This song, thus baptized in blood on the plains of Lutzen, has imparted strength to many a soldier of the cross during the two centuries that have succeeded. In our own land, within the last few years, its words have been altogether appropriate for the inspiration of our armies, and for the consolation of our citizens. We remember that on the evening of the Monday, in the summer of 1861, upon which the intelligence of the first battle of Bull Run was received, we were with friends in the country, where the latest news from town could not be obtained, and all were much depressed by the greatly exaggerated accounts of that reverse which at first prevailed. It was then that this old battle-song was

referred to, and if it had been written expressly for the emergency, its recital could not have proved more appropriate or consolatory. It was like a voice from heaven:

> "This seeming triumph o'er God's saints,
> Lasts but a little hour."

Let the national motto be, "God with us"; let our dependence be upon the Lord of hosts in these later stages, through which we are now passing, of the great conflict for nationality and for freedom, and "our complete and glorious victory cannot fail."

> "Amen. Lord Jesus, grant our prayer;
> Great Captain, now thine arm make bare;
> Thy church with strength defend!
> So shall all saints and martyrs raise
> A joyful chorus to thy praise,
> Through ages without end!"

At the opening of the eighteenth century Joseph Addison, then a young man, left his native land to enrich his mind by foreign travel. This journey gave rise to a composition sometimes published as an imitation of a part of the one hundred and seventh psalm (202):

> "How are thy servants blest, O Lord,
> How sure is their defence!"

His biographer informs us that in the month of December 1700, he embarked at Marseilles. Even at that season, the coast along which he sailed was rich with verdure, but he soon encountered one of the sudden and severe storms so common on the Mediterranean Sea. The captain gave up all for lost, and confessed himself to a monk who happened to be on board. Addison spent the solemn moments more profitably. The storm abated, and he reached Genoa in safety; but the impression made upon his mind by this peril, and by his providential deliverance was abiding, and is believed to have suggested some of the stanzas of the hymn referred to:

> "When by the dreadful tempest borne,
> High on the broken wave,

They know thou art not slow to hear,
Nor impotent to save.

"The storm is laid, the winds retire,
Obedient to thy will;
The sea that roars at thy command,
At thy command is still."

Passing through the Papal States, Addison went to Naples, and after a time came back to Rome, and there spent the hot and sickly months of August and September, when for the inhabitants even, much more for strangers, it is extremely hazardous to remain. His gratitude for his safety under this exposure is recorded in the verse:

"In foreign realms and lands remote,
Supported by thy care,
Through burning climes they pass unhurt,
And breathe in tainted air."

Montgomery calls this "the traveller's hymn." Dr. Kirk has told us that when travelling in Syria in 1857, in the sickly season, he and his companion frequently sang this beautiful psalm of confidence and praise; and many another traveller by land and by sea has found in these pious verses a condensed and appropriate expression of his own feelings, not to be surpassed by anything he could himself have framed.

Addison's sacred poems which appeared in the Saturday numbers of the Spectator with his religious meditations, are well known to us all, and several of them have a permanent place in our collections of hymns. Montgomery says of them: "It is only to be regretted that they are not more in number, and that the God of grace as well as the God of providence is not more distinctly recognized in them."

Macaulay has beautifully epitomized the life of this pure-minded man and elegant scholar, in the language of some of his own hymns; and as an illustration of what has already been said upon the individuality of hymns, we cannot forbear to quote the passage: "The piety of Addison was, in truth, of a singularly cheerful character. The feeling which pre-

dominates in all his devotional writings is gratitude. God was to him the all-wise and all-powerful friend who had watched over his cradle with more than maternal tenderness; who had listened to his cries before they could form themselves in prayer; who had preserved his youth from the snares of vice; who had made his cup run over with worldly blessings; who had doubled the value of those blessings by bestowing a thankful heart to enjoy them, and dear friends to partake them; who had rebuked the waves of the Ligurian Gulf, had purified the autumnal air of the Campagna, and had restrained the avalanches of Mount Cenis. Of the Psalms, his favorite was that which represents the ruler of all things under the endearing image of a shepherd, whose crook guides the flock safe through gloomy and desolate glens to meadows well watered and rich with herbage. On that goodness to which he ascribed all the happiness of his life he relied in the hour of death with the love which casteth out fear. He died on the 17th of June, 1719, having just entered on his forty-eighth year."

His message to his step-son, the gay young Earl of Warwick, is well known. "Come," said he, "and see how a Christian can die." It suggested the lines in the touching eulogy of Tickell:

> "He taught us how to live, and, oh, too high
> The price of knowledge, taught us how to die."

At the time when Addison was furnishing his hymns to the public, Dr. Watts contributed a paper to the Spectator, with a version of one of the psalms. It is No. 461, and bears date August 19th, 1712. We quote as follows: "Upon reading the hymns that you have published in some late papers, I had a mind to try yesterday whether I could write one. The one hundred and fourteenth psalm appears to me an admirable ode, and I began to turn it into our language. As I was describing the journey of Israel from Egypt, and added the divine presence among them, I perceived a beauty in this psalm which was entirely new to me, and which I was going to lose; and that is, that the poet

utterly conceals the presence of God in the beginning of it, and rather lets a possessive pronoun go without a substan, tive, than he will so much as mention anything of divinity there. 'Judah was his sanctuary and Israel his dominion,' or kingdom. The reason now seems evident, and this conduct necessary; for if God had appeared before, there could be no wonder why the mountains should leap and the sea retire; therefore, that this convulsion of nature may be brought in with due surprise, his name is not mentioned till afterward, and then with a very agreeable turn of thought God is introduced at once in all his majesty. This is what I have attempted to imitate in a translation without paraphrase, and to preserve what I could of the spirit of the sacred author:"

"When Israel, freed from Pharaoh's hand,
Left the proud tyrant and his land,
The tribes with cheerful homage own
Their king, and Judah was his throne.

"Across the deep their journey lay;
The deep divides to make them way;
The streams of Jordan saw, and fled
With backward current to their head.

"The mountains shook like frighted sheep,
Like lambs the little hillocks leap;
Not Sinai on her base could stand,
Conscious of sov'reign power at hand.

"What power could make the deep divide?
Make Jordan backward roll his tide?
Why did ye leap, ye little hills?
And whence the fright that Sinai feels?

Let every mountain, every flood
Retire, and know th' approaching God,
The king of Israel. See him here!
Tremble thou earth, adore and fear.

"He thunders, and all nature mourns;
The rock to standing pools he turns;
Flints spring with fountains at his word,
And fires and seas confess their Lord."

There are hymns which, in consequence of the benefits conferred by them upon some servant of the Lord whose name and experience are precious to the church, have in a sense become hallowed, like sanctuaries in which souls have been born again and fitted for the skies; Christian tears have watered them; Christian faith has triumphed in them; by their means lowly and contrite spirits have been raised to communion with their God. Superadded to the interest of their authorship and to their intrinsic value is this almost heavenly radiance with which religious biography has invested them. Every reader will recall some such. As an example we may mention (116, 344),

"The God of Abrah'm praise,"

written by Thomas Olivers, one of Wesley's co-laborers, a singularly gifted, although not an educated man. Montgomery says of it: "This noble ode, though the essay of an unlettered man, claims special honor. There is not in our language a lyric of more majestic style, more elevated thought, or more glorious imagery.

Mr. Christophers draws an interesting comparison between Byron's plaintive and melodious imitation of the one hundred and thirty-seventh psalm,

"We sat down and wept by the waters
Of Babel, and thought of the day,"

with the magnificent verses which Scott has put on the lips of his heroine Rebecca (1113),

"When Israel of the Lord beloved,
Out from the land of bondage came,"

and with the hymn by Olivers now before us, and he says: "The hymns of this remarkable trio are like a 'psalm of degrees.' They move in an upward gradation, raising the swell of Christian song until it rivals the music of Hebrew fathers. Under Byron's hand the distinctive form of beauty begins to breathe and unfold its tender charms. At Scott's touch it expands into more majestic proportions, and puts forth more of its inner life. But at Olivers's command it

manifests its maturity of soul, and gives full and harmonious expression to all its heavenliness of thought and affection. In the course of conversation a few years ago, the son of an old minister said: 'I remember my father telling me that he was once standing in the aisle of City Road Chapel, during a conference in Wesley's time, and Thomas Olivers, one of the preachers, came down to me, and said, Look at this; I have rendered it from the Hebrew, giving it as far as I could a Christian character, and I have called on Leoni the Jew, who has given me a synagogue melody to suit it; here is the tune, and it is to be called Leoni.'"

But we refer to this hymn particularly in this connection, because of its association with the cherished name of Henry Martyn. While that devoted follower of the Saviour was at Falmouth, awaiting the final departure of the fleet with which he was to leave England forever, he wrote in his journal, under date of July 29, 1805, as follows: "I was much engaged at intervals in learning the hymn,

'The God of Abrah'm praise';

"As often as I could use the language of it with any truth, my heart was a little at ease.

'The God of Abrah'm praise,
At whose supreme command,
From earth I rise, and seek the joys
At his right hand.
I all on earth forsake, —
Its wisdom, fame, and power, —
And him my only portion make,
My shield and tower.'

"There was something peculiarly solemn and affecting to me in this hymn, and particularly at this time. The truth of the sentiments I knew well enough. But alas, I felt that the state of mind expressed in it was above mine at the time; and I felt loth to forsake all on earth."

We think we may safely affirm that these admirable lines were never more appropriately adopted than by this holy man. Martyn was forsaking all on earth, brilliant academic

fame and position, usefulness and eminence in the English church, a cultivated home in the land to which his ardent soul so tenaciously clung, tender and appreciative friends, and one dearer than all besides. It was no ordinary sacrifice to which he was called. To any man it would have been most severe; to him it was crushing.

It is profitable for us, who think we sometimes deny ourselves and take up the cross, although as compared with the experience of Martyn, such self-denial is hardly worthy of the name, to recall a hymn whose pious sentiments and exalted strain imparted to him under such circumstances peace and consolation. "Solemn and affecting" to us is this hymn, because he thus made it his own.

Doubtless it was much in his mind during the voyage; for in his journal under date of September 28th, off Madeira, he writes: "O for the steady abiding under the shadow of the Almighty; and as the days pass on and bring me nearer to the end of the things which are seen, so let me be more and more quickened, to be ready for the unseen world.

'By faith I see the land
With peace and plenty blest, —
land of sacred liberty,
And endless rest.'"

We do not remember any other allusion to this hymn in his writings; but we doubt not that in far-off India and in Persia he repeated it with refreshment to his spirit; and it may be that when, in the solitudes of Asiatic Turkey, among strangers, and almost equally removed from beloved ones east and west, he felt the approach of death, he quoted with triumphant confidence:

"He by himself hath sworn;
I on his oath depend:
I shall, on eagle's wings upborne,
To heaven ascend.
I shall behold his face;
I shall his power adore;
And sing the wonders of his grace
Forevermore."

The illustration of our subject would not be complete without a special reference to Cowper — to the circumstances of his life, and to some of the hymns which in the providence of God these produced. Cowper at the age of thirty-two was overtaken by a morbid melancholy, which soon assumed the most alarming form, and at length developed into insanity. Although he had been correct in his outward life, and blameless in his intercourse with his fellow-men, he had not then experienced the renewing power of the Spirit of God; and his insanity, under the influence of strong religious convictions, took the form of blank and utter despair about the salvation of his soul. Having made repeated attempts at self-destruction, he was removed to St. Albans, to the house of Dr. Cotton, a pious and skilful physician. Five months he passed in continual expectation that the divine vengeance would instantly plunge him into the bottomless pit. But such horrors in madness are like those in dreams; the maniac and the dreamer seem to undergo what could not possibly be undergone by one awake or in his senses; and indeed he says that after five months of this expectation he became so familiar with despair as to entertain a sort of hardiness and indifference as to the event." Some lines written just before his removal to Dr. Cotton's asylum, give us an insight into his state of mind at that period:

> "Hatred and vengeance, my eternal portion,
> Scarce can endure delay of execution, —
> Wait with impatient readiness to seize my
> Soul in a moment.
>
> "Damned below Judas; more abhorred than he was,
> Who for a few pence sold his holy master;
> Twice-betrayed Jesus, me, the last delinquent,
> Deems the profanest.
>
> "Man disavows, and Deity disowns me,
> Hell might afford my miseries a shelter;
> Therefore hell keeps her ever hungry mouths all
> Bolted against me!"

Is it possible to conceive the condition of a man who firmly believed the awful truth thus depicted with such nervous

and desperate power? But now mark the change. After an interval his mental symptoms improved; a visit from his brother, who was a fellow of one of the colleges at Cambridge, and in whose conversion on his death-bed the poet was afterwards made instrumental, served to put to flight as he says a thousand deliriums and delusions which he still labored under. At about the same time he found, during one of his walks in the garden, a Bible which had been purposely placed in his way. "The Lord was pleased to reveal himself in his word, and to draw the poor, desponding soul to his own bosom of infinite love." Let us quote from Cowper's own account of these memorable experiences: "Immediately I received strength to believe, and the full beams of the Sun of Righteousness shone upon me. I saw the sufficiency of the atonement Christ had made, my pardon sealed in his blood, and all the fulness and completeness of his justification. Unless the almighty arm had been under me I think I should have died with gratitude and joy. My eyes filled with tears, and my voice choked with transport; I could only look up to heaven with silent fear, overwhelmed with love and wonder. I lost no opportunity of repairing to a throne of grace, but flew to it with an earnestness irresistible and never to be satisfied. Could I help it? Could I do otherwise than love and rejoice in my reconciled Father in Christ Jesus? The Lord had enlarged my heart, and I ran in the way of his commandments. For many succeeding weeks tears were ready to flow if I did but speak of the gospel, or mention the name of Jesus. To rejoice day and night was all my employment. Too happy to sleep much, I thought it was lost time that was spent in slumber. My physician, ever watchful and apprehensive for my welfare, was now alarmed, lest the sudden transition from despair to joy should terminate in a fatal frenzy. But the Lord was my strength and song, and was become my salvation. I said, 'I shall not die, but live, and declare the works of the Lord. He hath chastened me sore, but hath not given me over unto death. O give thanks unto the Lord, for his mercy endureth forever.' In a short

time Dr. Cotton became satisfied, and acquiesced in the soundness of my cure; and much sweet communion I had with him concerning the things of our salvation." In Cowper's poem on Hope, the well-known passage commencing,

"So when a felon whom his country's laws,"

beautifully portrays this precious and marvellous transformation. While still continuing at St. Albans, he wrote a hymn entitled "The happy change," and took for his text a sentence from the Book of Revelation, "Behold, I make all things new." As Southey says: "The contrast is indeed striking between what he calls this specimen of his first Christian thoughts, and that song of despair which cannot be perused without shuddering:"

"How blest thy creature is, O God,
When with a single eye
He views the lustre of thy word,
The day-spring from on high.

"Through all the storms that veil the skies
And frown on earthly things,
The sun of righteousnes he eyes,
With healing on his wings.

"Struck by that light, the human heart —
A barren soil no more —
Sends the sweet smell of grace abroad,
Where serpents lurked before.

"The soul, a dreary province once
Of Satan's dark domain,
Feels a new empire formed within,
And owns a heavenly reign.

"The glorious orb whose golden beams
The fruitful year control,
Since first obedient to thy word,
He started from the goal,

"Has cheered the nations with the joys
His orient rays impart;
But Jesus, 't is thy light alone
Can shine upon the heart."

Having resolved not to return to London, with its busy and exciting scenes, his friends arranged for him to reside

quietly at Huntingdon; and it was in view of his withdrawal from society and from his profession that he composed the sweet hymn, worthy, as has been said, of comparison with the best productions of Collins and Gray:

"Far from the world, O Lord, I flee,
From strife and tumult far;
From scenes where Satan wages still
His most successful war."

When with a remembrance of all the unspeakable agony through which Cowper passed during those dreadful months, and of that season of heavenly peace which ensued, we read his hymn, "There is a fountain filled with blood," it is apparent that every line and sentence were called forth by his own experience. He had said, "I shall not die, but live, and declare the works of the Lord"; and in these verses most sweetly has he done so. Not now with Judas Iscariot, but with the penitent thief, does he compare himself:

"The dying thief rejoiced to see
That fountain in his day;
And there have I, as vile as he,
Washed all my sins away."

In calm, heaven-given confidence thus he sang. Some compilers of hymns must have felt that either they or the people for whom they prepared their books, could not thus positively declare what the Lord had done for their souls; and they have therefore extracted all the assurance from this beautiful stanza, and have made it read,

"And there may I, though vile as he,
Wash all my sins away."

These counterfeit lines do not represent Cowper's feelings when he composed this hymn; he honored his Redeemer with an unqualified trust: in his own words, "he saw the sufficiency of the atonement Christ had made, his pardon sealed in his blood, and all the fulness and completeness of his justification." Perhaps it was necessary for the Christian poet to have drunk to the dregs the bitter cup of despair, in order that he might the more understandingly and triumphantly

sing of salvation by grace. Certainly there is no other hymn of the same kind, which has obtained such a hold upon the warmest affection of the church; and without question, it will continue to be used in the service of the sanctuary, at the domestic altar, and in the closet,

> "Till all the ransomed church of God
> Be saved, to sin no more."

From Huntingdon Cowper removed to Olney, where he lived upon the most intimate and confidential terms with the excellent John Newton. Here, that collection of hymns was projected, which has been and is so greatly esteemed by Christians of every name, and which, as Mr. Newton suggests in the preface, "stands as a monument to perpetuate the remembrance of an intimate and endeared friendship." But Cowper had not proceeded far in this work when his distressing malady came back upon him. "The clouds returned after the rain." His sun was clouded at noon, and although afterwards there were some gleams of light upon his horizon, the sky was never clear to him again; the gloom settled more and more densely around him, and he walked in darkness profound and awful, "darkness which might be felt," until the blessed morning of his final deliverance, when as we believe, he was admitted to that city which "the glory of God doth lighten, and the Lamb is the light thereof." We think the progress of his disorder may be traced in several of the Olney hymns; his last contribution to the collection, composed when despair was already seizing upon him, was that noble hymn which so wonderfully vindicates the ways of God to men:

> "God moves in a mysterious way
> His wonders to perform."

The precious consolations of this hymn were ineffectual to heal the stricken heart of the singer, or perhaps it were more correct to say, they failed to withstand the approach of the mental disease with which he was afflicted; but oh, how many sinking souls have been buoyed up by these verses,

when all the waves and the billows of the Almighty were surging around them.

> "The nightingale sings best
> When her soft and downy breast
> Is bleeding with the thorn."[1]

Thus was it with Cowper in the composition of this admirable hymn; and having uttered it, the Lord seems to have put his servant on trial, so that its testimony might be signally confirmed in the experience of its author.

During these tedious and mournful years Cowper's soul waited for the Lord more than they that watch for the morning. At one time he writes, "the dealings of God with me are to myself utterly unintelligible. I have never met, either in books or conversation, with an experience at all similar to mine. More than a twelvemonth has passed since I began to hope that having walked the whole breadth of the bottom of the Red Sea, I was beginning to climb the opposite shore, and I proposed to sing the song of Moses. But I have been disappointed." Yet disappointed and disheartened though he was, not one word of murmuring or complaint is to be found in his letters; never did he question the wisdom of the Most High, or doubt his infinite love; never did he cease to adore and worship him. An expression of his in a dream which he records (1793), probably exhibits the sincere feeling of his heart towards the Lord. "I love thee, even now," said he to the Saviour, whose absence he so bitterly deplored,

[1] Cowper, in a hymn already alluded to, compares his soul in its devotional retirement to this timid recluse, of whom Milton sings in Il Penseroso:

> "Sweet bird, that shun'st the voice of folly,
> Most musical, most melancholy."

He bore no resemblance to Wordsworth's "ethereal minstrel, pilgrim of the sky," the lark, to whom the poet says,

> "Leave to the nightingale her shady wood,
> A privacy of glorious light is thine."

His own beautiful verse is,

> "There, like a nightingale, she pours
> Her solitary lays;
> Nor asks a witness of her song,
> Nor thirsts for human praise."

"more than many who see thee daily." The same spirit of humility and resignation appears in the affecting lines:

> "He wounds, and hides the hand that gave the blow;
> He flies; he reappears, and wounds again.
> Was ever heart that loved thee treated so?
> Yet I adore thee, though it seem in vain."

Wonderful faith! Perhaps more like that of the Syro-Phoenician woman than any recorded in modern biography. Mr. Newton bears valuable testimony on this subject, in a letter dated May 26, 1774: "In the beginning of his disorder, when he was more capable of conversing than he was sometime afterwards, how often have I heard him adore and submit to the sovereignty of God, and declare, though in the most agonizing and inconceivable distress, he was so perfectly satisfied of the wisdom and rectitude of the Lord's appointments, that if he was sure of relieving himself only by stretching out his hand, he would not do it, unless he was equally sure it was agreeable to his will that he should do it. I hope I shall never have so striking a proof of the integrity of any other friend, because I hope I shall never see any other in so dreadful a state of trial."

While thus walking in spiritual darkness, Cowper achieved his reputation as a poet by the publication of The Task and other poems, but after the fatal year 1772 he wrote no more hymns except perhaps one or two for the use of the Sunday Schools in his neighborhood. His friend Mr. Bull requested him, in 1788, to resume his labors in this respect. Nothing could be more touching than his reply: "My dear friend," he says, "ask possibilities, and they shall be performed; but ask not for hymns from a man suffering by despair as I do. I could not sing the Lord's song were it to save my life, banished as I am, not to a strange land, but to a remoteness from his presence, in comparison with which the distance from east to west is no distance — is vicinity and cohesion. I dare not, either in prose or verse, allow myself to express a frame of mind which I am conscious does not belong to me."

But his tongue has long since been unloosed; the golden

harp of which he sang is in his hand; and "redeeming love" is again and forever his joyful theme. Doubtless the promise has been, at least in part, fulfilled to him, "What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter"; and from his abode of peace and glory he seems to say to the doubting, struggling, weary ones of earth,

"Judge not the Lord by feeble sense,
But trust him for his grace:
Behind a frowning Providence
He hides a smiling face.

"His purposes will ripen fast,
Unfolding every hour;
The bud may have a bitter taste,
But sweet will be the flower.

"Blind unbelief is sure to err,
And scan his work in vain;
God is his own interpreter,
And he will make it plain."

We think there is an instance in the history of hymns and their authors, even more melancholy than that of Cowper. When one who has sung so joyfully of the fountain drawn from the veins of Immanuel loses all sense of the divine forgiveness and favor, and becomes possessed with the conviction that there can be no mercy for him, it is indeed sad. But although this was Cowper's experience, we are assured that the resignation and patience with which he endured honored the name of his Redeemer, whom not seeing, he loved;[1] and that by means of these sufferings the poet was made perfect for eternity. We feel differently, however, respecting the case of one who after composing some of the sweetest songs of praise to Christ, and after spending many years in the ministry of reconciliation, was tempted to deny the Lord who bought him, and by the preaching of another

[1] His own words are:

"My Saviour, whom absent I love,
Whom not having seen I adore;
Whose name is exalted above
All glory, dominion, and power."

gospel which yet was not another, to put him to an open shame. This was the course of Robert Robinson of Cambridge, England, who wrote "Come thou fount of heavenly blessing," "Mighty God, while angels bless thee," "Brightness of the Father's glory." Nothing can surpass the evangelical excellence of these hymns; but alas, their author renounced his faith, and by his later teachings sought to diminish the influence of the cross of Christ. What a fall was this for one who had put upon paper such sublime verses as the following:

"From the highest throne of glory
To the cross of deepest woe,
All to ransom guilty captives,—
Flow my praise, forever flow.

"Re-ascend, immortal Saviour,
Leave thy footstool, take thy throne;
Thence return and reign forever,
Be the kingdom all thine own."

Of course a man so changed could not be happy. His new views would not be likely to make him better satisfied with himself, with his fellow-men, or with the government of God. A circumstance narrated by Dr. Belcher, gives affecting confirmation of this. "In the latter part of his life, when Mr. Robinson seemed to have lost much of his devotional feeling, he was travelling in a stage coach with a lady who soon perceived that he was well acquainted with religion. She had just before been reading the hymn, "Come thou fount of every blessing," and asked his opinion of it, as she might properly do, since neither of them knew who the other was. He waived the subject, and turned her attention to some other topic; but after a short period she contrived to return to it, and described the benefit she had often derived from the hymn, and her strong admiration of its sentiments. She observed that the gentleman was strongly agitated, but as he was not dressed in clerical garb, did not suspect the cause. At length, entirely overcome by the power of his feelings, he burst into tears, and said: "Madam, I am

the poor, unhappy man who composed that hymn many years ago; and I would give a thousand worlds, if I had them, to enjoy the feelings I then had."

It would be interesting if our limits permitted, to notice the influence of one hymn-writer upon another, and especially to trace the connection between some of the ancient hymns of the church, and those of modern date.[1] There is for instance an evident relation between Bernard's hymn (687), "Jesus, the very thought of thee," and Doddridge's (432) "Jesus, I love thy charming name," and again, Newton's (441), "How sweet the name of Jesus sounds." It will repay one for the trouble to read the three together, and it will be seen that while each is a distinct and independent composition, the later productions were in all probability suggested by the former.

On the other hand it is striking to observe the contrast between the Emperor Adrian's celebrated Apostrophe, which gives the impressions of an intelligent heathen in the prospect of death, and the odes of Pope and Toplady, both of which are entitled "The dying Christian's Address to his Soul." (Doddridge's beautiful hymn bearing the same title, is in a different vein.) The darkness of the emperor's doubts is not enlivened by one ray of hope:

"Ah, fleeting spirit, wandering fire,
That long hast warmed my tender breast,
Must thou no more this frame inspire,
No more a pleasing, cheerful guest?

"Whither, ah whither art thou flying?
To what dark, undiscovered shore?

[1] Many parallels may be traced also between hymns and the secular poetry in our standard literature. It was only recently that we were struck with the similarity between a portion of Addison's composition,

"The spacious firmament on high,"

and the following lines in the "Merchant of Venice":

"Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with features of bright gold.
There's not the smallest orb which thou behold'st,
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubims."

Thou seem'st all trembling, shivering, dying,
And wit and humor are no more!"

This is Pope's translation; and he must have had it in mind when he composed the following (1189), to which it is a relief to turn:

"Vital spark of heavenly flame,
Quit, oh quit this mortal frame!
Trembling, hoping, lingering, flying,
Oh the pain — the bliss — of dying!
Cease, fond nature, cease thy strife,
And let me languish into life.

"Hark! they whisper; angels say,
Sister spirit, come away.
What is this absorbs me quite,
Steals my senses, shuts my sight,
Drowns my spirits, draws my breath?
Tell me, my soul, can this be death?

"The world recedes, it disappears;
Heaven opens on my eyes; my ears
With sounds seraphic ring:
Lend, lend your wings! I mount! I fly!
O grave, where is thy victory?
O death, where is thy sting?

Still more evangelical and full of triumphant faith and holy assurance is the ode by Toplady:

"Deathless principle, arise;
Soar thou native of the skies;
Pearl of price, by Jesus bought,
To his glorious likeness wrought,
Go to shine before his throne,
Deck his mediatorial crown;
Go, his triumph to adorn;
Born of God — to God return.

"Lo, he beckons from on high,
Fearless to his presence fly;
Thine the merit of his blood,
Thine the righteousness of God.
Angels, joyful to attend,
Hovering round thy pillow bend;
Wait to catch the signal given,
And escort thee quick to heaven.

. . . . . .

"Mount their transports to improve,
Join the longing choir above,
Swiftly to their wish be given,
Kindle higher joy in heaven."

It remains for us to refer briefly to the comfort and support afforded to believers by the use of hymns in the hour of death. There are cases upon record in which the reading of a hymn has been blessed to the hopeful conversion of a sinner in his last hours; and the instances are almost numberless in which Christians have recalled hymns dear to them in time of health, to confirm their own faith, and to express to those around them their triumphant joys and hopes in the immediate prospect of dissolution. Martyrs have sung in the dreadful hour of their sufferings. Thus we read that Jerome of Prague, on his way to the place of execution, sang several hymns. When the flames began to envelop him, he sang again, and the last words he was heard to articulate were "This soul in flames I offer, Christ, to thee." And others to whom death has come with less of outward terror, have derived consolation, next to the words of holy scripture, from favorite and well-remembered hymns. Dr. Doddridge, himself one of the sweet singers of Israel, in his last sickness at Lisbon, when separated from all his relatives and Christian friends excepting only his faithful wife, was much comforted by a volume of Watts's hymns which he found in the house where he was staying. At the urgent solicitation of Dr. Watts he had written the "Rise and Progress"; to him he had dedicated it when it was published; and now that, far from home and in a foreign land, he was anticipating and preparing for his release from earth, the holy compositions of this venerated friend, who had died two years previously, must have seemed to him like the strains of ministering angels who had been commissioned to convey him to his heavenly rest.

In the memoir of Dr. Payson, it is related that not long before his death some of the choir of his congregation came

for the purpose of singing for his gratification some of the songs of Zion. He selected the one commencing,

"Rise my soul and stretch thy wings,"

part of the hymn,

"I'll praise my Maker with my breath,"

and Doddridge's hymn entitled "The Dying Christian's Address to his Soul," beginning,

"Ye golden lamps of heaven, farewell."[1]

It is profitable to know what were the chosen hymns of so eminent a saint on his deathbed.

The favorite hymns of Dr. Nettleton in his last days were

"Begone, unbelief, my Saviour is near,"

by Newton, to be found in the Village Hymn Book, and

"Come let us join our friends above," (869)

by Charles Wesley. An interesting anecdote is given by Dr. Belcher, in reference to the latter of these. Some years after Charles Wesley's death, and not long before his own decease, the Rev. John Wesley being in London, officiated on a certain occasion in his own chapel in the City Road. After the morning prayers had been read he ascended the pulpit, but instead of immediately announcing the hymn to be sung, to the great surprise of the congregation, he stood silent, with his eyes closed for, it is said, at least ten minutes, wrapt in intense thought. Recovering himself, and with a feeling

[1] When Goldsmith gave utterance to the lines,

"And oft I wish amid the scene to find
Some spot to real happiness consigned,
Where my worn soul, each wandering hope at rest,
May gather bliss to see my fellows blest,"

he probably did not know of the existence of the hymn referred to in the text, the last verse of which pointed to precisely such a paradise as that for which in his better moods he yearned, although lying far beyond the limits which his Traveller, "remote, unfriended, melancholy, slow," had sought to penetrate:

"There all the millions of his saints
Shall in one song unite,
And each the bliss of all shall view
With infinite delight."

which at once told where his spirit had been communing, he solemnly read the hymn,

"Come, let us join our friends above,
Who have obtained the prize,
And on the eagle wings of love,
To joy celestial rise."

We can easily imagine the effect this scene produced on the minds of those present who had known both the brothers.

Coincidences sometimes occur in the use of hymns, which are deserving of notice. On a Sabbath evening not many years since, a young wife transcribed the following verses from one of Bonar's hymns:

"Not first the bright, and after that the dark;
But first the dark, and after that the bright:
First the thick cloud, and then the rainbow's arc;
First the dark grave, then resurrection light.

"'Tis first the night, stern night of storm and war,
Long night of heavy clouds and veiled skies;
Then the fair sparkle of the Morning Star,
That bids the saint awake and day arise."

It was the last time she ever put pen to paper. On the following Sabbath her spirit ascended to its Saviour, leaving the body to slumber in hope until the dawn of the resurrection day. She had become a mother. The verses seemed suitable to her circumstances when she copied them, but she did not know how full of significance they would prove to be as her last written words. The copy, precious to surviving friends, was found after her death in her portfolio.

The hymn (1181)

"When from my sight all fades away,"

written by Paul Eber, a friend of Melanchthon, has long been a favorite with the dying. It is to be found unabridged in the Lyra Germanica, and commences,

"Lord Jesus Christ, true man and God."

Grotius requested that it might be repeated to him in his last moments, and died before its close. How pleasant to think of

these or other stanzas, as the ascending steps by which departing saints have gone up to the presence chamber of their King.

The late civil war in our country, furnished some incidents which illustrate this part of our subject. "A friend who visited the battle-field the day after the battle at Fort Donelson, found a little drummer-boy who was dying. His arm had been carried away by a cannon-ball, and he was singing:

"Nearer my God to thee,
Nearer to thee."

"Perhaps the vision of a loved Sabbath school class or a happy home circle, in which this beautiful hymn had been learned, floated before the dying eyes of this little drummer-boy. His prayer is answered, 'Nearer to thee.'"

One of the agents of the American Tract Society, who visited the vicinity of Pittsburg Landing immediately after the terrible battle there, relates the following: "I found among the wounded a personal friend (a Baptist minister), who was a lieutenant, and who also officiated as chaplain. When the alarm was given on the Sabbath morning, he was performing funeral rites over the remains of one of his men, and some of those present afterwards declared that they never heard a man pray as he prayed upon that occasion. He was severely wounded early in the conflict, and as the rebels temporarily advanced, he lay within their lines for more than twenty-four hours, with his wounds undressed, and unable to procure a drop of water. During a portion of this time, the balls and shells were falling all around him; yet in the midst of the awful strife, and notwithstanding his sufferings, he told me that he there enjoyed some of the sweetest experiences of his life. He several times found himself unconsciously singing,

"When I can read my title clear
To mansions in the skies,
I'll bid farewell to every fear,
And wipe my weeping eyes."

A day or two afterwards he safely reached his home.

Christian poets have not unfrequently derived comfort in their last days and hours from their own verses. We have already alluded to the Earl of Roscommon, who died while repeating his version of the Dies Irae. George Herbert on the Sunday before he died, rose suddenly from his bed or couch, called for one of his instruments, took it into his hands, and said:

"My God, my God,
My music shall find thee,
And every string
Shall have his attribute to sing."

And having tuned it, he played and sang from his exquisite verses on "Sunday":

"The Sundays of man's life,
Threaded together on time's string,
Make bracelets to adorn the wife
Of the eternal, glorious king.
On Sunday heaven's gate stands ope,
Blessings are plentiful and rife,
More plentiful than hope."

"Thus," says good old Izaak Walton, "he sang on earth such hymns and anthems as the angels, and he and Mr. Farrer" (a friend who procured the publication of his sacred poems), "now sing in heaven."

We cannot forbear allusion to the death of Toplady, whose many admirable hymns enrich all our collections. "Oh," said he, one day not long before his death, "I enjoy heaven already in my soul; to me sickness is no affliction, pain no curse, death itself is no dissolution; if there were not some abatement of these ecstatic joys, I could not endure the weight." At another time he exclaimed, "Oh the delights of the third heaven; my prayers are all converted into praise." On making his usual visit one morning, the physician found Mr. Toplady apparently much improved in health; the aspect of his case was much more encouraging. Turning to his patient he ventured to express a hope that his life might yet be prolonged. Mr. Toplady, raising his eyes flowing with rapture, while tears streamed down his cheeks.

exclaimed, "No, no; I shall die; for no mortal could endure such manifestations of God's glory as I have, and live." His prediction was verified; he expired the next day singing one of his own hymns:

> "Deathless principle, arise,
> Soar, thou native of the skies."

"His voice faltered, his eyes closed, and scarcely had the notes died away upon his lips e'er he took up the strain again in the immediate presence of that Saviour whom he loved with an ardor so intense, and served with a zeal so untiring." "Thus died at the early age of thirty-eight one of the brightest ornaments that ever adorned the English church." It has been said, "the religious experience of Mr. Toplady may be compared to a sky without a cloud, and if taken from the commencement to its triumphant close, stands perhaps alone in the annals of Christian biography."

This is the record of him who taught us to sing,

> "Rock of ages cleft for me,
> Let me hide myself in thee."

A hymn so utterly self-distrustful and so complete in its sole reliance upon the sufferings and death of Christ, could not have been composed, except under the very shadow of the cross. Had Toplady left no other legacy to the church, this single hymn would have been sufficient to endear him to us through all time; yes, and through eternity. It is pleasant to know that the late illustrious and excellent Prince Consort of England repeated this hymn constantly upon his death-bed; "For," said he, "if in this hour I had only my worldly honors and dignities to depend upon, I should be indeed poor."[1]

We will close with an account given by Mr. Christophers of the circumstances amid which Henry Francis Lyte, already referred to in these pages, composed his last hymn. The health of this faithful minister of the gospel had long been

[1] The original prefix of this hymn given by Mr. Toplady was "A Living and Dying Prayer for the Holiest Believer in the World," and was intended to be a protest against what the author supposed to be the Wesleyan view of Christian

failing, and he had been obliged to spend the winter in Italy during several succeeding years. In 1847, as the autumn advanced, he once more made his preparations for leaving England, but he had now become so greatly reduced in strength that it seemed doubtful whether he would be able to undertake the journey. He did go, however, but he never returned. Before leaving, he wished once more to preach to his people. His family feared what the result of such an effort might be, but he gently insisted, and was able to go through with the service. He knew that he was officiating for the last time, and his sermon was full of solemn and tender appeals to those whom he had guided and instructed for many years. He administered the communion also, and then retired exhausted in body, but with his soul sweetly resting on that Saviour whom he had preached with his dying breath. As the evening drew on, he handed to a member of his family the following verses, with his own music adapted to them :

"Abide with me ! fast falls the eventide,
The darkness deepens ; Lord, with me abide !
When other helpers fail and comforts flee,
Help of the helpless, oh abide with me !

"Swift to its close ebbs out life's little day,
Earth's joys grow dim, its glories pass away ;
Change and decay in all around I see, —
Oh thou who changest not, abide with me !

"Not a brief glance I beg, a passing word,
But as thou dwell'st with thy disciples, Lord,
Familiar, condescending, patient, free,
Come, not to sojourn, but abide with me !

perfection. Mr. Gladstone, the English scholar and statesman, has rendered the hymn into Latin verse. We give the first stanza :

"Jesus, pro me perforatus,
Caudar intra tuum latus,
Tu per lympham profluentem,
Tu per sanguinem tepentem,
In peccata mi redunda,
Tolle culpam, sordes munda."

"Thou on my head in early youth didst smile,
And though rebellious and perverse meanwhile,
Thou hast not left me, oft as I left thee;
On to the close, O Lord, abide with me!

"I need thy presence every passing hour,
What but thy grace can foil the tempter's power?
Who like thyself my guide and stay can be?
Through cloud and sunshine, oh abide with me!

"I fear no foe with thee at hand to bless,
Ills have no weight, and tears no bitterness.
Where is death's sting? Where, grave, thy victory?
I triumph still, if thou abide with me.

"Hold then thy cross before my closing eyes,
Shine through the gloom and point me to the skies;
Heaven's morning breaks, and earth's vain shadows flee,—
In life and death, O Lord, abide with me."

This was his last hymn on earth. He reached Nice, and shortly after his spirit entered into rest. He pointed upward as he passed away, and whispered, "Peace, joy!" Thus he went to abide forever with him, who has declared it to be his divine will that his followers be with him where he is, that they may behold his glory.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE RELATIONS OF GEOLOGY TO THEOLOGY.

BY PROF. C. H. HITCHCOCK, NEW YORK CITY.

THE object of the following pages is to present the relations of Geology to the several doctrines of Theology in their natural order. It is not necessary now to apologize for attempting to illustrate revelation by science. Thanks to honored names that battle has been fought, and the natural sciences are now copiously employed for the defence and illustration of religious truth. Few of the sciences afford better illustrations of biblical statement than geology. Its

principles, though recently established, have modified the common interpretation of several passages, and may elucidate them still further in the future. We do not need to come secretly into the cabinet, and stealthily inquire what nature means. The God of nature is the God of grace also; and therefore we may come boldly into the presence of either after converse with the other, for the foundation principles of both governments are the same. We may, therefore, reason from one mode of the divine administration to the other; we may derive stable conclusions from a major scientific and a minor moral premise, and the reverse. We may proceed from cause to effect, rather than reason from the effects to the causes, if thereby we shall acquire more knowledge. So important are the inferences, that we are glad to appeal to induction or deduction, philology, history, ethnology, geology, astronomy, and all the natural sciences. Nor must it be forgotten that light may be given by the Divine Spirit, for we believe that if "any man will do his will he shall know of the doctrine," whether it be religious or scientific. The true philosopher is conscious of the peril of trusting to his own wisdom, and seeks aid from above. May the spirit that inspired the evangelists permeate these inquiries with the leaven of truth! We shall attempt to establish the following proposition in detail: The facts and principles of geology prove, illustrate, and elucidate many of the doctrines of natural and biblical theology.

I. Geology furnishes peculiar arguments for the existence of God. The arguments most relied upon to prove the existence of God are of the *a posteriori* type, and are briefly these: 1. The existence of matter and finite mind proves a *Creator;* 2. The continuance of matter and finite mind proves a *Preserver;* 3. The movements of matter and the action of finite mind prove a *Governor;* 4. Design in the works of nature proves a *Designer*. These arguments are each made more impressive in detail, when it is considered that the world has existed for ages before historic times, sustaining successive tribes of organic life. These have each been created, pre-

served, governed, and fashioned by divine skill. The hand of God may be discerned in the life of every successive period. These views are specially adapted to the understanding of common minds, and may be advantageously employed in popular discourses where *a priori* and abstract discussions may be worse than useless. We will not go over the beaten track of natural theology, but simply specify what peculiar arguments for the existence of God are furnished by geology.

Arguments for a Creator.

We will present arguments for a Creator derived both from the inorganic and organic worlds. And first, the existence of inorganic matter proves a Creator. If matter has existed from eternity, as many philosophers have believed, it has not been created, and therefore its presence does not prove a Creator. The ancients argued for the eternity of matter on the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Their assumption was gratuitous. The time never was when infinite mind did not exist. A power has always existed competent to create matter. Without Deity the conclusion would be correct.

The best proof of the creation of matter, independently of natural science, is the principle that it does not exist of necessity. If not necessary it is not eternal, and therefore had a beginning. Now if we can follow back the history of matter to a time when we understand that its existence is incompatible with its necessary laws, we shall have proof of its creation, and can intelligently reason of its finite nature. We take the ground that the eternal existence of matter is impossible.

1. Organic life had a beginning. Following down the strata into the earth we see the remains of successive races of organisms, each one more simple, till in the oldest stratified rocks upon the globe are found the relics of the very simplest of the organic races. Earlier than the Laurentian no organisms could have existed.

2. Before the creation of life there was only one kingdom

in nature — the mineral or inorganic. This was in the condition of purely igneous fluidity.

3. Still earlier the matter of the earth was in the condition of intensely heated vapor, and according to the hypothesis of La Place the whole solar system was accumulated in one great revolving nebula.

4. The kindling of the nebula fire is supposed to be due to the action of chemical laws, — the atoms united by elective affinity thus producing light and heat. The theory does not necessarily imply that all matter existed originally in the form of uncombined elements, but they must have been more abundant than afterwards. These four points we assume without considering their proofs.

Matter cannot exist without chemical and physical laws. It is made of atoms, simple or compound. The full conception of atoms involves their peculiar affinities, size, and weight; that is, fundamental, chemical, and physical laws. We speak of mere matter or dead matter; but there is no such thing. The expression is figurative, denoting the absence of organisms. Any assemblage of particles in space must be affected by the law of gravity, the atoms must unite into compounds whenever brought near each other. The inevitable consequence of the action of these fundamental laws is revolution upon axis, and around other bodies if they are adjacent, heat, condensation, fusion, the combination of the atoms into crystals and an oblate or prolate sphere. These fundamental laws must continue to work until every atom is joined to its chosen companion, the sphere has become thoroughly cooled and consolidated. This must be the general result, with or without life. Hence the inference, that if matter had been eternal, these results would have been produced ages ago. Matter then is finite, — it was created; and hence there must have been a Creator.

It may be objected to the creation of matter that there has been an eternal succession of worlds and systems; that we see only a part of one great cycle, commencing with chemical action and ending in desolation; and that there is some law

of nature to resolve matter at the end of the cycle into the simple elements, when chemical action will recommence, and the same series of changes will again take place, including the introduction of organisms.

The reply from science to this objection is, that she knows of no law adequate to change the complex compounds at the end of one cycle into the nascent elements of the new series. It would require the superintending hand of a power above nature to effect this result. Moreover, the commencement of the first cycle is not accounted for on the supposition of an infinite series of cycles. The first kindling of the atomic fires still remain for a creative hand.

Paleontological arguments. Three distinct forms of the proof of the existence of a Creator may be derived from the paleontological history of animals.

A. The institution of the animal and vegetable kingdoms in nature proves the existence of a Creator. The distinctions between the inorganic and organic kingdoms are well marked. Except by a power from without, the atoms can never arrange themselves in any higher form than that of crystals. But the principle of life can combine the inorganic elements into substances unknown in the mineral kingdom. Without the life-force carbon would never occur in the condition of coal; it would have remained, invisibly combined in the gas, carbonic acid. The vital forces have decomposed the acid retaining the carbon, and setting free the oxygen. Now what produces this organific power? Is it contained in the atoms like gravity and elective affinity? No. Life is a power superior to the blind forces of matter, and acting in a totally different sphere. Inferior causes do not produce effects above themselves. The vital and physical forces are convertible only through the medium of organisms, and the origin of the vital is utterly beyond the limits of human science.[1] Life, then, had a beginning upon our globe, and it came not from the laws of nature; it was bestowed upon matter by an infinite mind.

[1] American Journal of Science, (2d series), Vol. xxviii. p. 319. Vol. xxx. p. 41.

B. The succession of systems of life evinces the hand of a Creator. Geology teaches that there have been several distinct systems of life and action upon the globe. The oldest economy of which we have traces is that of the Laurentian period in which plants were coupled with the very simplest forms of animal life, inferior even to corallines. In the next system, the Cambrian, there are sea-weeds, worms, and the most inferior of the crustacea. The third shows in comparative profusion crustacea, inferior mollusca, etc. The succeeding systems exhibit marked progress. The higher organisms gradually appeared, essentially in the order of their rank. There were no trees till the Devonian period, and those of low grade. Insects and reptiles came with trees, increasing in perfection equally with the forests. Fishes preceded reptiles and birds, but followed cephalopods. Birds succeeded reptiles, to be followed last of all by mammals. The doctrine of organic progression implies that complexity and perfection of organization increase as we ascend in the rocks, that numerous and successive systems of life, all differing from one another, have occupied the globe, and that these minor systems of life are but harmonious parts of one all-comprehending system of organization, whose culmination is witnessed in existing nature. The fact that each system has been suddenly introduced as a whole, not by single interpolations of species, indicates some general cause for its production, and in our view proves successive creations from an almighty hand. When life had been exterminated, an exigency existed which demanded a being of infinite power to create and adapt to novel circumstances new races. The paleozoic atmosphere was heavily charged with carbonic acid, and the paleozoic animals could breathe it with impunity. Not till the carbon had been condensed into coal-beds was the atmosphere sufficiently purified to allow large air-breathers to flourish. Every economy had its peculiarities to which the several families of animals were skilfully adapted.

C. The creation of man was a divine work. Man the most perfect of the animals was introduced last. He could not

have lived in many of the previous aeons on account of insalubrious climates, disagreeable associations, and unproductive soils. He appears suddenly upon the arena with nothing to connect him physically or mentally with previously existing animals. It is the grandest event in the earth's history. None of the previous races had possessed moral natures, nor mental, except in a limited degree, nor the power of speech. The creation of man, with endowments entirely different from those already existing, demands a divine Creator; for what else could meet the exigency?

Objection to C. Man was developed from the ape by principles of natural selection. The apes began to speak, speech developed mind and soul, and the body was gradually adapted to the wants of the mind.

Answer. The zoölogical distinctions between man and the apes are greater than can be possible between members of the same family or order. Therefore the one has not been developed from the other.

In the classification of the animal kingdom we have first the five grand types, then the classes, and thirdly the orders. Classes are characterized by the manner in which the plan of the structure of the respective types is executed; orders by the degrees of complication of class structure. The differences between man and the most perfect ape, the gorilla, are those of *degree*. Consequently man constitutes by himself a distinct zoölogical order, called *Bimana* (Blumenbach), *Archencephala* (Owen), or *Archont* (Dana). Now if man belongs to a distinct order from the apes, you cannot transform one into the other short of a score of gradations, entirely wanting in nature. The ape has four feet resembling hands; man has two hands and two feet. Man is the sole animal that uses only two extremities for locomotion, birds not excepted, because their forward extremities are changed to wings. Man's anterior extremities have been transferred from the locomotive to the *cephalic* series; that is, are made to attend to the wants of the head exclusively, and not to assist in locomotion also, as in the apes. Man's hands supply the

cravings of appetite, and execute the desires of the mind, the latter wants never being attained by the brutes. The anterior extremities of the ape assist in locomotion, not one of them walking erect naturally. And the erect posture of man is the natural effect of his superior physical structure. Now this *cephalization*, this subordination of the members and structure of the anterior part of the body to the head, is a difference in degree, constituting an order. Professor Dana has recently shown that the same cephalic distinctions exist throughout the animal kingdom, and may be made the basis of an improved classification.[1]

Objection to B. The principles of variation, natural selection, and other forces in nature will account for the transmutation of the first system of life into the second, the second into the third, and so on. This is the doctrine known as Darwinism, and the development theory. Darwin suggests that each great division of the animal kingdom may have originated in a single progenitor — say four or five in all, — and analogy would lead him one step further to believe "that all animals and plants have descended from some one prototype," and that "into this one primordial form life was first [created] breathed."

Answer. To answer this objection in detail would require statements of numerous zoölogical facts not within the proper limits or province of this Article. This theory has found some able advocates, but the weight of authority is against it, and, in our view, as a scientific explanation of all the facts it utterly fails. It comes within our province to allude to the proofs assumed for this theory from geology. Strange to say its advocates admit that most geological facts are pitted against it. Says Darwin: "Why then is not every geological formation and every stratum full of such intermediate links? Geology assuredly does not reveal any such finely graduated organic chain; and this, perhaps, is the most obvious and gravest objection which can be urged

[1] American Journal of Science, (2d series) Vol. xxvi. pp. 321, 440; Vol. xxvii. pp. 10, 157.

against my theory. The explanation lies, as I believe, in the extreme imperfection of the geological record."[1] "He who rejects these views [the extreme imperfection] on the nature of the geological record will rightly reject my whole theory."[2]

The very first evidence in favor of the theory to be expected from geology, is the discovery of the intermediate links, or the animals and plants connecting together different families and orders. There are fully thirty thousand described species of fossil plants and animals, but such links as are required by the development theory to connect any two different classes have never yet been discovered. There are seventeen classes in the animal kingdom, but no two of them have been brought into the chain by the discovery of these thirty thousand forms; therefore there are thirty thousand chances to one that the missing links will never be found. To account for the deficiencies they say that the geological record is imperfect, and that time will produce them. This is very unsatisfactory to the philosopher. The true geological inferences in reference to the origin of the different systems have been stated under B. The little aid afforded Darwinism by paleontology explains why its advocates are chiefly naturalists, not geologists.

But granting the truth of Darwinism, or any judicious modification of its principles, the foundation of our argument is rather strengthened than destroyed. The theory of development may be used like the nebular hypothesis. The latter was devised by La Place to sustain atheism, but after being avoided by theologians as long as possible, has been generally adopted by them, and is turned against its original friends. Hence we say to the development school, go on with your investigations, and if you succeed in establishing your principles we will use your theory for illustrating the argument for the existence of God.

The theory accounts for the origin of the different systems of life by the action of various laws. It is a law of nature

[1] Origin of Species (Amer. ed.), p. 246. [2] Origin of Species, p. 298.

that system shall succeed system, each an improvement upon the preceding, and that all organisms shall be developed in an unbroken series from one or more primordial forms. It is a law that the systems shall be gradually changed into one another without divine interposition. The track has been laid in which the wheels will always run, aided only by the original impetus. A system of progress in which remarkable events of diverse nature are ordained to succeed one another harmoniously, is more wonderful than one where an interposing agency is required to repair damages. When the type have been set up for the printing of a commentary they cannot be used to publish a lexicon without rearrangement. If there was a self-acting machine, capable of rearranging the type in their new combinations at the instant the last sheet of the commentary was struck off, it would be a more wonderful contrivance than the old-fashioned mode of laboriously resetting the type by the interposition of printers. So a system of nature that will provide for all emergencies without interposition is more wonderful, and calls more loudly for a Creator, than the theory which demands occasional aid from a power above law.

Objection to A. There are germs and tendencies in matter to produce organisms, and these will produce others upon Darwinian principles. This objector goes a step further back than Darwin. He makes an assumption without proof. If it were true, with such quantities of matter around us, we should constantly see examples of the production of organisms; and the waste rocks, soils, and reefs that now abound would teem with verdure and life.

To change the inorganic to the organic is a far more difficult task than to develop a monad into an elephant. Physical forces are convertible into vital only through the medium of an organized fabric. Man can produce varieties in organisms, but cannot in any known way create life.

But without further discussion we would say, as in the answer to the previous objection, if it be true that forces adequate to produce organisms reside in matter, and that

life has appeared in consequence of their action, we derive a stronger argument for the existence of God than in any other way. For who endowed matter with those wonderful properties, capable of developing life, reason, and a series of organisms, containing infinite complications, for ages investigated by the mightiest intellects, and not yet wholly comprehended? Whoever endowed matter with these properties also designated the epochs when the forces should operate, some interminably, others intermittently. He arranged for the advent of disturbing forces which remained dormant for millions of years after the beginning of life. And if these arrangements were all provided for in the tendencies of matter, it does not concern the argument for a Creator, if the plan was executed by second causes. God made the forces, and ordained that they should produce life and systems. The work is his, even if deputed to subordinates. This objector cannot urge the eternity of matter, for he assumes a beginning to organic life of necessity, and matter could not have existed always without producing developments; and, as before shown, the world ere this must have passed beyond the organic cycle to inorganic desolation if these tendencies existed.

Arguments from Design.

The adaptation of means to ends observable in the history of the earth, proves the existence of an adapting cause. When we perceive order, harmony, or adaptation of means to ends in any human work, we at once refer the contrivance to mind. Wisdom has suggested and the hands have executed the plan. Hence when we observe order and adaptation in nature, we immediately refer them to the mind of the author of nature. The reference is instinctive, while the ground of the feeling may be in our experience of the origin of human contrivance.

There were thousands of special illustrations of the adaptation of means to ends in the early history of the world. They were in the structure of every animal and plant, in the

fitnesses of each part for its own functions and their relations to the whole body. These illustrations as derived from living examples, have been frequently employed by theologians. Although we might argue from the structure of each fossil in almost the same words, we pass by the readiest elucidations of the argument to notice others peculiar to geology. We shall only attempt to point out a few features of the plan in the physical structure of organisms.

A. All organisms from the very first have been constructed upon the same general uniform plan. We will illustrate from a single division of the animal kingdom. The study of the different vertebrate animals shows a wonderful unity running through the whole series. Every bone has its particular use and shape, varying in the several classes according to the habits and modes of life. The bones of the forward extremities are homologous, the same in number, but of different shape, in the hand of man, the paw of the lion, the wing of the bat and bird, and the paddle of the whale. The whole series is therefore constructed upon a plan, every part adapted to its place in the grand system. It is the discovery of the details of this plan of structure to which the efforts of naturalists are directed. They are striving to attain to the perfection of the divine idea in contriving the system. On account of this uniform plan the paleontologist can refer specimens of the remains of animals to their proper place in the series; and whenever certain parts of animals are brought to him, he can refer them to their appropriate place, even if they are something unexpected. Thus when tracks of gigantic birds were discovered at Northampton by the father of Ichnology, although totally unprecedented, he did not shrink from announcing to the world the existence, in the Triassic period, of birds four times the size of the largest living species. The footprints corresponded to those of birds, therefore the animals that made them must have been birds. There was no other place in the series for them. Guided by the same principles several years later, when Professor Owen received from New Zealand a broken bone a few inches long, he

pronounced it the femur of a gigantic bird like Brontozoum. Its form showed it to belong to that particular place in the series; and his confidence in the uniformity of the plan led him to risk his reputation upon the result, though earnestly entreated by his friends to desist. The Brontozoum and Dinornis are now household names in science.

The study of fossil remains has brought to light curious types of animals now extinct. We have no living representatives of the trilobites, reptilian birds, iguanodon, ichthyosaurus, and whole families of reptiles. These missing forms have their places in the great system; they fill up gaps in the series. To have contrived the intricate structure of the animal kingdom demanded more skill, more discernment of nice adaptation of means to ends, more balancing of delicate adjustments, than any other department of nature. Therefore to have designed a uniform plan in accordance with which all organic beings are constructed must have required infinite skill; and this attribute belongs to mind, not matter.

Objection. The organic chain has been constructed by the laws of nature, one organism developed from another on Darwinism principles.

Answer. The development theory does not oppose our argument. Whence came the laws? Who ordered the system of nature so wondrously that polyp could change to echinus, echinus to mollusk, etc.? Who adapted the system of laws so that these harmonies resulted? It was mind. The development theory presents arguments for the existence of God as forcibly as the idea of progression. To many minds the argument from development would be indicative of more elaborate design.

B. There is a parallelism between the geological succession of animals and plants and their relative standing in classification.[1] This is equivalent to saying that the first organisms were the simplest, and the more complex were gradually introduced in the order of their rank. We may refer for a

[1] Contributions to the Natural History of the United States, by L. Agassiz, Part I. p. 108.

few details upon this subject to the subsequent pages of this Article.

C. Many of the fossil animals combined with their own characteristics some of those of other and higher classes not yet created. Though intermediate, they never occupy the middle point, as they properly belong to one of the two. Thus they were prophetic of the higher classes, and have been called synthetic or comprehensive. All the great vertebrate classes had their prophetic representatives in the age previous to that of their maximum development. The mammals were foreshadowed by the marsupials, who combine avian or reptilian with mammiferous characters, a few of whom lived in Triassic times. Birds were prefigured by the reptilian birds of the Connecticut sandstone. The Dicynodontia were reptiles having a pair of tusks growing downwards from the lower jaw like the mammalian walrus. The ichthyosaurus was reptilian and piscine. The labyrinthodon was batrachian with certain reptilian bones and ganoid teeth. The earliest fishes were sauroid, having reptilian characteristics. The sauroids were Devonian, but true fishes were first seen in mesozoic strata. Some of man's characteristics were foreshadowed in the mammals.

D. The adaptations of the physical world to the structure of the inhabitants in every age were very marked. In the Silurian age the climate was ultra-torrid; there were no mountains, the land was low and marshy, the air was thick with vapors and foul with carbonic acid, winds and storms were scarce. The inhabitants were low algae, corals, shells, and trilobites,—vegetative animals, perfectly adapted to their concomitants.

In the Jurassic period the sun shone, clouds and storms agitated the atmosphere; carbonic acid had been condensed into coal-beds; enormous air-breathing reptiles and voracious birds crowded the air, water, and marshes; carnivorous mollusks and insects peopled the estuaries and thickets. The Jurassic animals could not have flourished in the Silurian age, and most of the Silurian organisms would have fared

poorly in the later period. Every system of creation had its peculiar adaptations to the varying state of the world.

The whole series of systems constituted harmonious parts of one whole, and all the agencies were fitted to accomplish one grand result — preparation of the soil, climate, and surface for the advent of man. Death was present in order to maintain the system of reproduction, and carnivorous animals were nature's police to keep down the excess of population. All the agencies were adapted to accomplish specific purposes; and as we see them one after another, we realize that the fitness of each thing for every other was contrived by an infinite designer.

II. Geology proves and illustrates the natural and moral attributes of God. Certain geological facts may be employed to prove and illustrate such natural attributes as the personality, self-existence, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, unity, immutability, and eternity of God. The argumentation would be similar to that now employed by theologians, and therefore need not be stated here. Under the general term "benevolence" we include all the moral attributes.

Natural evils. Objection is made to the benevolence of God on account of the existence in the pre-adamic world of natural evils, such as death among animals and plants, pain, extremes of climate, deserts, deformity or absence of beauty, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. We take the ground that these evils were incidental, and sometimes essential to the stability of the system, with its present laws. Now if we show that these so-called evils are decidedly beneficial to the system, the objection to the divine benevolence is removed. We have no proof of the existence of moral evil or sin in the world before man.

1. *Pain and death.* The amount of susceptibility to pleasure and pain possessed by animals, denotes their relative place in the scale of life. The polyps may lose portions of their bodies, or be divided into fragments, yet the original animal does not appear to notice the injury, and each one of the parts may become a new animal. But man at the other

end of the scale may be killed by the point of a needle. The animals intermediate possess different degrees of susceptibility to pain or pleasure, but the one is always the exact measure of the other. We do not know of any way in which physical pleasure can be enjoyed, without implying the presence of susceptibility to pain. Death existed among the early animals. This is proved by the myriads of their remains in the rocks, by the succession of groups, by the presence of carnivorous animals who could not subsist upon vegetables, and by the discovery of animal food within the bodies of petrified carnivores. Many rocks are, to a great extent, composed of the remains of dead animals. The idea of reproduction implies death. The races when created were directed to increase and multiply, which command involves death. Plants were introduced with seeds in them; this implies the death of the plant. All organic life constitutes a cycle; first the germ or seed, then the embryo, the young, the adult, and then the seed to be developed as before, while the adult soon disappears. There is death during the entire lives of animals. Old matter is thrown away; as in man, the whole body is replaced every seven years. The office of plants is to convert mineral atoms into organic substance. They derive sustenance directly from the mineral kingdom, while animals can obtain their subsistence only from organized matter. Hence the existence of herbivores implies the death of plants.

The plant, as it grows, assimilates carbon from the decomposition of carbonic acid in the atmosphere. When it decays carbonic acid is formed by the union of the carbon with oxygen of the air, exactly as much as was consumed in its growth. Thus the chemical changes exactly balance each other. The same is true of the relations of plant-food to animals. The carbon assists in forming the bulk of animals, and when they decay it combines with the oxygen again. The higher carnivorous quadrupeds and the larvae of insects feed upon other animals, both the living flesh and dead carcasses. The flesh-worms and maggots serve to prevent

putrefaction, and thus the return of the highest organized flesh to the inorganic kingdom in the decline of the cycle is accomplished gradually, just as the ascent through plants and low animals was by degrees. The decomposition of bulky carcasses would render the air and water foul, and destructive to many species, did not the scavengers purify them, both by the removal and subdivision of the filth, so as to be readily assimilated by plants. Thus the carnivores preserve the balance of nature, both by checking excessive multiplication and preparing decaying bodies for plant-food.

Death to animals is a benevolent provision. Those killed by carnivores suffer very little, as their death is not anticipated, and they do not grieve at leaving their companions. Besides there is more pleasure on the whole to many races rapidly succeeding one another than to a few long continued. For the young of all animals enjoy more in the same period of time than their elders, on account of superior health, vigor, and the novelty of the scenes before them; and a succession of races enables a larger number to live in the time of vivid enjoyment, and thus the sum total of happiness is greater. Such are spared the feebleness of old age. Death by violence to unreasoning animals is the easiest of all the modes. If animals were immortal, there would have been little happiness among them as soon as the world was overstocked. There would have been suffering for want of food, and besides, immortality would have been impossible to those who were devoured. Plants are incapable of suffering.

It is difficult to see how occasional death could be avoided in a world like ours where the lightning may strike, the earthquake swallow up, the tornado devastate, tempestuous waves wash up marine animals beyond the reach of returning tides, and the torrents overwhelm. Especially would this be true when changes of level accompanied geological catastrophes. These may or may not have been violent, but their uniform result has been the complete or partial extermination of life. None of these calamities could have been averted without great injury to the earth. Death was an incidental

result of a series of events that were highly beneficial to the earth.

2. *Extremes of climate.* Tropical heat was more common than arctic cold in early times. Both extremes depend upon fundamental laws — heat, the position of the sun, distribution of land and water, and very slightly the internal fires. To have varied these extremes would have made the mean temperature disagreeable. Without arctic dry land we should have warmer winters but colder summers, a sort of Fuegian climate. A warmer air produced from the internal heat would have given a thinner crust with more earthquakes. There were races specially fitted to flourish in both extremes. Cold storms and winds may seem evils, but they are needed for the vegetable kingdom.

3. *Deserts.* It is a law of Meteorology that warm air absorbs more moisture than cold. Warm air in a cold place precipitates its moisture as rain and mist. Cold air carried over a warm region will absorb more moisture. This is the law that gives rain. Upon examination it will prove that most deserts are rendered sterile by the absence of rain. The winds passing over them are colder than the country, and consequently carry away the moisture to discharge it more abundantly elsewhere. This is why northern Africa is sterile and southern Europe fertile. Without this law the whole earth would be a desert. With it the surface is diversified; but evil and good both prevail, the result of a beneficial law, but the good vastly predominates.

4. *Deformity and absence of beauty.* It is rare to find a perfect leaf in nature; fruit is often blasted, many productions are abortive, mineral crystals are the exceptions, while many rocks are crystalline, the great animals have been ugly and fierce, the reptilian age abounded with monsters, etc. Now these are more negative than positive evils, and they exist at the present day as well as previously. We may doubt whether the variations of leaves are evils. Though perfection is rare, the infinite variations produce pleasures. Uniformity might be distressing. Blasted and abortive vegetable pro-

ductions are commonly due to improper situations: a deficiency in air, light, heat, moisture, or fertilizers. Crystalline perfection would have been a practical imperfection; for granite and other rocks would be worthless for building-stones, because rendered brittle. Many animals and plants may seem ugly to us, while they are perfectly adapted to their habitats. A perfect system will be admirable and beautiful as a whole, yet some of its subordinate features may not be so. A bright color upon many defenceless animals would point out their presence to their enemies. As there is always a beauty of adaptation, we do not need in every case to find elegance of form and color. The right thing in the right place is always beautiful to the sense if not the eye, especially since the great majority of animals and plants in all ages of the world have been beautiful and attractive.

5. *Earthquakes.* Earthquakes result from the expansive tendencies of volcanic matter confined beneath the surface. If the lava can discharge itself readily there may be no quakings; but if the proper vents are obstructed the crust may be violently disturbed. The laws that ordain earthquakes have elevated continents and mountains out of the ocean; have permitted the accumulation of stores of coal, limestone, and the metals; have given us streams of water and petroleum, and diversified the surface with scenery.

It appears, then, from a review of the principal physical evils existing before man, that they were involved in the fundamental laws of nature as incidental effects. The design of these laws was to benefit the world, but, as arranged, they cannot be executed without inducing these so-called evils. It is a very simple law that heated bodies will contract upon cooling; but its action has produced faults and foldings in the crust, earthquakes, extremes of climate, and the extermination of systems of life; yet even these evils have produced beneficial results not attainable in any other known way. Hence they cannot be regarded as indicating malevolence or absence of benevolence in Deity. Geology is not concerned to say why a system containing incidental evils should have been employed in preference to others.

Benevolence of God. The past systems of life, like the present, are full of evidences of the benevolence of God. Some of the geological arguments are peculiar, and others are common to all ages and conditions of the world.

A. Pleasure has been the rule and pain the exception in the lives of all the early races. Without appealing to particulars such is the general impression received by every interpreter of nature, whatever his theories.

(a) An incidental design of every bodily contrivance has been to produce happiness. The nerves were designed to make animals perceive objects, to regulate the muscles by the will, to control the action of the different organs, and all these operations are pleasurable. The senses enable timid animals to become aware of and avoid danger. No anatomist can put his finger upon any nerve, muscle, vein, artery, or lymphatic of existing or extinct constitutions, and say this particular organ was designed to produce suffering and derangement in the system. We find instances where there has been suffering, but they were marked exceptions, like the fewness of invalids compared with persons in good health. But some animals were provided with the means of destroying life, others had poisonous fangs and stings. These organs were intended partly to provide sustenance, and partly for self-defence, the only suffering being among the victims. These were exceptions to the general rule, and, as before shown, the pain was slight in the sum total of happiness.

(b) Organic functions have produced pleasure where pain is just as consistent with their perfect action. Consider the action of the senses. Taste, hearing, sight, and smelling were all positively agreeable, and often delightful. Objects offensive to the senses could generally be avoided. Now the senses might have been constructed so that every sound would have been harsh, every mouthful bitter, every odor repulsive, yet the wants of nature would have impelled their exercise. The action of the muscles might have been made painful, and the involuntary movements might have been accompanied with neuralgic twinges; but there is no evi-

dence of pain in the exercise of any organ when in a healthy state.

(c.) A variety of means have been provided for the performance of important animal functions. Most animals have a large number of extremities, so that if one or more of them is injured the power of walking and feeding is scarcely impaired. The crab may lose some of its members in casting the shell, but suffers very little in consequence, as some of the other parts perform the functions of those wanting. Arteries when lacerated can be tied up, and the blood will find its way through the system by other channels. The lower animals can devour food through their mouths, or absorb it through pores in the skin. In case of injury the secretive organs can increase their action so as to afford an unusual supply of new material. Extraordinary provision is made for the reproduction of species. There are no less than five different modes. The higher tribes may use but one, while some of the inferior classes can employ several. And most animals have the ability to adapt themselves to varied circumstances. These proofs, though derived from existing nature, apply with equal force to the early races.

(d.) The successive systems of life have been perfectly adapted to the varying conditions of the globe through every period. No two life-systems could have exchanged places and flourish, on account of the different states of the earth and climate. While animals can adapt themselves to new circumstances to some degree, these limits are not extensive. Slight changes in climate, situation, and food will engulf a whole system in a cataclysm. Therefore great wisdom was required to adapt each system to the varying conditions, and benevolence to order that the delicate machinery of organic structure should be kindly adjusted. A being without benevolence would not have troubled himself to provide for the pleasant adaptation of dumb beasts and worms to the changing climates and variable atmosphere.

B. The natural evils existing in the system have been rendered the means of good to the earth and its inhabitants.

The benefits resulting from some of them have been mentioned. Death was found to be essential to preserve the balance of nature and prevent the over-crowding of the population. The general climate would not have been improved by the abolishment of the extremes. The deserts were the means of rendering large tracts of land more fertile. Deformities and absence of beauty were seen to be harmonious, and earthquakes a benevolent provision because they prevented the occurrence of overwhelming catastrophes. Eruptions from volcanoes were connected with earthquakes, and have been repeatedly quoted to prove the divine benevolence. Besides these, certain other apparent evils evidence benevolence.

(a) The disturbed, broken, and overturned condition of the earth's crust. Investigation proves these disturbances to have been produced according to law. Great lateral forces have pushed up parallel chains of mountains, while subsequent denudation has given the surface its present uneven contour. The overturns of the strata are not obvious without study. Except for these upheavings we should have been without mountains, valleys, and consequently without natural scenery, rain, springs of water, and should have been unable to reach the valuable ores and minerals stored away in the crust. Who, then, will call these commotions evils? They are rather blessings. They have been essential to the fitting up of the earth for the residence of man.

(b) The desolating effects of ice and water in the drift period. In all high northern and southern latitudes the whole surface has been scoured down by ice, ledges have been broken, mountains truncated, and the fragments spread over the low grounds. But this tremendous rasping has been remarkably beneficial. It has produced soils, without which man could not exist. The rocks have been pulverized, fertile elements extracted, long successions of trees and herbs have accumulated vegetable mould, and the apparent decay and ruin speak eloquently of the goodness of God. Without this agency the mountains and hills would have been sur-

mounted with sharp pinnacles, like those of the Alps, and sometimes covered with perpetual snow. There would have been little alluvium in the valleys, their floors would have been bare rocks, upon which trees could hardly find a foothold. The grinding, degrading, and assorting agencies have been necessary to render the world habitable for man. Doubtless similar agencies were employed less energetically to fit the ancient continents for the accommodation of the by-gone systems.

C. Vast cavities in the earth have been filled with immense supplies of metals, coal, petroleum, salt, lime, gypsum, etc., for the benefit of man ages before his existence. This may be called prospective benevolence. These substances were of no use to the primitive inhabitants of the earth; they were designed for the benefit of those who had skill to work the ores, and apply the metals to the wants of every-day life.

(a) *Metals*. These are distributed according to their need. No metal is so useful as iron, and none is so widely distributed through the rocks. It was deposited in every age, and occurs in every condition, from the tough crystalline ores of Lake Champlain to the accumulations in alluvial bogs. The principal iron works of our country are where the ore and the fuel necessary to smelt it occur near together. The ores need to be reduced, and thus there is a requisition upon the inventive genius and practical skill of man to devise the best methods. Perhaps the next valuable metals are lead, copper, and zinc; and these are less commonly diffused than iron, but more abundantly than tin, manganese, mercury, and the precious metals. The latter being universally desirable are widely spread, but in much smaller quantities. Gold, silver, and platinum in the metalic state, both occupy veins in the rocks and are disseminated through beds of gravel. They appear not to have been even injected into the veins till shortly before the advent of man. The precious metals were designed specially for man's benefit, for they were of no use to the fishes, mollusks and crustaceans of early times. When scattered through beds of gravel, machinery can separate

them from the base earth, and thus even the poorest tribes can extract them for the purposes of trade.

(b) *Coal.* If an intelligent being had visited the world in the carboniferous period, and seen the immense forests now converted into coal, he might have asked to what purpose is all this waste, since there are no mental natures to enjoy its beauties? But the nineteenth century can answer his question. The immense forests of sigillariae, lepidodendra, cycads, etc., have not only purified the atmosphere by the withdrawal of a deadly gas, but have been stored up as a fossil fuel for the benefit of factories, steamships, railroads, and dwelling-houses. We are warmed, fed, and clothed by its aid. There are not less than four million millions of tons of coal in North America alone, twenty-one times as much as in Great Britain. Ninety-two million seven hundred and eighty-seven thousand eight hundred and seventy-three tons of coal were raised in Great Britain in 1866; and at the same time the State of Pennsylvania produced twelve million six hundred and ninety-eight thousand five hundred and thirty-two tons. There is enough coal in the world to last for hundreds of thousands of years at the present rates of consumption. Who can doubt that prospective benevolence prepared these immense deposits for the age of mind?

(c) *Petroleum.* As fast as new wants are felt the same kind hand opens new reservoirs of supply. Very much of the material used for illumination had been derived from whales; but these animals are becoming so scarce that the world can no longer depend upon this source. To meet this scarcity, within a few years immense reservoirs of natural oil or petroleum have been discovered west of the Alleghanies. By sinking bore-holes a few hundred feet into the rock in certain localities, streams of oil will spout forth. I have seen such a stream produce two thousand barrels per day, and larger ones have been known. The yield for 1864 in the United States, was eighty-seven million gallons; and for four years, beginning with 1861, two hundred and twenty-one million gallons. The value of that obtained in 1864 is

estimated at forty million three hundred thousand dollars. The annual sales of petroleum in this country equal those of either coal or iron, and there is no reason to expect a serious diminution of the supply at present. Hence this new business must not be considered a financial bubble, ready to burst when monetary difficulties arise.

(d) Similar supplies of limestone, gypsum, rock salt, guano, bitumen, clay, and other substances have been stored in the earth for man's benefit.

(e) *Water.* We should expect such an unstable element as water to be very unequally distributed on the surface, but it abounds wherever man sets up his habitation. The grand source of water is rain. This percolates the earth and either remains upon the surface forming lakes, ponds, and streams, or occupies cavities and particular strata in the earth. The layers, both of the surface deposits and solid rocks, are of two kinds, those pervious and impervious to water. Those that are impervious hold the water trickling down from the surface in natural cisterns at various depths. Man penetrates to these cisterns or wells, and derives from them in purity the element so necessary to his existence. Viewed as conservators of water, the alternations of gravel, sand, and clay, so often exposed in cuttings, and so little esteemed, assume a new importance. They have been arranged in alternating order by an all-wise hand, prospectively for the benefit of man.

D. The general stability and security of the present system of life and action proves the divine benevolence. When one reads of the numerous revolutions in the crust of the earth, its elevations and depressions, the fractures, foldings, and inversions of the strata, the numerous injections of melted lava into fissures and the repeated extermination of life, he is apt to imagine the whole history a "grand tossing, rending, recomposing process, a world rolling down through gulfs and fiery cataclysms." But these striking events were occasional during ages of quiet action, and were manifested more by the changes of life than violent action. And these changes

have been less frequent in the Cenozoic than any of the earlier periods. The present state of the globe is one of permanent stability and security, although there may be slight earthquake-jars, and slow changes of level. The variations in the climate within historic times have been chiefly caused by man's agency, and the surface temperature is not appreciably affected by the internal igneous nucleus. This permanence and security is essential to the existence and well-being of all organic nature. And it must have required infinite wisdom and benevolence so to adjust all the elements of change in the system that they should balance one another and secure a quiet habitation for hundreds of generations. The same benevolence has also thus kindly provided for each of the pre-existing systems similar exemption from evil, till the time came for the introduction of a new dispensation. At present the world contains more organisms of delicate and complicated structued than at any previous period.

These four arguments, each of whose subdivisions is really a separate proof, offer convincing evidence of the existence of benevolence in Deity. They are the more important because drawn from a field at the first view unpromising. Their force will augment with the growing perfection of the sciences.

(To be continued.)

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Dr. Pond's Theological Lectures.[1]

Dr. Pond was born at Wrentham, Mass., July 29, 1791; was graduated at Brown University in 1813; was pastor of the church in Auburn, Mass., from 1815 until 1828; was editor of the Spirit of the Pilgrims from 1828 until 1832; was Professor of Theology at Bangor from 1832 to 1855; and has been Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the same Institution from 1855 to the present time. He has published a large variety of essays in the magazines and quarterlies of the day; a large number of sermons and pamphlets, and more than twenty volumes, of which the last is the ablest. He has been, and still is, a model of diligence and regular self-discipline.

The present volume contains seventy lectures. It is written in a perspicuous style, and on many subjects exhibits a clear and sound logic. He says correctly in his preface: "These lectures are not sermons, like those of Dr. Dwight, which were delivered to a public assembly on the Sabbath. Neither are they mere technical, scientific forms, to be enlarged upon, *ex tempore*, by the lecturer, and to be taken down in notes by those who hear them. They are rather theological essays, written out in full and read to the students, not to be servilely copied or imitated, but to awaken thought and interest, and assist them in the difficult work of writing which was to follow. Prepared in this way, and for such a purpose, the lectures are adapted to be read and studied, not only by ministers and theological students, but by intelligent Christians generally. They are adapted to be used in theological classes, should any such be formed in our congregations. They are adapted and intended for a somewhat general circulation."

In the first fourteen lectures Dr. Pond discusses the various truths relating to the Divine existence and attributes, to the sacred scriptures, to the Trinity. He then proceeds to consider the decrees or purposes of God. These purposes he distinguishes from the divine law; for the law is a rule for the conduct of intelligent creatures, "but the purposes of God are not a rule of conduct to his creatures. They are rather a plan of operation to himself — the plan according to which he is disposing of events throughout the universe" (p. 159). The divine purposes are also distinguished from the divine foreknowledge; "they are prior in the order of nature to foreknowledge, and are that on which it is grounded" (p. 160).

[1] Lectures on Christian Theology. By Enoch Pond, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary at Bangor. 8vo. pp. 747. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication. 1867.

"The purposes of God do not precede omniscience, though in the order of nature they do precede foreknowledge" (p. 161). "In the possession of omniscience, he looks out upon the whole range and compass of possible things. But everything, at this stage, is barely possible. 'I can adopt this plan, that, or the other, — anything, everything, within the range of possibility.' As yet nothing is fixed, nothing determined on; and of course nothing future is certain, or can be foreknown. But among all the possible plans of operation presented to the Omniscient mind, instantly and intuitively the best plan is discovered, and instantly it is preferred or adopted. It is adopted in all its branches and particulars — in all its endless ramifications. Everything embraced in this plan (and everything is embraced in it) is now settled and certain, and becomes at once the object of foreknowledge. It could not be foreknown before, because it was not certain before" (pp. 161–162). The questions arise whether Dr. Pond does not use the term *omniscience* here in a peculiar sense, and whether in its stead he should not have used the terms "infinite skill or wisdom." Is not omniscience the knowledge of all things *future*, as well as present and past, and if omniscience precedes the decrees, does not foreknowledge, which is a necessary part of omniscience, precede them also?

Of course, Dr. Pond denies that the "foreseen good character of believers is the ground or reason of their election"; but he as strenuously denies that the "purposes of God, in respect to this important matter, are capricious, arbitrary, and without reason. He must be supposed to have had the best reasons for choosing some, rather than others, to everlasting life; though in no case, except where he has made a particular revelation, can we so much as conjecture what these reasons were. To the apostle Paul, the reason of his election and consequent conversion was revealed: "For this cause, *I* obtained mercy, that in me, first, Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them which should hereafter believe on him to life everlasting" (1 Tim. i. 16). But, except in the case of this great apostle, I am not aware that a particular revelation on this subject has ever been made" (p. 172).

After considering the works of God in creation and providence, Dr. Pond proceeds to discuss the truths relating to the nature of the mind, the will, holiness, sin, the apostasy, etc. In regard to the freedom of the will he says: "Moral freedom consists in exercising the will one way while conscious of the power to exercise it in some other way; or in preferring, choosing, some one thing while conscious of entire natural ability to choose some other thing. In other words, it consists in voluntarily yielding to the strongest motives, or in doing as we please, while conscious that we could do differently. This is freedom. It is all the freedom that we need, or of which we can conceive; and this always exists where there are the human faculties, and more especially the faculty of will" (p. 279). "We ask a companion, who is with us in the fields, to leap to the top of a precipice.

fifty feet high. He says, 'I cannot.' But having clambered to the top, we ask him to leap down. He says again, 'I cannot.' His answer is the same in both cases. He is unable either to leap up or to leap down. But clearly, the inability in the two cases is not of the same nature. My friend could not leap up the precipice if he would; but he might break his neck by leaping down, if he were so inclined" (pp. 282, 283). "It is demanded by those who deny natural ability, whether we mean to say that depraved man is able, of himself, to turn to God and do his duty. Before answering this question, we must be permitted to ask how much is intended by it. If you mean to inquire whether man is able to do his duty independently of God, without the support of his hand and the direction of his providence, we answer, no. In this sense we can do nothing of ourselves. We cannot act at all, or subsist a moment. It is in God that 'we live, and move, and have our being.' But if you mean to ask, whether men are naturally able to do their duty, without the special aid and influences of the Holy Spirit, we answer, yes. The Holy Spirit is given, not to impart new natural ability, but new moral ability; not to bestow new natural faculties, but to stir us up to new obedience — to make us willing to exert the faculties we have, in the service and for the glory of God" (p. 286). "The moral *cannot* is not altogether synonymous with *will not*. It expresses indisposition, aversion, unwillingness, with much greater emphasis and strength. It is sometimes said of sinners that they *will not* come to Christ. But when their criminal aversion to Christ is to be set forth in all its energy the moral *cannot* is used. 'No man *can* come to me, except the Father, which has sent me, draw him.' It would but feebly set forth the moral perfection of an angel to say that he *will not* sin against God. We rather say, he *cannot*. It would be an equally inadequate use of terms to say of Satan that he *will not* submit to God, and return to his duty. He *cannot*. Yet in both these cases the *cannot* is altogether of a moral nature" (p. 288). "We need the Spirit, not to increase our natural ability — to give us any new faculties or natural powers. The difficulty lies, not in our want of faculties, but in the abuse of them. But we do need the influences of the Spirit to overcome our moral inability, — the natural aversion of our hearts to God, and to make us willing in the day of his power — willing to use the faculties he has given us in his service and for his glory" (p. 291).

But while thus insisting on the freedom of the will, Dr. Pond does not fail to insist on the influence of motives, and on the fact that the will uniformly yields to the strongest motive. "If the will were not under the influence of motives, and if the degree of influence exerted was not in proportion to the strength of the motives urged, then what propriety in using motives with men to persuade them to do their duty, or to do anything else, and in making these motives as impressive as possible? On this ground, poor preaching would be as likely to prevail as good preach-

ing, and men would be as likely to be converted without preaching as with it. But as mankind are constituted, ministers of the gospel have every encouragement for a skilful and powerful application of motives. There is just as much room for skill in adapting motives, and earnestness in enforcing them, as though everything depended on their instrumentality; as, indeed, under God, it does. To be sure, God is the grand moving power in the moral world, as in the natural; but then he operates in both by means, and in accordance with established laws; and this is one of the laws of mind, that the will is always as the strongest motive. Let, then, the minister of Christ adapt his motives wisely, and urge them efficiently, and make them as impressive as possible, and he will be proportionally the more likely to be successful; not because he, by his eloquence, can convert or sanctify the soul, or because motives alone can do it, but because God works by motives in turning the hearts of sinners to himself, and it is an established law of his operation, that the stronger the motive, the more likely to prevail" (p. 281).

On the nature of holiness and sin the remarks of Dr. Pond are equally explicit. Speaking of the ambiguities of that chameleon word "disposition," he says: "This word occurs in common conversation, and in our discussions on moral subjects, in the three following senses: 1. There is the ulterior disposition — a state of mind, and not an exercise; a proclivity, preparation, or disposition (using the word in its most literal, etymological sense) for the performance of an action. In this sense the disposition may operate as a motive; but is not an exercise, and has not, in itself, any moral character. 2. There is the sentient disposition — an emotion, a feeling, lying altogether in the region of the sensibilities; a motive to action, but not action, and possessing as before (except as far as it is yielded to), no moral character. 3. There is the voluntary disposition, which is an internal, voluntary affection, which has a moral character, which prompts to ontward action, and in which the right or the wrong of the outward action entirely consists. Here, it will be seen, are three obviously different senses of the word 'disposition'; — and the same may be said of the parallel word 'inclination'; — and when these are confounded (as they frequently are) no wonder that confusion and error should be the consequence" (p. 285; see also pp. 262, 263). Speaking of the "*possibility* of our first parents falling in the manner they did," he remarks: "Some have thought their apostasy wholly unaccountable. They were perfectly holy. Their propensities, feelings, and habits were all holy. They had, in fact, a holy principle, a holy nature. How then could temptation reach such minds? How could it overcome them? On the supposition that our first parents had a holy nature previous to their fall, — something back of and distinct from all holy affections, and which could express itself in nothing but holy action, — I do not see how they could fall. They certainly could not, unless their holy nature was changed; and no being but their Creator was able

to change it. But there is no reason to suppose that they had such a nature as this. The evidence from reason and from facts is all against it. They had all the human faculties, fully developed, in a pure and perfect state. And up to this time they had constantly exercised their faculties in the most proper manner. Their thoughts, their affections, their words, their actions, all had been holy. And in these, all their holiness consisted. It was an active holiness, comprised essentially in supreme love to God, and a disinterested love to the creatures of God. In other words, it was an active and perfect obedience to the divine law. And all that their fall involved was, for this to be changed into active disobedience. There was no holy nature, back of and distinct from all that was active within them, requiring to be changed, but only a change in their active exercises and affections, from those which were holy to those which were sinful" (p. 336).

The "law of paradise" is thus described: "The threatening to our first parents before they fell must not be confounded with the consequences of their fall. An endless train of evils has resulted from the fall, reaching not only to our first parents, but to their posterity forever. Indeed, an endless train of blessings has flowed, indirectly and consequentially, from the fall, including all the blessings of redemption. But it would be preposterous to regard all these consequences, one way and the other, as included in the original threatening to Adam. We must distinguish therefore, as I said, between the simple threatening and the consequences of the transgression.

"In order to understand the threatening referred to, we must bear in mind (what has been before stated) that our first parents in Paradise were under law — mere law. The precepts enjoined on them were those of the law. The rewards which they enjoyed and anticipated were those of law, — dispensed to them, and to be dispensed, on the ground of law. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the threatening under consideration was one of law. In other words, our first parents were threatened, in case of transgression, with the proper penalty of the divine law. The passage including the threatening is parallel to those in which it is said: 'The soul that sinneth, it shall die.' 'The wages of sin is death.' As our first parents were under a dispensation of law, they were threatened, in case of transgression, with the proper penalty of the law; the same that was inflicted on the sinning angels — eternal death. This would include, of course, spiritual death — a being 'dead in trespasses and sins; since none will suffer the pains of eternal death who are not in a state of spiritual death, or who, in other words, are not entirely sinful.

"Most evangelical Christians regard the threatening before us as including spiritual and eternal death; and some represent it as including also temporal death. But manifestly, if it includes eternal death, it cannot include temporal death; since the two ideas are incompatible. Temporal

death is a dissolution of the connection between soul and body; eternal death is the destruction of soul and body in hell. Suppose then eternal death to have been included in the threatening, and to have been immediately executed — as it must have been but for intervention of the gospel — upon the transgressors. There would have been no room, in that case, for temporal death. It could not possibly have ensued. Soul and body must have gone to destruction together, and could not have been separated.

"There is another consideration going to show the truth of what has been stated. Christ came into the world to redeem his people from the curse of the divine law — that curse which hangs over every sinner, and was denounced upon Adam, in case he fell in sin. But Christ does not redeem his people from temporal death. They still suffer that. It follows that temporal death makes no part of the proper penalty of the law — that penalty which was originally denounced upon our first parents.

"Temporal death, from the very nature of it, belongs not to the dispensation of law, but to that of grace. It is indeed a bitter fruit of sin; but it is such a fruit as can be tasted only under a dispensation of grace. Accordingly, the first intimation which we have in the scriptures of temporal death is found subsequent to the promise of a Saviour. It was in connection with the great gospel promise, but subsequent to it, that God said to our first parents: 'Dust thou art, and to the dust shall thou return.'" Gen. iii. 19" (pp. 330–332).

"Adam was not threatened with the sin and ruin of his posterity, in case he ate the forbidden fruit, but rather with that eternal death which is the proper penalty of the law. And besides; where is the justice or propriety of thus punishing Adam in his posterity? Where is the justice of it, so far as his posterity is concerned? This would be, not to visit the iniquities of the fathers upon the children consequentially, but to punish the child for its father's sin — a thing which God has declared that he can never do. (See Ezek. xviii. 20.) And where is the justice of such punishment, so far as Adam is himself concerned? If Adam repented of his sins, and was forgiven, and has gone to heaven, why should he continue to be punished in his posterity? Or if he died in his sins, and has gone to perdition, he is suffering the full reward of them in his own person; and why should he be punished in his posterity? In every view, therefore, this theory of punishment appears to be unfounded" (p. 359).

From the clear views of Dr. Pond in regard to the nature of sin and penalty, it is easy to infer his views in regard to the *atonement*, which he supposes to consist in the *death* of Christ. He says: "Some have believed that by suffering for us, Christ literally paid our debt to divine justice. So taught Anselm in the twelfth century, and Aquinas in the thirteenth, and many others of later date in both the Romish and Protestant churches. But to this theory there are insuperable objections. In the first place, the demands of strict governmental justice against us are not of the nature

of a debt, and cannot be cancelled as such. And then, if they were, and if the sufferings of Christ had cancelled them, we should owe nothing to the law. The law would no longer have any demands against us. We should need no forgiveness, nor would forgiveness be possible, as there would be nothing to be forgiven.

"Some have said that the death of Christ availed to make an atonement for sinners, not by paying a literal debt, but by his suffering for them the strict and proper penalty of the law; but to this statement, also, there are insuperable objections. The first grows out of the very nature of the penalty in question. This is eternal death — an eternal separation from God and all good, and the eternal destruction of body and soul in hell. It involves all the agonies of the bottomless pit; not the least part of which are the direct results of indulged sin; the indulgence of the most hateful, painful passions; the stings and reproaches of conscience; dissatisfaction with God and his government; and a perpetual, burning sense of his displeasure. Did our Saviour suffer all these, or any of them? Being perfectly holy, was it possible that he should? How could such a being endure the pains of unsated malice, envy, and revenge? How could he suffer from the stings and reproaches of conscience? In other words, how could he suffer the pains and agonies of the bottomless pit, which go to constitute the proper penalty of the law?

"But suppose that Christ did suffer all this. Suppose him to have suffered, not only as much as all his elect would suffer in hell forever, but the very same, 'agony for agony, and groan for groan'; would he, even then, have suffered the proper penalty of the law? The penalty of the law is denounced upon the transgressor, and upon no one else. 'In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.' 'The soul that sinneth, it shall die?' Such is the language which the law uses, in setting forth its penalty; and we see, from the very terms employed, that the penalty can fall upon none but the transgressor. Another may step in, and endure a full equivalent, and so make a full expiation; but he cannot endure the proper penalty, even though he should suffer in kind and amount the same.

"But it is argued on the other side, that justice demands the full penalty of the law, which we, by transgression, have incurred; nor will it be satisfied with anything less. Hence, if justice is satisfied in the atonement of Christ, he must have suffered the full penalty of the law. But is justice of such a nature that it can be satisfied with nothing but the infliction of the literal penalty? Does it admit of no substitute, no equivalent? Then it precludes entirely, and always, the exercise of mercy. The demands of justice must, on this ground, be violated, or mercy is impossible.

But we do not so understand the claims of justice; nor can they be so understood by any one who hopes in the mercy of the gospel. The demands of justice are answered when its ends are answered; and these may

be as fully answered by a substitute as in the punishment of the transgressor. And when all the ends of justice are thus met and answered, when the honor of the law is sustained, and the authority of the sovereign is fully vindicated, then there is room for the exercise of mercy. Then the penalty of the law may be remitted, and no interest will suffer in consequence. The government is as strong in bestowing pardon, as under other circumstances it would be in inflicting punishment. There is no injustice in treating sinners better than they deserve, when this can be done in consistency with other objects and interests. Injustice rather consists in treating them worse than they deserve — a mode of treatment most abhorrent to all the ends and aims of the atonement, and which none will ever receive at the hands of God" (pp. 393–395).

Historically considered, one of the most suggestive passages in this volume is the following: "This is not the place to go into a consideration of objections to the doctrine of justification by the imputed obedience and merits of Christ. We pass these over entirely; and would simply say, that the principal ground of difficulty on the subject seems to us to lie in not rightly conceiving of the penalty of God's law. This penalty, in its fullest extent, is both privative and positive. It involves the loss of God's favor and the incurring of his displeasure; the loss of the rest and happiness of heaven, and the endurance of eternal miseries in hell. Such is the full penalty of the law of God, for the removal of which the atonement of Christ furnishes the sufficient and only foundation. In procuring the salvation of those who embrace it, it removes, first, the positive part of the penalty, so that they are no longer liable to suffer the pains of eternal death. It removes, secondly, the privative part, and thus restores them to the forfeited favor of God, and to the happiness of heaven. All this is implied in freeing the returning sinner from the full penalty of the law; or which is the same, in forgiveness; using the term 'forgiveness' in the widest sense. But forgiveness, in this sense, is the same precisely as justification; the one restoring the subject of it as much as the other. And so the case was regarded by the apostle Paul. He repeatedly speaks of full forgiveness and justification as the same. 'Through this man is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins; and by him all that believe are justified from all things from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses" (Acts xiii. 38). 'Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins' (Rom. iii. 24). 'David also describeth the blessedness of the man unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works,' or, which is the same, justifieth, saying, 'Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sin is covered' (Rom. iv. 6). The apostle here quotes from the thirty-second Psalm, in which David sets forth the blessedness of him who had humbly confessed his sins, and been forgiven, representing

such an one as justified; which shows that, in Paul's theology, justification and forgiveness are the same.

"Calvin and other eminent theologians have taught the same doctrine. 'The righteousness of faith,' says Calvin, 'is a reconciliation with God, which consists solely in the remission of sins.' 'The Lord cannot receive any one into favor or fellowship with himself without making him, from a sinner, to be a righteous person; and this is accomplished by the remission of sins.' 'It appears, then, that those whom God receives are made righteous no otherwise than as they are purified, by being cleansed from all their defilements, by the remission of their sins; so that such a righteousness may be denominated, in one word, a remission of sins' (Institutes, Book iii. chap. xi. sect. 21).

"From these statements it appears that justification and full forgiveness are the same; and hence the sufficiency of the sufferings and death of Christ to procure the one as much as the other. And there is no need of bringing in the personal obedience of Christ in order to make the atonement a sufficient ground of justification. His personal obedience or holiness is indispensably connected with the atonement, as before remarked; so indispensably, that without it no atonement could ever have been made. Still, the atonement itself consisted, not in the obedience of Christ, but in the shedding of his blood" (pp. 391, 392).

We should be happy to make further quotations illustrating Dr. Pond's views of the New Birth and its results, of Eschatology and the Positive Institutions. Our limits, however, forbid. We regret that the volume has not been stereotyped. We understand that nearly all the copies of the present edition have been sold. A second edition ought to be published, for it would be read extensively by laymen as well as clergymen.

History of the Christian Church. By Philip Schaff, D.D. From Constantine the Great to Gregory the Great, A.D. 311–600. In two volumes. pp. 1037.

These volumes were originally written in German, and were translated by Rev. Dr. Yeomans of Rochester, N. Y. The translation is very fresh and natural, as the original style of the work is animated and inspiring. There is often in Dr. Schaff's writings a curious felicity in the use of words; as when he describes St. Symeon the Stylite, who "lived for six and thirty years, until his death, upon a pillar, which at the last was nearly forty cubits high, for the pillar was raised as he approached toward heaven and perfection." Theodoret "compares him to a candle on a candlestick"; "the pious monk Nilus, with good reason, reminded the ostentatious pillar-saints of the proverb: 'He that exalteth himself shall be abased;'" "On this giddy height the anchoretic ascetism reached its completion (Vol. ii. pp. 192–195).

Dr. Schaff describes very clearly the rise of Episcopacy; the change

from the simple title servant of Christ to "Dominus beatissimus, sanctissimus, or reverendissimus, beatitudo or sanctitas tua." He gives a faithful description of ecumenical councils, and weighs carefully their claim to our respect. He portrays the virtues and the vices of the ancient clergy, discusses at length the question of ecclesiastical miracles, and devotes a large part of his third volume to the Pelagian controversy and the works of Augustine. He marshalls the facts of history with great skill, and evinces extensive learning. He expresses his own opinions freely, and illustrates important historical facts by the passing events of the day. His entire work is characterized by richness of thought and vivacity of expression, and has especial claims upon the attention of American as well as German scholars.

Notes, Critical and Explanatory, on the Book of Genesis, from the Covenant to the Close. By Melancthon W. Jacobus, Professor of Biblical Literature and Exegesis in the Theological Seminary at Allegany, Pa. 12mo. pp. 266. 1866.

In its literary execution this work is superior to the Notes on the Gospels by the same author, though it is not wholly free from the same faults which are observable in the latter. Its style is more easy and natural. The author gives no quarter either to the rationalistic or scientific objections to the Mosaic authorship of Genesis, and the commonly received interpretation of the account of the creation. Whether more concessions might not have been made to objectors than Dr. Jacobus has thought best, is a question on which we think that equally conscientious critics may differ. The work, however, is very ably executed, and skilfully adapted to the wants of those classes for whose special benefit we suppose it to be designed.

The New Birth, or the Work of the Holy Spirit. By Austin Phelps Professor in Andover Theological Seminary, author of "The Still Hour." 16mo. pp. 253. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Company; Cincinnati: George S. Blanchard and Company. 1867.

This volume will be considered the most valuable for a theologian which has been published by Professor Phelps. It advocates the biblical, and at the same time the philosophical, view of regeneration, with singular power and with great practical effect. Intelligent laymen as well as clergymen will read, or rather study, this book with profound interest.

We are happy to perceive that the publishers of the above work have in press a volume of the Bampton Lectures, entitled "The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament," by Thomas Dehany Bernard, Exeter College; also the Annual of Scientific Discovery for 1866 and 1867. They have recently printed, not published, a valuable octavo volume of 206 pages, entitled "Charities of France in 1866; an account of some of the principal existing charitable institutions in that country."

The Literature of the Sabbath Question. By Robert Cox, F.S.A. 2 vols., 12mo. pp. 480, 499. Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart; London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. 1865.

The author of this work has published on the same question, two other volumes, entitled, "Sabbath Laws and Sabbath Duties," 8vo. pp. 600. "The whole Doctrine of Calvin about the Sabbath and the Lord's Day," 8vo. pp. 92. The volumes which he appears to regard with the greatest deference on the question, are, "The Sabbath, or an Examination of the Six Texts commonly adduced in the New Testament in proof of the Christian Sabbath: By a Layman"; "The Sabbath; or an Inquiry into the supposed Obligation of the Sabbaths of the Old Testament: By Sir William Domville, Bart." (who was also the author of the preceding volume); and the Bampton Lectures of Dr. Hessey. The present volumes of Mr. Cox, containing nearly a thousand closely printed pages, present the opinions of more than six hundred writers on the Sabbath. If he had not added his own criticisms on these opinions, the extracts which he has given might appear more valuable. He puts himself forward too often as a partisan against the Puritan theory of the Sabbath, and thus awakens a suspicion that perhaps his excerpts from the writings of other men are partial and one-sided. Many of these extracts are very interesting. One of his quotations from the old Puritan, Dr. Samuel Wright (1683–1746), is eminently philosophical. To it Mr. Cox appends the following note: "At the Dublin meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, on the 4th of September, 1857, Mr. Bianconi, to whom Ireland is so much indebted for establishing and ably managing the system of public cars, stated the result of his extensive experience as follows: 'I found that I could work a horse with more advantage eight miles a day for six days, than six miles a day for seven days; and therefore I discovered that by not working on Sunday, I made a saving of twelve per cent.' It appears from the Report that this business-like statement of the commercial advantage of piety extorted laughter from the men of science; but the fact itself is neither ridiculous nor unimportant" (Vol. ii. p. 169).

A New Translation of Job, Ecclesiastes, and the Canticles, with Introductions and Notes, chiefly explanatory. Third edition. 12mo. pp. 351. A new Translation of the Book of Psalms and of the Proverbs, with Introductions and Notes, chiefly explanatory. Third edition. 12mo. pp. 421. By George R. Noyes D.D., Hancock Professor of Hebrew, etc., and Dexter Lecturer in Harvard University. Boston: American Unitarian Association. 1867.

Although differing from Dr. Noyes in many of his philological views, we entertain a high respect for him as a learned and candid writer, who expresses his opinions with great clearness and neatness, and deserves to be studied by those who do not, as well as by those who do, agree with him.

A Hand-Book on Christian Baptism. By R. Ingham. 8vo. pp. 624. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. 1865; also, abridged, Hand-Book on Christian Baptism. By R. Ingham. 16mo. pp. 76. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1865.

Both of these works are the result of great industry and perseverance. They develop an immense amount of information, and a wide extent of reading. Whether we can or cannot submit to Mr. Ingham as an authority, we shall often refer to his two volumes for hints and suggestions.

The Comparative Geography of Palestine and the Sinaitic Peninsula. By Carl Ritter. In four volumes octavo. Translated, and adapted to the use of biblical students, by William L. Gage. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1866.

This great work demands a far more extended notice than we can now give it. We are happy to see in Vol. ii. pp. 69–78 a just recognition of the researches of American geographers and explorers, especially of Drs. Edward Robinson and Eli Smith.

Elements of Logic, comprising the Doctrine of the Laws and Products of Thought, and the Doctrine of Method, together with a Logical Praxis. Designed for Classes and for Private Study. By Henry N. Day, author of "Art of Rhetoric," "Rhetorical Praxis," etc. 12mo. pp. 237. New York: Charles Scribner and Company. 1867.

This is a work of great value for clergymen. If it were less technical it would, perhaps, be more useful.

Sermons by the late Alexander McClelland, D.D. Edited by Richard W. Dickinson, D.D. 12mo. pp. 424. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1867.

These sermons are rich, powerful, and original. Dr. McClelland's style is not always dignified, see expressions like, "Poh! there are no such men in the world," "horse-laugh," etc., etc.; nor is it always reverential, see expressions like, "I tell the Almighty he has *no right* to create us as we are," etc., etc. p. 85.

We find ourselves compelled to defer many Notices already prepared of new German Works, and also Notices (some of which are already in type) of English and American works, among which are Dr. Alexander's new edition of Kitto's Biblical Cyclopaedia; Roberts's edition of Ecce Deus: Essays on the Life and Doctrine of Jesus Christ, with Controversial Notes on Ecce Homo; Alger's Solitudes of Nature and of Man, etc.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE MORAL FACULTY AS DISTINGUISHED FROM CONSCIENCE.

BY REV. DANIEL J. NOYES, D.D., PROFESSOR IN DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

THERE is hardly any word in our language which is so convenient, and at the same time so inconvenient, that is, so difficult of satisfactory explanation to those who freely use it, as conscience. It is obvious, on a moment's reflection, that both the convenience and the inconvenience are owing to the same cause—its comprehensive meaning. Conscience is not a single faculty. It embraces exercises of the understanding, the reason, and the emotional nature; and expresses the result of their combined action in moral conduct. Now if all these powers were in their normal state, and the action of each absolutely correct, absolute correctness might be affirmed of the result of their united action; and a single word might exactly and truly express it. Or if, when the action of one of these elements of conscience is wrong, or in any way defective, the action of the others were also absolutely as well as relatively wrong, then the whole wrong might be predicated of the combined result without particular discrimination; and a single term might be used to express that result. But if one of the elements is always right in its action, while that of another is sometimes wrong, as is

the fact, it is not proper to regard their united result as wholly characterized by the action of either; as wholly right, when the action of but one is right, or wholly wrong, when the action of but one is wrong. We cannot, therefore, say that the decisions of conscience are *always in all respects right;* for the decisions of one of its elements are sometimes manifestly wrong. Nor, on the other hand, can we say that they are *ever in all respects wrong;* for the decisions of one of its elements, and the one too which is generally regarded as constituting all that is embraced in the word "conscience," are always right.

It is not strange, therefore, that confusion of thought should often take place in the use of this familiar word. More than this, practical evil here, as elsewhere, is likely to follow errors in judgment. If we take the ground, without very careful discrimination, that the judgments of conscience are not always correct, that it is liable to err in its decisions; our confidence in its authority is likely to be weakened. It will be regarded as essentially on a level with those impulses of our nature which are merely constitutional, and which often mislead us. It will not be recognized as the voice of God, but of man — of man, too, ignorant and fallible. Great practical evil is doubtless the result of this view of the subject. Attention is thus unduly fixed upon the element of conscience which is liable to err in its judgments. On the other hand, if the ground is taken that the decisions of conscience are always correct, that it never errs in its judgments, — meaning really a single element of it, — and that therefore it should always be obeyed; there is danger of evil in another direction. There is danger lest the decisions of the understanding, in respect to moral subjects, should be regarded as always right and clothed with the authority of an intuitive judgment. Just here will be found a fruitful source of most dangerous self-deception, and of fanaticism in its various forms and degrees.

It is a very important inquiry how the philosophical difficulties, and much more the injurious practical consequences,

which grow out of the use of this word, may be avoided. It would seem at first view, that a careful analysis of the different elements of conscience might entirely relieve the difficulty; so far at least, as regards minds of some degree of reflection. Much may doubtless be accomplished in this way for this class of persons. But more or less confusion is likely to follow the best attempts of this kind, as every teacher of Ethics can testify. In addition to this, the analysis, if well understood at the time, is liable to be forgotten or disregarded when most needed. Old and established habits of thought do not readily give place to new views, even though more correct. Were it not for the loss in other respects, and also were it possible, we should like to limit the meaning of the word "conscience" to what, in the minds of most men, is really expressed by it; and to assign other exercises of mind now embraced in it, to their appropriate faculties. This being impossible, as language is now constructed, the best method, we think, of clearing the subject of difficulty, and one which may be of some practical benefit, is to select the central element of conscience, that in it which is usually understood by the word, and assign to it an appropriate name, and use that name instead of the other, as often as occasion requires. This discrimination in the use of the word would gradually give it its proper place in written and oral discourse. Such a name stands ready for this use — the Moral Faculty. We are aware that this name is now generally used by ethical writers as synonymous with conscience. But the term is so suggestive of its exact meaning, so expressive of the precise idea contained in it, and no more, that it would be easy to recover it from the broader signification sometimes given to it, and limit it to this specific use.

Though the change which we suggest may never take place, — is not perhaps to be expected in any considerable degree, — there is an advantage in using the term "moral faculty," in discussing the general subject of conscience, in this limited and definite signification. In this way, better than in any other, we may be able to remove some of the difficulties that

beset this important subject. In this sense, therefore, we propose to use it in this Article.

By the moral faculty, thus limited, we mean the Reason when exercised upon subjects possessed of moral quality. On account of its great importance and frequent use as thus exercised, we give it a distinct name, and one significant of its precise office. Other exercises of the Reason or Intuitional Faculty, may have distinct and appropriate names assigned to them, when there is occasion, as in this case, to make very frequent reference to them. In this way we distinguish the different exercises of the emotions, the desires, and affections.

The distinguishing office of the moral faculty, is the perception of right and wrong in the character of moral agents. In connection with this perception, a sense of obligation is always felt to be, or do, what is seen to be right. But obligation and right are nearly, if not quite, identical. A better definition of a right action cannot be given than that it is something which a person is under obligation to do. An emotion also is experienced in perceiving the right, and still more distinctly in doing it. But this is no part of the moral faculty, and should no more be included in it than the emotion awakened by memory or the imagination should be included in these faculties. The moral faculty stands in an important relation to the emotions, and moves them as no other faculty does. But they are no part of it.

The subjects to which the action of the moral faculty is exclusively confined, are acts and states of the will. It takes no notice of external actions; no notice of acts of the intellect; no notice of the constitutional desires and affections; no notice of volitions, as executive acts of the will. It regards only deliberate choices of the will, and in accordance with them pronounces its judgments of character. Nor is it mainly of individual and specific choices of the will that the moral faculty takes cognizance; but rather of its settled states, its underlying, controlling principles, which give character to all specific acts. As moral quality is limited entirely to the state of the will, so also is the action of the

moral faculty. By bearing this constantly in mind, one of the principal difficulties connected with the subject will be avoided.

But the nature of the moral faculty, and its relation to other faculties must be learned, if ever learned to any good purpose, by noticing its operations in our own individual consciousness and experience. We can never be satisfied with any theory which we cannot verify in this way.

Let us, then, in the first place, notice what may be called the general law of the moral faculty, that is, the mode of its operation in connection with other mental faculties closely related to it; or, in other words, what is the order of mental action when we perceive the moral quality of states of the will, and experience the obligation consequent upon this perception. The moral faculty, like the other faculties of the mind, is never called into exercise except in conditions suited to its action. What then are those conditions, as shown by our own experience? It is to be particularly observed, that the moral faculty never pronounces its decisions directly upon the state of the will as seen by itself. Its judgments are not of the concrete, but exclusively of the abstract. It does not say that the will of a particular person is virtuous or sinful. It has no means of ascertaining the state of his will. It cannot see it directly, as consciousness sees it, nor has it any power of reasoning or inference by which it can come to a knowledge of the subject. For this knowledge it is entirely dependent upon another faculty — the understanding. There must therefore, first, be an exercise of the understanding by which the state of the will is ascertained. But here it should be carefully noticed, that the understanding does not decide whether the will is *virtuous* or *vicious*. It is not competent to this. It is not capable of a moral idea. It decides only as to the tendencies of the will; that is, whether it has a state, or principle that tends to the honor of God and the good of man, or the contrary. As soon as the understanding has thus decided upon the character of the will, whether its decision is correct or not, the moral faculty

gives its intuitive judgment. It says that *a* state of will which is obedient and benevolent is right. The case may be such that no further action of the moral faculty is required in respect to it. But if some expression of the state of the will thus approved, is to be made in external conduct, there must be another exercise of the understanding to decide in what manner this shall be done. On this point the moral faculty can say nothing. It has no knowledge of anything external. All that it does is to approve and require the exercise of a loving state of the will. Such a state, and such a state in exercise, it does require; but it leaves the will to learn for itself, how this state shall be expressed in action. This it does through the aid of the understanding, whose office it is to adapt means to ends. When the understanding has decided what appears to itself the proper mode of expression, there is another exercise of the moral faculty; if it should be called another, rather than the same one continued, which we have already noticed. Here the moral faculty *seems* to require a particular external action. But this is not the case. All that the moral faculty does at this point, is to urge the expression of love, in the scripture sense of the word. It does not indicate the mode in which it is to be expressed, and is in no sense responsible for it. That is left entirely to the will which obtains its light from the understanding. Should the understanding adopt a mode of expression which is improper, the moral faculty is not responsible for it. It does not indorse the action of the understanding; indeed, it does not know what that action is. But we shall have occasion to refer to this point again. In case the will is obedient and prompt to express its love in the way that the understanding suggests, there will be a still further exercise of the moral faculty. The will, in its acts of obedience, presents to the understanding a more decided and lively exercise of the moral affections than before. This is followed by a more decided approbation of the moral faculty in the conviction of personal merit and its attendant agreeable emotions.

In striking contrast with this is our experience, when the will is not disposed to obey at once the decisions of the moral faculty. If it is obedient, there is no experience of what some ethical writers call the "impulse of conscience." Such an exercise of the moral faculty takes place only when there is reluctance of the will to obey. The impulse, indeed, is only a repeated decision of the moral faculty that the state of the will is wrong, thus urging a different state. If obedience is still refused, the moral faculty pronounces its sentence of condemnation, which is accompanied by a sense of demerit and its attendant emotion, remorse. A brief illustration will embrace all the points of this analysis. A person in the neighborhood needs assistance. Our attention is directed to the case, and we experience certain feelings towards the person, prompting us to aid him. The understanding decides that these feelings are benevolent, such as tend to his good. The moral faculty at once says, such feelings are right. The understanding says again, give him food. The moral faculty says, the *state of will* which prompts to such an action is right and ought to be expressed — urges its expression. The lively affections of the will, called into exercise by obedience, receives a more decided approval of the moral faculty, which is followed by agreeable emotions. In this case, conscience would include what we have assigned to the understanding, the moral faculty, and the emotional nature. Such may be regarded as the general law of the moral faculty, which every one by a careful observation of his own consciousness may verify for himself.

We now turn to a more particular examination of those features of the subject, which are the occasion of more or less difficulty to most minds; all of which, we think, can be satisfactorily explained in accordance with the principles which we have advanced.

It is a favorite argument of Paley and his school, that conscience is not an original faculty of the mind, but the result of education, because its decisions are often so very different in different nations and periods of the world; and

even among different individuals in the same community. We must admit the charge. There is this diversity in the judgments of the conscience. The inference, however, by no means follows, that conscience is not an original faculty; or rather, that the faculties whose exercises are embraced under this name are not original faculties. Now the best way, if not the only effectual way, as respects common minds, to avoid the confusion and error incident to the use of the word "conscience" in such cases, is to adopt the preceding analysis, and show the exact office of the different elements of conscience. The specific office of the moral faculty, as we have seen, is simply to pass judgments upon states of the will; to decide that a state intending the good of another is right, and that the opposite state is wrong. It is not true of the moral faculty, however it may be of conscience, that its decisions are different in different ages and communities; that they are one thing in the first century, and another thing in the nineteenth century. They are always and everywhere one and the same. The different and contradictory voices complained of as coming from the conscience, come not from the moral faculty, but from the understanding. For the sake of perfect clearness, take a simple illustration. There is in the community a family in great distress by reason of extreme poverty. They are ready to perish for want of the necessaries of life. Attention is called to them, and a question of duty arises. Here a complex case in morals is presented, in which are involved, first, a certain feeling or state of the will towards the family; and secondly, the manner in which that feeling shall be expressed in action. Of the first only, the state of the will, does the moral faculty take cognizance, and its decisions will in every instance be the same; that is, it will approve in all cases a state of the will which is inclined to do the family good, to promote their well-being. There would be no exception to this decision, in a single instance, in any community or age of the world. The moral faculty approves of love, always and everywhere says it is right, and urges the expression of it. This is all

that it has to say in the case, or in any case that can be supposed. The proper mode of expressing love in action does not fall within its province. This belongs exclusively to the understanding; as much so as any case in which is involved simply the adaptation of means to an end. Here, of course, there may be a wide difference of opinion. One man may think that the best mode of aiding the family would be to give them money; another is of the opinion that they should be aided by giving them food and clothing; another is very decided in his judgment that the best expression of true benevolence would be to give them an opportunity to assist themselves by their own efforts. These different decisions of the understanding are perfectly consistent with one uniform decision of the moral faculty; for they have reference to an entirely different subject.

This simple analysis removes all difficulty in cases where the moral faculty, or conscience used in the limited signification which we have given to the moral faculty, seems not to speak with a uniform voice. Take the case, often referred to, of the Hindoo and Christian mothers in their treatment of their children. One conscientiously casts her child into the Ganges; the other conscientiously trains up her child for God. Here the decisions of conscience are very different. Not so, however, the decisions of the moral faculty. These mothers are both, we may suppose, actuated equally by love, by a sincere desire to benefit their children. The moral faculty gives the same approval of that love in each case. How the love shall be expressed by these mothers is the appropriate work of another faculty, whose judgments are often, as in this case, very different. In Sparta the moral faculty approved of that state of the will which prompted her citizens to seek the highest good of the commonwealth. So it did at Rome; and so it does everywhere. But how the highest good of the commonwealth can actually be secured, is a subject on which great difference of opinion may exist, and one which does not come before the moral faculty for a decision. The Spartans thought that it could be done, in part, by cul-

tivating in the young that shrewdness and skill which would be required to succeed in taking the property of others without being detected. They therefore encouraged theft. Another nation decides that the same object, namely, the good of the state, can be better secured in some other way. They agree as to what is right, namely, the intention to benefit the state; but differ in judgment as to the best mode of expressing that intention. The same analysis is to be observed in the great moral questions of the day, in respect to which there exists so wide a difference of opinion, — about which "conscience" has so much to do. On the subjects of war, slavery, temperance, union and disunion, and the like, the moral faculty of the nation and the world is one and the same; that is, it has nothing to say about them as modes of external action, as the embodiment of a living spirit. It is that living spirit itself, of love or the opposite, before it is embodied, — before it has assumed any form, — that is the subject of its decisions. What mode of expression the state of the will shall assume, it is not its province to decide.

A diversity exists, and always has existed, among mankind in their speculative opinions, as to the best mode of securing the ends which the moral faculty, without the least variation in its judgments, recommends. The reason for this diversity will be found in the difference of opinion as to what will best promote the good of man; and also in the difference of opinion as to the manner in which that good can be best secured. Enough has been said to show that the decisions of the moral faculty are in all cases uniform.

There arises at this point an inquiry of still greater interest in the discussion. Admitting, as we must, that the decisions of the moral faculty are uniform, are they also correct, always according to truth? Yes, we answer; they are absolutely correct. The moral faculty never gives a wrong decision. It is infallible. We admit that this cannot be said of conscience in the comprehensive sense in which it is used. In one of its elements the decisions of conscience are often

wrong. But in that element which we are now considering, and to which we give the name "moral faculty," there is no error. In its decisions it never reasons or comes to its conclusions indirectly by inference, but pronounces its judgments intuitively. It acts independently of any biassing influence of the will. It is the impersonal faculty, the voice of God rather than of man. We are so constituted that we cannot doubt the correctness of its decision. "If this is so, how does it happen," you ask, "that the moral faculty sometimes decides that a state of the will is right which is afterwards found to be wrong; which the same moral faculty afterwards decides is wrong? That such is the fact, is obvious in cases of self-examination. Otherwise how could a person ever be deceived in respect to his true character? If the moral faculty approve, and its decisions are correct, he must be a good man. But evidence is conclusive that such a person at the very time of approval may be a bad man. The same will sometimes be found true when the moral faculty passes its judgments upon the character of other men." This difficulty is apparent rather than real; and will disappear at once if we keep in mind the definition which we have given of the moral faculty, and what we have said of its mode of action. It is that faculty, we have said, which passes its judgments upon states of the will; which decides that a state of the will that intends good is right, and the opposite state wrong. In these decisions, we contend, it never errs. We have said also, and distinctly, that previous to such a decision there must always be an exercise of the understanding to decide what the intention of the will is. The moral faculty cannot take cognizance of external actions; nor has it the power of reasoning, of comparison, or inference, by which it can come to a knowledge of *actual* states of the will, either in ourselves or others. This, as we have seen, is the work of the understanding. In walking the street we see a man strike another a severe blow. We see him repeat the blow again and again, till the man who is thus beaten falls helpless to the ground. Instantly, with the quickness of intuition, we pronounce the

man who dealt the blows a bad man. The moral faculty condemns him as having a malicious state of heart. But how do we know what is in his heart? We do not know with certainty. But we have learned by observation that such conduct generally proceeds from a spirit of malice or revenge; and we accordingly conclude that this man has such a spirit. On that conclusion the moral faculty pronounces its sentence of condemnation. This process of reasoning is not the work of the moral faculty, but of the understanding exclusively, which decides that the man has a revengeful spirit. When this decision has been made, the moral faculty pronounces its judgment. It says, such a spirit is wrong. Now is this judgment of the moral faculty correct? Yes, it is an absolutely correct judgment; for it decides this, and no more: that a malicious state of the will is wrong. This is an intuitive conviction, in which there can be no error.

In this case the intellect has presented a state of the will — that is, is contemplating a state — which, according to its judgment, is malicious. The moral faculty has pronounced such a state, namely, a malicious state, wrong; as it always does, and truly. But upon inquiry, it appears that the man was not influenced by such a spirit; that he had no malice towards his neighbor, but was acting simply in self-defence. What does the moral faculty now say? It gives, of course, a very different decision from what it did before; and for the very good reason that an entirely different case is before it. In both cases the decision of the moral faculty was correct; that is, in perfect accordance with the premises, as furnished by the intellect. The moral faculty did not err in the first decision, and correct the error in the second: both decisions were correct. It said in the first instance that malice is wrong; and in the second, that a state of the will which leads a person to protect himself is right. It was the understanding that erred in the first case, in presenting a state of will that did not actually exist. Having obtained further light, it corrected this judgment, which was followed by an appropriate judgment of the moral faculty.

There is the same mental process in the decisions which the moral faculty pronounces upon ones self. We can no more obtain a knowledge of the actual state of our own will by means of the moral faculty, either by direct perception or by reasoning, than we can obtain a knowledge of the will of another person in this way. We are just as dependent on the understanding in one case as in the other. The understanding says of us, as it does of another, such is the state of the will; that is, its tendency to good or otherwise. The moral faculty decides accordingly. If we analyze carefully the processes of the mind in the moral judgments which we form of ourselves, we shall find them somewhat as follows: First, we are conscious of the exercise of certain feelings; secondly, we decide what is the tendency of these feelings; that is, whether they tend towards God, or the world; towards the well-being of our fellow-men, or the contrary. When the intellect has thus decided, whether correctly or not, then, thirdly, the moral faculty passes its judgment; not upon the state of the will as it *really is*, but upon the state of the will as *contemplated by the understanding*, which may or may not be the actually existing state. This view of the subject removes the difficulty suggested, and makes it apparent that the moral faculty is never in error in its decisions on the state of the will. It decides upon states, principles, intentions, in the abstract, not upon them in the concrete.

As the case now stands, the error in judgment, where one exists, is chargeable upon the understanding. But it should not rest there. The understanding is an honest faculty, and will always decide according to truth, so far as it has opportunity. Let us ascertain, if possible, where the responsibility of these erroneous decisions, so far as they are erroneous, properly rests. It is not in the least degree, as we have seen, upon the moral faculty. It is not upon the understanding, so far as any blame is implied. The fault is entirely with the will. We charge it wholly upon the deceitfulness and wickedness of that faculty. Through its influence the understanding is often deprived of the light which is necessary

for forming correct judgments, both respecting its character and the proper modes of expressing that character in action. The will, which may be called the principle of personality, knows that the understanding will tell the truth respecting its character, so far as it has opportunity; and that its decisions will be followed by a corresponding judgment of the moral faculty. Now if the will is in a bad state, the temptation is very strong to conceal it from the understanding, and thus avoid the reproof of the moral faculty, This it can accomplish in a good degree by bringing out fully, and giving great prominence to, all that is favorable to itself, and by keeping in the background, or perhaps entirely out of sight, all that is unfavorable. As the state of the will is inferred from the conduct which it prompts, by attending exclusively or unduly to certain parts of the conduct, a favorable decision may be secured when an unfavorable one is deserved. The Saviour recognizes this principle when he says: "Every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved. But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God." Instances of this are familiar to every man in his own experience, while others often come under his observation. Let us look at the workings of the mind in a case of doubtful morality. A young man who has been educated in the belief that theatrical amusements are injurious in their tendency, and that it is morally wrong for him to countenance them by his presence, visits a distant city. He learns by the advertisements that a favorite play of Shakespeare is to be acted on a particular evening. He has a strong desire to witness it. But the moral faculty stands in the way, tells him that it is wrong; that is, it tells him that a state of will is wrong which inclines him to do what his judgment has decided is injurious to the best interests of society. Now how shall he gratify his desire, and still avoid the reproof of the moral faculty? In other words, how shall he make his moral faculty approve what he desires? To accomplish this, he must secure from the understanding a

favorable judgment of his desire. It must pronounce the desire good — such as is fitted, if gratified, to do good to himself and others. But how can this be done? He reasons with himself somewhat as follows: If I attend the theatre my influence on others will not be injurious, as I am a perfect stranger in the city. The effect on myself in attending but once, cannot be unfavorable. My reputation also is safe, since what I do here will not be known elsewhere. Again, if I attend, I shall know better what a theatre is, and shall be able to advise others intelligently respecting it. Moreover, I may expect to derive advantage to myself in various ways: I shall better understand the great poet; learn something of human nature; be able perhaps to present truth more forcibly; know how to influence men more effectively for their good. Thus he reasons; and, by keeping all opposite views of the subject out of sight, it is not strange that his arguments appear conclusive to him, and that he comes to the full belief that attendance on the play is his duty. But why does he give this undue attention to some features of the subject, while he entirely overlooks those of a different character, which are equally important to a correct decision? Because the will is bent upon a particular course, and naturally influences the mind to take those views of the subject which will justify it in this course. The understanding, thus unduly influenced, presents the case, and the moral faculty pronounces its verdict. It says, *a state of will* which has such tendencies is right. But whether the individual has or has not such a state, it does not decide. The will has virtually made the decision itself by its unfair and dishonest treatment of the understanding.

It is not a difficult matter for a person thus to deceive himself; to secure such a judgment of the understanding as the will may desire. The will is so thoroughly educated in this deceptive work, that we are often unconscious of its influence.

We have here the explanation of a very important practical truth, namely, that the approbation of the moral faculty

is not conclusive evidence that the will is in a right state. This is obvious from what has been said. A full view of the state of the will, in all its relations, does not, in such cases, come before the mind. The understanding is left to infer the character from a single class of feelings and actions, which are naturally right, and which may be in part a proper expression of a virtuous state of the will, though not in themselves virtuous; while another class of feelings and actions from which a very different inference would be drawn, are kept out of sight. This will explain more fully such cases as that of the heathen mother to which we referred. We said that the moral faculty approves the state of will which prompts her to seek the good of her child. But she is not virtuous, not approved of God. The reason why the moral faculty decides as it does in the case, is, that only so much of the character of the will as is concerned about the child comes before the mind. The decision of the moral faculty is correct according to the case presented or contemplated. But let the other relations in which she stands come into view, her relation especially to God; let her feelings and conduct towards him be considered, and the decision respecting her character would be very different. A very different case indeed would be before the moral faculty.

It is on this principle that so many whom we call moral men, men of integrity, who are exemplary in all respects in their social relations, deceive themselves as to their true character. They infer the whole state of the will from conduct which is altogether suitable to human relations, and which would be essentially the same in that respect if all their relations were taken into the account. But as only a part of their relations are taken into the account, the conduct in which they are deficient is not considered. Their judgment of themselves, consequently, is incorrect.

On the same principle the moral faculty of the wrong-doer is much more active and troublesome, on the exposure of his crime to public view, than when it was concealed in his own bosom. The reason is, that the will can no longer keep from

the understanding a correct view of its real state. It is now thrust upon the mind from without, and kept constantly before it. Such being the case, the moral faculty has opportunity to do its appropriate work. We notice a similar effect upon the moral faculty caused by the presence of a person whom we have injured. While he is absent from us, the wrong we have done him is easily kept out of the mind, and the moral faculty is quiet. But as soon as he appears, all the efforts of the will to turn off the mind from the subject are of no avail. One reason, doubtless, and it is an important one, why we are so little disturbed by our sins against God is, that he seems to us a great way off. We are not forced to think of him.

But of what use, it may be asked, is such a faculty, if it neither tells us the actual state of the will, nor is a rule of conduct; if it is thus dependent for its action upon the understanding and the will? Of great use, we answer. It is only through the moral faculty that we obtain a knowledge of right and wrong, that we experience a sense of obligation; in this way only are we raised to the dignity of moral and accountable beings. This is its office, and a noble office it is; and surely we have no reason to complain of it, that it does no more than its appropriate work; that it does not do the work of other faculties, which they are perfectly competent to perform, and which, with a right state of the will, they would always perform correctly. We may as reasonably complain that the written law is of no use, because it only decides that a particular state of the will is right or wrong, without deciding who has such a state, without preventing a person's deceiving himself as to his own character. The law says that love is right. It requires it, and passes its approving judgment upon the man who has it. But it does not tell us who has love, or who that thinks he has it, is deceiving himself. Each man must do this for himself, in the exercise of his appropriate faculties. It is a part of his probation. There is danger of wrong judgment in this respect, and the scriptures warn us against it. No one finds fault with the

law because this is so. Now the moral faculty is that law so transferred to the mind, so placed within the soul, that it will execute itself, pronounce judgments intuitively, whenever a case comes before it. To expect more from the moral faculty than it was designed to accomplish, will only tend to shake our confidence in its appropriate work.

We have said that it is the exclusive office of the moral faculty to pronounce judgments upon states of the will, and that in these judgments it never errs. We have also said that it is the office of the understanding to decide in what mode the state of the will approved by the moral faculty should be expressed in action, and that in these decisions the understanding is liable to error. The inquiry may arise at this point: Does not the moral faculty so act in connection with the decisions of the understanding as really to indorse them as its own? In other words, if the decision of the understanding is wrong in respect to conduct, and the moral faculty requires a person to act when he has such views of conduct, does not the responsibility rest upon the moral faculty? It is the common impression, and the view presented by ethical writers generally, that the moral faculty does require the *particular action* which the understanding approves, and that we are morally bound to perform it for that reason. The moral faculty is thus made a rule of external conduct which we must obey; but which may lead us into sin if we do obey it. Thus Dr. Alexander says: "It is true, if a man's conscience [meaning evidently the moral faculty as we have explained it] dictates a certain action, he is morally bound to obey; but if that action is in itself wrong, he commits sin in performing it, nevertheless. He who is under fundamental error is in a sad dilemma. Do what he will, he sins. If he disobey conscience he knowingly sins, doing what he believes to be wrong; and a man never can be justified for doing what he believes to be wrong, even though it should turn out to be right. And if he obey conscience, performing an act which is in itself wrong, he sins, because he complies not with the law under which he is placed."

Now if Dr. Alexander means by this simply that all the conduct of an impenitent man is morally wrong, so long as he remains impenitent, whatever may be his intellectual or moral judgments of himself or his actions, we of course agree with him. But if he means that the moral faculty ever leads a person into sin, or requires him to remain in sin, or to perform a sinful act, we dissent from him entirely. We could by no means agree with him, even if we should include in the term "conscience" an exercise both of the understanding and the moral faculty. In order to a clear explanation of this point, we should notice the different senses of the word "wrong," when used as an epithet of an action. An action may be either morally wrong, or naturally wrong. It is morally wrong when it proceeds from a bad state of the will. It is naturally wrong when it is not suitable to the circumstances in which it is performed. A person may desire to injure another, and perform an action for that purpose. That is a morally wrong action because it proceeds from a bad state of the will. Again, a person may be sincerely desirous to benefit another, and perform an action for that purpose; but for want of sufficient knowledge, the action may be injurious, not fitted to benefit him. That action, though morally right, is naturally wrong. Now it is certain that the moral faculty never requires a person to do a morally wrong action, an action which he cannot do without sinning. For such an action proceeds only from a bad state of the will, from a bad intention, which the moral faculty always condemns.

Admitting for the present that the moral faculty requires a person to perform the particular action, which his judgment tells him is the proper expression of a good state of will, that it actually indorses that decision as its own; it does not follow that the action, though naturally wrong, must be a sinful action; that a person must commit sin in doing it. The moral faculty has required, in the case supposed, as it always does, the existence and exercise of a benevolent state of will. The understanding, under the in-

fluence of that state, decides what, in its judgment, is the best expression of benevolence in action. But for want of sufficient knowledge, of natural ability, it cannot tell what action is best suited to the circumstances, what is naturally right. It decides, we will suppose, in favor of an action naturally wrong. The action is performed. Now no one can blame the will in this case, for by the supposition its intention is good. Nor can the understanding be blamed, for it acted under the influence of a good state of will, and according to the light which it possessed. But if the will and understanding are blameless, no fault can attach to the moral faculty for urging the performance of the action dictated by the understanding; for the moral faculty has no means of knowing anything respecting external actions — if we suppose it to know them at all — except through the understanding. It follows then, of course, that if no blame attaches to any of these faculties in the performance of the naturally wrong action, no sin is committed in performing it. The man acts according to the best of his ability.

But it may be said that the want of natural ability to do better, to perform a more suitable action, is owing to previous misconduct, to the misimprovement of the means of knowledge with which he had been favored. If so, he is certainly to be blamed for that misconduct. He ought to have improved his means of knowledge. He is responsible for his wrong conduct in this respect. But he is not responsible for the consequences of it. By the supposition, he has now a different state of will, is a different person morally, and of course is responsible in the future only for what he has natural ability to do. If he does not know, and cannot know, a better expression of love than that which he makes, no blame will attach to him in respect to that action, though it be positively injurious.

If we admit, therefore, that the moral faculty requires a person to perform the naturally wrong action, an action positively injurious, it does not follow that he must *sin* in obeying the requirement. He acts under a sense of moral

obligation, and with the very best intention of doing what is naturally right. Such conduct will always be approved of God.

But the moral faculty does not require this naturally wrong action. It has no knowledge whateverof the decision of the understanding which dictates it, either when it is made or after it has been made; and of course it does not require the will to act in this particular manner; that is, it does not dictate this particular action. All that it requires, as we have seen, is the exercise of love. It throws the entire responsibility, as to the manner of expressing it in action, upon the will, which obtains all its knowledge from the understanding.

Still it may be asked, does not the moral faculty require the will to do in general what the understanding decides is best, though it may not know what the decision of the understanding is? In other words, is not a person morally bound to do the very thing which his judgment decides is, on the whole, best? Most certainly he is. This is an essential law of our mental constitution. The will has no rule of action but the dictates of the understanding. No light can come to it except through the understanding. If the will therefore act at all, it must act as the understanding dictates. Such being the constitution of the mind, if the moral faculty urges the will to express love in action, it must express it according to the judgment of the understanding, or not at all. Should the will refuse to act in this only way in which it can act, a new case would at once come before the moral faculty. The understanding would decide that a state of will which would not act in accordance with its decisions as to what is naturally right, is not a state intending good, and the moral faculty would immediately condemn it. But in all this no responsibility for one particular action, rather than another, rests upon the moral faculty. All that the moral faculty does is to hold the will to its normal action, to require it to do what God requires it to do, and what he has made it to do. It is God's ordinance that it shall conform to the decisions of the understanding, which, rightly used, is a safe guide. If the will exerts improper influence over the under-

standing, as it may do, though it is under no natural necessity of doing it, and thus secures an erroneous decision, God is not responsible for that decision. Nor is the moral faculty, which expresses the voice of God, responsible for it. This simply requires the will to act honestly and truly, as it was made to act. The responsibility for the erroneous judgment of the understanding here, as well as for the erroneous judgment respecting the state of the will, rests entirely with the will.

Again, suppose the state of the will really bad, while the person thinks it good, and under the influence of this deception decides upon a course of action which is naturally wrong. What is the relation of the moral faculty to that state of will, and to the action affected by it? Does it require either the state of the will, or the action affected by it? Neither; it requires a good state of the will, no other. But suppose the moral faculty is not obeyed in this respect, the will continuing bad; does the moral faculty require that the action which the understanding decides is a proper expression of a right state of the will should be performed? Yes, in the sense explained, but not with a bad state of will. What the moral faculty approves in the case of self-deception, is not the existing state of will, but a state which the understanding decides intends good; and what it requires in action is the, expression of such a state, according to the natural ability which the will possesses. This is an exact explanation of the case of Saul of Tarsus, whose conscience, some think, required him to commit sin: "I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." Here "thought" expresses the exercise of the understanding, and "ought" the exercise of the moral faculty. Through an improper influence of the will, the understanding decided that the will was in a state of love to God and man. The moral faculty approved of such a state. Again, through an improper influence of the will, the understanding decided that persecution of the church was the proper mode of expressing love. The moral faculty urged the expression of love, leaving the responsibility for

the mode of doing it with the will, in the use of the means which God had given it. The sin of Saul therefore did not consist in his obeying the moral faculty; but it consisted wholly in his disobeying it. The moral faculty required of the will — of him, love to God and man. This he refused to exercise. He disobeyed the command. Again, it required of the will the expression of love in action to the best of its ability. Here again, he refused obedience. He might have known, and with a different state of will would have known, that persecution was not the proper expression of love in the circumstances.

It follows, as a logical inference from the main points of the discussion, that the moral faculty cannot be improved or injured directly by any particular treatment to which we can subject it. We say directly, for as this faculty is an essential part of our mental constitution, whatever affects the whole mind must necessarily affect this. The idea which we mean to advance is, that the moral faculty cannot be improved by particular cultivation, nor injured by particular abuse or neglect, any more than the law of God, which is written on the sacred page. This language, we are aware, cannot be used in respect to conscience, which in some of its elements is subject to the same laws as the other mental faculties. We speak of a tender conscience, an enlightened conscience, a perverted conscience. The scriptures use similar forms of expression, as a "good conscience," a "weak conscience," a "seared conscience," a "conscience void of offence." But such expressions, analyzed according to the principles which we have laid down, will show that these epithets do not belong to the moral faculty, but to other faculties closely connected in their operations with it. For example, "a good conscience" is not a conscience that has a good moral character; for conscience has no moral character, any more than memory. But by "a good conscience" we mean a state of the will which the moral faculty pronounces good. A "conscience void of offence" means a state of the will which does not offend the

moral faculty, that the moral faculty does not pronounce wrong. "A weak conscience" is not the moral faculty in a debilitated state; but a condition of the understanding which is hesitating, doubting, as to what is the best mode of expressing in action a right state of the will. A "seared conscience" is a state of the will which has long prevented the understanding from obtaining such a view of it as the moral faculty will condemn, and thus awaken, through the emotional nature, a feeling of remorse. The apostle Paul speaks of "commending" himself to "every man's conscience:" That is, he so preached and labored as to give evidence to the understanding of every man, of a state of will in himself which their moral faculty would decide is right. He also speaks of purging the "conscience from dead works" by the blood of Christ. But what effect could the blood of Christ, or the death of Christ, have upon the moral faculty directly? None at all. But the end is secured indirectly, in this way. It is the will, and not the moral faculty, that is impure and needs purging. The death of Christ renders it consistent for God to remove the corrupt state of the will by the agency of the divine Spirit, and to give it such a state as the moral faculty approves. The will is purged, and thus the action of the moral faculty in respect to it is changed. In this way may all similar expressions in the scriptures, and such as are used in common discourse, be analyzed. No effect is produced upon the moral faculty. The effect is entirely upon the will or the understanding as they stand related to the moral faculty.

In the same way we account for the workings of the moral faculty in very bad men. Even the pirate upon the high seas can pursue his course of terrible crime with little or no remorse. He will admit, perhaps, that he did wrong at first, but after society made an outlaw of him for his crime, there was no other mode of life before him; and consequently he reasons, if he cannot be fully justified for his conduct, he cannot be greatly blamed for it. In this way the understanding is kept in ignorance of the true character of the will, and the moral faculty cannot pronounce the decision that such a state of the will de-

serves. The moral faculty has not been injured. It is not asleep in all this course of wickedness. It is not weak or feeble. It is watchful, vigorous, and faithful. This is evident from what always occurs when the Spirit or providence of God reveals the true state of the will. No time is necessary for the moral faculty to awake, to recover strength. It lays hold of its victim at once, in an instant, with giant power; foreshadowing most clearly what it will do hereafter. In very good men, on the other hand, the moral faculty condemns with great severity the least deviation from rectitude, not because it has been improved by education, not because it is more vigorous and watchful than in the other case, but because the will, being less wicked and deceitful, is disposed to come to the light of God's law, that its true character may be known.

But while the moral faculty needs no improvement, and can receive none, the faculties closely related to it may be improved, and thus essentially affect its decisions. It is to the state of the will that we are directly to refer all that is morally wrong in conduct; and to this cause also must we indirectly refer, in a great measure, what is naturally wrong. It is owing to the depravity and consequent deceitfulness of this faculty, that the understanding is blinded and mislead; and thus decisions of the moral faculty relatively wrong are secured. There can be no essential improvement of the will without a radical change wrought in it by the Spirit of God. Until this takes place full self-knowledge is practically impossible. Man will not know himself, if he can avoid it, when such knowledge must be followed by the most exquisite suffering which the human soul can experience. Nothing short of regeneration by the Holy Spirit will restore all the mental powers to their normal condition and action. But though there can be no essential improvement of the character till this great change is wrought by the Spirit of God, still much may be accomplished, as respects external conduct, by a careful training of the understanding while the will is unrenewed. It may receive such instruction as

to what is right in action, that it will be exceedingly difficult for the will to mislead it.

In this connection we see the great importance of correct and well-established principles and habits of action. They are not only safe guides if followed, but they exert great influence in constraining us to follow them. The explanation is this: If these principles are prominent in the mind's view, and have become established by long practical observance of them, it will be very difficult for the will, however deceitful, to persuade the understanding that it is in a right state, when it proposes to disregard these admitted and established guides of conduct —when it would lead the understandinging to turn aside from these highways of virtue. The understanding thus disciplined has had experience on the subject, and knows better. It has learned by observation and long practice what is the proper mode of expressing right states of the will in particular circumstances, and cannot easily be mislead. But if there are no such principles of action established by practice, if the understanding has not some support outside of the immediate circumstances in which it is called to act, a corrupt will can easily prevail over it and carry it captive at pleasure. We see this illustrated in student life. If a young man has fixed principles of study, of habitual attendance on required exercises, of obedience to every law, the will, whatever its state as towards God, cannot persuade him that the opposite course of conduct is wise, suitable, becoming, and therefore right. So in life generally. If the understanding is fully established in principles of truth, honesty, temperance, and other virtues, it will be very difficult for the will, though at times it may be very strongly inclined to do it, to justify to the understanding a different course of conduct. When the temptation is presented, the inquiry will at once arise: Why should I do this? Why should I not do as I have ever done? Or the recollection of some sad experience in the past, when this wrong course was pursued, will come before the mind. The light coming in this way through the understanding will expose the true character of the will,

which might otherwise be concealed, and the moral faculty will have opportunity to do its appropriate work. Here is the secret of the force, to a great degree, of early moral and religious instruction. The child is taught, in substance, that certain beliefs and actions are the true expression of a right state of will, that such a state cannot be expressed in any other way. The moral faculty is thus enlisted in behalf of this particular course. If there is any deviation from it, the understanding decides that it proceeds from a wrong state of the will,—a state, which the moral faculty instantly condemns. The fall of those who have been regarded as good men, men of integrity and uprightness, may be accounted for on the principle which we are now considering, though at first view it seems to contradict it. It will be found in all such cases, that the will has gradually undermined the general principle; we should say rather, has established another principle in its place, and confirmed it by habit, viz. that occasional indulgence in what is ordinarily considered wrong, a slight deviation at times from absolute integrity and purity, is proper in the circumstances. When this principle is established, as it may be, without any very distinct consciousness of the fact on the part of the individual, the fall, which astonishes every one as sudden, takes place. It was not sudden; nor any exception to the great law of our moral nature. It is a melancholy illustration indeed, of the fact, that however correct the intellectual view of what is right in external conduct, and however firmly established in it by practice, there is no absolute safety for this world even, but in a state of the will which is right in the sight of God. A house built upon the sand, though beautiful, and for the time useful, is liable at any moment to be swept away by the storms that may beat upon it.

We learn from the view which we have taken of this subject, how alone true and permanent peace of the moral faculty can be secured. This, at first view, might seem impossible in case of a person who has once sinned. The decisions of the moral faculty, as we have seen, are according to truth, and consequently immutable. What it con-

demns to-day it must condemn through eternity. How then can a person who has ever committed sin avoid the condemnation of the moral faculty, and the consequent feelings of remorse, when all ignorance is removed from the mind, when deception can no longer be practised, when he must see himself as he is in the full light of truth? Here is a problem which philosophy of itself could not have solved; but which Christianity solves on strictly philosophical principles. It is true that the moral faculty will never cease to condemn a state of the will which is wanting in love to God and man. If we have such a state now, the moral faculty condemns it, if it has the opportunity; and it will condemn such a state forever, whatever change may take place in us. It will never say that such a state is right. How then, we may well ask, can there be peace, when the veil is stripped from the heart, and the clear light of truth falls upon it? Must not the sinner be wretched forever, whatever provisions may have been made for his happiness in the gospel? These, if accepted, cannot change the decisions of the moral faculty respecting the past. Wrong being and wrong doing must forever be condemned by it. They deserve condemnation. How then can he who has once sinned have peace, even if he has repented of his sin and believed in Christ? We have noticed that when the moral faculty condemns a wrong state of will in another person it is not attended with that peculiar feeling of remorse which is experienced when the bad state condemned is our own. The condemnation is as decided in one case as in the other, but the attendant moral emotions are not the same. In one, it is disapprobation simply, an indignant feeling towards it. In the other, there is, in addition to this, a feeling of remorse. Now, when the state of the will is changed by the Spirit of God; when, in the expressive language of scripture, we are born again, we become new creatures in Christ. We put off the old man. We are morally different persons, for we have a different character. While therefore the moral faculty condemns the state of the will which existed previous to the change, and will always

condemn it, as wrong; the moral emotions attending the condemnation will be the same as though the state of the will belonged to another person. It does really belong to another person, viz. to the old man which we have put off, with the affections and lusts belonging to him. We shall always disapprove of that state, feel indignant towards it. But it is no longer ours. The understanding now sees a state of will in us which has love to God and man. The moral faculty approves of that state, and its approbation is followed by a class of emotions which fill the soul with joy and peace.

ARTICLE II.

THE RELATIONS OF GEOLOGY TO THEOLOGY.

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(*Continued from page* 388.)

III. GEOLOGY gives additional force to the arguments for the truth and inspiration of the scriptures. The arguments for the truth of the historical statements of the Bible and its authority had been clearly stated and confided in by the church before the birth of geology. Not knowing that the history of immense periods anterior to man could be acquired, divines supposed the world began with man, and that only the existing animals and plants were produced in the creation. As soon as glimpses of the truth appeared, sceptics cried out that the Bible had committed itself to scientific error, and honest inquirers were bewildered. After decades of discussion, sceptics are silenced, the church adopts new interpretations of Genesis, and allows the conclusions of science to illuminate the sacred page. This feature of the connections between science and religion has been the most commented upon, though less important than some others.

Geology confirms the biblical account of the antiquity of the earth; the order of creation, particularly the compara-

tively recent origin of man; the nature of the Noachian deluge; and the future state of the earth. The interpretation of the Bible was formerly incorrect in these particulars. Before entering immediately upon the discussion of these topics, let us examine the form and evident design of the first eight chapters of Genesis, which contain the principal statements respecting the early history and condition of the earth.

Form. The accounts of the creation and fall of man must have been directly revealed to Moses, or else he was inspired to select material from historical records, to be moulded into one connected narrative. The latter course seems to have been adopted. The style of the first chapter is different from that employed later in the Pentateuch. There seem to be separate statements, each giving the history of some particular event, and complete in itself. The earliest documents were quoted in full, and they succeed each other abruptly. Those later may have been abridged, pruned of human additions, and explained by the insertion of Mosaic connectives and sentences. So far as the truth and inspiration are concerned, it makes no difference where Moses obtained his information; he was inspired to select what was proper.[1]

The different documents are characterized by the special names applied to God. Thus Document No. 1 (chap. i., ii. 1–3) describes the creation of the universe, using only Elohim [God] for deity. This account is brief, simple, and pertinent. Document No. 2 (chap. ii. 4–25, iii.), is a different record, composed by another hand, and written without reference to the first. It describes man's original condition and fall, and is appropriately prefaced by a brief notice of the creation of plants, the earth, and heavens. These are repetitions of what has gone before, but the account of the creation of man and woman is amplified. The progressive nature of the creation is not at all alluded to. This record uses only the words "Jehovah Elohim" (LORD God) for deity, except when Eve speaks with the serpent, which may be a quotation.

Document No. 3 (chap. iv.) gives the history of Cain and

[1] See Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xii. p. 87. Yahveh Christ; or the Memorial Name, by A. MacWhorter, p. 56 et seq.

Abel, using the word "Jehovah" [LORD] almost exclusively for deity. Document No. 4 (chap. v.), is the book of the generations of Adam, using only the word "Elohim" for deity. The account of the deluge (chap. vi., vii., viii.) seems to have been compiled from both Elohistic and Jehovistic documents. Elohim is an older name than Jehovah, the latter first coming into general use in the time of Enos, when "men began to call upon [use] the name of Jehovah."[1]

We have thus briefly alluded to the fragmentary character of these chapters, because the knowledge of their origin enables us to interpret them more intelligently. If Moses was simply guided in selecting the materials, as Ezra compiled the books of Chronicles, he may not have been aware of their full meaning or importance, while the preservation of the original history of the creation, probably revealed to Adam or some one before the time of Enos, shows us the designs of providence in giving us, thousands of years later, the means of properly interpreting his first revelation.

This ancient document, the first chapter, is of necessity retrospectively prophetic. Divinity alone can reveal to man what happened before his birth. We may conceive these truths to have been made known in a series of visions to Adam. Each great act in the drama of the earth's history passed before his mind, and the successive impressions are recorded in the form of a pictorial history. It is not a poem, nor an epic, but a plain, simple description of each vision in the magnificent panorama; not that the subject was not sufficiently grand for versification, but we should not expect to find metrical composition in the first family, whose ideas and words were few and expressive of the most common objects and sensations.

The first scene is of the materials about to be used for the building up of the earth, unarranged, without atmosphere, ocean, life, or even light, just as they had been created. God says: "Let there be light"; and suddenly chemical action commences among the atoms, and light shines. In the second vision activity is apparent. God commands the elements

[1] Gen. iv. 26. Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xiv. p. 107.

to move, and the sky separates itself from the earth, clouds gather, and thus there was established, apparently, a great reservoir above, from which rain falls; and there is now a space between the waters in the clouds and those resting upon the earth.

The third scene represents the collecting together of the waters into oceans, and the elevation of continents; and presently the arid expanses are covered with verdure — a beautiful change from the previous barrenness. The fourth scene brings to view the sun and moon. The heavy primeval mists have cleared away, revealing the celestial bodies, while in the background of the picture there may be other green landscapes, but the mind is occupied with contemplations of the greater and lesser lights, so as not to mention them. In the fifth scene the attention is directed to the smaller objects — the animals sporting in the sea, on the land, and in the air. The ocean is seen to be swarming with corals, shells, and fishes; insects and birds fly in the air, and great leviathans and whales sail upon the waters. God had commanded the elements to abound with animals, and they appeared in regular order and definite succession. At the beginning of the sixth vision the command is uttered, and immediately the land is seen to be alive with living creatures, — camels, elephants, oxen, sheep, the smaller creeping animals, and wild beasts of the forest. And while the new races are enjoying their existence, the determination is expressed to create man in the likeness of the Elohim, with a moral nature, who should multiply, dominate over the senseless beasts, and use them for his purposes. With the introduction of man the visions cease, but the following day of rest was made as memorable as the periods of vision.

Even if such a series of visions appear fanciful, none can deny that the supposition will explain the obscurities and systematize all the facts better than any other. And we can perceive its uses.

The pictorial method of representing facts is used elsewhere to reveal the future. The source of all description is

eye-witness; and when events in the past or future are to be described, they must be represented precisely as they appear. Two kinds of pictorial descriptions of future events are employed in scripture; the one where the precise acts or objects are represented, the other where the things perceived are symbols of the reality. Of the first class is the vision of the secret chamber of imagery, where Ezekiel saw seventy men of the ancients of Israel offering incense to idols; the women sitting in the northern door of the gate of the temple weeping for Tammuz; and also the vision of twenty-five men between the porch and the altar worshipping the sun. We may consider the pattern of the tabernacle showed Moses in the mount as another instance. Examples of symbolic visions are numerous. The living creatures, the wheels within wheels, and the brightness seen by Ezekiel symbolized the appearance of the likeness of the glory of God. The vision of dry bones taking on flesh and life symbolized the national and spiritual restoration of Israel. The visions of the fat and lean kine, the full corn and blasted ears, symbolized the years of plenty and famine in Egypt.

But there is a special class of symbolic representation peculiarly appropriate to our discussion, the time-symbols. The seventy weeks of Daniel symbolized the time that should elapse before the destruction of Jerusalem. The forty-two months, or twelve hundred and sixty days, mentioned in two places, symbolize the duration of antichrist. Then there are the thousand two hundred and ninety days, the thousand three hundred and five and thirty days, the thousand years during which Satan is to be bound, the time, times, and a half, all symbols of periods whose duration is not known. The best interpreters are now agreed that the days mentioned in the account of the creation are symbolical of previous periods of unknown length, like the time-symbols used by the prophets. The time-symbols of the future have a double signification; so have the time-symbols of the past; and we are authorized to draw inferences from the connections of the word "day" in other parts of scripture under either signification.

Some authors think the word "day" should be interpreted figuratively, i.e. it means directly an indefinite period, and not at all a common day. It is then necessary to attach definite significations to the mornings and evenings, which is done clumsily. It is better to adopt the symbolical theory which gives all the advantages of both the figurative and literal significations. The figurative sense is occult and abstruse; the symbolical does not nullify the obvious meaning.

Thus the most important peculiarities in the form or style of the first few chapters of Genesis are these. It was written by different authors; it is retrospectively prophetic; it is a pictorial history of the creation, and the word "day" is used in a symbolic sense.

Design of the Creative Account. The account of the creation was probably designed to teach several important religious truths:

(a) The creation of all things is ascribed to God. It is repeated again and again that God commanded so and so; God created; God saw; and God approved. The word "Elohim" is used thirty-five times in thirty-four verses. As God created the animals and heavenly bodies, men are taught to worship him who made all else.

(b) It was designed to teach that the creative work was performed in a manner worthy of God. It was accomplished with infinite ease. What can be more admirable than the creation of light? The atoms were all emptiness and desolation, but God says: "Let there be light," and the universe was instantly illuminated. There is no machinery, no visible exertions; but God speaks, and it is done. No agent is anywhere employed. Even where the expression seems to imply the aid of instrumentalities, — the waters commanded to bring forth the moving creature, the air to abound with fowl, and the earth to produce quadrupeds, — the context declares immediately that God made the great whales, the fowl, and cattle. That God is the energy enabling second causes to act is the plain doctrine of Genesis. We derive the impression that the creative work was performed in

accordance with a predetermined plan. Each days' work is approved, as if the result corresponded with the purpose; and the plan is evidently progressive, with a growing fitness for the introduction of moral beings. There is no creation of organic life until the continents are finally separated from the oceans, and no animals until sustenance is prepared for them. And when the six days' work is completed, the several parts are seen to be combined into one perfect whole, "very good."

(c) It was designed to show the superiority of man over the brute animals. They were commanded to be fruitful and multiply, but man was to have dominion over them.

(d) It was designed to show what was the natural and proper food of man — the fruits, grain, and vegetables. This was his sustenance in paradise, and it was not till after the flood — when sin had grown so mighty as to overwhelm the world — that the use of animal food was allowed.

(e) It was designed especially to remind men that a portion of their time must be consecrated to the service of God. The very first families were distinctly notified that the example of their Maker must be imitated. Six days had been spent in fitting up this beautiful world for their residence, and the day succeeding the cessation of labor was sanctified, forever set apart from other days for sacred employments. The only other reference in the Bible to the divine work is the command to remember the seventh day to all generations. Here we conceive, is the origin of the use of the number "seven" to denote perfection. The work of creation was perfect, and hence it was natural for men to transfer the idea of perfection to its most conspicuous feature. We cannot, therefore, so invert the order of the symbol as to suppose the use of the number "seven" simply denotes the perfection of the creative work, while there is no truth in the special acts of each day, or that the creative document is merely a poetical fiction, designed to teach great truths, but with no foundation in facts.

God was not satisfied with ordering the observance of the seventh day; the law of the Sabbath was written in the con-

stitution of the animal kingdom. Its violation is visited with a penalty. The week is thus a natural as well as a positive institution, and from its origin is commemorative of the creative work. We have really, therefore, an argument for the truth of the creative narrative in the constitution of men, animals, and society.

(f) We believe the creative chapter was designed at the outset to confirm the truth of the sacred narrative in a remote sceptical age. A modern science, born fifty-five centuries after the art of music, illustrates the earliest inspired record, so that it is better understood than at any intermediate period. Though not given to teach scientific principles, the fact that the incidental statements of the document designed to illustrate the power, wisdom, and benevolence of God are properly understood only till the fifty-ninth century, while whole systems of false creative philosophy and pretended revelation intermediate have been overwhelmed, proclaims unmistakably the truth and inspiration of the scriptures. Gladly would irreligion convert the substantial foundations of the biblical edifice into airy myths, that the superstructure might crumble at their blasts; but the corner-stones have been planted upon a rock, and will not yield to storms and floods. The first chapters of Genesis are at the foundation of religion. If we call them myths we destroy the obligation of the Sabbath, the doctrine of human depravity, and the sanctity of the marriage relation.

With these preliminaries we now propose to state briefly how the science of geology confirms the truth of the incidental statements of the Bible concerning the antiquity of the earth, the order of creation, and the time of the introduction of man.

There is a presumption in favor of a notice of the geological history, arising from the character of the rest of Genesis. The sacred writings of the Jews describe the early history of the human race, while those of every other nation are limited to the events pertaining to themselves. Hence we should expect to find a description of the creation of all things in the creative chapter.

Days.	Order of Scripture.	Order of Geology.		Names of Formations.	
		When introduced.	Predominance.		
6	**Man.**	**Man.**	**Man.**	CENOZOIC	Alluvium.
	Mammals.		Mammals.		
		Large Mammals.			Tertiary.
5	Birds.		Reptiles and	MESOZOIC	Cretaceous.
					Jurassic.
	Water animals.	Small Mammals. Birds.	Reptilian birds.		Triassic.
4			Plants,	PALEOZOIC	Permian.
	Sun, moon, and stars.	Reptiles.	Amphibians.		Carboniferous.
		Fishes.	Fishes, Plants.		Devonian.
		Articulata, Mollusca, and Radiata.	Mollusks and trilobites.		Silurian.
3	Plants.			AZOIC	Huronian.
		Protozoans.			Labradorian.
	Dry land and seas.	Plants.			
		Dry land and ocean.			Laurentian.
2	Clouds and waters separated.	Development of Atmosphere.			Previous to the formation of Strata.
		Gradual cooling and condensation of the earth.			
	Atmosphere.				
1	Day and night.	Day and night.			
		Igneous fluidity. Nebular state.			
	Light.	Light.			
	Creation of matter.	Creation of matter.			

We present five columns in which we have endeavored to give the true order of the succession of events, both according to scripture and science. The last three are paralleled according to their geological age. The third represents the geological order of the inorganic acts, and the first appearances of the different classes of organisms. The fourth gives the classes predominating in the several periods. No events have been moved up or down for the sake of manufacturing an agreement. It will be noticed that the order of the events, both as respects the times of introduction and predominance in the two geological columns, agrees with that in the scriptural account. No attempt is made to specify from geological data the time when the heavenly bodies first gave light to the earth. It was probably not later than the dawn of the Silurian period. (See Table, p. 437.)

First Day. So far back as we can be carried by the formation of strata we have a sure guide to the general physical structure of the earth. Beyond that the hints are mostly of the probable, and will be viewed differently. We think that matter came into existence chiefly as original elements, in their various forms of solid, liquid, and gaseous, or perhaps all were expanded to the gaseous condition. These particles of matter did not long remain quiescent. Having mutual affinities, contiguous atoms immediately united to form compounds, and this union was attended with intense light and heat. At the same time the universal law of gravitation affected the mass it began to revolve, portions of it were detached to be developed into planets and satellites, while the large nucleus remained as the sun. For all the particulars consult the Nebular Hypothesis.

Our planet was a mass of rarified, intensely-heated, revolving matter. It continued to revolve and condense till reduced to igneous fluidity. Still condensing and cooling it attained its present sphericity and rotatory speed. Hence there were days of twenty-four hours established thus early, with intervals of darkness as soon as light came from the sun. Were the early days of different length, the polar diameter

of the earth would have been either greater or less in proportion to the time. According to La Place the present oblateness is precisely that belonging to a fluid globe of the weight and size of ours, revolving at its present rate. After the formation of a stiff crust its sphericity could not have changed perceptibly without inducing the utmost confusion, of which there is nowhere any intimation.

The scriptural statements may refer to these early conditions of the earth. The beginning may be the creation out of nothing (*bara*[1]) of the heavens and earth, or the whole material creation apprehended by the senses. There was nothing but bare matter, for the earth was very empty. But the Spirit of God was hovering over the "bottomless commixture of elements," probably of a fluid (*thehom*) character, dark and desolate. He spake, and light came; and the light was divided from the darkness, producing day and night. This period was evidently long, from the brooding action of the Spirit of God. The parallel events between the two accounts are these: (1) creation of matter out of nothing; (2) light; (3) succession of light and darkness, involving the axial revolution of the earth. This light may have been generated by chemical action, or have been derived from the sun, so far obscured by vapors as to be invisible himself, like his absence during a stormy day. We derive no hint of igneous fluidity from the text, further than is involved in the idea of day and night. It is not necessary to consider the question of a vast interval of time between the first and second verses.

Second Day. Until the fiery globe had cooled so that a crust had begun to form, the sky would not have been perceptible, nor could water have existed near the earth, except as steam. The next stage in the process of refrigeration, therefore, was that in which water began to collect, and part remained as vapor or clouds, and part settled down upon the earth. The same events appeared in the vision. The prophet

[1] For the use of *bara*, and a thorough and satisfactory discussion of the philological meaning of Gen. i. by Professor Barrows, see Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xiii. p. 749 et seq. Compare Ps. xc. 2; Heb. xi. 3.

saw the firmament or sky appear to be covered with clouds, while the heavier mists below were condensed into water. We cannot agree with those who interpret the waters by the gases of the nebulous period.

Third Day. We can now learn more of the history from geology. The gradual refrigeration of the crust of the earth caused it to shrink, so that great ridges and furrows were formed. There were changes of level in the crust, and the water collected in the depressions, leaving the ridges, so that dry land and seas began to exist. Since that time there have always been continents. Now commenced the work of denudation. Wherever on the dry land rain fell, currents and streams of water formed, and began to wear away the earth and push it towards the sea, the primitive igneous rock of the earth being broken up and deposited in the bottom of the ocean. There was an immense thickness of these deposits formed, in our country nearly twenty thousand feet, called the Laurentian series. Great disturbances agitated the crust at the close of this period, and upon the edges of the upturned Laurentian strata another series of sedimentary beds were deposited, over ten thousand feet thick, called the upper Laurentian or Labrador series of rocks. These two in turn were disturbed, and another series called the Huronian (Cambrian?) twelve thousand feet thick were piled upon them. It is in these three great series that traces of life are first seen, yet very obscure, so scant that some geologists still apply the term Azoic to the group. The evidences of the existence of plants are twofold: (1) Beds of plumbago or pure carbon, which is generally supposed to have been derived from vegetation, though no traces of the plant structure have yet been detected in them. (2) Beds of iron-ore. It is believed that nearly all beds of iron-ore are formed by the action of vegetation, just as our present bogs are abstracting iron from the soil and depositing it as ore. Water steeped with plants has the power of reducing the insoluble peroxyd of iron or rust to the state of the protoxyd. This new compound is dissolved in the water, and remains in it, flowing

away till coming in contact with the air, more oxygen is absorbed, and it returns to its original insoluble peroxyd state, and falls to the bottom. A constant repetition of this process will ultimately accumulate enough of the peroxyd to form a large bed of ore. The Laurentian iron beds were formed in this way, thus involving the presence of vegetation, and probably in considerable abundance. In the Cambrian a few distinct marine plants have been discovered.

The remains of animals lately discovered in the Laurentian group are those of Rhizopods or Foraminifera. They are the simplest of all animals, and probably constitute an independent type of life, like the Vertebrata. They are the nearest approach of the animal to the vegetable kingdom. These fossil specimens are chiefly microscopic, were discovered by Sir W. E. Logan, in Canada West, and have been described by Dr. Dawson of Montreal, under the name of Eözoon Canadense.[1]

The features of the third day as described in the vision may be recognized in this geological account. The waters were gathered together into one place, and the dry land appeared. But this was a work of time, therefore requiring long periods for its accomplishment.

Next commences a new order of things. Life is introduced. The dry land is covered with vegetation. God commands the earth to bring forth the tender grass, such as cattle feed upon (or more probably inclusive of seedless or cryptogamic plants), the herb yielding seed, such as the different species of cereals, and the fruit tree bearing fruit. These all have seed in themselves, that is, are capable of sustaining themselves without the necessity of a new creation. This classification of plants is a popular one adapted to the wants of man. That adopted by botanists is more exact. There are two great divisions, the Cryptogams, without flowers or seeds, and the Phenogams, or flowering and seed-bearing plants. The former include sea-weeds or algae, fungi, mosses, and ferns; the latter embrace the Endogens — grasses, grains,

[1] See Canadian Naturalist, 2d series. Vol. ii. p. 99.

lillies, etc., and Exogens — coniferous plants, forest trees, herbs, and fruit trees. The plants first introduced were sea-weeds. No land plants are known till the Devonian, and it is chiefly the higher Cryptogams and lower Phenogams that flourish till the later Mesozoic. It is a fact also that all the plants existing through nearly the whole geological history are now extinct. In view of these facts we would interpret the scriptural statements thus: God established upon the earth the vegetable kingdom, with its laws of propagation and general form, before the commencement of animal life. The prophet could not describe the peculiar classes of vegetation without scientific details, and therefore modelled his descriptions upon existing plants. Thus there is an essential agreement in both records concerning the events transpiring upon the third day.

Fourth Day. Following the geological record we are brought to the great Paleozoic age of life, including the formations known as the Silurian, Devonian, Carboniferous, and Permian, whose faunae and florae have a general resemblance to one another. In the Lower Silurian, representatives of three types of animal life were introduced — corals, graptolites, and starfishes of the Radiata; multitudes of trilobites of the Articulata; brachiopods, gasteropods, and gigantic chambered shells, the sharks of the early ocean, of the Mollusca. Plants were represented by sea-weeds, and vegetation must have been abundant to supply the material for the thick masses of bituminous shale and reservoirs of petroleum which occur in these rocks in Kentucky. In the Upper Silurian the assemblage of life was similar, but new species and families appeared. The whole period may be fancifully named the age of trilobites or mollusks, because these animals predominated. It is a disputed question whether the earliest rocks containing a few remains of fish in England belong to this or the following group.

The Devonian life differs from the Silurian by the presence of large numbers of sauroid fish — scarce in America, but abundant elsewhere; by the presence of land plants in the

latter part of the period, and by a diminution in the number of trilobites. Plants were sufficiently abundant to form local coal-beds, and from that time to the present nearly every formation has its beds of vegetable debris that can be used for fuel. The Devonian also furnishes the astonishing amounts of petroleum spouting out of the ground in Pensylvania. Insects and reptiles commenced to live near the close of the period. This has been styled the age of fishes.

The next has been called the age of plants, or the Carboniferous period. Most of the productive American and European coal-fields belong to this group. To the animals already mentioned must be added a few large amphibians, with numbers of insects. The trilobites have dwindled down and entirely disappeared in the following period — the Permian. The plants in both were chiefly terrestrial, trees and reeds of gigantic size and tropical luxuriance, but not so highly organized as our conifers. They were tree-ferns, tree club-mosses, and fern-conifers. Their *tout ensemble* was like that of existing tropical marshes. The Permian period witnessed the close of the great Paleozoic age, and the disappearance of most of its peculiarities.

These periods were probably synchronous with the great events of the fourth day. Upon this day the heavenly bodies were not created (*bara*), but appointed (*asa*) to the office of giving light and regulating the seasons, whence it is inferred they may have existed from the first, but were not visible upon the earth till this time. This view will harmonize both records. The sun is the central body, on which the earth depends. The oblateness of the poles and the succession of day and night were probably caused by the revolutions of the earth before the Laurentian period. By the theory that the original light was chemical or electrical purely, and the sun created on the fourth day, we know not how the days and nights were produced for many ages after the disappearance of the chemical light beneath the crust; and the electrical theory does not permit the succession of light and darkness. There must have been some foreign body to give

this succession; yet this light may have been obscure. During the Paleozoic age the atmosphere was heavily charged with carbonic acid, so that animals of delicate organizations could not have lived. The amount of gas may be conceived by reflecting that a portion of it has been condensed into the coal-beds. Such an atmosphere would increase the temperture enough to produce a tropical climate all over the globe, even if there were no increments of heat radiating from the internal fires. This is also indicated by the fossils; for the carboniferous rocks contain tropical species between twenty-five and seventy-seven degrees north latitude. The density of the air would diminish the amount of atmospheric disturbance; not that storms and winds would have been uncommon, yet the fall of rain may have been greater because of the increased amount of evaporation, and there would have been mists and clouds constantly resting upon the land. It may be that the presence of these clouds explains the apparent absence of the sun until the purification of the air permitted the light to shine through. Some have imagined the presence of the nebulous matter about the sun himself to explain all these phenomena.

We get the idea that this period was as long as the others, from the biblical notice of the fourth day. We may, therefore, suppose that the attention of the prophet during this vision was so much occupied with the contemplations of the astronomical bodies, that he overlooked the progress of events upon the earth, none of which were very different from what had been previously perceived. Adopting this notion, we may synchronize the Paleozoic age of geologists with the fourth day of Genesis. Or there may have been a slight repetition in respect to time. The events of the fourth day may have occupied the whole specified period; but in the enumeration of the animals introduced upon the fifth day, the creeping things of both the Paleozoic and Mesozoic may be included.

Too much stress has been laid upon the equal length of the periods; one may have been very much longer than another.

The suggestion that the order is that of importance, rather than of time, has much force. On account of the scarcity of words to express anything but absolute wants, the prophet, although inspired with a perfect knowledge of the disclosures of modern science, could not have expressed philosophic ideas, except by a narration of events succeeding one another. First came the most important matter. He had no word corresponding with materials, but expressed the idea by the phrase "heavens and earth." Next came the forces that act upon matter, or the inorganic laws of nature. What could have better represented the origination of forces than the creation of their representative, light, especially since it is found that the inorganic forces are mutually convertible? Next in importance would be the sky; and so on in the order of Genesis. The events must be described as successive, as that was the most convenient mode of expressing relative importance. It so happens that the order of importance is also that of time; but if for any reason they should differ, we ought not to lose faith in the record.[1]

Fifth Day. Following the geological account we come next to the Mesozoic age, divided into the Triassic, Jurassic, and Cretaceous periods. Many of the ancient types of life have disappeared, such as the cyathophyllum family of corals, graptolites, cystideans, several genera of brachiopods, and all the trilobites. In the Trias were representatives of all the great types. There were beautiful crinoids or sea-lilies, with star-fishes and corals among the Radiates; representatives of all the Molluscan classes; crustacea, worms, and true insects among the Articulates. The Vertebrates were the most conspicuous. The fishes were more modern in their structure. The reptiles were numerous and peculiar. There were frogs as large as oxen, traces of turtles, and our own New England furnished flocks of birds and reptilian birds, thirty-five species. There were also a few small marsupials. The plants were similar, in general, to those of the Carboniferous age.

The Jurassic animals and plants differed generically and

[1] Christian Examiner, Nov. 1855, p. 385.

specifically from these. There were new mollusks of the oyster tribe, and interesting cephalopods. Some of the higher insects appeared. The peculiarity of the period consisted in the immense saurians, terrestrial, aquatic, and aerial. A few of the mammals were non-marsupial. The Cretaceous period showed a great change in the vegetation. There were more than a hundred species of trees similar to those now growing in warm temperate forests, the tulip, oak, poplar, willow, etc., also conifers, and the first of the palms. The Rhizopods, or systemless animals, were abundant and characteristic; so were interesting conchifers and cephalopods, immense reptiles, the first appearance of modern osseous fishes, true crocodiles, and cetaceans or whales. There were besides a few mammals and birds. In general the whole Mesozoic period may be called the age of reptiles.

The fifth day of the Bible is marked by the introduction of creeping things, fowls, and great dragons. Jarchi says creeping things include "every living thing which is not high above the ground," such as flies, ants, worms, beetles, lizards, weasels, mice, snails, and other like creatures, and all fishes. The term "fowl" includes bats, grasshoppers, and flying insects generally, as well as birds. Great dragons may include serpents, crocodiles, and sea monsters. There would be no difficulty in referring all the animals in both the Paleozoic and Mesozoic ages to these descriptions. If however it be wished to make the work of the fourth day include the former, the Mesozoic alone is enough for the fifth.

Sixth Day. The deposits remaining belong to the Cenozoic period, including all recent accumulations. These are in two groups — the Tertiary and Alluvium. There have been four or five separate creations of life, at the beginnings of the Eocene, Miocene, Pliocene, Post-Pliocene, and Recent. None of the Eocene animals are now living. In the European Miocene fifteen to twenty per cent of the fossils are of existing species; in the Pliocene from forty to fifty per cent of the animals still flourish, and about ten per cent of the Post-Pliocene groups are extinct. No living species have been

found in the American Eocene or Miocene. Forty to sixty per cent of the Pliocene animals of South Carolina are still living, and the number of extinct American species of the latest period is about the same as in Europe.

The plants of the Tertiary were of a warm, temperate cast, including oak, maple, hickory, magnolia, palms, conifers, cinnamon, etc. There were rhizopods, corals, echini, brachiopods, conchifers, including modern oysters and clams, gasteropods, and no cephalopods except nautilus. The Articulates were represented by most of the modern crustacea and insects, even the higher group among the crabs — the Maioid. All four classes of Vertebrates abounded. Sharks were in their perfection; but the mammals were of especial interest; it was the age of mammals. There were whales equal in size to those living. West of the Mississippi were many peculiar forms, now characteristic of the Eastern continent, as the hyena, rhinoceros, camel, and horse. The tapir family was there also, which was chiefly developed in the Paris basin at this period, although the nearest living analogue is in this continent. Mastodons and elephants were introduced in this age. There are evidences of different climates, and many regions had peculiar local characters, just as there is now in marsupial Australia and edentate Brazil. Thus there was an approximation in the character of the life and the climatal features to existing nature.

At the beginning of the Alluvial period the continents had attained essentially their present altitudes. Then there came an ice period in all high northern latitudes, when many of the still existing Tertiary animals and plants must have been destroyed or moved southerly. In the tropics the organisms may not have been affected, and the deposits show no marks of ice. But in the temperate zones, the existing races were introduced after the disappearance of the ice, which vanished slowly, and still remains among high mountains. With a warmer climate the animals of the lower zone would gradually emigrate to the vacant region, often the same species that had been forced by the cold to leave. The glacial

deposits are called drift, and were chiefly laid down before the appearance of man. The last creation was after the general ice period, but a large number of the animals previously existing were permitted to live on.

The period succeeding the glacial was one in which our prairies, river-bottoms, and terraces were produced. The materials composing the sand, gravel, and clay, were chiefly derived from the universally diffused glacial ruins, and differ from them by stratification. The former are miscellaneously piled up; the latter are neatly arranged according to specific gravity, the heavier stones in gravel beds, the fine grains in strata of sand, and the completely pulverized rock in clay. Local beds of coarse drift may overlie fine sands and clay. Every country had its own peculiar alluvial physical history. A volume is needed to give all the details upon this subject; but we must be contented with presenting, in parallel columns, some of the most important features of the Alluvium in different countries.

Nomenclature.	New England.	Great Lakes.	Switzerland.	Human Periods.
POST-PLIOCENE. — DRIFT,	Northern drift on high mountains.	Northern glacial drift.	Northern glacial drift.	
MODIFIED DRIFT,	Beach period, upper terrace and sea-bottom period.	Fresh water subsidence.	Post-Tertiary Mammals — Period of subsidence.	
DRIFT,	Marine drift of Atlantic coast; boulders on surface.	Boulders of copper, etc. on surface.	Ancient diluvium; large smoothed pebbles.	
RECENT. — MODIFIED DRIFT,	Terrace period.	Lake terraces and ridges.	Modern glaciers, terraces, and loess.	Early stone age.
	Lower terraces,			Deluge.
	River bottoms,			Later stone age.
	Peat and marl.			Bronze age.
				Iron age.

The question whether the early northern drift has been produced by icebergs or glaciers, implying therefore a subsidence or elevation of the land, is not yet settled. The evidence is increasing in favor of both an elevation and depression. There is a marine drift along the New England coast, overlying both the ancient glacial piles and a fossiliferous stratum; so that there may have been both a glacial and an iceberg period. These facts have been overlooked until lately by geologists.

The predominant species in the latest-born system of life is man. All geologists, whatever their religious notions, agree that man's remains are confined to the deposits laid down since the glacial period. He is supposed to have been introduced in company with most of the existing animals and plants, certainly not before them. According to Darwinian principles, man must be the latest-born animal, since he stands at the summit of the series. The ninety per cent of Post-Pliocene organisms still living, form a very small proportion of existing nature.

The biblical account of the sixth day harmonizes with the geological record. The earth, obedient to command, is covered with living souls, cattle, the mammals, and the *remes* — another class of creeping things, small land animals, having a low creeping motion, — and wild beasts. They represent the mammals, the highest type of the animal kingdom, and introduced immediately before man. Last of all God created *the man*. He came directly from the hand of God. He was an object of forethought and conference. He received, after the animal, a mental and moral nature, that rendered him superior to all who existed previously. The vegetable kingdom was ordained for his food, and with the introduction of the original pair into the garden of Eden commenced the age of man. The seventh day may symbolize the historic period, when God is resting from the work of creation, and the present system of life is working out its destiny.

Conclusions. A review of the work of creation as described

in nature and revelation, convinces us of the essential harmony of the two records:

(1) The order of events in the inorganic creation is the same. Neither record fixes the time of the beginning, and both present the same order of light, atmosphere, day and night, clouds, water, dry land, oceans, the appearance of the heavenly bodies, and most of these before plants.

(2) The order of the introduction of organisms is the same. Both describe plants before animals, the marine lower forms before reptiles, birds and reptiles before mammals, and mammals last of all before man. The agreement is perfect.

(3) Apparent discrepancy is removed. Nothing seems more natural than that plants could not exist without the full light of the sun. But there is reason to believe that the sun was not visible for ages after the creation of plants. Probably this apparent discrepancy will hereafter prove the most convincing proof of the truth of the creative account.

(4) The animals in the eye of the writer of the biblical record were chiefly those of existing races. No one can read over the simple creative account without receiving this impression. The world abounds in living forms, more numerous, varied, and perfect than those of any previous period; and it was these which received names from Adam. We suppose the extinct groups were included only by implication. We may compare the description to a photograph of natural scenery. It is the large objects in the foreground that arrest our attention. But if we use a microscope, numerous minute features in the background appear. They were not observed till they were searched for. So the creative visions may have been chiefly of existing races, while the ancient and distinct forms are distantly alluded to, and are plainly perceived by the aid of modern research.

(5) The work of creation was progressive with intervals of repose. There were five evenings when there was rest. We find similar periods of creative inactivity in the scientific record. These are the most prominent features in science. There were successive epochs of creation followed by long

intervals of repose. Changes of level, synchronous with geological catastrophes, marked the beginnings of creative activity. The number of creations has been stated differently, according to the additions to our knowledge of organic remains. It is clear that there have been no less than twenty-seven different exterminations and creations, or periods of activity and repose. Their number will be increased rather than diminished by the progress of knowledge.

(6) The time-words in Genesis were intended to be understood as literal days, like those used by the prophets, till the age came when their proper meaning is understood. Then we perceive the meaning of the symbol, and become aware of a twofold signification. And we are authorized to apply either meaning to the term, as may be convenient.

(7) Man was introduced last. Some facts recently developed prove that certain animals have become extinct since the birth of man. They were probably introduced in a previous age, and had nearly completed their cycle when man came, and he may have aided in their extermination.

The question has been raised of late whether man has not existed much longer than six thousand years. Even if a greater duration be assigned than has been common, it will not conflict with the creative record, in which no limit is fixed; and there may be improvements in the science of biblical chronology in the future. As the facts are recent, we will now present some geological notices of man's antiquity and early history.[1]

Antiquity of Man.

As soon as men became numerous their works and remains accumulated in alluvial deposits, and by examining these relics or fossils geologists infer periods corresponding more or less perfectly to the results of historical research. Geologists have arranged the history of man into three periods, called the stone, bronze (or copper), and iron ages, the names

[1] See Review of Lyell's Antiquity of Man in North American Review for Oct. 1863.

being derived from the materials of which their implements were successively composed. Since the change of implements must depend upon the ingenuity of different races, and their location near veins of tin-ore, or native copper, the length of these ages is not the same among all nations. The Papuans and some of the American Indians have not yet completed the stone age. The antediluvians in the time of Tubal-Cain understood the use of brass and iron. The Greeks and Romans entered upon the age of iron very much later, though early in their history. Hence we must study separately the archaeological monuments of every nation, whether historic or geological, in order to ascertain their progress in the arts; and it is only closely allied tribes that will be found to have progressed uniformly. We will present a few characteristic details.

The Danes find in their peat bogs and *kitchen-middings* or ancient refuse-heaps, remains of various trees at successively higher levels. The stone period showed a predominance of the Scotch fir, while the inhabitants were brachy-cephalous, with short heads and small bodies like the modern Laplanders. In the bronze period the people were larger, possibly of another race, displacing the former, and the forests were of oak. The iron period is synchronous with the commencement of historic records, and is marked by the prevalence of the beech tree. All these trees existed in each of these periods, but only one seems to have predominated at once. Caesar must have visited England in the oak or bronze period, as he mentions the scarcity of the fir and beech. And if the trees of the adjacent countries were similar, the age of beech must have commenced since the time of Christ. No fir trees now live in Denmark. Probably the time occupied for the formation of the peat bogs was about four thousand years, according to the Danes. The bones of two extinct animals have been found in Denmark, the *Bos urus*, a wild bull, mentioned by Caesar and an author in the sixteenth century, and the Auk, last seen alive in 1844. The other animal remains found are of existing edible mollusks, common mammals, birds, and fishes.

In Switzerland the remains of ancient dwellings are found in the lakes. Piles were driven in shallow water, and houses constructed upon them. The refuse-heaps were accumulated beneath the houses, and composed of material very much the same as in Denmark — remains of the stone, bronze, and iron periods. Fifty-four species of animals were found, all now living except the *Bos urus*. The earliest known notice of dwellings of this character is given by Herodotus of the Paeonians, a Thracian tribe, who flourished about 520 B.C. A few fishing huts were constructed on this plan in Switzerland, in the last century, and at the present day the Papoos in New Guinea live in them. No reliable estimate of age can be derived from the relics.

We pass over numerous details to speak more particularly of those relics of man found in connection with the bones of animals extinct before the time of written history. These have been found in caverns and alluvial deposits.

Until recently it was commonly supposed that the intermixture of the remains of men and extinct animals in caves was produced accidentally, the dens of the animals having been selected by man for places of burial in a later age. Dr. Buckland, thirty years ago, illustrated this view in his *Reliquiae Diluvianae;* and the bone-caverns described by him are admitted to be of this description. One of the most convincing proofs of the contemporaneous intermixture is in the limestone at Brixham in Devonshire. Its exploration was conducted under the auspices of the Royal Society. All limestone rocks abound in caverns formed by underground currents of water. Originally simple crevasses, they gradually increase, partly by denudation, and partly by chemical action, till perhaps they are connected with streams at the surface. It is not uncommon in limestone regions to see a river instantly plunge underground, and as suddenly emerge somewhere else. Such streams are constantly depositing detritus in the caverns and changing their courses, so that the early accumulations are now high and dry, exposed where they can be easily examined.

The discovery of the Brixham cave was accidental, where a portion of the roof had fallen in. Five galleries have been excavated there, or the deposits removed for a length of five hundred feet. There are three different layers; at the top a stalagmite, next loam or bone earth, and lowest of all a gravel, generally destitute of fossils. From the two upper layers have been derived the bones of the mammoth, rhinoceros, cave-bear, hyena, cave-lion, reindeer, horse, ox, and some rodents, chiefly extinct species. No human bones were found, but a large number of flint knives were exhumed from the bone earth. The clearest case of the synchronism of the knives and bones was where a very perfect tool was found in close proximy to the entire left hind leg of a cave-bear. Every bone of this leg lay in its proper place, even to the patella and astragalus. It must have been introduced when the bones were still joined together by the natural ligaments. They could not have belonged to an age previous to the knife, and the tool must have been fashioned by the hand of man. This is genuine proof of the contemporaneity of man with mammals now extinct. We need present no more examples of this class, as the Brixham case is convincing. It was, however, a wild assemblage for man's companionship, a circle of acquaintance we should best appreciate at a distance. The population of England at that time was the following, after Owen:

"Gigantic elephants of nearly twice the bulk of the largest individuals that now exist in Ceylon and Africa roamed here in herds, if we may judge from the abundance of their remains. Two-horned rhinoceroses, of at least two species, forced their way through the ancient forests, or wallowed in the swamps. The lakes and rivers were tenanted by hippopotamuses, as bulky and with as formidable tusks as those of Africa. Three kinds of wild oxen, two of which were of colossal strength, and one of them maned and villous like the bonassus, found subsistence in the plains. There were also deer of gigantic dimensions, wild horses, and boars, a wild cat, lynx, leopard, a British tiger, much larger than that

of Bengal, and another carnivorous animal, called machaerodus, quite as large, which, from the great length and sharpness of its sabre-shaped canine teeth, sometimes eight inches long, was probably the most ferocious and destructive of its peculiarly carnivorous family. Besides these, troops of hyenas larger than the fierce *Hyena crocuta* of South Africa, which they most resemble, crunched the bones of the carcasses relinquished by the nobler beasts of prey, and doubtless often themselves waged a war of extermination on the feebler quadrupeds. There were also in Britain a savage bear, larger than the grisly bear of the Rocky Mountains, wolves, foxes, badgers, otters, beavers, hares, rabbits, bats, moles, rats, and mice. The bones of these species, all of which are extinct, are found in the rocks and caverns of the country. The teeth of at least seventy-five hyenas have been found in one cave, along with the bones of various animals, from elephants to hares, on which they fed; and the marks left on some of the bones exactly fit the hyena teeth which occur with them. Fragments and chips of bones cover the bottom of the cavern, and the abundant hyena excrements are just like those of the modern South Africa hyena, which is especially greedy of bones."[1]

The most noted locality of the combined human and extinct mammal remains is in the valley of the river Somme, in the north of France. The most important excavations are near Abbeville, Amiens, and St. Acheul. The river empties into the English channel, after passing through Picardy in a northwest direction. Abbeville is about twelve miles from the sea, St. Acheul, thirty-four, and Amiens, thirty-seven. The valley has been excavated out of chalk, averaging a mile in width, and from two hundred to three hundred feet deep. Beds of peat from twenty to thirty feet thick occupy the bottom of the valley, underlaid by gravel containing elephant's bones and flint tools. Works of art of the iron and stone period, including articles of Roman manufacture, have been found in the peat, but no succession of forests as in

[1] New Englander, May 1859, p. 320.

Denmark. The gravel beds have yielded many bones of living and extinct animals, marine and fresh-water shells, and flint tools. More than a thousand of the flints have been obtained, exhibiting different degrees of skill in their manufacture. The most imperfect are chalk flints, very slightly fashioned. Then come the "knives," which are little more than chips of flint rudely shaped. Next are arrow-heads and oval spear-heads. The edges appear to have been fashioned by chipping, like those of the North American Indians. A human lower jaw has also been found in these gravel beds, associated with the knives and elephant's bones. It had a very fresh look, and by some was thought to have been too recent to have been derived from the gravel. We have not reliable data in this valley upon which to base a chronology.

In the year 1820 a human lower jaw, in company with bones of the elephant and various living animals, was obtained from near the base of the *loess* or ancient silt of the Rhine. This deposit is supposed to have been formed when the Rhine flowed at a higher level than at present, from the impalpable dust and very fine mud washed from glacial moraines. Its recent place in the Swiss deposits may be seen in a table already presented.

Besides the works of men, a few skulls and other bones have been found in the alluvium at various localities. The Darwinians, supposing that they must show close affinities with the apes, have examined them with great care. But they find in none of them more marked pithecoid characters than can be exhibited any day in the skulls buried in the cemeteries of London. Huxley, the most learned of this school, admits, after their examination, that the first traces of primordial man "need no longer be sought by those who entertain any form of the doctrine of progressive development in the newest tertiaries; but that they may be looked for in an epoch more distant from the age of the Elephas primigenius, than that is from us."

Calculations have been made of the age of the mound-builders of our Western States from the size of the trees grow-

ing upon them, and their supposed predecessors. Judicious estimates of the age of their builders are reliable, and present no unexpected figures. In Mississippi and California the remains of men have been found associated with the bones of megalonyx and mastodon, now extinct. The calculation of the age of the Indian skeleton found beneath four cypress swamps at New Orleans — fifty-seven thousand six hundred years — is notoriously monstrous; and the calculated age — ten thousand years — of the human bones described by Count Pourtalis in the Florida coral reefs rests upon data yet to be established.

We do not shrink from the conclusion forced upon us by the facts, although it would have been avoided ten years ago: Man and his living associates were partly contemporary with the extinct animals of the Post-Pliocene age. Admitting this statement, it remains to be proved incontestably that man was introduced more than six thousand years ago. It is very common to find certain species of one geological age surviving the extinction of their fellows, and witnessing the introduction of new races. The records of palæontology teem with such instances. More of the Post-Pliocene animals are living than have become extinct. If we may believe the best authorities only five or ten per cent have disappeared, and the remainder are still living. The following are some of the living mammalian contemporaries of the hyena and rhinoceros, known from the presence of their bones in the gravel: the red deer, roe, reindeer, aurochs, wild cat, bear, wild boar, wolf, fox, weasel, beaver, hare, rabbit, hedgehog, mole, dormouse, field-mouse, water-rat, shrew. On the other hand, many Post-Pliocene animals have become extinct within the time of written history. Sixteen species of birds have recently become extinct, and another, the great auk (*Alca impennis*), has not been seen alive since 1844, although its remains are exceedingly abundant in some alluvial deposits. The Dodo and Solitaire of Mauritius were alive two hundred years ago. Eleven species of Dinornis, the Notornis and Apteryx of New Zealand, and the Aepiornis of Madagascar

have also passed away recently, chiefly, perhaps, by the hand of man. The large siren Rhytina is not now found living, and the Arctic musk-ox is on the point of extinction. The Bos primigenius existed till the time of Julius Caesar. The great Irish stag probably lived much longer than many of his earlier contemporaries. The aurochs would have become extinct long ago, did not legal enactments preserve a few in a forest in Lithuania. One of the mammoths was introduced in the newer Pliocene, and lived to be contemporary with man for a time.

The question has arisen in some minds, whether the human contemporaries of the mammoth were different from the living races. No great peculiarities have been detected in their bones, but it is certain they were an uncivilized and barbarous race. Some authors think the human contemporaries of the mammoth may have belonged to a different species from that living. If it can be proved that the Post-Pliocene period terminated with the introduction of the now living species, this would be a plausible theory, removing all difficulties; and we may have scriptural hints of it in references to beings which kept not their first estate, who had evidently sojourned for a time in some terrestrial abode. Such a view would give rise to many interesting speculations.

We have in our country some glimpses of the late existence of a few of the extinct animals. One of the finest specimens of a mastodon's skeleton ever exhumed came from Newburg, New York, in 1845. The bones were remarkably fresh, and the half-chewed twigs he last devoured were perfectly preserved. The animal had become mired in a bog when in search of food. His immense weight caused him to sink so deep in the marl and peat that extrication was impossible. The bones were chiefly in a marl bed, such as are now forming. Above this was a bed of peat about three feet thick. We do not know the rate of the growth of peat in this country, but by assuming a rate rejected by Lyell as too small for the valley of the Somme, three or four thousand years would suffice for its accumulation; and even this appears exaggera-

ted. It is probable that the animal was caught while devouring the twigs which grew upon the peat. He probably flourished long after man's creation.

The Indians have their traditions of the appearance of an immense animal in the Ohio country, which President Jefferson, in his notes on Virginia, refers to the mastodon. The South American Indians have traditions of a giant naked bear, and another animal resembling Jefferson's megalonyx. Other North American legends speak of the great elk or buffalo, which, besides enormous horns [tusks], had an arm [proboscis] protruding from its shoulder, with a hand at its extremity. Lyell, in speaking of extinct quadrupeds in his "Second visit to the United States," says, "that they were exterminated by the arrows of the Indian hunter is the first idea presented to the mind of almost every naturalist."

Within a hundred years the entire carcasses of an elephant and a rhinoceros have been dug out of the frozen mud of Siberia. The former, when living, was protected from the cold by an abundance of long hair. Its flesh was eaten by dogs when discovered. The impression derived from all these examples is, that these gigantic animals have lived almost to our time. These and similar facts, when carefully studied, will afford interesting inferences.

Accuracy of calculations. One of the assumptions upon which the arguments for a very great antiquity of man are based, is the so-called "uniformitarian theory." Though possessing many elements of truth, it must not be carried out too rigidly. This theory is the especial hobby of Sir Charles Lyell, and the principal part of his writings have been composed in its defence. It assumes that the rate with which changes are now going on in the earth's crust must be taken as the measure of the duration of the ancient life-periods. It also assumes long intervals of quiet between the successive ages of action, denying suddenness of change, and maintaining that old species have gradually died out, and the new ones been as slowly introduced.

We take the ground that while upon the whole, the opera-

tions of nature have been uniformly progressive in all the later periods, the agencies acting with variable intensity have been too numerous to admit of accurate calculation. The time may come when such estimates will be reliable; at present they are very inferior to historical records, and must always defer to them. For instance, a conglomerate at Tisbury in England contains silver coins of the reign of Edward I. The deposit must be more recent than the reign of that king, even if the uniformitarian theory would carry it further back. Another example is in the Egyptian monuments. Bunsen ascribes the age of Menes, the earliest king to 3643 B.C., and Lepsius to 3893 B.C., or at the most about six hundred years earlier than the deluge, according to the Septuagint. Now these dates are so well established that they are accepted as an approximation to the truth, especially as they agree with astronomical estimates of the ages of the pyramids,[1] and they should form the basis of geological calculations. Therefore when we find gentlemen obtaining very different figures for these events from geological data, the presumption is against the calculators, even if we did not also discover that the facts were not accurately stated. It has been calculated from the time required to raise the valley of the Nile a few inches, that bricks dug from the depth of sixty and seventy-two feet were deposited there from twelve thousand to thirty thousand years ago. This is from six thousand to twenty-four thousand years earlier than the first king, according to the monuments. The error is from one to five hundred per cent in excess of the true amount. Shall we accept the mean of this — three hundred per cent — as the proper ratio of the variation in all uniformitarian calculations? It is easier to find a geological than a historical variable; therefore the former must generally yield to the latter in cases of discrepancy.

A very important variable in geological calculations is change of level. This agency keeps all *terra firma* in motion, though much more rapidly in some districts than

[1] Annual of Scientific Discovery for 1863, p. 286.

others. For instance, our Atlantic coast from the Delaware river to Nova Scotia is gradually sinking. Since the Romans were in Great Britian, a part of Scotland has been elevated twenty-seven feet. In Hoosic, N.Y., a hill has risen within the past fifty years so much as to conceal from certain farm-houses a mountain in Bennington, Vt., twenty-five hundred feet high.[1] There may be changes of hundreds of feet in the interior of a continent during any geological period, which would not be generally noticed, yet this is a highly important variable, seriously affecting all calculations. Elevation would increase the amount of rain and snow, augment rivers, and a greater thickness of deposit would be the result. Similar oscillations, as Lyell has shown, may change the climate of a continent. Now, if we wish to obtain accurate geological calculations of time we must know exactly what oscillations have been in progress for several thousand years, and what the difference has been at the extremes of altitude. The reader may judge of our knowledge of these changes, when he bears in mind that until the accidental discovery of the rising of Russell Hill in Hoosic, few geologists imagined that different parts of the same township would rise or fall unequally. Who knows how many hundreds of similar cases may exist, of which we shall never be informed? We can estimate changes of level on the shores of the oceans, but changes in the interior do not leave indelible marks behind them.

Another variable is the succession of forests. A diversity of causes, both known and unknown, may operate in the change. The character of the soil, liability to destruction from fire, the comparative speed of the growth of different species, the competition between them, the amount of moisture received according to the elevation of the land, are some of the known variables affecting the duration of each forest. Those who have observed the accumulation of alluvial deposits in valleys very well know that a stratum of sand may be ten times greater one year than another; but

[1] American Journal of Science (2d series), Vol. xxxviii. p. 243.

which shall be taken for the standard? The existence of extensive forests about the sources of streams affects the amount of water in the rivers, rendering their flow equable; but when the trees have been cut down the water rushes in floods for a short time, and is scarcely perceptible the rest of the year.

The great truth taught by geology concerning man is this, and it is perfectly harmonious with the Biblical record, even if evidence should suggest an enormous antiquity to the race: Man did not appear upon the globe until a very late epoch of the Alluvial period; and no one can instance a single example of a species introduced later. It was fitting that the monarch of the animal kingdom should be introduced last into a world whose continents had been inhabited for ages by his servants, who had purified the atmosphere and fertilized the soils for his benefit.

The Noachian Deluge.

The opinions in respect to the nature and causes of the Noachian deluge have been various and conflicting. There has been more agreement since the investigations of my father, Dr. Pye Smith, and Hugh Miller. Geological principles illustrate the mode in which the waters may have been accumulated and the people destroyed. A more exact explanation may be expected when the geology of Asia shall have been thoroughly explored. We will present the most acceptable views on this subject in a series of propositions:

1. The Noachian deluge could not have deposited all the organic remains found in the solid rocks, nor could these strata have been formed between the birth of man and the flood. These statements do not require formal proof, as they constitute the basis of all correct geological reasoning.

2. The Noachian deluge does not correspond with the Drift period of geologists. Fifty years ago this was the common doctrine. The latter was an overwhelming deluge, but long anterior to man.

3. Deluges similar to the Noachian have frequently occurred

in geological history. They have been coincident with changes of level, and partial or complete exterminations of life. The proofs are, changes in the dip of the strata, in the material of the deposits, in the life, and often there were outbursts of volcanic matter. A great fall of rain is not the necessary accompaniment of any of these phenomena except the last. Some of these oscillations may have been as rapid as the Noachian, particularly when the entire life-systems were overwhelmed. Doubtless every partial extermination witnessed more or less change of level. It was only the precautions adopted by Noah that preserved any of the antediluvian fauna. Evidences of this submergence may yet be discovered, where remains of the works and bones of men have been accumulated in favorable localities. It would not be strange if the extinct mammals of the stone age were destroyed by some catastrophe similar to the deluge.

4. The Noachian deluge was probably not co-extensive with the earth's surface. This view has been generally adopted since the beginning of the present century.

(a) A universal deluge was unnecessary: it would not be required to overwhelm more of the earth than was inhabited, and the population was probably confined to a small area.

(b) It would be contrary to analogy to suppose all the continents to be submerged at once, so that there should be a universal ocean. There is plenty of water, however, to accomplish such a result provided the land should sink and the beds of the ocean rise. Nearly three fourths of the present surface are covered with water, and the average elevation of the land is less than the mean depth of the ocean. But if the universal flood were derived from rain, one miracle must produce and another remove it; for rain by the present laws of meteorology is derived from existing water by evaporation and condensation, and ultimately returns to its source by a cyclical statute.

(c) The ark built by Noah was not large enough to contain pairs of all the land animals, besides their food. This vessel was probably four hundred and fifty feet long, seventy-five

wide, and forty-five high, and it is estimated that there are living twenty-one thousand species of Vertebrates, three hundred thousand Articulates, twenty thousand Mollusks, and ten thousand Radiates. Those that would require protection in the ark would be, say, sixteen hundred species of mammals, five thousand of birds (allowing two thousand for aquatic species that would take care of themselves), a few hundred reptiles, all the fresh-water fish, about half the Articulates and a few hundred Mollusks. Sir Walter Raleigh estimated that room would be required only for one hundred and twenty animals of the size of an ox, besides space for a few birds, and provisions for carnivorous beasts. Buffon's estimates were double those of Raleigh, and these old calculations would have been sufficient for the whole animal kingdom, did not zoölogists constantly add to the number of species. We do not need to attempt to calculate the space required for storing the thousands of living species. Many vessels of the capacity of the ark would be required. Over fifty thousand species of plants would require preservation also, if the flood were universal, and space should be calculated for them. But a vessel of the size of the ark may have been large enough to contain all the animals requiring preservation, if the deluge were limited to one district. It is well known that every country supports animals and plants peculiar to itself, and that they will not flourish when transported to another zone, always excepting a few domesticated animals. Darwinian results may be admitted far enough to allow that the animals capable of adapting themselves to slight changes in their circumstances, may have migrated from the adjacent countries after the cataclysm, and spread themselves gradually over the vacant territory. It is not irrational to suppose that Noah was supernaturally directed in his choice of the animals requiring preservation, especially as the foreknowledge of the cataclysm was revealed to him. Hence we may be satisfied that the ark was sufficiently large to preserve from extinction all the organisms needed to repopulate the devastated area.

(d) There exist cones of volcanic craters, formed of loose scoriae and ashes which would have been washed away by a universal deluge. Such are those of Auvergne in Southern France and Etna in Sicily. Examples of the washing away of volcanic cones are Graham's, Nyoe, and Sabrina islands. Graham's island arose out of the Mediterranean in July 1831. It attained a height of two hundred feet, and a circumference of three miles; but in three months this immense mass was worn down to the sea-level, and in a few weeks more it became a shoal. Such would have been the fate of Etna and the Auvergne craters had the waters covered the whole earth. Etna's cones are estimated to be not less than twelve thousand years old, while those in France belong to the Miocene Tertiary.

(e) The interpretation of the language of scripture does not necessarily imply a universal deluge. Without entering into details it is only necessary to mention the names of divines entertaining this view. They are such as Matthew Poole, Bishop Stillingfleet, Pye Smith, and nearly all modern hermeneutists.

5. The Noachian deluge was probably limited to a portion of Western Asia, while so far as the human race was concerned it was universal. This theory will reconcile all difficulties, both exegetical and scientific.

The physical character of the country supposed to have been inhabited by the antediluvians, proves that it would have been easily overflowed by the sea, if small changes of level were induced.

(a) In Western Asia, extending even into Russia, there is a large territory, nearly as large as Europe, whose rivers empty into internal salt seas, and do not communicate with the ocean. They are the Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas, Lake of Ooroomiah, and others; and such rivers as the Volga, Ural, Sihon, and Jordan flow into them. Some of this territory is beneath the ocean level. The Caspian is eighty-four feet below the Black Sea, and a portion of the great steppes adjacent — as the Steppe of Astracan — has an average level of

thirty feet below the Baltic, and the Dead Sea is thirteen hundred and twelve feet below the Mediterranean. Now if the low barrier between the Caspian and Baltic were depressed, a torrent of water would immediately flow in and overwhelm this immense region.

(b) There is geological evidence that the Caspian in the later Tertiary period covered a much larger area than at present, yet it did not communicate with the ocean. This is indicated by the peculiar organic remains, and by vast plains white with incrusted salt, including the desert of Khiva. Other changes are intimated in a remark of Herodotus, twenty-three hundred years ago, who says the sea of Azoff was equal in extent to the Euxine. It is not so now.

(c) A large portion of western Asia, ten degrees of latitude in breadth, including much of Asia Minor, ancient Armenia, Georgia, and part of Persia, shows evidence of abundant volcanic eruptions in the later Tertiary, and slightly in historic times, as in the Caucasian range. The Katakekaumene of the Greeks, or the burnt district of Asia Minor and Mount Ararat, has probably witnessed eruptions within the human period. Eruptions are commonly accompanied by torrents of rain, but do not necessarily attend changes of level, yet are almost certain when the oscillation is rapid.

(d) There are instances on record of a sudden change of level near the ocean. Upheavals in the interior would not be so readily perceived, on account of the absence of a fixed line of comparison. In 1819 two thousand square miles of the delta of the Indus in the Cutch were suddenly depressed beneath the sea-level, and the water immediately rushed in, covering everything except the tops of the houses and the tower of a fort which still remain projecting out of the water. That area now forms an inland sea. In 1821 there was a similar depression of the valley of the Mississippi for a distance of three hundred miles, and the depressed area was filled with water. This overflow was made use of successfully by General Pope in his campaign against Island No. 10. These changes of level were attended by earthquakes.

We have, therefore, abundant facts to justify the construction of a rational theory of the Noachian deluge. Let us suppose the antediluvians peopled this remarkable region from the Euxine to the Persian Gulf, comprising an area of over two millions of square miles. We may suppose the barriers had been gradually sinking for ages, so that they were nearly overcome, when all at once there were eruptions of lava from the volcanoes, accompanied with earthquakes or paroxysmal changes of level. If these oscillations should occur nearly simultaneously in three directions, on the Euxine, Gulfs of Finland and Persia, the "fountains of the great deep" would have been undermined, and the water would have flowed in torrents all over the low countries, drowning all the animals and men before they could possibly escape. And the air would be filled with drenching rain in consequence of its disturbance by streams of lava. Like other catastrophes this deluge would be of brief existence. Forty days and forty nights would afford time enough to cover the whole country with water, and destroy every living thing in which was the breath of life, both man and beast. The most of the water must have been derived from the ocean, while the rain must have appeared the more terrible. It is not necessary to suppose that every day's rain was new material, for the process of evaporation was constantly going on, and the same water may have fallen several times during the forty days.

It is difficult to say how deeply the earth was covered. According to our theory at least two sides of the new sea were bounded by high land. As the Ararat upon which the ark rested was probably in Armenia, and not the modern mountain of that name, we do not need to hold that the land sunk to the depth of that peak — seventeen thousand seven hundred feet. If Noah described the scenes according to appearances, he would represent the flood as universal, for he would have been out of the sight of all land over the plains of Shinar, or the steppes of Astracan, even if the water was but a few hundred feet deep.

After the culmination of the disaster, this theory supposes a change of level back again. This would cause the ark to ground on high land and the waters to run off into the ocean. Probably the change continued till the parts now below the ocean level were temporarily elevated above it, so that none of the waters were left to increase the size of the inland seas. It accords with geological observation that a great oscillation in level is commonly followed by another in the opposite direction, so that the changes of the earth's physical features during the deluge were in accordance with previous experience, and the relative levels in western Asia may now be essentially what they were in antediluvian times.

Some authors suppose there was a new creation of animals and plants at the close of the deluge, in order to repopulate the desolated district, just as after similar geological cataclysms. The principal objection to this view is the absence of reference to it in the Bible. Provision was made to secure the repopulation of the world, by the building and filling of the ark with representatives of the earlier races. Why then was it necessary to create others? At the same time it must be remembered that the Bible contains nothing opposed to such a creation, or to others at subsequent periods. Possibly there is an allusion to this creation of new species in Ps. civ. 29, 30.[1] No geologist has yet been able to point out examples of new species, and most theorizers have held to the contrary view.

Almost every nation upon the face of the earth holds a a tradition of the early destruction of the inhabitants of the world by a deluge.[2] If every human being was destroyed except those in the ark, the flood was universal so far as the race was concerned, and it is not strange that its memory has

[1] Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled; thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created; and thou renewest the face of the earth.

[2] See Articles by E. Hitchcock, Biblical Repository for January 1835, and April 1836. Testimony of Rocks (American edition), p. 283, etc. Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xx. p. 395; Vol. xxii. p. 416.

been branded into the mental structure of mankind. In view of the universality and general agreement of the traditions, compared with the account in Genesis, there is no force in the objection that the individual records refer to certain local floods producing great devastation to each nation in their early history, and not to the whole human race.

The Destruction of the Cities of the Plain

Modern researches throw light upon the catastrophe that overthrew the cities of Sodom, Gomorrah, Admah, and Zeboiim, in the time of Abraham (Gen. xix.).

The surface of the Dead Sea is thirteen hundred and twelve feet below the Mediterranean. Its bottom may be considered as two submerged plains, the one averaging thirteen hundred, the other, the southern portion, averaging thirteen feet below the surface, while along the southern margin it is scarcely one foot in depth. This structure naturally suggests a more recent submergence of the shallow portion south of the promontory on the eastern shore, or where the cities were supposed to have been situated. It is conjectured that immediately after the conflagration, a paroxysmal change of level was induced by an earthquake, so that the plain was submerged. The "rain of fire and brimstone" does not sound exactly like the description of an eruption of lava and cinders; but may mean, besides a shower of sulphur, lightning combined with flames from earthquake fissures, kindling the carbonaceous gases and petroleum filling the "slime pits." Like this catastrophe was the destruction of the city of Euphemia in Calabria in 1638. An observer looked for the city after the earthquake, and saw a black cloud, and when this was gone, a dismal and putrid lake occupied the place of the houses.

The following facts support this view: (1) The language of scripture implies that the cities were submerged. Moses in speaking of the vale of Siddim before the destruction of the cities, says, "which is the salt sea,"[1] or, in other words, the sea is now where the cities were.

[1] Gen. xiv. 3.

Some have supposed the Dead Sea did not exist till after this event, and that the Jordan formerly flowed into the Red Sea by way of the Wady Arabah. The structure of the river valleys south of the Dead Sea forbids this view. Their gorges, worn down for ages previous to man, point towards the north, because the streams followed the depression of the land. Were this theory true these valleys would have converged in the other direction.

(2) There is no evidence of eruptions of lava in modern times about the Dead Sea. The region is one of extinct volcanic action, for the few specimens of igneous products discovered have not the modern facies. The rock salt of Usdum and the asphaltum are not necessarily volcanic products.

(3) A profound fault extends along the valley of the Jordan through to Akabah on the north-east arm of the Red Sea. It is along such fractures that earthquakes are felt, thermal springs abound like those near the Sea of Tiberius, and eruptions occur.[1]

(4) The vale of Siddim was full of slime pits, or wells of petroleum. These were undoubtedly like those now common on the Caspian Sea and in Burmah. The modern Orientals, probably in imitation of their ancestors in the vale of Siddim and on the plains of Shinar, dig pits in an oil region, and gather the petroleum gradually collecting upon the surface of the water, instead of boring deep artesian wells. Asphaltum or bitumen is inspissated or hardened petroleum melting readily, but not kindling rapidly, when placed in the fire. Inflammable gases always abound in oil regions. Some wells discharge only gas, others gas and petroleum alternately. Hence, in cases of neglect fearful accidents occur, as the late terrible conflagrations at Pit Hole City and Shaffer's in Pennsylvania, where, in a few moments, many lives and property worth millions of dollars have been destroyed. The pits in the vale of Siddim must have contained this inflam-

[1] See Biblical Repository, Vol. iii. second series, pp. 24, 324. Transactions of the Association of American Geologists, 1842, p. 365.

mable gas, which, once ignited, either by lightning or earthquake flames, might have occasioned fearful destruction, and by its suddenness preventing the escape of the inhabitants. On the contrary if the catastrophe resulted from an overflow of lava, or the combustion of the underlying bitumen, many of the people could have escaped, especially upon the latter alternative, for large beds of asphaltum would burn as slow as coal. Beds of coals have been known to burn in the earth for several years without seriously affecting the surface or consuming very much material, and certainly without injury to the miners.

(5) Any one familiar with oil regions will recognize in the descriptions of the regions at the south end of the Dead Sea geological indications of the fluid. The underlying limestone is fetid, impregnated with petroleum, as in Canada West. Maundrell describes stones on the shores of the lake, "which being held in the flame of a candle, soon burn and yield a smoke of an intolerable stench, losing only its weight but not bulk." This is shale or sandstone saturated with heavy oil. Dr. Madden describes native sulphur, and says that, on bathing, his body was coated with inflammable asphaltum. The solid asphaltum from which the name of the lake was derived exists only at the bottom of the shallow portion, and is forming there as in ancient times. It is probable that artesian bore-holes would develop producing wells of petroleum in this valley.

The Future Condition of the Earth.

It is very difficult to interpret prophecies. Very few of those contained in scripture have been properly understood till after their fulfilment. The hints respecting the future condition of the earth are brief, and every interpretation of them must be accompanied with abundant allowance for misconception. The chief account of the end of the world is in 2 Pet. iii. It implies that the heavens or atmosphere and the earth are "reserved unto fire against the day of judgment"; that the "heavens shall pass away with a great

noise, the elements melt with fervent heat," and that the earth with its works shall be burned up. The common interpretation of this, and a few other kindred passages, is, that the present system of life and action will be terminated by fire just as the antediluvian world was overwhelmed by water.

1. These passages do not imply the annihilation of the matter of the earth. Fire consumes, but does not annihilate; the elements change into the gaseous form and become invisible. Matter can be annihilated only by the special action of the power that created it.

2. These passages do not necessarily imply the return of the earth to the state of igneous fluidity. Considerable labor has been expended in explaining the steps of the transition from the present to the new heavens and earth through ages of fire, but such effort seems to us unnecessary. As in the Noachian flood, with which this is contrasted by Peter, the objects were accomplished by a limited deluge, so the termination of the present system may be effected by fire without reducing all things to a melted state. The object of the catastrophe seems to be to purify the world of sin, and provide new heavens and earth wherein righteousness may dwell — a renovated and beautiful abode, constructed for the redeemed from the ruins of their former habitation.

3. The earth contains within itself the agencies necessary for its desolation by fire. The crust of the earth is supposed to be several hundred miles thick, while the interior mass is in a state of fusion, like lava. The three hundred active volcanoes on the crust are the breathing-holes of the internal fire. At present counteracting agencies prevent this lava from breaking forth. But let the order be issued for its liberation, and these vents will all belch forth fire and desolation. The works of man, in which we take so much pride, may be crumbled in a moment by the concussions of the crust. Liberated gases may combine explosively with the oxygen in the air, so that the heavens should pass away with a great noise.[1] If the expression is to be understood as apply-

[1] Astronomers tell us of *new stars* which occasionally suddenly appear in the

ing to the earth, "that there shall be no more sea," we can conjecture what will become of the water. Confusion and utter ruin would result from the disruption of the crust, and every human work would be destroyed. Synchronous with these events will be others of a judicial nature, not foreshadowed in the earth's physical features.

4. The earth has already experienced igneous devastation with a change of its inhabitants. These catastrophes in different parts of the earth have been nearly or quite simultaneous, yet its entire surface was never so covered with fire as to leave universal traces of it. Any atmospheric disturbances could not be recorded. But that exterminations of life have resulted from overflows of igneous matter and their concomitants is abundantly proved.

These changes have always ushered in an improved condition of the earth. Analogy, therefore, independently of revelation, suggests that when the present system has culminated there will be a season of desolation followed by an improvement in the earth's condition. Inspiration reveals a future glorious world as the residence of believers, and the fact that

sky, but are not permanently brilliant. One of the latest of these temporary stars appeared in the constellation of the Northern Crown in May 1866. It was analyzed with the spectrum, by those careful observers, Huggins and Miller. They concluded that the spectral lines peculiar to this star, "taken in connection with the comparative suddenness of the outburst of light and its immediate very rapid decline in brightness, from the second down to the eighth magnitude in twelve days, suggested the startling speculation that the star became suddenly enwrapt in the flames of burning hydrogen. In consequence of some convulsion it may be enormous quantities of gas were set free. A large part of this gas consisted of hydrogen, which was burning about the star in combination with some other element. As the free hydrogen became exhausted the flames gradually abated, the photosphere became less vivid, and the star waned down to its former brightness." It seems, then, that there are known instances of worlds wrapped in flames. They ignite, burn fiercely, fade, and almost disappear. Suppose now, that for any reason a combustible gas should be evolved upon our planet; then it might combine explosively with the oxygen of the atmosphere, or burn like the star in the Northern Crown. Either case would meet the conditions of the prophecy. We think, therefore, that the words of Peter are amply illustrated by the latest discoveries of astronomy. We also desire to say that the spectrum analysis has confirmed the view of the nebular hypothesis given above.

the purification of the present can render it a beautiful habitation, fit for the residence of princes, renders probable the belief of many divines, that the redeemed will dwell upon this earth after the day of judgment.

IV. Geology illustrates God's plans or the doctrine of decrees. The object of philosophical inquiries is to ascertain the plan upon which every department of nature is constructed. Every generation adds information to the knowledge delivered to it, but we are still far removed from a perfect understanding of any portion of the whole. One attempts to discover the fundamental idea in the structure of the animal kingdom; another investigates the composition of matter; a third the principles that regulate the motions of bodies; a fourth studies into the structure of the human mind, its works and its words. The investigations in every department aim to develop its fundamental idea, while the foundation principles of all the sciences form parts of one grand whole, standing out as clear as crystal to the Divine Mind.

Now these wonderful arrangements are not the result of chance or fate; they are God's plan, in accordance with which he has decreed every event in nature, so that he knows beforehand what shall happen. We feel instinctively that the events of the universe are governed by law; that effects result from causes, and that the course of nature as we see it is uniform. It is impossible to conceive of any way for the accomplishment of these results, except through the establishment of the system by Omnipotence: "For every house is builded by some man; but he that built all things is God."

The early history of the earth abundantly illustrates the existence of decrees, for it reveals how they have been executed in every age. The ancient trilobite crawling upon the surface of an unfinished planet, the earth revolving in its assigned method, and the mountains arising out of the sea by law, all obey divine decrees, each in his appointed place. The bounds have been set which they cannot pass.

V. Geology illustrates God's providence, or such a control over the universe as secures the accomplishment of his decrees. The views prevalent as to the manner in which God's providence is exercised tend to two extremes, which may be called distinctively the law theory and the God-acting theory. The first ascribes the control over the universe to second causes. After the world was created its government was committed to laws or forces impressed upon matter and mind, which have the power of producing all natural phenomena. This view may include the theory of animal development, and deny the reality of miracles.

The second theory supposes every event to be due to the direct and immediate agency of God, that the laws of nature are the uniform modes of his action, and that he occasionally interferes to oppose the uniform course of nature, when moral reasons demand interference.

The most acceptable views of divine providence may be stated serially :

1. God created and preserves in existence matter and forces. Without his sustaining hand no agencies can operate.

2. God chooses to sustain the operations of nature, or all the events of his general, universal or particular, ordinary or common, direct and indirect, providence, by means of subordinate forces or agents, properties of matter, and organisms. Even the fall of a sparrow and the rustling of a leaf have been planned in his decree and executed by his providence. Infinite in power and knowledge, he fainteth not, neither is wearied by attention to the minutest particulars.

3. By means of his system of agencies God secures the occurrence of phenomena specially fitted to arrest attention by their marked adaptedness to a moral design. These are special providences, and are less common in the geological than human history.

4. When second causes cannot provide for certain exigencies God acts directly upon nature, or employs new agents, producing results inexplicable by the established course of nature. These extraordinary events are miracles, and may

be conceived of as provided for from eternity by special agencies diverse from others, just as the common providences have been decreed; but they will not thus be deprived of their moral uses. If the early history of the earth was to be repeated, these miraculous events would recur.

When a sling is used to hurl a stone, the movements of the strap through the air describes a curve more or less spiral. By varying the length of the strings, or the impelling force, these curves will be varied. One kind of spiral, after passing successively through a million revolutions, will change into another. When arranged in a certain way there is a series of eight different curves, one passing into another in a certain order, even when the first and fourth may resemble each other more than the first and second. After all the eight gyrations have been passed through, the revolutions return through the same series in the reverse order.[1] These curves afford an illustration of the occurrence of miracles. After witnessing a million revolutions of the sling, the observer would think it always described this particular curve; but the next revolution is of an entirely different character. There was an occult force providing for an altered curve upon the first revolution succeeding the millionth. Miracles appear in a similar unexpected manner, subject to the law of divine interposition. Without knowledge of all the elements producing them, the observer can never predict their occurrence.

We only need to present illustrations of the special and miraculous providences displayed by geology; the common providences are generally admitted. Some of the careful preparations made for man in the structure of the earth indicate special providence as well as prospective benevolence. The storing up of cubic miles of coal, reservoirs of petroleum, veins of metals, and other useful articles are phenomena specially fitted to arrest attention by their adapt-

[1] Imperfectly reported memorially from a communication by Prof. B. Pierce of Cambridge, to the National Academy of Sciences, on the theory of the sling, August. 1865.

edness to the wants of man, and their uselessness to the former inhabitants of the earth. For man also the rich profusion of natural scenery, mountains, rivers, trees, and flowers were prepared.

A third class of these providences appears in the special adaptations of animal and vegetable races to the varied conditions of the earth at different epochs. The course of nature was not permitted to continue as it began, although well arranged at first. Certain features in the organic structures were modified, special provision being made for altered conditions. Time forbids the mention of others.

Miraculous Providence. Exigencies demanding the action of a power above nature have occurred in the geological history of the earth when the seas were destitute of life. It requires a new creation to explain satisfactorily the restocking with organisms the depopulated continents and oceans. This exigency has been met probably from twenty-five to thirty times. There are three phases to this series of miracles: First, there was the creation of organisms out of inorganic matter; second, there was a succession of races; and third, man appeared. These creations may be regarded as the interruptions of cycles—the arches spanning the yawning gulfs between different aeons—the marks of the divine hand cutting asunder the great chain of life and organizing new systems.

Inferences from IV. *and* V. 1. If all events in the natural world have been foreordained, there is a presumption that the acts of men have been likewise predetermined. For the physical acts of man are the same in kind with those of animals; and the operations of mind are as much regulated by law as those of the body. The one class would seem no more intricate than the other.

2. It has been objected to miracles that they are contrary to nature, and therefore impossible. Geology proves the reverse; and therefore these extraordinary events may be expected in either form of God's government, natural or moral. It is easier to call the biblical miracles myths than

to disown the characters written in the book of nature. All miracles may be under the control of law, but not in any sense that will impair their religious uses.

3. If special providences have been provided for in nature, much more may they be looked for in human history, where minds exist capable of appreciating their moral designs. It is surely no more difficult for Omnipotence to decree answers to prayer, than to predetermine the force and direction of the wind. Even if every future answer to prayer is as rare as the occultations of the planets, the results happen in consequence of the supplication. By referring all these things to law, we only philosophically explain how God acts, instead of removing him entirely from the arena, as many would desire. Let the Christian then exult, because his prayers will be answered as surely as the tides shall rise or the rains descend.

VI. Geology illustrates the doctrines of scripture respecting the fall of man. A common notion has been that all nature changed when the first sin was committed; herbivores were changed into carnivores; arctic cold and tropical heat succeeded to an ever vernal climate; the serpent had previously walked erect or like an alligator; and that every species of natural evil then first began to exist.

In the place of these antiquated notions, two theories press themselves upon us: 1. Whether he be obedient or disobedient the world is adapted equally well to man.[1] 2. The world was intended to be a theatre for the exhibition of the work of redemption.[2]

We will first consider what the Bible teaches concerning the fall. The events of each creative day were pronounced "good," and the whole "very good," by Elohim. This account included the creation of carnivores, — and consequently suffering and death among the animals, — uncouth forms, fierce characters, and the death of plants. Certain

[1] See Anticipations of Man in Nature, by Professor Dana, New Englander, May 1859, p. 293.

[2] Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xviii. p. 253.

natural evils therefore were included in the system which met the approval of Omniscience. Man was placed in a beautiful garden, containing trees pleasant to the sight and good for food, besides the tree of life, and of knowledge of good and evil. We may suppose the fruit of the tree of life was intended to prevent or heal sickness, sorrow, and to instill immortal vigor into the system, so as to counterbalance all possible natural evils; for, lest the race should have feasted upon it and lived forever, the first pair were expelled from Eden. The eating of the forbidden fruit gave man his knowledge of the distinction between holiness and sin, and was the occasion of moral evil and suffering to the race.

The serpent tempted man to sin. The inference that previous to the curse he walked erect, is warranted neither by scripture nor science, for in the Tertiary rocks are found the bones of serpents like those now living — boa-constrictors and vipers. Probably an evil spirit entered into the serpent, just as in other parts of scripture dumb beasts have been influenced by spirits, both good and bad; as Balaam's ass, the fish that swallowed Jonah, the fish with a coin in his mouth, and the Gadarene swine. Hence the curse may apply partly to the evil spirit, and partly to the animal. The curse upon the evil spirit is persecution and final destruction by the seed of the woman; that of the serpent seems to be the estimation placed upon him by mankind. He is avoided by them, he trails upon his belly in the dust, and is a symbol of the deceitful.[1] The curse pronounced upon woman pertains to herself alone. That pronounced upon man renders his labor unproductive, and entails sickness, suffering, painful death, spiritual evils, and penalties. The ground is also cursed, yet entirely in its relations to man. In consequence of the transgression the human race receives the same curse as Adam.

It is an inference of theologians that the curse includes all physical evils, such as the sufferings and death of animals,

[1] See the "Serpent in Eden," by Dr. John Duns, Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxi. p. 163.

extremes of climate, existence of carnivorous animals, absence of beauty, earthquakes, etc. It can be no longer maintained that natural evils did not exist before the fall, as we have already proved, and the creative chapter implies the presence of some of them before man's introduction. Besides, herbivores could not be changed into carnivores except by a new creation.

The first theory denies that the pre-Adamic evils are included in the curse. They would have continued to exist if man had never sinned. Carnivores cannot subsist upon plants, therefore suffering and death must have prevailed among the animals. Even the herbivores would have devoured many insects and other minute forms unintentionally. In some regions there would have been deserts and extremes of climate. There would have been ugly characters, deformities, absence of perfection and beauty, eruptions from volcanoes, and earthquakes. Man would labor, as he was to dress and keep the garden, but his toil would not be accompanied with sorrow. As the population increased they would naturally spread to all parts of the earth, and would devise means to protect themselves from climatic extremes and miasmatic influences. There would have been no sickness nor sorrow; unavoidable injuries would have been either impossible or instantly remedied from the tree of life, and the mar of sin would have been wanting. What a beautiful world this would have been even with the evils, without the blot of sin!

The second theory includes post-Adamic and pre-Adamic evils in the same category. God knew that man would sin, and therefore fitted up the world to be in harmony with man's state. It was full of natural evils, because they are particularly appropriate to a fallen condition. The pre-Adamic evils are logically a consequence of the transgression, though chronologically previous. Had obedience been foreseen, the world would have been fitted up differently, without physical evils. As many of the simplest laws involve evil, the difference in nature would have been fundamental.

Such a view exalts our conceptions of the extent and grandeur of the work of redemption, because every event, from the first axial revolution of the world to the elevation of the last foot of land above the ocean, has had reference to man's character and wants as a sinful being in a probationary state.

This theory then accounts for the existence of evil in the system. It was introduced, not because it could not have been prevented, but because man's disobedience made it necessary. Benevolence, which foresaw the evil, adapted the universe to man's fallen condition. Had man chosen obedience, the entire system would have been constructed without the presence of evil. This view explains why it was best for God to permit the existence of evil.

The first theory involves a different notion of the introduction of evil; it was necessary to the symmetry of the system. The very idea of law implies the existence of imperfection; and hence it may be that God could not prevent the presence of evil, and at the same time sustain a moral government.

These two theories are presented without comment. Either of them explains all the facts, although resting upon very different foundations. Neither of them has atheistic or heterodox tendencies.

Note. — Since the preparation of this Article many additional facts respecting the association of flints and human bones with the remains of extinct animals have been published, and more precise subdivisions of the stone age have been suggested. These facts are similar in kind to those described above, and all interested in the details may consult the scientific journals. The writer has also visited the valley of the Somme and other localities of interest, and has seen nothing that will conflict with the conclusions stated above. It would not be strange, however, if in the future we should find it desirable to revise our chronology.

ARTICLE III.

FREE COMMUNION.[1]

BY REV. SERENO D. CLARK, SECRETARY OF THE CONGREGATIONAL BOARD OF PUBLICATION.

PART II.—THE SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES AND CANONS OF SCRIPTURE PRESCRIBING AND REGULATING CHURCH FELLOWSHIP.

As intimated in the previous part of this discussion, it is not our object to break down denominational distinctions, or to consolidate all visible saints into one church organization. It is the farthest possible from our design to obscure the cardinal doctrines of revelation. We have no sympathy with efforts towards Christian union which undervalue these, or descry zeal in their honest defence. Such endeavors indicate rather a feeble grasp of gospel realities than that calm, rational charity which "worketh no ill to his neighbor." There is nobler ground. It is the public recognition of the unity in Christ of all who have publicly entered into covenant with him. It is a unity of Christians and churches perfectly compatible with denominational distinctions, notwithstanding even the earnest defence of such distinctions; a unity which ought to be visibly recognized, and which we believe Christ intended should be specially recognized in the memorial supper, the family feast of the household of faith. While, therefore, the several denominational organizations may be retained in all their fixedness of outline, we affirm that the sacramental table of each should be free to all other denominations receiving Christ as their atoning Saviour. No bar-

[1] In the Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xix. pp. 133 sq., was inserted an Article by Rev. Alvah Hovey, D.D., entitled Close Communion. In the Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxi. pp. 449, sq., was inserted the first part of the Article by Mr. Secretary Clark, entitled Free Communion. Both of these Articles belong to the series of Essays on the Distinctive Peculiarities of the various Evangelical Denominations. The second part of Mr. Clark's Article is not injured by its separation from the first part, as both parts form independent Essays.—EDS.

riers should be thrown around the sacramental board, save such as the nature of the ordinance demands.

In this discussion, therefore, we admit: 1. That believers alone may partake of the Lord's supper.[1] 2. That to commune with a church one must give the body credible evidence that he communes with Christ, and that the proper way of doing this is the profession of his faith by entering into covenant with God and with the brethren.[2] 3. That the church of Christ is purely a spiritual body; the scriptural practice of infant baptism not being incompatible with the idea of a church thus constituted.[3] We are willing in argument even to admit that infant baptism is unscriptural, and that it tends to paralize the church by introducing into it unsanctified elements; in a word, that the Baptist views regarding the rites and spirituality of the gospel church are correct.[4] Our position lies below such supposed errors and their developments. It is, that actual life in Christ, under the conditions above stated, is the ground of eucharistic communion, not prospective life; nor is prospective paralysis or death the ground of disfellowship. All sin and error have the latter tendency. If the tendency of sin and error is to be adjudged a justifiable cause of withholding sacramental fellowship, we shall never enjoy it with any one.

We may illustrate our position by its application to the Puritan Congregational churches of New England. These, it is affirmed, have been brought to the very gates of death by infant baptism, and errors superinduced by it. But they have now utterly discarded these errors, are fully restored from their ill effects, and as strenuously maintain that none but true believers have a right to the Lord's supper as do our Baptist brethren. True, they still practise infant baptism, but it is in a manner not discernibly injuring the life of the churches, or chilling their zeal in the work of the Lord. Now, we argue that, while this spirituality, this zeal, self-denial, and heroic enterprise in the cause of Christ remains,

[1] See Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxi. p. 450.
[2] Ibid. p. 451. [3] Ibid. pp. 453, 454. [4] Ibid. pp. 457, 459.

the scriptural law of Christian fellowship requires those differing from these churches with respect to ritual practices, or other non-essential errors, to welcome them to their sacramental boards; and with them all in public covenant with God who evince a similar devotedness to the Redeemer. Hence our thesis "We are to receive to the sacramental board all whom, as a church, we have satisfactory evidence that Christ receives." [1]

Having traced the proof of this proposition so far forth as derived from the scope and spirit of the New Testament, we proceed to show that the same is enjoined by the laws of church fellowship taught by Christ and his apostles, forming, with the genius of the gospel, one systematic whole.

Section I.

We argue free communion from the scriptural canons and principles bearing indirectly on our subject. Most of these our opponents regard as simply prescribing the intercourse of Christians, as such, in distinction from the closer communion of the sacramental board. We maintain, on the other hand, that while they require this, they have a much broader significance; demanding as their complement or logical result the highest communion enjoyed in the most endeared Christian relations. These, for the sake of distinction, we denominate the preceptive principles and laws of associated Christianity; though we are far from admitting, as the following sheets will show, that they are not in reality preceptive principles and laws of ecclesiastical Christianity as well. But as they are more general in their statements, are less apparently regulations of gospel church organizations, and as some of them are found in the Old Testament, we prefer to consider them as a code of laws for Christians viewed simply as social beings. They constitute a smaller circle of divine requirements within the larger circle of gospel teachings, but which, equally with the latter, demand, for the sake of congruity, the catholic law of church fellow-

[1] Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. xxi. p. 459.

ship. Before developing, therefore, this determinative law of unrestricted church communion taught in the New Testament (which we reserve for Section II.), we will glance at a few of those principles and laws enjoining a community of affections and interests among Christ's followers; so that, when we reach the consideration of the determinative law of church fellowship, we shall see that it is but the necessary outgrowth, not only of the spirit of the gospel, but of the principles and laws of associated Christianity. Without it the code has neither completeness nor symmetry. It remains an unfinished structure, weak and tottering, like a beautiful arch without its keystone. But while these preceptive principles are shown to point to the catholic law of sacramental communion as their necessary complement, each of itself constitutes an argument proving, if not the reality of the law, at least the inconsistency of denying it.

Of these principles and laws substantiating indirectly church communion, we name:

1. *The evangelical law of forgiveness and charity.* It is impossible to decide the question before us in a way pleasing to God without clear and impressive views of these duties. They are fundamental in Christian fellowship, and are no less binding than the inflexible requirement "to fulfil all righteousness." "Forgive," is the clearest accent that reaches us from the cross, demonstrating that the gospel, as a system of holy living, partakes of the nature of its foundation — God's sovereign purpose to forgive and save his enemies. Christ bids his disciples "love one another as I have loved you." He loved them with a forgiving love. Paul says: "And above all these things put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness." "Perfectness" (τῆς τελειότητος) signifies an ending, a finishing, a perfecting. Hence, in the view of the apostle, charity is the consolidating, completing grace; that which gives finish of character to the church and to its individual members. When Peter says, "Above all things, have fervent charity among yourselves," he elevates the duty paramount to all others, the want of it vitiating the

whole conduct. Let it never be forgotten that the church of Christ is an organization whose corner-stone is forgiving love, whose brightest glory is charity; and that the dominant spirit of him who is the head of the body must of course be the life of its governing law.

2. *The nature and limit of Christian toleration and forbearance.* Toleration presupposes wrong doing or wrong opinions in those towards whom it is exercised. The same is true of forbearance. Christian toleration or forbearance is looking with indulgence on religious errors or wrong religious practices, and treating those involved in them as brethren in Christ. God's people are but partially sanctified. Probably no Christian on earth sees the whole circle of revealed truth with perfect distinctness; much less can we believe that any denomination, as such, has received all scriptural truth without mixture of error, or is free from moral delinquencies. If we enjoy Christian fellowship at all, it must be enjoyed with imperfect Christians. Hence, we must "forbear one another in love."

As this preceptive principle is as applicable to ecclesiastical as to associated Christianity, we will discuss its bearings on both viewed as one.

The question of church communion resolves itself into this: What known errors shall we tolerate in the church, and what shall we refuse to tolerate? We all grant that there are heresies and wrong practices which may not be suffered. Where and how shall the division be made? Plainly, by some clearly defined principle which shall be applicable to every act of Christian life alike, a line running through and so dividing the wide field of errors and wrong practices, that all on one side shall be deemed reconcilable with Christian character and fellowship, and all on the other side not so. Can such a principle be found?

To be Christlike is the great end of our being; and to be Christlike is to feel as Christ feels towards all objects and beings within the circumference of our knowledge, and to act accordingly in our several relations. Consequently it is

Christlike to embrace in our Christian fellowship all whom we have adequate evidence that Christ embraces in the arms of his forgiving love. If we are Christians our own experience informs us how Christ feels towards sinners whom he forgives. When pressed under the weight of our sins, we weep over them, bowing with broken hearts before the throne, and take hold of Christ as our sin-pardoning Saviour and only refuge in despair; when the serenity and joy of conscious peace which flows from a conscious lying at the foot of the cross suffuse the soul, we enjoy the delightful conviction that Christ smiles, and that his Father looks down well pleased. We feel assured that Christ accepts us, and will at last welcome us, though the chief of sinners, to his eternal communion. Now when we are rationally convinced that others are likewise sincere penitents, that it is the habit and purpose of their being to weep before the cross and cling to it as their only hope, we have satisfactory evidence from our own experience that Christ receives them as well as ourselves into his fellowship; and feeling as he does towards them, we, in like manner, receive them into our fellowship.

From this purest Christian experience, agreeing with the teaching of scripture, we derive a well-defined principle of church fellowship, or Christian toleration. It bids us tolerate all errors deemed consistent with holding to the Head, and all wrong practices not forfeiting Christian character. This is being Christlike in church fellowship. God will love the soul that loves him, and embrace it in eternal fellowship, whether we do or not. This is a law of the eternal mind. It is equally a law of every Godlike mind. The deepest tendency of its being, the cravings of its holiest affections, will attract it towards all of kindred spirit.

The advocates of close communion do not make the distinction between things to be tolerated and things not to be tolerated in the church thus radical or experimental. They draw it between things acknowledged to be of the same nature and character. God is pleased with the affections and conduct of some on both sides of the line. The distinction is

arbitrary. It is not laid in a universal principle, and hence gives free scope to caprice and prejudice. It involves its abettors in marked inconsistencies; for instance, refusing to fellowship sacramentally those whom they have evidence to believe Christ so fellowships; rejecting some of the best Christians from the Lord's supper, and receiving to it some of the most defective; placing an external observance above right affections of the heart, and making the communion of the spiritual church dependent on the mode of a rite. Would they receive to the sacramental feast all publicly acknowledged to be Christ's disciples, rejecting only those not thus acknowledged, they would avoid both these and other hurtful inconsistencies.

Objection. It may be said, This is not so drawing the line of separation that God sees all on one side to be his children, and all on the other not; you make a public profession as necessary to sacramental communion as we do. True; but our position, grounded on an immutable principle, is not limited by an act, only by another principle. Our line of distinction is not arbitrary. We can judge of the heart only by its manifestations. No church can intelligently commune with a brother as one with Christ till he has given the church evidence of oneness with him. This is not limiting sacramental fellowship simply by an act, or the mode of an act, but by that which cannot be altered without altering either our own minds or the significance of the sacramental rite.

3. *The superiority of moral to positive precepts or external rites.* A moral precept is one intuitively discerned, or when taught its justness is at once seen. It springs out of the nature of things. It is immutable, and as enduring as our existence. The authority of a positive precept subsists alone in the will of the lawgiver. It is transitory, alterable at the pleasure of the promulgator. "The former is commanded because it is right; the latter is right because commanded." Every moral precept is suggestive of other precepts, ever multiplying itself, ever presenting new aspects to meet new relations. Hence it is comprehensive. Love will prompt to

every feeling and act, which, as circumstances and relations arise, we ought to exercise under the divine government. Resignation, submission, faith, repentance, benevolence, forgiveness, justice, candor, all the social virtues, are equally comprehensive. God himself can never abrogate them while he retains the relation of moral governor. Fully obeyed or experienced on the heart, they constitute a personal likeness to God, and are just as important as that likeness; forming a bond of union which no finite power can sunder.

The fundamental truths of the gospel, which, when cordially received, indicate and inspire the same or similar states of mind demanded by the moral precepts, are equally universal in their influence. They originate and mould character.

No such efficacious or wide-spread influence belongs to a positive precept. Its force is confined to the act prescribed. It has no authority in new relations to prescribe new duties, not united to it by the will of the lawgiver. If in any change of circumstances it conflict with a moral precept it may and must be disregarded. Positive precepts may have the power of testing obedience to moral precepts, as had the Adamic prohibition; for the disposition to comply with an external observance indicates an obedient heart; and an unwillingness to comply, a disobedient heart. But a misunderstanding in regard to the requirement, or a conscientious mistake concerning the mode of its performance, by no means proves a disobedient heart. The mistaken mode of a rite, while believed to be the proper mode, has, in its administration, the same moral effect as the right mode. In either case the demands of the conscience are equally met. But this is not the case with a conscientious mistake relative to moral precepts or the doctrines of grace. These are elements of life; their misconception, elements of death. Every moral precept obeyed, and every fundamental truth of the gospel cordially received, gives spiritual life; but every moral precept disobeyed, and every essential truth of the gospel discarded, weakens the pulse of holy activity. While, therefore, very

slight errors concerning depravity, regeneration, justification, dependence, or accountability, owing to the subtile influence of these truths on the heart, may prevent the progress, even the origination, of holiness in the soul, the conscientious mistake respecting an external rite is comparatively harmless. The higher place, then, must be given to the moral precepts.

Our Baptist brethren acknowledge this, even with respect to church order and government (see Rev. A. Fuller, Vol. viii. p. 459). Dr. Arnold is equally explicit: "We do not by any means put baptism on an equality with that love which is the fulfilling of the law."

This is in exact agreement with the teachings of scripture (Micah vi. 6–8; Matt. xii. 7; Mark xii. 33). It is thus distinctly taught, both in the Old and New Testaments, that the moral precepts sustain more vital relations, and occupy a higher place in Christ's kingdom, than the positive. Consequently, the failure to administer an ordinance of the gospel in its precise form or order while its spirit is retained, we cannot reasonably judge to be so displeasing to God as the want of that love or charity which assimilates us to himself. Christians agreeing in obedience to the moral precepts should therefore unite harmoniously and lovingly, though they may disagree in opinion and practice respecting the positive. Satisfactory evidence of qualifications for spiritual communion like that of heaven is enough. On this principle we plant ourselves as the only standing-place consistent with the distinction we are considering; while all argumentation for strict communion proceeds on the ground of the superiority of the positive precepts to the moral, in direct opposition both to the decisions of reason and of inspired teaching.

4. *All institutes of the gospel attain their highest end in the edification or holiness of Christians*, answering to the ultimate end of Christ's mission: "That he might purify unto himself a peculiar people." The apostle, speaking of the manner of conducting the worship of the church, says: "Let all things be done unto edifying" (1 Cor. xiv. 26; see also 1 Cor. xiv. 12; Eph. iv. 11–14). But in what specifically

consists the edification of God's people? In that which "maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love." "Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth." Cherishing or promoting the Christian graces, preparation for blessedness and everlasting communion with Christ, is the great end of all gospel institutes. Rev. A. Fuller, speaking of the grand design of the apostles in organizing churches, agrees with this view: "Whatever measures had a tendency to build up the church of God and individuals in their most holy faith, these they pursued. Whatever measures approved themselves to minds endued with holy wisdom as fit and lovely, and as tending to the enlargement of Christ's kingdom, these they followed, and inculcated on the churches. ..... In this process we perceive nothing of the air of ceremony, nothing like that of punctilious attention to forms, which marks obedience to a positive institute; but merely the conduct of men endued with wisdom from above. All things are done decently and in order; all things are done to edifying." Consequently, when this high and glorious end is better secured, when these graces assimilating us to God are better promoted by the neglect of the ordinances, they are, on scriptural authority, omitted or dispensed with for the occasion.

It was so in the old dispensation, in which rites seem almost living elements. On the day that Nadab and Abihu were destroyed by fire, Moses commanded Aaron and his surviving sons to take the meat-offering, as was their duty, and eat it before the Lord; but they did it not. Moses, discovering their neglect, was angry, and reproved them sharply. When Aaron, however, stated the reason, — his grief and that of his sons in view of the judicial death of those so dear to them, — Moses was content, because it would have been improper to eat it with sorrow of heart.

Hezekiah issued a proclamation to the Israelites to keep the passover, which had been for a long time neglected. Many had not cleansed themselves as the law required; nevertheless they ate. But Hezekiah prayed: "The good Lord

pardon every one that prepareth his heart" (2 Chron. xxx. 19); and the Lord accepted them.

The Israelites are attacked by the Philistines. They are alarmed, and beseech Samuel to cry unto the Lord for them. Samuel offers a sucking lamb as a burnt offering unto the Lord, and the Philistines are defeated. But Samuel was not a priest, and had no right, according to the Mosaic law, to offer the sacrifice, nor was Mizpeh the appointed place to offer it; yet the Lord accepted the offering. There seems, indeed, to have been a revival of religion during the whole judgeship of Samuel, although the worship of the people during the entire period was not performed precisely after the Sinaitic model.

Further, we find that, though circumcision was the entering ordinance into the Mosaic church, no one was to be admitted to the passover without it, could not even be received as one of Israel; yet, during most of their sojourn in the wilderness the rite was omitted in direct violation of the law of Sinai. And it is remarkable that in no period of their existence as a nation did God bestow upon them more extraordinary blessings, or manifest to them more signal marks of his favor. It is plain that God excused this neglect under the circumstances, and held them still in the very heart of his affections. The only reason we are justified in assigning is, that in the then existing circumstances of the church the administration of the rite was not necessary to secure their separation from other nations, or the promotion of holiness among themselves; their reception of Christ being a sufficient ground of their acceptableness to God; as Bunyan pithily remarks they "had that richer and better thing." "They did all eat the same spiritual meat; and did all drink the same spiritual drink" (1 Cor. x. 3, 4).

If the rigidity of the Mosaic ritual could give way in certain circumstances, when the ends it was designed to secure were reached as well without it, we may certainly expect equal leniency under the freer dispensation of the gospel. Indeed, Christ has shown that this pliability or leniency

respecting positive institutes not only existed in the Mosaic economy, but also is a fundamental principle of action in the economy of grace: "I will have mercy and not sacrifice" (Matt. xii. 1–7). This is the spirit of all the ordinances of Christ's appointment (compare also Lev. xxiv. 5–9 and 1 Sam. xxi. 6 with Matt. xii. 3–8; Num. xxviii. 9 with John vii. 22).

Positive laws demanding ritual observances are not therefore, either in the old dispensation or in the new, unbending principles, which must, under all circumstances, be obeyed, like the great law of love, which can never be abrogated or relaxed. The Christian graces, the life of Christ in the soul, constitute all that is really pleasing to God in the institutes of his church. It is a principle of scripture never to be forgotten, that outward observances may be modified or omitted; the law requiring right affections, never. The whole superstructure of visible Christianity is arranged with reference to this one thing, — the advancement of God's people in holiness: "The knowledge of God is more than burnt-offerings." Shall we then greatly sin if we believe charity — mutual edification in love — to be of higher esteem in God's view than the right mode of adminstering an ordinance?

5. *The oneness of believers with Christ and with each other.* This is the deepest and broadest principle of associated Christian life. Christ, who came to make the redeemed one with himself, planted it in the centre of his church, to be there a living energy, an irrepressible force, working in the heart and working in the extremities; a preceptive element of universal authority, a ubiquitous and immutable law of existence, guiding now, guiding everywhere, guiding forever. This oneness of Christians, based on oneness with Christ, rose before the mind of Paul in all its beauty, dignity, and practical bearings, kindling his heart to a glow, and awakening his loftiest eloquence. He never seems weary of dwelling on the delightful theme.

Though this point is vital to our subject, yet as we have discussed it in Part I., and shall allude to it in other sections

of our argument, we will not now linger to draw out its full force by explicating the several passages in which it is taught. Commending them to the careful investigation of the reader, we will merely allude to a few.

In Eph. iv. 2–16, 1 Cor. xii., Col. ii. 19, Rom. xii. 4, 5, Paul compares the oneness of believers in Christ to the identity of the several members of the human body under the control of the indwelling spirit. He represents the Holy Ghost as the great transforming agent, working a radical change in their hearts, and engendering there a supernatural life, which creates among believers an inner spiritual organism — a sublime, mysterious unity, which no language so well expresses as "oneness with Christ." It is as if the innumerable multitudes of Christ's disciples were one person, animated by one soul, so that every member of his body is as dear to him, the Head, as every member of the natural body is to the person. Indeed, they are part of Christ (Eph. v. 30).

The apostle also compares this oneness to the oneness of husband and wife (Eph. v. 22–32); to the unity of a temple resting on its foundation (Eph. ii. 21–22); to the unity of a family (Gal. vi. 10; Eph. ii. 19; Heb. vi. 11); to the unity of the civil state; of the shepherd and his flock (John x. 19); of the vine and its branches (John xv. 1–5); to the vital connection (*σύμφυτος*) between the scion and the stock (Rom. vi. 5). See Olshausen, Calvin.

The equality of believers reveals the same truth as lying underneath, and demanding it (Rom. x. 12; Gal. iii. 26–28). It is also implied in the command, so often repeated, enjoining Christlike love on the universal brotherhood (John xiii. 34; xv. 12; Eph. iv. 32.)

It is taught negatively: 1. By the severe reprimands for dissensions and divisions among Christians uttered both by Christ and his apostles (Matt. xii. 25; Rom. xvi. 17, 18; 1 Cor. i. 11–13; iii. 3, 4; Gal. v. 15; 1 John iii. 14, 15; iv. 20; Col. ii. 2). 2. By the prohibition, "there should be no schism in the body." The scriptural idea of schism, in a

single sentence, is dividing the body of Christ. This is evident from Paul's illustration of the unity of which schism is the rupture. The sin is named at the close of that beautiful analogy he traces between the unity in the members of the human body and the oneness of believers in Christ. *Σχίσμα*, signifies primarily a rent, a breach, the division of a substance in two. Applied to a unity subsisting in moral affections and sentiments, it signifies any disturbance of kindly feelings, any estrangement creating parties or factions. Hence, any quarrel among brethren in Christ, though it may not proceed so far as separation, is called by the apostle, schism; and such was the division he so severely censured among the Corinthians.

But if such limited estrangement is schism, the division which actually severs the body of Christ, refusing fellowship to those freely acknowledged to be Christians and in covenant with God, even going so far as to set up a separate church organization, not allowing those rejected so much as occasional communion, is schism in a far higher sense. If Paul, in view of the alienations in the Corinthian church, where all, notwithstanding differences, remained in one communion, deeming each other brethren in the Lord, could, with a kind of wonderment at the strangeness of the act, reprovingly ask: "Is Christ divided?" with how much more astonishment and severity would he have put the question had they actually divided into separate communions, one party counting the other unworthy to partake of the sacramental emblems.

Now, by gathering into one view the various representations of the unity of Christ's disciples, and the several strong expressions teaching it, such as: "We being many are one body in Christ"; "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones"; "The fulness of him that filleth all in all"; "Till we all come unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ"; "That the members should have the same care one of another"; "The whole body fitly joined together and compacted"; "Whether one

member suffer all the members suffer with it," as if a vital consciousness beat through all, identifying them as one person; — we say by gathering these expressions and illustrations, some of them reiterated again and again, into one view, in connection with the fact that Christ prayed that his disciples might be one with him, as his Father and he are one, the mind reaches the inevitable conclusion that the members of Christ's body should, by divine right, enjoy the privilege of communing with all his acknowledged disciples in partaking of the emblems of his literal body, broken for the sins of all. Surely, they who partake of Christ, the heavenly bread, who dwell in Christ, and Christ in them, should have the privilege of partaking of the symbols of that bread and that indwelling, which symbols he designated in the solemn and tender hour of the institution, " my body," " my blood."

The symbolizing of this unity is, indeed, the essential idea of the sacramental board. 1. This is apparent from those touching words which Christ addressed to his disciples at the institution of the supper, recorded in John xiii., xiv., xv., xvi., the central idea of which is the unity of his disciples with himself; and closing with that sublimest prayer, in which, as intercessor, he pleads with his Father, " that they may be one, as we are." The manifest significance of this address and prayer, uttered in immediate connection with the institution of the supper, must have been, in the view of the disciples — this memorial feast is for all who are, or shall be, interested in his death; for all who are, or shall be, one with the Master as the branch is one with the vine, — participation of the spiritual bread entitling then and evermore, to commune with him in the symbolic bread.

2. Divisions and subdivisions, sectarian and denominational lines between true disciples, though then present to the Saviour's omniscient view, evidently presented no barrier to the fellowship of his table. All one in him had then, and ever will have, an equal interest in commemorating his death in sacramental love.

3. In agreement with the teachings of Christ on that touch-

ing occasion, Paul represents the unity of believers in their Head both as furnishing just ground of communion in the highest token of fellowship, the Lord's supper, and as implied in its reception (1 Cor. x. 16, 17). "We" refers to those whom he addresses in this epistle (chap. i. 2),— we, all Christians who are in Christ, are as the particles of flour which compose the loaf eaten in communion, personally distinct, yet organically one. Being such, all have the same title to and interest in the sacrament where we enjoy communion with our common Lord, and with all who are in him.

4. Surely if visible membership of Christ's "body, of his flesh, and of his bones," does not entitle to the highest form of fraternal communion, at what point does the title fail? Reckoning the highest point at one hundred degrees, does it fail at fifty, sixty, ninety, ninety-nine? Where may the dividing wedge be driven? It is incumbent on our opponents, recognizing the nature of the institution, to say where the schism in that body "fitly joined together and compacted" may be made. It is demonstrable that the point cannot be logically found.

5. The richest Christian experience accords with this decision. One prostrated in utter lowliness before his Saviour, burdened with sin, groaning under a sense of inward depravity which forces from him the exclamation of Paul, "Oh, wretched man that I am!" while his eye is fixed on the cross, and the excruciating anguish there endured to procure for him, and all like him, pardon and an immortal crown, can scarcely have the heart to say to a professed brother in Christ by his side, bowed as he is bowed, and weeping as he is weeping, and looking up to Christ with the same affectionate interest: "Stand thou aside; thou hast no part in this feast of dying love; for thou hast mistaken sprinkling for baptism, and by thy practice art sanctioning the application of the initiatory rite of the church to infants." Hence, many warm-hearted Christians among close communionists have expressed a desire to sit at the table of dying love with members of other denominations; and, only restrained by a sense

of obligation to what they deem a principle of order in their church, have heartily wished the barrier removed.

The proposition announced to be proved in section I. *established.* The above conclusion is the decisive result deduced from one of the principles and laws of Christian communion or association. In view of them all combined, the logical inference, that they demand sacramental communion as their complement, is irresistible. The feelings and conduct they prescribe are incomplete without it. In view of the reason they culminate in this as inevitably as the vegetable laws of the shrub culminate in the flower or the fruit.

This conclusion is denied by our opponents. They admit the obligations of reciprocal fellowship growing out of the unity of believers in Christ; but maintain that these obligations of holiest sympathies may be met without uniting in sacramental ordinances. They make a distinction between "Christian and sacramental communion." They affirm that the scriptures indicate two kinds of fellowship in the body of Christ — the one enjoyed with the invisible church and with unbaptized visible Christians, and the other with the visible baptized church. The same distinction they sometimes denominate "church communion" and the "communion of the saints" (see Curtis, pp. 35, 45;[1] Howell, p. 113;[2] Remington, p. 71).[3] This position supposes the visible body of Christ divided for the purpose of sacramental communion;

[1] The Distinction between Christian and Church Communion, and between Communion and its Symbols. By T. F. Curtis, A.M., Professor of Theology, Howard College, Ala. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society.

[2] Terms of Communion at the Lord's Table. By R. B. C. Howell, D.D. Ninth thousand. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society.

[3] A Defence of Restricted Communion. By Rev. S. Remington, A.M. Fifty-first thousand. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. In this discussion we have taken the works published by this society as authoritative with respect to the principles of the Baptists. For it is the object of the society, as stated by themselves, "To provide and put in circulation a Sunday school and general literature, such as illustrates and enforces the peculiar and, as we believe, scriptural principles of the Baptist denomination." Also, "That others should be enabled to learn what Baptists are from our own presentation of our principles."

one part qualified, the other unqualified. They conceive baptism to be the divisive principle, and maintain:

I. That they find verbal authority for their opinion in the fact that the primitive Christians are said to have been baptized into the church or the body of Christ. Passages relied on are 1 Cor. xii. 13; Gal. iii. 27; Eph. iv. 5. But "baptism" and "baptize" in these passages may signify regeneration, or the reception of Christ's life into the soul. Dr. Gill, Dr. Hodge, Dr. Armstrong, Olshausen, Neander, and others support this interpretation.

II. It is argued that the office of baptism, as the only public act by which a scriptural profession is made, divides the visible body of Christ for the purposes of sacramental communion. In consistency with relying alone on the express declaration of the New Testament so emphatically asserted by our opponents, they assume by this distinction that two classes of accredited Christians are known in scripture. The modern division in the religious world between professing and non-professing Christians is carried back to apostolic times, and reasoned from as then existing. The simple question therefore, is: Did this distinction then obtain? We reply in the negative. For,

1. It divides mankind into three distinct classes: (1) Unbelievers; (2) Christians qualified for the communion; (3) Christians unqualified for the communion. But the Bible divides mankind into two distinctive classes only, believers and unbelievers; saints and sinners.

2. We have no knowledge in scripture of a class of Christians acknowledged spiritually qualified for a sacramental rite, even desirous of it, but who were refused it. This is conceded relative to baptism. It is equally true relative to the Lord's supper.

3. By a position which the Baptists themselves take on another point, they virtually deny the existence of a recognized class of Christians in apostolic times to whom "the communion of the saints" was allowable, but "church communion" forbidden. If such a class existed they were of

course visible Christians; and visibility is the result only of some significant act. But the Baptists maintain that the initiatory rite to the church was the first public act spoken of in the Acts and in the Epistles after believing in Christ. This rite, baptism, they say, was "placed at the beginning of the Christian life, as the introduction to a course of obedience." "It followed immediately as the first duty after the exercise of saving faith." All visible Christians then belonged to one class.

4. The inscriptions of Paul's Epistles show that he held to no such distinction among Christians. The Epistle to the Romans is addressed "To all that be in Rome, beloved of God, called to be saints";—to all whose "faith is spoken of throughout the whole world." The inscription to the first Epistle to the Corinthians is: "Unto the church of God which is at Corinth, to them that are sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints, with all that in every place call upon the name of Jesus Christ our Lord, both theirs and ours." The arguments and persuasions to unity, the requirements of brotherly love, the reprimands against estrangement and schism, enforced in these epistles were addressed to the same individuals as those referred to in the inscriptions. They indicate but one class of visible believers.

5. Admitting that Paul in his epistles addressed only the members of the particular churches to which they were severally directed, and consequently only the baptized, the result is the same. It may prove that all known Christians were baptized; but it equally disproves that the body of visible believers was divided into two classes.

6. Indeed, the Baptists themselves virtually deny that the peculiar significance or office of baptism, as the act of profession, has this discriminating power. Baptism, with them, is always a sign of what was previously possessed. It does not, then, form the mystical union of Christ's body, but indicates that union as already existing. It does not give visibility to the body. It is the profession of faith which the rite presupposes that gives visibility (Curtis p. 93).

Our reply to the argument for two classes of recognized believers drawn from the necessary precedence of baptism to the Lord's supper we reserve for Part III.

But while most strict communionists concede that the New Testament furnishes no direct testimony respecting such a distinction among primitive Christians as answers to the modern distinction of Christian and sacramental communion, they maintain that it does teach, at least by implication, certain principles of church organization and order, which involve laws of church fellowship warranting such a division in the body of Christ. We will mention a few of them.

Principle I. is, that the Lord's supper is not expressive of communion with the brethren, only with Christ (Denison, pp. 18, 22).[1] This theory, if it can be established, is an easy method of settling the question in debate. It is undermining all argumentations for free communion by a single stroke. Alexander-like, it is not loosening, but cutting, the Gordian knot. But the theory may be sufficiently refuted by the following considerations:

1. The language which Christ employed in the institution of the supper shows that it was intended to be symbolical of fraternal love. It may be shown that the words, "this is my blood of the new testament," indicate that the covenant of the gospel dispensation is sealed with blood, as was the Mosaic; that the supper is the great sealing ordinance of the gospel covenant, as the passover was of the Mosaic; that the significance and communial extent of the passover is to interpret the significance and communial extent of the supper; that as the former was expressive of fraternal regard, so is the latter. The same may be further shown from the fact that a covenant implies a law or commandments, and its sealing ordinance implies a pledge of obedience to its law or commandments. The law of the gospel covenant which is sealed in the Lord's supper is that which Christ uttered in immediate connection with its institution: "A new commandment

[1] The Supper Institution. By Rev. Frederic Denison, A.M. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society.

I give unto you, that ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another." Hence the supper is expressive of the purest fraternal love. The same is implied in the mutual thanksgiving or prayer in which the disciples joined with the Lord in the consecration of the bread and wine, and in the song of mutual praise which they sang at the close of the instituting service. The prophetic declaration: "I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom," is expressive of the same.

2. The theory conflicts with the essential idea of the supper as a social feast. That it is a social institution our opponents earnestly maintain. But if a social institution, it must have some significance relative to those with whom it is enjoyed (Curtis, p. 74; Arnold, 59).

3. The instruction and prayer of Christ at and immediately after the supper show that fraternal love was especially symbolized by it. The address of Christ contained in the latter part of the thirteenth chapter of John, and closing with the sixteenth, was probably delivered in the chamber where the supper was instituted (Steir, Bloomfield), or on their way to Gethsemane, to which they immediately repaired. The central and all-pervading thought of the address is, the union of believers in Christ—brotherly love in its highest and richest form. The address may be safely taken as explanatory of the import of the supper just instituted.

4. The advocates of this theory regard the supper as expressive of the whole scheme of gospel truth (Denison, pp. 47, 48). If so, it must of course be expressive of its determinative, essential idea—the ultimate end to which it tends, the union of all Christ's disciples in one (Eph. i. 9, 10).

5. The theory conflicts with 1 Cor. x. 16. (See Calvin, Bloomfield, Alford, Hodge, Olshausen, Neander, Stanley, etc).

6. The theory is incompatible with the fact that the sacramental supper was primarily taken in connection with the "agape." This practice, on the supposition that the holy

supper has no relevancy to fraternal regard, would have been exceedingly apt to mislead.

7. The theory conflicts with the psychological nature of union with Christ. Communion with Christ implies communion with all like him. It is impossible to partake of the supper aright, or with feelings of full communion with Christ, and not enjoy communion with the brethren.

8. It conflicts with the testimony of antiquity and with the almost universal sentiment of the Christian church (Neander, Schaff, Blunt, Coleman).

9. The theory is denied by other Baptist writers, such as Drs. Hovey, Arnold, Howell, Hiscox, and Professor Curtis.

Principle II. is, that the Lord's supper expresses communion in intellectual views, in doctrinal sentiments, and ritual practices.[1] The fallacy of this position lies in its representing the supper as a symbol of intellectual harmonies, whereas it is a symbol of spiritual harmonies only. The oneness of believers is the oneness of love and faith — of the Christian sympathies. A commingling of these at the feast of dying love is perfectly compatible with diversities of sentiment.

Principle III. is, that discrepancies in religious opinions justifying denominational organizations justify exclusion from each other's communion tables. But it may be shown: 1. That diversities of opinion justifying different denominational organizations may not necessarily justify exclusion from each other's communion tables; for while they might hinder church fellowship, they might not hinder sacramental fellowship. 2. The fact that evangelical Christians are divided into different denominations may be shown to be one of the strongest reasons for manifesting their oneness in Christ by partaking together of the holy supper, an ordinance in which all have an equal interest.

Principle IV. is, that the Lord's supper is a "church ordinance"; i.e. an ordinance belonging to each particular church, to be celebrated only by its members in church ca-

[1] The Communion Question. Pamphlet published by the Baptist Convention, Ohio.

pacity, symbolizing church relations, betokening fellowship exclusively between Christ and themselves. In the same sense that the passover was committed to each family of Israel, the Christian passover is committed to each particular church. It is given to the church as a body, in distinction from its individual members. Hence we have no right to carry it to the families of the church, to administer it to those unable to go to the place of public celebration. Nor have professed Christians, members of churches, and ministers assembled in associations, in councils, in presbyteries, in synods, in conventions or conferences, even although all belong to one denomination, any right to celebrate the Lord's supper as a symbol of their oneness with Christ. It must be administered to each church in its church capacity, and in no other way. Membership in one church neither guarantees the right, nor gives the privilege of partaking of it in another (Curtis, pp. 85–94; Denison, pp. 20–24; Remington, pp. 67–72; Hovey, p. 154; Arnold, pp. 43–45).

The main grounds of this theory are two. The first ground is the alleged fact that the Christian church was organized at the institution of the supper; that the twelve were the "ecclesia," the small company of disciples called out from the whole company of the disciples to form the first gathering of Christ's visible church, to whom he committed the sacramental feast; thereby declaring that it was an ordinance belonging to an individual church, and must ever be celebrated by the church in its corporate capacity. This is the simple averment of a fact. But is it a fact? Its certainty cannot be demonstrated.

1. To affirm that the company or family of the twelve disciples was organized into the visible church of Christ at the institution of the supper is mere assertion. There is no proof of it. Thousands, both learned and unlearned, have read the account of the institution of the supper, and never suspected that the visible church of Christ, as distinguished from the Mosaic, was then inaugurated. It cannot receive rational credence till demonstrated.

2. According to the eternal counsels of the Godhead, all the persons in the Trinity were to have specific work to do and to be glorified in human redemption — in forming the Christian church, and imparting to it its efficiency and beauty.

3. Christ was not to be installed mediatorial king till he had purchased his kingdom. It was to be given him as a reward for his death (Isa. liii. 10–12; Ps. ii. 8; Philip. ii. 8–11). We cannot reasonably suppose the king would be installed before his kingdom was given him.

4. The Holy Spirit was to be the divine agent to create the materials out of which the gospel church was to be erected, and by whom, as an inward formative power, it was to be perpetuated, a vital corporation in the world — a fact of special importance in determining the time of its commencement. This is apparent from John xiv. 16, 17, 20, 26; xv. 26; xvi. 7–13.

5. Christ was to be exalted as mediatorial king before he sent the Spirit in its greater fulness and power. This is evident from John vii. 39; xvi. 7; xiv. 16. "I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another comforter." This prayer was to be offered as intercessor. The twenty-sixth verse implies the same thing, "whom the Father will send in my name" (Acts ii. 33, 36).

6. The twelve disciples were to be the human agents in setting up the visible church (Luke xxiv. 47–48; John xv. 27; Acts i. 8; ii. 32. They were to be qualified for this important work, (a) by the instructions of Christ (Acts i. 3); (b) by the enlightening and guiding power of the Spirit. This last was done in the glorious effusion of the Holy Spirit on the day of pentecost (Acts i. 4, 5, 8; ii. 2–4).

7. The testimony of church historians is in favor of the first founding of Christ's visible church on the day of pentecost (Neander, Schaff, Gieseler, Milner).

8. Some of the ablest Baptist writers affirm the same.

9. But could it be proved that Christ's visible church was organized at the institution of the supper, it would not demonstrably follow that the supper was committed to particu-

lar churches in such sense that the members of one might not communicate at the table of another.

a. The passover was a symbol of union and fellowship with the Hebrew nation, expressive of their common deliverances, their common interests, and their common hopes as God's people. This has been shown above in our confutation of principle I.

b. The Israelites were all to kill the paschal lamb at the same hour, and to eat it at the same hour. Order and decorum were distinctive features of their ritualistic worship. No passing from one table to another could therefore have been allowed. It would have rendered the festival a scene of disorder and confusion. There was a necessity for confining each person to a particular table. The churches of Christ in evangelical Christendom do not celebrate the Christian passover at the same time. There is not therefore the same necessity for confining each communicant to the same table.

c. The families or groups for the participation of the paschal feast were not permanent bodies. Neither order nor convenience would permit all the paschal lambs to be spread on one table, and the assembled nation to gather around it. The people must of necessity be parcelled off into groups or societies. Division into families was most convenient and suitable, as commemorative of the preservation of families in the slaying of the first-born. But another point was to be secured. Lambs enough must be slain, but not a superabundance (Ex. xii. 3, 4). The paschal group was a family only generically. Josephus informs us that their number ranged from ten to twenty. Bush remarks on the phrase, "Every man according to his eating" — "every man according to the mouth of his eating. That is, in making out a suitable number to participate of the lamb, or form the paschal society, ye shall include every one who is capable of eating a certain quantity, to the exception of the sick, the very aged, and the very young. This quantity the Jewish writers say was to be equal to the size of an olive." These

groups were made up in the annual arrangements for the observance of the passover. They varied from year to year. Some in a group this year might be assigned to another the next. They were by no means permanent bodies like particular churches. No just inference concerning the point in discussion can be drawn from the variable paschal societies, circumstanced as these societies were, in relation to permanent societies situated so differently as are Christian churches.

d. Neither in the Jewish nor gospel economy are ceremonies and ordinances ends in themselves. Their end is always edification in holiness. When this could be secured without their performance, or without a rigid regard to their forms, they were, in scripture times, either modified or entirely neglected, even under the ritual economy of the Jews. (See above; Indirect Canons for Free Communion, No. 4.)

The symbolization of union and fellowship among the Israelites, one grand end of the paschal festival, was transferred to the Lord's supper. This principle is therefore common to both ordinances. But while a principle itself is not mutable, the mode of carrying it out according to the soundest logic is mutable. This eucharistic principle, consequently, may, on grounds both of reason and scripture, be modified by the new relations and circumstances of the gospel.

Now, because in a ritualistic system of extremest precision of modes, one end of the passover, fellowship, was best expressed by its being partaken of by small societies exclusively among themselves — societies annually composed for each annual observance, so that the members of one were strictly forbidden to pass from one to another, is it demonstrable that the fellowship of Christian churches is to be expressed exactly in the same manner; especially when in the new circumstances, another mode is more expressive, and in perfect keeping with the freer economy of grace in which we live? From this premise can it be demonstrated that the members of one Christian church may not partake of the emblems of Christ's death with another; or that one

church is under obligation, in order to a proper celebration of the supper, to debar from its communion board the members of all other churches? Certainly, if the ordinances of the gospel are not ends in themselves, if the end of all is the edification of believers in holiness, the intelligent and candid must see that such is not the logical inference from the hypothesis of our opponents, were it even proved true. This asserted fact therefore would avail nothing could it be substantiated.

Besides, the assumption that the visible church was inaugurated at the institution of the supper involves its advocates in several difficulties:

1. It conducts them from the New Testament to the Old to find proof, if not of the institution of a Christian rite, at least proof of one of its essential practical elements. The argument is, the Mosaic ritual required the passover to be eaten, each family by itself; therefore the Lord's supper is a church ordinance to be celebrated invariably and exclusively by a church in its corporate capacity. The Jewish ordinance is made the exact mould in which the Christian ordinance, as a symbol of fraternal fellowship is cast; so that we have it precisely in the same shape, restricted by the same limits. Can there be a more decisive resort to the Mosaic ritual and dependence upon it for the ascertainment of the essential element of a gospel rite? But this is directly contrary to one of the avowed principles of our opponents (Hovey, p. 134; Denison, p. 14).

2. If Christ intended the supper to take the same place in the New Testament church that the passover occupied in the Old Testament church, and if by first celebrating it with his disciples as his family, he meant to show that it was to retain its characteristic as a family rite, it is the legitimate conclusion that it was designed to be a rite, celebrated, not in the gospel church as such, but in the families of the gospel church. But this would completely overthrow the hypothesis that it is to be invariably celebrated by the church, as such, never to be carried out of it into the association, council,

synod, or family. It would prove just the reverse. Its supporters save themselves only by changing what they term the family of Christ into the church of Christ at the moment when he took bread, blessed, and brake, without the least intimation of such a change.

3. The theory compels its advocates to put upon "ecclesia," church, a sense diverse from its accepted ecclesiastical usage. Its received signification is, "called out by authority from the world into the family of Christ." This is very clearly stated by Flacius Illyricus, quoted with approbation by R. C. Trench; also by Coleman, Schaff, and Neander. Our restrictive friends admit that "ecclesia" purports "called out by authority," but not distinctively out of the world, — indirectly, perhaps, out of the world, but distinctively out of the company of believers. The very object of the hypothesis is to show that Christ enjoyed sacramental communion with only a part of those with whom he enjoyed Christian communion. The twelve were called out by authority for this distinctive purpose. According to the hypothesis, they were called out from his known and avowed disciples — from the seventy, the family of Bethany, separated even from his own mother, from those, so far as we know, who were as dear to him, and with whom he enjoyed as endeared communion, as with the twelve. Nor were they called out from the invisible company of believers to be formed into a visible company, but from a company of believers already visible.

4. The ground of excluding Pedobaptists from the sacramental table is by the hypothesis shifted from those usually assigned as justifiable. That which rises high above all others is baptism (Curtis p. 240; Terms of Communion p.8).[1] But Christ plainly did not exclude his other followers because they had not been baptized or immersed. There is the same reason to believe that they had been baptized as that the twelve had been. He did not exclude them because they were "walking disorderly"; for they were walking as orderly as those he welcomed to the supper. He did not exclude

[1] Tract by American Baptist Publication Society, Philadelphia.

them because they had embraced any error, or were guilty of ill practices or misdemeanors. They were as sound in the faith, as correct in ritual usages, and as exemplary in deportment as those to whom he broke bread. He did not exclude them because he loved them less affectionately. We have every reason to believe that he loved his mother and the family at Bethany as warmly as his chosen disciples. He did not exclude *all* of them certainly because they did not or might not have belonged to his family or "paschal society." He might have introduced eight more to make up the number twenty. The family of Bethany must have united with some other family, for they were too small to compose of themselves a paschal group. His mother might surely have been reckoned as one of his family. Thus the hypothesis excludes all his disciples except the twelve on entirely new ground. That is,

5. It excludes them simply on the ground of sovereignty. There was no apparent cause in the excluded disciples either subjectively or objectively; none in what they had done, thought, believed, said, felt, or purposed; none in what they had failed to do, think, speak, feel, or desire. On the hypothesis, the cause lay alone in Christ's sovereign will, because so it seemed good in his sight.

6. Since Christ's example in matters of church order constitutes law in view of our opponents, a just inference from their hypothesis is, that he intends to incorporate but a small proportion of his followers into his visible church. If at the institution of the supper the twelve and seventy constituted the whole number of disciples, he designs only about one in seven to belong to his visible church. If the whole number were an hundred and twenty, he designs only one in ten. If the whole number were five hundred, he designs only about one in forty. Thus the hypothesis belittles the whole subject of church organization and church ordinances. Even sacramental communion is of little consequence. Christ excluded from it his own mother, the dearest of all his friends, the friend who held the deepest place in his affections amid

his dying agonies. Would he shut her out from any privilege of great moment? Was there any one by whom he more desired to be remembered?

The second ground of argument, proving that the sacramental supper is exclusively a church ordinance, to be administered in and by the church as such, and never to be carried out of it, is the alleged fact that the apostolic churches met severally "in one place" to enjoy it; met as a body, and not in detached companies or families. The scripture mainly relied upon in proof of this position is 1 Cor. xi. 21–33.

The argument from the facts narrated in this passage is very simple and direct. Based on the principle that Paul "exalted the customs of all the churches to the position of a moral law for believers," it is this: "No less than four times within the space of a few verses does Paul connect the coming together" of the Corinthian Christians "in one place with the celebration of the eucharist"; therefore the holy supper must always be observed by each particular church as a body; it may never be celebrated by a portion of it separately, never by members of different churches assembled to promote important Christian enterprises; never be carried out of the church into the family for the comfort of the sick and aged; it may be observed only by the several particular churches in their respective corporate capacities assembled in one place. Between these bodies there may be no intercommunion in the memorial feast of Christ's love, though it is extremely desirable that they extend to each other all other Christian courtesies and forms of Christian fellowship.

We have no disposition to deny or obscure one of these facts. Indeed, they accord precisely with the views of Pedobaptist Congregationalists. It is a leading idea with them that a church should ordinarily be composed of those who can conveniently meet in one place. This was the opinion of Thomas Goodwin, the great champion of Puritan Congregationalism in the seventeenth century. He says "a church is an instituted body assembling in one place." Punchard lays it down as a fundamental principle of Congregationalism,

"that a church should ordinarily consist of only so many members as can conveniently assemble together for public worship, the celebration of religious ordinances, and the transaction of church business." Besides, the law of open communion for which we are contending, grounded in the union and oneness of Christ's disciples, demands that a church meet together to celebrate the Lord's supper, as a general rule. We should deem it in the highest degree disorderly for a church to split up into factions and parties, to show their partizan views or inimical preferences over the sealing ordinance of their covenant vows — that touching emblem of Christian unity. Thus the facts recorded in 1 Cor. xi. as decidedly favor us as our opponents.

This is sufficient to show the inconsequence of the inference. But its unwarrantableness may be shown by other considerations:

1. Other reasons may have led the Corinthian and other apostolic churches to partake of the communion severally among themselves, aside from the special command of Christ requiring each particular church to celebrate the ordinance in her corporate capacity, as a symbol alone of their particular fellowship.

a. The vividness of their Christian consciousness drew the early disciples together. The true idea of Christian unity, their mutual oneness with Christ and with each other, seemed wrought by the Holy Ghost into their deepest experience. The feeling that they were mutually one in interest and affection and purpose with Christ was intense. They viewed themselves as one family. They had "all things common."

b. The Jewish idea of worship which lingered in the minds of the early Christians, greatly modifying the method of their public devotions, might have led the apostolic churches to partake of the eucharist together. The Jewish religion was emphatically a social religion. It abounded in public services. It would be, therefore, very natural for the primitive churches to assemble in one place for the purpose of public worship, and in connection with it, for the celebration of

sacrificial love, though Christ had not expressly taught them to do so.

It is undeniable that the intense and vital consciousness of their unity in Christ cherished by the early Christians, wrought as a plastic organizing power in the formation and well-ordering of the apostolic churches. It concentrated into a particular church all who could conveniently assemble in one place to celebrate the ordinances together.

2. This consciousness of unity must have led the churches to extend their Christian sympathy and fellowship beyond their respective limits. It surely would not have rendered them repellent exclusionists and conducted them to the position that the limits of the particular church were the limits of fellowship. It must have led them to join in commemorating the death of their common Redeemer in the touching emblems of sacramental love, when circumstances and consistency with covenant obligations to their own particular church rendered it justifiable. Exactly this is affirmed by one of the advocates of the theory to have been the custom of the primitive Christians. "The apostles and the members of the churches, when with any of the churches, united with these churches in observing the institution" (Denison, p. 69). Thus the principle underlying the scriptural facts on which our opponents depend for the establishment of their restrictive policy, proves precisely our sacramental views. Its free workings forbid close communion.

3. Other passages of scripture militate directly against the inferences of our opponents.

a. Acts ii. 42, 46. That the breaking of bread in these verses indicates the dispensation of the Lord's supper is acknowledged by the advocates of the inference in question. For further proof the reader is referred to A. P. Stanley's note on 1 Cor. xi. 20, where the argument is fully drawn out.

If "breaking bread" denotes the Lord's supper, we have very decided evidence that it was not always celebrated by the church as a body; and that this was not to be an essen-

tial element in its right administration, as was the observance of the passover separately by Jewish families. In verse forty-six, "in the temple" is contrasted with "from house to house," public with private. While they went up to the temple and joined in public worship, they celebrated the eucharist in private houses. Robinson interprets κατ' οἶκον, κατ' οἴκους, "in private houses." In Acts v. 42, viii. 3, the words are translated, "in every house." On Acts xx. 20, where they again occur, Bloomfield comments: "It is plain from the foregoing term δημοσίᾳ, which has reference to meetings of the whole congregation at once, that κατ' οἴκους must mean not 'from house to house,' but 'in private houses' (the κατά only denoting rotation), namely, those where separate parts of the whole number of Christians met." Professors Hackett and J. A. Alexander confirm the same interpretation (see also Olshausen, Bengel, Pool, Alford). Besides, it is not probable that Christians at Jerusalem who belonged to the poorer classes had houses large enough to accommodate, for the orderly administration of the holy supper, their whole number, which soon amounted to more than five thousand; and, before they were scattered by persecution, became much larger. And we have no reason to believe they would have been permitted to administer the holy supper, the memorial of Christ's death in any public room; as Dr. Hovey says: "It may be taken for granted that they could use neither temple nor synagogue for any service distinctly and visibly Christian." Neander, approved by Hackett, observes "that a single room would hardly have contained the present number of converts. He supposes that in addition to their daily resort to the temple, they met in smaller companies, at different places; that they here received instruction from their teachers or one another, and prayed and sang together; and, as the members of a common family, closed their interview with a repast, at which bread and wine were distributed in memory of the Saviour's last meal with his disciples." We have, therefore, no decisive evidence that the commemorative ordinance was celebrated

by the church as a body in one place at its first setting up; but was observed in private houses, where but a portion of the whole number of Christians could be accommodated.

b. The apostle speaks of the church in the house, or as belonging to the household (Rom. xvi. 5). This phrase unquestionably denotes either that the whole family were members of the church, or designates those who were in the habit of worshipping at the house of him who is named the head. The church in the house of Priscilla and Aquila were undeniably not the whole of the church at Rome. The apostle not only salutes others as members of the church, but two other companies belonging to households (vs. 10, 11; see Bloomfield, Stuart, Hodge, Barnes).

Now, as it is a well-attested fact, that the primitive Christians usually partook of the holy supper at the close of their seasons of social worship, if a part of the church met for worship at different houses, a part of the church observed the sacramental ordinance separately from the body. This conclusion is undeniable. But if this conclusion is established, the hypothesis we are considering is untenable.

4. History decides against the hypothesis (see Gieseler, Vol. i. p. 92; Neander's Planting and Training of the Christian Church, Vol. i. p. 23, also p. 151; Neander's History of the Christian Church, Vol. i. p. 152; Schaff's Apostolic Church, p. 549).

5. Certain facts militate inferentially against the hypothesis. The first fact is, that there were no church edifices forming public centres of the several churches until about the beginning of the third century. The second fact, that, persecuted and hunted by their enemies, the primitive Christians were often compelled to worship in obscure places, now here, and now there, where a few could safely collect together (see Schaff's History of the Christian Church, pp. 127, 370; Coleman, p. 306). These facts show that the members of different churches would be exceedingly liable to become temporarily or occasionally intermingled; many finding it convenient to worship, and therefore to commune with other

churches than those to which they specifically belonged. But since this, on the hypothesis we are contemplating, would have been the violation of an essential law of the eucharist, we might reasonably expect to find some instruction of the apostles guarding against the sin; some caution, some intimation that in the circumstances of the times they were in peculiar danger of thus offending their master. But no such instruction, caution, or intimation appears in the apostolic history. Not even in the Epistle to the Galatians, in which several approximate churches are addressed. He addresses them all as one; for he declares them to be one in Christ, all standing on a perfect equality in him (Gal. iii. 28; iv. 6, 7). He taught them that they were free from bondage to forms and ceremonies (iv. 22–31); that by love they must "serve one another"; that they were to walk in the spirit, which, working in them fraternal affection, drew them together in one indissoluble union with Christ. Such instruction would have led them to conclude that not only as individual members, but as churches, they were one; grouped together as a band of sisters; and that as such they might occasionally, at least, mingle together in partaking of the emblems of that body of which they all were mystical members. In connection with the enforcement of such sentiments, on the supposition that the hypothesis we are considering is true, we might anticipate some caution or admonition of this kind: "Now remember, dear brethren, that, while as individuals and as churches you are all one in Christ, and while you may freely mingle in both capacities in worship and social intercourse, yet you may not partake of the Lord's supper, which specially indicates your oneness in this free, unrestrained, manner; because it would denote that membership in one church gives right to the sacramental ordinance in another. This would be a violation of a fundamental law of the eucharist, which was designed simply as a symbol of communion with the individual church celebrating it, and not with other Christians or other churches. Hence, I wish you, as churches, to be particularly careful to

exclude each other from this feast of love — emblem of your eternal fellowship with Christ and all that are his in the eternal world."

We find, however, nothing of this sort; indicating that the churches in all their intercourse were to act on the high principle of their entire equality, of their oneness as adopted children, crying Abba, Father.

This is the decisive point. Sure are we that the warm gushings of Christian unity, untaught, could never have thought of the discrimination of welcoming members of other churches to seasons of social worship, and of excluding them from sacramental fellowship at their close, according to the practice of modern exclusionists. Partizan zeal may have done it, but conscious Christian oneness, never.

Rev. Cornelius Winter, that most exemplary Christian and devoted minister, of whom a contemporary "very remote from adulation, and of very discriminating judgment," said: "I have long thought he is more like Jesus Christ than any man on earth," "was once desired by a Baptist minister to preach for him. The sermon immediately preceded the Lord's supper, to which his discourse was preparatory. When the public service was over, he was informed that he must excuse their asking him to communicate, as it was contrary to the law of the house."[1] Did the apostles know of any such "law of the house?"

6. The supporters of this hypothesis make concessions which really undermine it. One of them, speaking of occasional communion, says: "It is the custom of the Baptists to invite members of other churches of the same denomination to participate with them in the Lord's supper. This might, at first view, be thought a deviation from the principle we have laid down, that the Lord's supper is designed to express the communion subsisting between the members of a particular church as a church. As, however, the individuals so invited are such persons as we should be willing to admit to our permanent church fellowship if they were permanently

[1] Memoir of Rev. Cornelius Winter, by Rev. Wm. Jay

located amongst us, and may therefore, for the time being, be considered as members of the churches with which they unite in worship, they may with perfect propriety be invited to partake of the Lord's supper" (Curtis p. 96).

This concession virtually overthrows the principle endeavored to be established.

a. All Christians for the two or three first centuries belonged to one denomination. Then, during all that period the members of different particular churches permanently located near any other particular church might be considered, for the time being, as belonging to it, and might be invited to partake of the Lord's supper. If they might be considered as members of the church and invited, it was a duty to invite them. The supper was not therefore in apostolic times considered a church ordinance, in which there might be no mingling of other churches, in the same sense as the passover was a family feast. For all worshippers in the several primitive churches might be invited to the table, because they might "be considered as members." Consequently, this concession forbids the establishment of the theory, that "membership in one church does not imply membership in others" on scriptural authority in the sense of our opponents, and sanctions all that is really contended for in free communion. They who might and ought to be invited to the table might and ought to be united in divinest fellowship. Sacramental communion, therefore, as practised in the times of the apostles, was identical with Christian communion. It was as broad as professed Christianity. If the principle of our opponents was then included in Christ's instructions, it was a hidden principle. But to suppose that an essential element in the administration of the crowning ordinance of the gospel church was concealed or unknown during the apostolic age is an absurdity.

b. By the concession, here is an exception to the principle equally essential to the right administration of the holy supper (neither known nor suspected) till sectarian divisions arose in the body of Christ; in fact, not dreamed of for cen-

turies after such divisions existed. At length it came tardily to light, sternly requiring each denomination to exclude the membership of all other denominations from the table commemorative of atoning blood, a principle intensifying sectarian zeal and embittering sectarian animosities, and thus driving sections of brethren in Christ farther and farther asunder. Can it be that the requisitions of the memorial of the Saviour's love wraps up such a divisive and exacerbating element? Besides, the fact that it is confessedly the discovery of a partizan spirit throws around it the suspicion that it is the offspring of that spirit.

c. How great a difference of views and feelings in his body did Christ intend should justify a denominational division? Who shall decide this point? Is it replied, Christians are to decide? But conscientious and devoted Christians would decide differently. They would equally vary in judgment as to the character of those whom they might justly "admit to permanent church fellowship." The concession thus makes the line of demarcation between Christian and sacramental communion exceedingly ill-defined and tortuous.

Principle V. is, that the distinction between the invisible church and the visible demands the alleged distinction in communion which we are considering (Curtis, pp. 179, 253). The distinction between the invisible church and the visible is very distinctly drawn by Dr. Dick. He says (Vol. ii. p. 457): "I consider the invisible church to be the congregation of those who have been called by divine grace into the fellowship of the gospel and sanctified by the truth. ..... This church is said to be invisible, because it cannot be discovered by the eye. It is not separated from the world in respect of place, but of state. It lies hidden in the visible church, from which it cannot certainly be distinguished. The qualifications of its members are internal. Their faith and love are not the objects of sense. ..... It is unseen by every eye but that which 'searches the heart and tries the reins of the children of men.'"

We admit the distinction, but deny, on the following

grounds, the inferences deduced from it relative to sacramental recognition. But before entering on the discussion, two or three points must be premised.

1. The communion we are advocating in these pages is spiritual — sympathy of spirit with spirit, whether it be denominated Christian or church communion. It is the outgoing of holy souls towards each other. 2. But while thus spiritual, it is manifested. It comes forth in reciprocal action. This is recognized by Professor Curtis (p. 21). 3. It is manifested by required action — by laws (Curtis, p. 45).

These points being premised, we reject the inferences of our opponents drawn from the distinction of the church visible and invisible, touching communion.

1. Because required manifested communion with the invisible church is an absurdity. The invisible church is unseen; its members are personally unknown. Its fellowship is invisible, subsisting in unseen sympathies. It sustains no visible relations. It has neither sign nor token by which it is visibly or tangibly recognized. But law regulating human conduct implies visibility. Again, law implies organization — a law demanding visible action, a visible organization, a governmental constitution, in which the law inheres. Not a law, civil or ecclesiastical can be named not thus adhering. The very idea is an absurdity. Again, a law of fellowship must be reciprocal. If I am required to commune with another, because he is one with Christ, he is required to commune with me for the same reason. But such a law in the invisible church or in relation to it, obeyed or realized in action, at once brings the church into a state of visibility, or transforms the invisible church into the visible.

This effect of supposable law in the invisible church is virtually admitted by the advocates of this theory (Professor Curtis, p. 39; Denison, p. 107). Laws of fellowship are as impossible as ordinances. The author of Theodosia says: "The ordinances of this kingdom were visible ordinances, symbolizing to the eye as well as the heart. The laws of the kingdom were visible laws." Indeed, the invisible church is

just what Dr. Arnold argues that the visible would become should Robert Hall's principles universally obtain (p. 33). "When we attempt to carry out this theory of the visible church, we find that it is utterly impracticable. Nothing but a 'poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,' can 'glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven,' with sufficient rapidity to catch this unsubstantial vision; nothing but a poet's imagination can 'body forth the form of' this 'thing unknown'; and not even the 'poet's pen' can 'give' to this 'airy nothing a local habitation.' The visible church has all at once become invisible. To speak soberly, no church ever did, or ever could, manage its affairs, or even exist as a church, on this theory."

Thus there are no commands or persuasions to commune with the invisible church; no exhortations to strengthen the bonds uniting her members, nor admonitions against weakening those bonds. It is indeed a body composed of men, but placed far above the influence of man: it was not made by man, nor can it be destroyed by man: it can neither be divided, nor drawn closer together by man. Fellowship with the invisible church is a mere spontaneity: it is the mutual sympathy of holy souls: it would exist, whether commanded or not. It is not so much a creature of authority as of life.

2. Our opponents seem not quite satisfied with this sharply defined distinction between the church visible and invisible. They therefore sometimes draw the line of difference as above, and sometimes make the invisible church synonymous with the universal (Curtis, p. 37): "He [Robert Hall] takes for granted, as a matter of course, rather than attempts to prove that the universal church (which is an invisible body) 'differs from a particular assembly of Christians (which is a visible body) only as the whole differs from a part.' ..... The invisible or universal church is entirely a spiritual body." In agreement with this wavering distinction they sometimes speak of spiritual communion, and sometimes of Christian communion.

This view of the invisible church furnishes as little ground

for the distinction in communion which we are considering as the one already discussed. This universal church is still, in the sense of our opponents, invisible — "invisible" and "universal" being convertible designations of it. It is unorganized. It contains organized parts or societies, but is not, as a whole, an organized church. It has no organism in which law can inhere. It is the same invisible church, composed indeed of visible as well as invisible Christians, but taken in its entireness is the same as that of which our Baptist friends affirm the impossibility of ordinances, and consequently of laws.

3. Agreeably to the above decisions of reason relative to the impossibility of laws of fellowship in the invisible or unorganized church, the scriptures nowhere inculcate such fellowship. All fellowship enjoined in the New Testament on the disciples of Christ is enjoined on his professed disciples or on the visible church. Professor Curtis, who has labored this point ably, has utterly failed to find in the New Testament a single precept commanding Christian communion or fellowship with the invisible or unorganized church, though he has devoted an entire chapter to its elucidation and proof. The texts he adduces as proving Christian communion, or communion with the invisible church, are John xiii. 34, 35; xv. 12, 13. But according to the Professor, and those agreeing with him, the twelve disciples, to whom these precepts were primarily addressed, had already been organized into a particular visible church at the institution of the supper. On the principle of these distinguished advocates of restricted communion, therefore, these precepts were given to an organized visible church; and consequently demand, not Christian communion, but church communion.

4. In the nature of the visible and invisible churches there is no intrinsic difference, which may serve as a basis of the two kinds of spiritual communion. A difference in kind of communion enjoyed with different bodies of Christians implies a difference in their intrinsic character, not in their extrinsic circumstances. Our opponents affirm that the visi-

ble and invisible churches are utterly unlike, "as unlike as possible in everything but name." But this is expressed too strongly. Their difference is entirely objective. They are subjectively the same. In all that determines the character of communion they are the same. There is not even an objective difference between the Baptist and Orthodox Congregational Pedobaptist churches. Both have made a public profession, and made it solemnly by baptism in the form they conscientiously believe to be scriptural — one by immersion, the other by sprinkling. Can this slight difference lay a foundation for two kinds of holy communion? Has baptism by immersion power to bring Christians into a state of visibility, while baptism by sprinkling, though performed with equal publicity, with equal consecration and joy in Christ as Redeemer, and is followed by the same earnest efforts to spread the savor of his name, has no such power? the Christians who have submitted to it still left enveloped in the same invisibility as before? Hence,

5. It is an absurdity to regard evangelical Pedobaptist churches as belonging to the invisible church; Christians, as they are by profession and covenant, who have for centuries been doing the peculiar work of Christian churches, and whose light is to-day streaming over every ocean, and illuminating every benighted shore.

6. It cannot be proved that Christ does not own the evangelical Pedobaptist churches as visible churches.

This may be denied; it may be asserted with great positiveness that nothing but immersion can raise Christians into the state of visible church relations. But can it be demonstrated that Christ, who will not break the bruised reed nor quench the smoking flax; who always looks at the heart and judges of character by the intention; who is far more ready to receive an erring brother to favor than we are, does not regard evangelical Pedobaptists as members of his visible body? Yet on this demonstration depends the entire force of the argument of restricted communion as based on the distinction between the visible and invisible church. We who have

tasted the pleasures of communion with him at his table, cannot doubt his recognition of us as members of his visible family.

VI. Our opponents find ground for their peculiar hypothesis of two kinds of communion, Christian and sacramental, in the appropriate significance and limitation of symbols. The theory is, that symbols represent particular ideas, affections, and relations. Every symbol is limited to those it was appointed to shadow forth, and can never be appropriately employed in their absence. The Lord's supper was designed to symbolize the relation of the members of a particular church to each other and to Christ. It can never be scripturally celebrated only when these relations co-exist. Consequently, it can be lawfully celebrated only in and by a particular church. All other Christians and churches are by right excluded. Professor Curtis has more systematically unfolded this theory than any other writer. His object, he says, is to establish close communion on a principle rather than a rule. The principle is (p. 3), "that the Lord's supper is a symbol of church relations between those who unite in its celebration." He defines a symbol (p. 65), as "an emblem or sign by which any moral truth or idea is intelligibly represented." In defining more particularly the design and limitation of the symbolic supper, he adds (p. 65): "Where any symbol represents several relations, it is not sufficient that one of them exist in reality as represented by the symbol. To be appropriate, all of them must subsist in the measure indicated. For example, the Lord's supper is, first of all, a symbol of our participation in the benefits of the death of Christ. But inasmuch as it also indicates, as we shall show, certain relations as subsisting between the parties who celebrate together, it would not be proper for those persons to unite, between whom all the relations indicated did not exist, however appropriate the symbol might be, so far as it related to the great Head of the Church." He then unfolds the groundwork of his argument, as already passed over, and signifies the application he intends to make of it to the proper use of

symbols (p. 66). "In the former part [of my work] we have seen that our communion, as followers of the Lamb, has for its objects: 1. Christ, the Head of the church; and 2. The church which is his body; this latter being again divisible into (1) communion with Christians as such, and (2) with the members of some particular visible church. Corresponding to this, the symbols of communion may be classified according to their objects thus:

I. Symbols of communion with Christ.

II. Symbols of Christian communion, or with Christians, as such.

III. Symbols of church communion."

The strength of the argument is, that the holy supper was designed to symbolize the relations of a particular church. It can never represent the communion of Christians as such; but simply and alone the communion of the individual church.

We agree with Professor Curtis, that a symbol is a representation of certain ideas, affections, sympathies, and relations; and that the representative power of a scriptural symbol is just what God has given it, nothing more, nothing less. It is as great a sin, therefore, to circumscribe its import, as to extend it. The sacramental supper is, in our creed, not less than in his, a symbol of union to Christ and the brethren. We are willing to denominate it a symbol of church relations. We differ from him only in his application of the principle. We therefore regard the theory as insufficient to establish the doctrine of two kinds of communion.

1. Because the principle that the eucharist belongs exclusively to the particular church, and is to be dispensed only in and by the particular church, upon which the argument from symbols is erected, and which it is designed to illustrate, is groundless. This we have shown above. If the principle is groundless, of course the argument attempted to be built upon it by way of illustration is inconclusive.

2. The author confounds facts or social acts with symbols. A symbol properly indicates something more than the act or fact in which it subsists. A proper symbol points to some-

thing beyond itself. It is a designed representative. A social act, to be appropriately deemed a symbol, must be so designated in scripture.

3. We can see no psychological reason for the institution of the Lord's supper as a symbol of communion on the ground that it is simply a symbol of fellowship with those partaking of it, indicating no fellowship beyond. That such are "one body," united for worship and mutual help is a fact. That they profess themselves one with Christ and with one another by solemn covenant is a fact. These facts stand apparent to all. Nothing can make them more evident to the senses. We can see no psychological reason, therefore, for any symbol to represent them, or exhibit them more palpably to the senses. Hence,

4. It is more consonant to reason to suppose the eucharist instituted as a symbol of fellowship with all the members of Christ's family, or with those recognized as such, than to suppose its symbolical significance narrowed to the limits of a particular church, on the ground that the supper pre-eminently symbolizes the vital principles of Christianity — faith, hope, life in Christ, and the oneness of those who possess that life. Why take this emblem, so precious to all believers alike, and so capable of universal significance, and restrict it to such narrow limits? For these, thousands of symbols might have answered as well; while, for universal communion no other could have been so appropriate.

5. If the Lord's supper is admitted to symbolize fellowship with the particular church celebrating it, it cannot be proved, not to symbolize a more extended fellowship. If it indicates the fellowship of those receiving it because Christ's life dwells in them, and they belong to his visible body, why does it not symbolize fellowship with all others in whom Christ's life dwells, and who belong to his visible body? Reason cannot negative the question.

6. There are no symbols of Christian communion in distinction from church communion appointed in the scriptures. Professor Curtis labors hard to find symbols of Christian

communion; for on this discovery depends his argument for two kinds of communion based on symbolic significance; and he names some which he deems such. But they all turn out to be symbols of church communion. He first speaks of Jewish symbols; but Jewish symbols were church symbols. "In former ages," he says, it was "supposed by almost all, that Christian fellowship or communion consisted in praying together." But history shows that prayer was considered a sign of church fellowship, and not merely of Christian fellowship. "The Apostolic Constitutions" (p. 246) direct: "If any one pray with a person excommunicated, let him be suspended." "If any clergyman pray with one deposed, let him also himself be deposed." He also speaks of uniting with other Christians in benevolent enterprises, as a symbol of Christian communion (p. 81). But Christians meet in missionary, bible, tract societies, etc. 1. Not to make a show, but to do a work. 2. As denominations, not simply as Christians. Mention is also made of the contributions of charity given to assist the apostles and poor saints as symbols of Christian fellowship. But these were acts of church fellowship, or between those who were publicly recognized as visible Christians. The truth is, he can find in scripture no symbols of Christian communion in distinction from church communion. All that he imagines he finds are of human device. As we previously showed that no Christian fellowship is enjoined by Christ and his apostles not implying church or sacramental fellowship; so there are no symbols of brotherly fellowship which are not symbols of church or sacramental fellowship. This failure is fatal to his theory.

VII. Pedobaptists, it is affirmed, practise strict communion as well as Baptists, and thus virtually maintain the doctrine of two kinds of fellowship. It is said: "You do not receive to the communion table converts to Christ as soon as they hopefully experience a change. Sometimes they remain for years hoping, yet not professing. Many continue through life in this condition; they trust they are Christians, and you trust they are; but as they make no formal profession of

their faith, you admit them not to the sacramental service." This is true. But such by no means stand in the same relation to our churches as other professing Christians stand in to close communionists. The latter exclude Pedobaptists from the sacramental board because they have not professed Christ in the prescribed form. We exclude those above referred to because they have not professed Christ at all; and consequently have not given us that decisive evidence of piety which, in the circumstances, we have a right to claim. They either have not had time to test their piety in the conflict of life, or are not willing to come out from the world and be separate. They have been instructed in their duty, urged perhaps to come forward; but all to no purpose. There they stand. We hope they are Christians. But their continued holding back from duty detracts from that evidence of personal union to Christ which they are capable of giving. The ground on which we withhold from such the emblems of Christ's atoning death, is altogether different from that on which the Baptists refuse sacramental recognition to other evangelical denominations. We exclude those above named because seemingly unwilling to take a stand for Christ before the world. They exclude those who have taken the decided stand. Our refusing the sacramental emblems to recent converts before they have sufficient opportunity to test their allegiance to Christ, or to those apparent Christians in our congregations who decline submitting to the discipline of any evangelical church, can never, therefore, be justly cited by our opponents in justification of their exclusive policy. To attempt it is to confound things radically different.

VIII. Christian communion is more important than sacramental. The falsity of this position may be easily shown. 1. It belittles the whole subject of church existence and relations. On this ground the Christian world is not specially benefitted, nor Christian sympathies specially gratified by church fellowship. 2. Sacramental communion includes Christian communion. The former cannot exist without the

latter. That moral sentiment or relation which includes another must be the greater or more important of the two. 3. Sacramental communion is covenant communion. It implies covenant relations with God and with the brotherhood. It signifies to the world that one has chosen God for his portion. It is an act by which he gives his fellow-Christians increased evidence of his union to Christ, and thereby draws towards him more warmly and more rationally their Christian regards. 4. The scriptures represent sacramental communion as the highest form of Christian intercourse. It is eating Christ's body and drinking his blood, denoting that we dwell in Christ and Christ dwells in us. The purest and richest experiences of the Christian also testify that he never gets so near his Saviour, nor enjoys such endeared communion with those who are like him, as at the memorial feast. 5. The persistent refusal of sacramental communion renders full Christian communion impossible. Communion is more than love; it is mutual love, or rather the result of mutual love. It is a reciprocity of the social principle. Hence, it always implies a choice in each mutually directed to each — a delightful mingling of mutual sympathies. I may love another when he makes no return, may even pursue him with tenderest compassion while he repels it. But I cannot commune with another unless his affections flow out and meet mine flowing towards him. Communion is the confluence of two smoothly flowing streams. If one ceases its onward flow, or becomes refluent, communion ceases. Communion also implies reciprocal confidence and esteem. The least perception of the want of confidence in a supposed friend, especially the indication that he deems us unqualified for the intimacy of his family, at once disturbs our affections and diminishes the pleasure of our intercourse.

The affections are regulated by certain laws, and close communion cannot be disengaged from these laws. It will be almost sure to hold back the Christian sympathies of the excluded from gushing forth as they otherwise would towards their excluders. On the other hand the close communionist

checks the warm flow of his own Christian sympathies towards the excluded. Hear a free communionist among the Baptists on this point: "There seems to be the same spontaneity of mind toward open communion on the part of the young convert as towards immersion. ..... How many a babe in Christ has felt a chill run through his new heart of love, and a certain crushing of his free sympathies, when the close communionist has begun to bring down upon him his logical propositions, which he may not answer, but which he feels to be lead and iron upon his soul. Moreover, is it not the desire of most in our churches to receive at the Lord's table some unbaptized ones whom they know? They wish it were the Lord's will that they should do it. But they check their sympathies by calling to mind the old dictum: 'Baptism is prerequisite to the communion.' And so, nerving themselves up, and pacifying themselves in the thought that they are true to a principle, they shut down the gate of sympathy, and conscientiously proceed with the sacred ordinance."

This sentiment we heartily endorse. Hence, we believe entire obedience to the law of Christian love, or the full realization of the unity for which the Saviour prayed between bodies of acknowledged Christians, is a psychological impossibility, while one shuts the other from the sacramental board.

The above are a few of the alleged principles which are supposed to justify the distinction between "Christian and sacramental communion," forming a basis for restricted communion. This brief review is enough to show their untenableness. Consequently, the thesis that the laws of associated Christianity demand free sacramental communion as their complement stands unimpaired.[1] Indeed, the bare fact that these principles, theories, and hypotheses, put forth by the acutest and most scholarly minds to establish this arbitrary distinction — a distinction hidden from the church for generations after the apostles were in their graves, and the book

[1] Above, pp. 496, 498.

of revelation was finished, are found indefensible, strongly indicates that the distinction itself is undemonstrable; and that the position, "Accredited membership of Christ's visible body entitles to communion in the sacramental emblems of his body natural," is impregnable.

ARTICLE IV.

THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION IN ENGLAND.[1]

BY REV. GEORGE F. MAGOUN, PRESIDENT OF IOWA COLLEGE.

[The object of this Article is to set forth the condition, progress, and prospects of theological education among English Congregationalists. Most of the public institutions in Great Britain for the training of Congregational[2] ministers are in England. One is in Scotland — the Theological

[1] 1. Minutes of the Proceedings of a Conference of Delegates from the Committees of various Theological Colleges connected with the Independent Churches of England and Wales, held in the Congregational Library, Blomfield Street, London, Jan. 7th and 8th, 1845. pp. 73. London: Published by the Conference.

2. Minutes of a Similar Conference (Wales not represented), same place, Jan. 24th and 25th, 1865. pp. 89.

3. The Congregational Year Book, 1865, 1867. pp. 380, 424.

4. Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Theological Training (of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland), 1863. pp. 21. Appendix, "Vidimus of the Theological training of different Denominations." pp. 16–21.

5. The Patriot (newspaper) London, 1865–66. The English Independent (the Patriot and British Standard united.) London, 1867.

6. Pamphlet Reports of different Colleges.

[2] Twenty years ago, as these pamphlets show, the names "Independent" and "Congregational" were used interchangeably in Great Britain, and to some extent, though less frequently, are still. Dr. Robert Vaughan, in his "Notes on the United States since the War" (British Quarterly Review, Oct. 1865), mentions as "one point in which the Congregationalism of the United States is wiser" than that of England — "it eschews the name 'Independency.'" Dr. Vaughan himself, however, finds the old habit too strong for him. So does the Year Book, whose list of Congregational ministers has for the running-title, "Independent." In the second pamphlet named above, this title does not once

Hall at Edinburg, founded 1811, Rev. W. Lindsay Alexander, D.D., and Rev. A. T. Gowan, D.D., Professors. Two are in Wales — Brecon Independent College, founded 1813, and North Wales Independent College, Bala, 1842. There are, besides, three institutions of the same character in the British Dependencies — one in British North America, at Montreal, established 1839, and two in Australia, at Melbourne in Victoria (1861), and at Sydney in New South Wales (1863). Ten of the "theological colleges," as they are termed, are in England.[1] They represent fairly the whole number in Great Britain and her colonies. The statements that follow are drawn in part from the documents named below, and other publications, and are in part the result of personal examination and inquiries.]

The late Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Gladstone, uttered in his place in Parliament, not long before his retirement, emphatic and weighty testimony to the character and intelligence of the English Congregational body, as the leading one among the "Dissenters." Critics of the established church have recently made very significant admissions concerning the superior ability of the ministry of the Congregational churches. The Dean of Canterbury, for example, reviewing in the Contemporary Review four volumes of sermons, by Dr. Raleigh, Rev. R. W. Dale, Rev. H. R. Reynolds, and the late Mr. Hull, pronounces them "far, very far above the average of such publications" in the church of England. "An Anglican volume owes its publication most frequently," says the Dean, "to the eminence of the preacher, or to the affection of the flock, or to the occasion of delivery; very seldom, indeed, to the fact that the sermons are in themselves worth publishing. Already the Nonconformists have passed us by in biblical scholarship and ministerial training; the specimens which we have given of their sermons are such as the church of England in our day could hardly show." The

occur, and upon the title-page it is displaced by "Congregational," as it seems to have been in all the discussions and essays of the Conference. Dr. Vaughan himself writes "Congregational" only in this pamphlet. The tendency clearly is to adhere to this name and drop the other.

[1] Year Book, 1867, p. 330. In the Statistical Summary, p. 422, the count is, "England, eight," and two preparatory institutions, which had been previously classed as colleges, namely, Bristol and Nottingham.

great majority of the present English Congregational ministers were educated at the "theological colleges" — eleven hundred and twelve out of eighteen hundred and twenty-six. The Scotch universities supplied eighty-eight; the Irish, eighteen; University College, London, six; and the English church, supposably through the national universities, five. Private training is credited with two hundred and forty-three, and the education of two hundred and forty-two is unknown.[1] Inferior, therefore, as the seminaries of the Dissenters must be, in much, to the great and wealthy educational establishments enjoyed by the sect "by law established," they do not appear to produce an inferior ministry. Dr. Vaughan indeed says:[2] "A high order of ability is not so much the rule in our ministry as the exception." "We have few, if any, masters of theological learning," testifies the London Patriot. Dr. Falding, principal of Rotherham College, adverts[3] "to the recognized insufficiency of able pastors and preachers" and to the difficulty in filling the college chairs, three or four able men having been invited to nearly all of them successively, while vacancies in the faculties never call out any strong competition. Perhaps the dissenting standard of ability is higher than the established one. At a church congress not many months since, Dean Alford gave a deplorable account of the qualifications of Episcopal clergymen. Mr. Litton, an examining chaplain, also stated that "the usual knowledge of theology is limited to an ability to give scripture proof of the Articles. As to the Old Testament the standard is little superior to that of the higher classes in a good national school." Dean Alford proposed a sort of apprenticeship to incumbents for candidates for orders, and also class lists at the universities by which those who do not attend divinity lectures shall be known. Commenting upon these disclosures, the London Times alleged that "men enter the church every day destitute either of theological knowl-

[1] Year Book for 1867, p. 423. [2] Minutes of Conference of 1865. p. 61.

[3] Ibid. p. 17, seq. There are different grades among the colleges, noted hereafter, as there are not among the universities.

edge or of practical experience." The leading journal proposes a probation in orders of a few years before livings are bestowed, and an examination of every incumbent, as a *sine qua non*, in one good English text-book in divinity, and one good introduction to the scriptures. "If, for example," says the Times, "every candidate for orders were required to pass an effective examination in Pearson on the Creed, there would be a vast deal more theological knowledge in the church than there is at present." Whether the system of the universities, however, so far as theological, is chargeable with existing clerical defects is at least doubtful. Mr. C. Buxton, M.P., stated in a debate in the House of Commons on tests, that in the last twenty years the number of candidates for orders from Oxford and Cambridge had fallen off from five hundred and ten to two hundred and ninety-eight;[1] and those content with less than what is deemed the best English education for clerical life had increased threefold. The Pall Mall Gazette has predicted that the universities will not long furnish a majority of the Episcopal clergy. But it is equally doubtful whether more university education would bring up the established pulpit to the dissenting level. The late Rev. F. W. Robertson, and such as he, lament that these venerable seats of secular and sacred learning furnish no systematic preparation for the ministry. Yet Mr. Robertson learned the Greek Testament by heart while a student of Brasenose. Even the late Archbishop Whately in the Preface to his Logic, contradicts Bishop Berkeley by declaring that theology is not a science, and therefore admits of degrees of proficiency. A study of examination papers and other details of the university calendars, will not go very far to convince one that the

[1] "The bishops are authorized to admit to holy orders persons who, though not university men, yet appear, on scrutiny by the examining chaplains, to be 'literate persons.' The term 'literate' is easily corrupted in the mouths of university men, into another not quite so complimentary, but more often true. Still the majority enter one of the Universities." — "On the Cam"; Lowell Institute Lectures. By William Everett, A.M. The statements above, with which this barely agrees, are later than Mr. Everett's.

standard of scientific theological study has risen much in the years since this remark was made ; [1] and a comparison between them and the courses of study at the Congregational colleges is not to the manifest discredit of the latter. Cowper, in his Tirocinium, makes a father in his days, ambitious of his son's preferment, aver that

> " Church ladders are not always mounted best
> By learned clerks and Latinists professed.
> The exalted prize demands an upward look,
> Not to be found by poring on a book ;
> Small skill in Latin, and still less in Greek,
> Is more than adequate to all I seek."

The Latin and the Greek are very likely more common clerical accomplishments than they were in Cowper's day ; but it cannot be pretended that expertness in biblical exegesis and in doctrinal theology, especially the latter, are yet common. Both Englishmen and their critics remark upon the fact that England wants only very superior educated

[1] Two pages of the Oxford University Almanac and Register are occupied with divinity subjects, and a hundred and one with athletic sports and boating and cricketing. At the Divinity School of Trinity College, Dublin, the whole number of theological lectures in the course is one hundred and sixty, eighty of them not being properly lectures at all, but merely catechetical examinations. Letter of Rev. Dr. Reihel, Vicar of Mullingar, and late Professor in Queen's College, Belfast. In the College of the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the course embraces two hundred and thirty-two ; in the English Presbyterian College, London, six hundred. In the Free Church of Scotland College at Edinburg, the whole number is four hundred and eighty ; in that of Glasgow, seven hundred and twenty. — " Vidimus," in the Report to U. P. Church, compiled from correspondence with Theological Faculties, English, Scotch, Irish, Dutch, German, and American. Our thanks are due for the Report to the worthy " convener " or chairman, Rev. David McEvan of Edinburg, who gives Princeton and Danville as the only representatives of America, and whom we had the pleasure of informing concerning the seminaries at Andover, New Haven, Bangor, Chicago, etc. On the universities, cf. Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. vii. p. 599 ; iv. p. 787. Further details of the universities in respect to the moral and spiritual training of a Christian ministry, and these of a painful character, may be found in Everett's Lowell Lectures, and Bristed's Five Years in an English University. Some one has said that Dissenters get their piety before their ministerial education, but churchmen afterwards. The author of " English Tracts " observes that the university aims rather to produce a gentleman than a saint or a psychologist (p. 223).

men; there is no place in that country for well-furnished average men; the universities, which are frequented almost entirely by the upper classes and the wealthy, do not produce these. Yet these must compose the great body of the Christian ministry anywhere and everywhere, if the ministry is what it should be. A very few clerical scholars like Alford and Ellicott — even if their scholarship were due to their undergraduate university training — do not make amends for the lack of such a body of ministers. And in this respect it must be admitted that the English Congregationalists train up a superior ministry to that of the established church. If the comparison were extended to soundness and harmony of views, practical Christian efficiency, and power for good over their countrymen, it would be equally favorable to Congregationalism.

But the Puritan Nonconformists of that country are far from being contented with what they have attained. The reports of the theological colleges, the proceedings of ecclesiastical bodies, and the discussions of their most thoughtful, cultivated, and influential men, show that the further improvements of ministerial education is a more prominent object of present solicitude with them than with us. More than twenty years ago the committee of the Congregational Union of England and Wales publicly pronounced it "the most important of all our public cares." It holds even a higher place now with those they represented, than it did then. In January 1845, this committee called together in London a conference of representatives of the colleges, consisting of committees and tutors, trustees or directors, and professors, as we should call them. The time seemed to them "a great religious crisis"; "unwonted opinions, activities, and struggles," it was said, "are now moving the Christian mind of our country; beloved young brethren now trained for the work enter public life under circumstances far more difficult than those which attended the early labors of their predecessors." The committee expressed the hope that this college conference would "neither be perpetuated

nor repeated." After twenty years' experience and progress the committee of the same body called another. Weighty and pressing problems required it, "great and almost fundamental questions," the chairman of the Union pronounced them; there had come "a momentous transition of thought and feeling relating to ministerial education." The Rev. George Redford, D.D., LL.D., of Worcester, presided over the first college conference, the Rev. Thomas Binney of London, over the second, the secretaries being in both cases the secretaries of the Congregational Union. The institutions represented are in the main the same in both, — Airedale, Cheshunt, Cotton End, Hackney, Lancashire, Rotherham, and Spring Hill; the Welsh colleges, Bala and Brecon, appearing in the first list but not in the second, together with Exeter, Fakenham, Homerton, Highbury, and Newport-Pagnell, the places of which are taken by Bedford, Gloucestershire, New College (London), Nottingham Institute, and Western College (Plymouth).

The fashion of proceeding at these conferences is noticeable, being *par excellence* English — the annual fashion of the English Congregational Union. The National Council at Boston has given us an example of the same, and the foreign deputations present then found nothing in it unwonted to them, save in the entire liberty of debate.[1] "Documents discussing points of principal interest, open to free remark, and liable to be set aside or altered at the pleasure of the meeting, appeared the most appropriate preparation for the proceedings." The interest and excellence of these papers

[1] In his account of the reception of the foreign delegates to the Council at Boston, Dr. Vaughan observes: "It was not the manner of the council to assign their resolutions or papers in the hands of persons who should move and second the adoption of them, and be prepared to defend them, should that be needful. Any member was at liberty to volunteer his services in that form" (Notes etc., in British Quarterly Review, p. 443). It is the manner of all English bodies to have the advocates of their utterances appointed beforehand, and it would be an unprecedented violation of prescriptive usage for any one to speak upon a resolution, however open to "free remark," till the appointees have delivered themselves.

may be inferred from the names of those who supplied them. In 1845 the essayists were Drs. John Pye Smith, H. F. Burder, William Smith, R. W. Hamilton, George Payne, and John Harris, with Rev. Messrs. John Angell James, W. H. Stowell, Walter Scott, Francis Watts, and J. Blackburn. Those of 1865 were Rev. Drs. D. Frazer, Robert Vaughan, F. J. Falding, and A. Morton Brown, with Rev. Messrs. R. W. Dale, J. G. Miall, E. J. Hartland, J. W. Charlton, H. R. Reynolds, and J. B. Paton. Most of these were from the college faculties, seven of the writers of 1865 having been "principals," including Dr. Vaughan, and another, Mr. Miall, theological professor. The topics discussed throw light upon the methods and history of education for the ministry among our brethren of England, and also in some measure upon the whole subject of theological education. The papers were much briefer than those read at Boston. The Conference of 1865 voted that "none of them should exceed fifteen or twenty minutes at the utmost in delivery." We give some account of the topics touched in the first pamphlet minutes — those of 1845, — not only because English progress on the subject is shown thereby, but also because the document is now very scarce, and its materials never have been made use of in any of our theological journals.

Dr. John Pye Smith, then of Homerton (now merged in New College, London), read the first paper, and made a vigorous argument for the usefulness of secular learning to pastors and Christian teachers. He conjectured that about half the whole number of theological students at that time commenced their professional training with only a common education. Adverting to the spread of science, he asked: "What must be the effect upon thousands of artisans and laborers, as well as the young persons of our families, if the preachers and pastors of our churches through the land be notoriously inferior in those departments of knowledge which will have become familiar to the humble workman?" He set forth the great importance of preparing men in the Congregational colleges for matriculation and degrees in the

University of London, the opening of which to Dissenters and the affiliation of dissenting colleges with it, seem to have been the chief occasion of this conference.[1] Dr. William

[1] In the first year of her reign (1837), Queen Victoria revoked the old London University charter, and issued another, declaring the purpose of the university to be "to hold forth to all classes and denominations, without any distinction whatsoever, an encouragement for pursuing a regular and liberal course of education," and constituting certain persons a body politic and corporate, "for the purpose of ascertaining, by means of examination, the persons who have acquired proficiency in Literature, Science, Art, etc., and of rewarding them by academical degrees and marks of honor." By a third charter, January 6, 1863, the university was still further liberalized. This last charter names the Duke of Devonshire, Earl Granville, Lord Derby, Bishop Thirlwall, Sir James Clark, Professor Faraday, Mr. Grote, Sir G. C. Lewis, Robert Lowe, Esq. (now M.P.), Peter Mark Roget, William Senior, Esq., and others. The degrees authorized are "Bachelor and Master of Arts, Bachelor and Doctor in Laws, Science, Medicine, and Music, and Master in Surgery, and also the several Degrees of Bachelor, Master, and Doctor in any departments of knowledge whatever, except theology." All affiliated institutions, "corporated or unincorporated," which the Queen has authorized so to do, may issue certificates to candidates for degrees, "whether in the metropolis or elsewhere." Nine of the Congregational colleges are affiliated, together with the West of England Dissenters' Proprietary School at Taunton. Since 1837, besides forty-one examined in Hebrew or Greek scripture, one hundred and seventy-five Congregationalists have taken degrees (one LL.D.). About one-third of these are Masters of Arts, twenty-eight Bachelors of Laws.

The origin of London University in the exclusion of Dissenters at Oxford and Cambridge is well known. While we write a bill is pending in Parliament for abolishing tests at Oxford, admitting Dissenters to degrees and to convocation. Mr. Coleridge, the eminent advocate, in defending the bill (which is the same as that lost last year), said: "The university is a national, not a church of England institution; and it rests with the exclusionists to show why they oppose the admission of Nonconformists. The only objection seriously urged is, that it would destroy or weaken the religious influences of the place. But what are the religious influences of Oxford? If the truth must be told, the governing body of the university has uniformly been opposed to everything like religious earnestness among the students. Old Thomas Fuller described the heads of the university in his day as stupid obstructionists. When John Wesley and his brother tried to revive religious life they were pelted with stones and mud; and Wesley and his friends were driven away, with the greatest loss to the university and the church. Mr. Coleridge instanced John Henry Newman as another earnest and religious spirit driven off by petty persecutions at Oxford, and declared that "the admission of Nonconformists would increase the religiousness of the place." The learned and eloquent Queen's Counsel was heard by the House of Commons with astonishment; but the "English Independent" expresses the belief that the bill will pass this year without mutilation. When Mr. Glad-

Smith, also then of Homerton, disclosed the serious injury done to both collegiate and theological studies, pursued as in England in one institution, and for the most part, in one course, from the continuance of the two together to the end. This is still the custom in the English Congregational colleges, and in some of them a preparatory or academical course is also supplied for those not fitted to enter upon ordinary collegiate studies. The three years' course at Edinburg Theological Hall is extended to five years, if elementary tuition is required. Several of the essayists adverted to the disturbed and insufficient attention given by students to theological studies proper, compared with what is due to them. Dr. Payne advocated examinations for testimonials at the end of the course — one in respect to the student's spirit, habits, discretion, and aptness to teach, and another concerning proficiency in literature and science, "and pre-eminently biblical and theological attainments." The custom seems to have been for the committees to give testimonials without examination on the report of the teachers. Formerly examinations were held, and relics of the usage remain. Dr. Payne contended earnestly for a more thorough and uniform practice, in justice to the young brethren, the churches, and the colleges. He inclined to the *viva voce* method in preference to the prescriptive English written form. The first examination might not require the personal appearance of the student. Rev. W. H. Stowell treated of the importance of an interval between theological study and the pastoral office for the better maturing and furnishing of the candidate, and advocated residence with a pastor therein, expressing the hope that the colleges would yet turn out a race of candidates qualified to enter at once on their work. Rev. J. Blackburn read a paper on the advantages of estab-

stone was in office he met, within our knowledge, a company of Congregational ministers and laymen, at breakfast, at the house of Rev. Newman Hall, to obtain their views on church reform. His known liberal views on this subject assisted in unseating the Russell-Gladstone Ministry, though he is but half a church reformer. It is "the bloody Act of Uniformity in 1662" which requires fellows, or Masters of Arts, in both universities to conform to the establishment.

lishing a central college committee in London, to represent the various institutions, promote their financial prosperity, and act on other matters of common interest, — gathering and publishing statistics, giving information to the churches of unemployed graduates, obtaining libraries, and issuing text-books on the ministerial work and related subjects. It was suggested that prizes be offered through this channel, in medals, money, or books, to the students of all the colleges, "for certain compositions in the Latin tongue, or for English essays on theological and philosophical subjects." The Rev. J. Frost offered a plan for "a seminary, in which only an English theological education should be given, or in addition, such acquaintance with the original languages of holy scripture as is attainable without previous study of the Greek and Latin classics." Among its features were these: occasional lectures on some of the best English poets and other writers; selections from the writings of the Reformers, Puritans, Nonconformists, and Scotch and American divines; these to be thoroughly studied, abstracts and abridgements of them to be made, and essays written on the different subjects treated of. "Would not the close and analytical study," the essayist inquired, "of such writers as Chillingworth, Butler, Howe, Edwards, Fuller, etc., prove to many of our young men more valuable, as a mental and moral training for the pulpit, than the imperfect and unsuccessful study of the mathematics and classics?"

The recommendations made in these papers were, in the main, approved by resolutions of the Conference. We do not find evidence, however, of the practical execution of them. The plan for an English theological education was commended as "adapted to train for efficient ministerial labors many brethren for whom a more learned education is quite unsuitable"; but it was judged that "this subordinate education will be more appropriately given in the houses of competent ministers, receiving small numbers under their care, than in any institution formed expressly for the purpose." Possibly this has been done in late years by some of

the gentlemen who have been announced in the Year Book as sustaining "private theological seminaries, designed to prepare ministerial candidates for colleges, or for immediate labor, without passing through a collegiate course." There are now four of these, and five preparatory or missionary institutions besides; four of which — Bedford, Bristol, Cotton End, and Nottingham — are also classed with colleges. At Cotton End Mr. Frost, the author of this plan, was teaching in 1845, and teaches still. Bristol and Nottingham are new and peculiar institutions which require separate mention more at large. Another peculiar institution on the list is the Mission College, Highgate, established in 1864 in connection with the London Missionary Society, for the last year's special training of foreign missionaries. Missions, ancient and modern, the foreign languages spoken on mission fields, surgery, and medicine are subjects of instruction at Highgate, and the scriptures in the originals.

When the second College Conference assembled in London, January 1865, in the same room where that of twenty years before had met, some of the same leading questions still awaited and demanded solution. The committee of the Congregational Union submitted the following queries: "1. Whether the Conference, while not depreciating other branches of study, might not deem it expedient to affirm the paramount importance of Theology, of Biblical Criticism, and Antiquities, of Church History, and of Homiletics, together with a sound acquaintance with Hebrew, with Hellenistic Greek, and with Latin, as being the essentials of a competent education for the Christian ministry? 2. Whether the Conference might not recommend the formation of an independent board of examination to examine in these branches of knowledge such alumni of the various colleges as might present themselves with due testimonials as to conduct, and to give certificates, or other honorary distinctions, according to the proficiency which had been obtained?" The first of these questions was not considered, the second came up in another form. The Rev. J. M. Charlton of Western College opened

anew the subject of some organic bond of college union, but it was referred back to the managers of the institutions. Rev. R. W. Dale of Birmingham, in a paper abounding with excellent suggestions, took up the resolution of 1845 in respect to what we call "post-graduate" study, maintaining that the first two, three, or four years after leaving college should be passed by graduates in the work of assistant ministers or junior pastors. Dr. Vaughan discussed the effect of the estimate of ministerial service on the character of the ministry. The Rev. J. B. Paton, M.A., of Nottingham Institute, set forth the best means of cultivating piety in college. The Rev. J. G. Miall, of Airedale College, showed the importance of impressing denominational principles upon candidates for the ministry. And Dr. Morton Brown, of Cheltenham, enforced the duty of pastors and churches to encourage suitable young men to enter the ministry. Ten essays were read in all. Their publication was voted with the understanding that the responsibility for the particular sentiments advanced was to rest with the writers, the aim and general views only of the last five being commended. The chief interest of the conference gathered about four other essays; and out of their suggestions, and the discussions and action resulting, two great questions rose above all others; viz. 1. The best method of training the more learned and cultivated order of ministers. 2. How to secure at the same time the most efficient and useful preparation of ministers of a humbler class. One of these four essays, that of the Rev. D. Fraser, LL.D., Principal of Airedale College, attempted to fix "the minimum of education which colleges ought to furnish, and all college-educated ministers possess." Dr. Fraser laid down this as the minimum: "For the shortest course (that of three years) a critical knowledge of the Old and New Testaments in the original languages, embracing Biblical Criticism and Exegesis (sound rather than extensive); systematic and pastoral Theology, practical training in sermon-writing and in preaching, Ecclesiastical History, Logic, the study of the English language, at least an elementary knowl-

edge of Latin, along with as much scientific knowledge as can be communicated." The conference was disinclined to pronounce upon this point, but referred it and the essay to the colleges in which there is considerable diversity and inequality of requirements, and no probability of speedy agreement. It is very clear that the consulting parties and the whole body of churches and ministers they represented, are neither ready to enjoin one style and measure of education upon those entering the sacred office, nor to fix upon a minimum even. The two great questions stated above must needs be considered separately. From the remaining three essays and other sources it is easy to discover how these questions stand before the minds of our Congregational brethren of England.

I. A well-wrought and suggestive paper was read by the Rev. F. J. Falding, D.D., Principal of Rotherham College, on "The best means of securing a higher amount of theological and biblical scholarship for some of our students." The work common to all denominations, said Dr. Falding, may be done by untrained men, but the doctrines characteristic of Nonconformity must be preached, even in the villages, by men as cultivated and learned as devout and earnest men can be. All cannot, indeed, become highly cultivated. Some must make attainments beyond those of others. This does not assume that higher attainments are not desirable for all. Those best trained should be, on graduation, 1. Well skilled in the Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and German tongues; 2. Prepared in logic and metaphysics for a careful, discriminating acquaintance with schools of philosophy; 3. Acquainted with the greater part of the scriptures, in the originals, and with the most available critical helps; 4. With the principal works of the Fathers and Reformers; 5. With the general development of theological and ecclesiastical systems. A considerable margin is discernible between this maximum of Dr. Falding and the minimum of Dr. Fraser, greater than commonly exists in theological education among us. Dr. Falding observed that there are reasons for fearing lest

"even the present inadequate proportion of truly learned ministers" in England may not be maintained in the future; such as, e.g. the increased attention paid to literary studies in colleges since their affiliation with London University; the growing demands upon the time of pastors; the popular taste and spirit of the age, stimulating general literature rather than profound learning. He argued that men of promise should proceed to the universities before studying theology, instead of afterward, as now;[1] that a new institution should be established for theological study alone, or one of the existing ones so modified;[2] and that examinations should be held and distinctions conferred by some general body created for this purpose.

This last suggestion was also brought forward by two other essayists, but was treated at length by the Rev. H. R. Reynolds, B.A., Principal of Cheshunt College, in the most striking paper of the session, and the only one whose recommendations were adopted by the Conference. This paper illustrates the importance attached to distinctions, as such, in a country full of social caste, as England is, as well as the condition of theological learning in the chief body of Dissenters. Mr. Reynolds propounded a detailed plan for a federal board empowered to grant degrees in theology. The London University charter, it will be remembered, does not authorize the senate to confer such degrees upon the Dissenters who resort to that institution for other honors. "Sinecures and fellowships there are none among us," said Mr. Reynolds. "It does not appear that we have supplied stimulus enough

[1] "The number of B.A. graduates at the London University from Congregational colleges has dwindled down from eighteen in 1859 to one in 1866" (English Independent, January 24). The falling off is ascribed to the higher standard of examination, requiring time needed for theological study.

[2] It is now proposed to modify the college over which this gentleman presides (Rotherham) into a theological seminary. Rotherham is in Yorkshire, a few miles from Sheffield. Airedale is at Undercliffe, near Bradford, in the same county. It is not contemplated to change the theological courses of the other institutions, but to establish a more advanced one at Rotherham, leaving the other colleges in the provinces and the city as they are.

to the pursuit of the higher departments of theological knowledge;[1] nor does it appear that the number of learned men among us fitly represents the magnitude of our religious community, or fairly corresponds with the learning, acuteness, activity, and prominence of those distinguished men who in recent times have conferred such honor upon the church of England." It is noticeable here that the phrase "theological knowledge" is used in a generic sense, and neither means didactic and metaphysical doctrine specifically, as in this country, nor implies that doctrine holds so large a place as with us. Those distinguished in the establishment of late have hardly been profound in doctrine, according to the standard derived from the Edwardses and other New England divines. In the paper of Dr. Fraser, systematic theology in all its branches, has the second place after a moderate amount of biblical knowledge, "sound rather than extensive." Such is the comparative estimate common in England on all sides. Mr. Reynolds' plan was referred to a committee of seventeen, chiefly college officers, who have modified it in part, and taken steps to carry it into effect. It provides for a Board or Senatus Academicus, composed of all the professors and three delegates each from the committees of the colleges, whose functions shall correspond to those of the university senates in respect to examinations and

[1] The existence of scholarships for candidates for the Congregational ministry does not conflict with Mr. Reynolds' statement. They are neither fellowships nor sinecures. New College has more than any other institution (value, from less than £13 to £60), chiefly for undergraduates. The John Yockney and Mills scholarship, tenable for one and three years, are available for those who have completed theological studies. Dr. Daniel Williams's divinity scholarships, under the care of the trustees of Dr. Williams's library (till lately in Red Cross Street), are open to those who have taken the degree of M.A. in a Scottish university, or of B.A. at Oxford, Cambridge, London, or Dublin. Tenable two years, value £31 5s. per annum. Candidates are examined in Homer, Xenophon, Euripides, Horace, Virgil, Tacitus, Algebra, Geometry, Conic Sections, Logic (Whately's), Greek, Roman, and English History, Locke on the Understanding, Paley's Natural Theology, and Latin and English Composition. Studies to be pursued in such schools of theology as the trustees shall select or approve. Twenty-four students of independent colleges have enjoyed the benefit of these scholarships since 1841. But two are awarded each year.

honors. Its chief office is the appointment of examiners. The original plan proposed four of these — one in Hebrew, Syriac, Old Testament Exegesis, Criticism, Introduction, and History; one in Alexandrine and Patristic Greek, New Testament Exegesis, Criticism, etc.; one in Ecclesiastical History, and History of Doctrine; and one in Systematic Divinity, Christian Evidences, and Theological Literature. It is decided that there shall be not less than five, — two in Theology and History of Doctrine; one in Hebrew, and Old Testament Introduction, Exegesis and History; one in New Testament Introduction, Exegesis and History, and one in Ecclesiastical History and Patristic Literature, — a re-arrangement with some advantage to theology proper. Two examinations (the first of such a character as the majority of students should be able to pass) are conducted in writing, the subjects of the first to be announced one year previous. Among the subjects announced this year are, one of the Gospels or the Acts of the Apostles in Greek, and two or more other books of the New Testament; selections from the Old Testament in Hebrew, with elements of Hebrew Grammar; Butler's Analogy, or some other standard English theological work, and one Latin work selected from the writings of the Fathers or Reformers. In all, there are thirteen subjects, "Systematic Theology and History of Doctrine" forming one. At the second or advanced examination candidates are to be examined in the following subjects: 1. Exegesis and Criticism of the New Testament; 2. Exegesis and Criticism of the Hebrew and Chaldee Scriptures; 3. Exegesis and Criticism of the LXX. or Syriac New Testament; 4. Systematic Theology and History of Doctrine; 5. Ecclesiastical History and Patristic Literature. Those who pass this examination are not required to show a competent knowledge of all the subjects named, only of two out of five.[1] Those who pass the first examination will be

[1] The Scotch Presbyterians have been more vigorous than English bodies: the Secession Church, for example, requiring two examinations of candidates after study. At Hackney an oral examination, combined with written papers, is held. "The oral examination comprised the translation of Pictet's Christian

admitted associates of the senate; those who pass the second will be admitted fellows. The question of granting a corresponding title in each case is referred to the consideration of the senate when constituted. The original plan provided three distinctions — Licentiate of the Theological Society; Bachelor of the same (equal to B.D. of the Universities); and Fellow, (equal to D.D.), along with prizes and scholarships for those obtaining the first two distinctions. Candidates for the distinction of "F.T.S." were to compose each, at leisure, a theological thesis, and submit any original published works they chose. This method of bestowing honors might still further cheapen those of trans-Atlantic origin in English eyes. They are now distinctively marked in lists of English names by explanatory words set over against them. British journals speak of them with disparagement. "Some obscure colleges in America," it is said, "sell the degree of D.D. very cheap, and without any apparent regard to the learning or culture of the individual." The plan agrees with that of our Chicago Theological Seminary in this, that it is by a theological body honors are bestowed; but our Western Senate is authorized by charter to confer doctorates without the severities of examination. The English plan, it is thought, will lead dissenting students to care little for the sacred honors denied them at the universities. The stringency of the examinations is primarily depended upon. The degree of B.D. at the University of Dublin "necessitates only the veriest rudiments of theological learning; and when this has been gained, the principal requisite for the higher distinction

Theology, the exegesis of the last four chapters of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Doctrine of the Trinity." "The written examination consisted of papers on eight different subjects: Mental Philosophy, Logic, Rhetoric, and Butler's First Sermon (Senior Class); Butler's Analogy (Part i. Chap v.) and Logic (First Junior Class); Paley's Evidences and Angus's Bible Hand-Book (Second Junior Class). All the students also constructed skeletons for a sermon, on a text not previously known, and without reference to a concordance, commentary, or any other book" (Sixty-first Report, June 1864). Hackney has but two tutors, one theological, one classical, and both branches of study are carried on by the same students together, as elsewhere.

of D.D. is the presentation of a sermon in Latin, which, supposing the rule and the practice alike stringent, is far more a test of classical scholarship than of biblical attainments. In the Scotch universities degrees in divinity are merely honorary. The notion even prevails that a doctorate is too serious a thing to be conferred on the ground of an examination, i.e. on the best evidence we can obtain of solid and extensive knowledge. It is therefore often given in cases where there is no direct evidence at all, and as a mere compliment to popular celebrity." In the English universities "the position of a Bachelor and even of a Doctor in Divinity (unlike that of one who obtains any other degree), is reached with scarcely an effort, and is in itself little more than a name." [1] It is expected that the new "Dissenting" distinctions will represent real and superior merit, and that those who attain them will not ask to have them confirmed even by the Queen. As funds are obtained for the purpose it is contemplated that scholarships and exhibitions shall be endowed in connection with the examinations of the value of from ten to thirty pounds per annum.

II. The most difficult and perplexing subject considered — it seems to have been the most interesting also, as it was more immediately practical and pressing than any other — was the education of a less learned ministry. It furnished the chief occasion for the assembling of the conference. The chairman of the Congregational Union [2] said at its last previous meeting: "Many problems connected with the education of our ministry present themselves for solution, just now; for example, the relation of general and classical education to specific theological education; how to extend to a maximum the curriculum of such students as give promise of learned efficiency; and how to reduce to a minimum the curriculum of those upon whom more than mere elementary

[1] Professor Charlton, in Minutes of 1865.

[2] Rev. Henry Allon, at Hull, 1864. Mr. Allon and Professor Reynolds of Cheshunt College, are the accomplished successors of Dr. Vaughan in the editorship of the British Quarterly Review.

culture is wasted; the position and probable influence of the elementary colleges recently established — how to secure the advantages which they promise, and to avoid the evils which they threaten; the promised advantages being such as these — some degree of education to Home Missionaries, Evangelists, and others, who otherwise would be thrust into their work without any; the probability that among their students men of exceptional promise will occasionally be found who might be advantageously transferred to one of our superior colleges for a more adequate education. The threatened evils are, that a superficial and limited education will supercede one more thorough and extended."

The "elementary colleges" here referred to are the Bristol and Nottingham Institutes, — "institutes, not colleges." They were both opened as late as 1863. It has been for some years the practice in several of the colleges, e.g. Western, Rotherham, Airedale, Spring Hill, Brecon, and Edinburg, to allow a shorter course for older candidates whose early literary advantages have been small, as well as to permit those of higher culture to enter the theological course only, and to extend it in some cases. Cheshunt and New Colleges alone seem to have no such shorter course. But this, it was felt, did not suffice. Laymen, especially liberal, intelligent, and earnest laymen, insisted on attempting a more limited preparation for the pulpit. The two institutes named seem to have been experiments, until the year past; they are now permanent, and their resources and attendance of students increasing. The reasons that prompted to their establishment are four. They are all reasons of necessity:

(1) The greater portion of the English people dwell in cottages. They are neither of the higher class in society, nor of the middle class. The greater part of the piety of England is in the middle classes; the chapels of dissent are filled with them. Social considerations and early habits formed under a style of education which the church established controls, will chiefly account, if we may believe the Pall Mall Gazette and kindred journals, for the presence of

the upper classes, and gentlemen and their families — the aristocracy and squirearchy — at the Episcopal churches. But not one fifth of the working men of England ever attend public worship at all anywhere.[1] In London, on Census Sunday in 1851, a million of people able to attend public worship were absent; most of them of this class. Their dense general ignorance is almost beyond American belief. The term "public schools" in that country means the reverse of what it means here; it is monopolized by the great endowed schools — Winchester, Eton, Rugby, and the rest. Common schools are not only unknown but impossible — one sect being by law established, and the national schools conducted in the sectarian interest thus favored. Englishmen like John Bright, Handel Crossham, and Dr. Vaughan, re-assure their countrymen that in America there is an education of the masses which the English mind can hardly conceive. It is difficult to imagine how the preponderating ignorance and irreligion over sea can diminish, while the political economy and the political constitution of England continue as they are — an enormous land monopoly which forbids the miserable food-grower to own the land he tills, and an overgrown manufacturing interest which cares nothing for the starving operative as a human and rational being. A fearful heathenism in the bosom of the wealthiest civilization on the globe is a necessary consequence. The evil, already gigantic, is steadily growing. Good men are appalled. A learned ministry can never overtake it. Such a ministry is indispensable in evangelizing other orders of mind; it is a simple necessity to employ a less elaborately educated ministry for this. The missing links between Christianity and this mass of death must be found. "The England of to-day," says the Patriot, "needs to take lessons from other countries and from its former self. One church opened in the most degraded part of Glasgow twelve years ago, is now the parent of seven large, flourishing, self-supporting mission churches. The Rough House at

[1] "Gentlemen lately testified in the House of Commons that in their lives they never saw a poor man in a ragged coat inside a church" (English Tracts, p. 222).

Hamburg and Fliedner's Institution at Kaisewerth, are samples of the magnificent practical Christianity which is leavening the working classes of Germany, while the universities have poisoned the educated classes. The United States show to us a working-class people that are eminently religious. Wales and Scotland show us a condition of society similar to that of the States. The early labors of Wesley and Whitefield, and the first Methodist preachers, show how Christianity has power to sieze the working classes, and to pervade them with a sudden, marvellous, glorious life." "These outlying crowds must be visited in their own regions, by men who will carry 'the glad tidings' to them." "There is a work to be done," says the English Independent, "in the workshops, in the streets, in the parks, and in the open forum, before the operative classes will even think of bending their steps to the church door. Wholly new and altogether abler agencies are required for the persuasion of the skilled mechanics."

2. Incompetent men are largely finding their way into the lower order of ministers. Distinctions of ability and culture exist in the English ministry which have never obtained among American Congregationalists. A village pastor is not what he is in New England.[1] But the home missionaries and evangelists differ as much, quite likely still more, from those known in this country by that name. The latter "are in no instance to take upon themselves the formation of separate and independent churches. Neither are they to assume

[1] The following is a recent account of a pastor in a small village: "From that point he sets out daily for the purpose of visiting the sick and preaching in one or more of his eleven village stations. He has now five chapels in which he regularly preaches, and some four or five rooms which are hired in cottages. He preaches three times every Sunday, and every night in the week except Saturday. He travels for the purpose of preaching (without reckoning his visits to the sick) about two thousand miles a year. It would be a false mode of estimation if it could not be added that the quality of the work done is good." These men are not of course installed pastors, or, as the English word is, "recognized." But they are settled as to home and sphere of labor, as the home missionary and the evangelist is not. The village is the centre of operations and the residence for that purpose.

the status of the ordinary ministry." They are laymen. The home missionaries, who may through superior merit rise to the rank of village pastors, are ministers. But the evangelist is more than a lay preacher; his occupation is evangelism. Connected with the Congregational churches of Great Britain are two or three thousand lay preachers. Of these two hundred and thirty-three are in home missionary stations. The Home Missionary Society has besides, fifty-nine evangelistic agents, supplying sixty evangelistic stations, and preaching in three hundred and forty rooms, cottages and farmhouses. All this is in addition to one hundred and nineteen stations of the society for home missionaries, and a thousand and sixty-five out-stations of the larger churches, with which the Home Missionary Society has nothing to do. In a paper read before the conference of 1865, by Rev. E. J. Hartland, tutor at Bristol, the men who often find their way into the pulpits of the smaller churches are thus described: "Ambitious city missionaries and scripture readers, tradesmen unable to grapple with the commercial activity of the times, ill-furnished but fluent young men from shops, warehouses, and counting-houses, having all of them much zeal but little knowledge." Among them "have been men of deep piety, yet led away by their fluency to fancy themselves called to a work for which they have few or no requisites; men whose doctrinal notions lead them to think they are all the more fitted for the ministry because they have had no special preparation for it, and men whom the pressure of circumstances makes glad to escape from misfortunes into the position of a Christian minister. These men have helped to keep our rural churches what they are;" and "given to [hostile] influences a crushing power. These have been the men who, after short, unsuccessful, and troublous pastorates have too often become burdens upon funds established to help pastors of another order." It was stated in 1864, that it was easier to enter the ministry than to enter college; that "for every twenty-eight pastors twenty-five come in without passing through college. Last year only thirty from colleges

became pastors, while forty-seven pastors were derived from other sources; of course this does not imply that the latter necessarily are uneducated."[1] Of one hundred and five ministers appointed in 1866, sixty-two were from the colleges and sixty-three from other sources, of whom nine were from preparatory institutions, and four from city and town missions. In Gloucestershire in 1864 there were sixty pastors, and of these twenty-eight — nearly one-half — had no ministerial education; in Somersetshire, seventeen out of thirty-one; in Herefordshire, three out of nine; in Wiltshire, eighteen out of thirty-nine. "Of the majority" in these counties "it may be said that they are uneducated; that they have not the literary qualifications for the correct exposition of Holy Writ, or the instruction of a congregation in the great truths of religion." In the cities the proportion of uneducated is less; London district has a hundred and seventy pastors, of whom a hundred and thirty-nine were specially educated. Of seventeen hundred and thirty-eight ministers in all England in 1864, four hundred and fifty-nine had no professional training, and three hundred others entered the ministry without passing through the regular colleges. Of eighteen hundred and twenty-six in 1866, about seven hundred would come under both these descriptions. Deducting pastors in the London district, about one-third of the whole number remaining are professionally untrained.

3. The conclusion has been reached that in England the two classes of ministers — the more learned and the less — cannot be educated together in the same institutions. "The thing was tried at Airedale — young men put with others in the theological class, which was already two or three years in advance of them — and proved unsatisfactory. Other colleges have tried it, and failed. Men would not go [to college] under such circumstances. The Nottingham Institute has treble the number of applications on this account."[2]

[1] Rev. H. Allon, at Hull. Those educated at the institutes of Bristol and Nottingham are included in the number of forty-seven.

[2] Rev. J. B. Paton of Nottingham, speech at the anniversary at Bristol, June

"You would be creating a class distinction among students," said Mr. Hartland,[1] "the influence of which could not but be most injurious; for divinity students are but men. You would, moreover, probably defeat your own end. The students in question would, in a large number of cases, become dissatisfied with their destination, and when placed in it would fail to work heartily. And the policy [in respect to] the reputation of the colleges would be fatal. Such men would go forth as alumni of A., B., or C. college, where a high classical education is professedly given. The public at large would recognize no difference between the two classes of students. Circumstances might bring out the great disparity between the curriculum of our colleges as generally understood and the attainments of the men in question, and thus faith in institutions which should ever command confidence would be weakened."

4. The colleges cannot supply the existing and increasing need. Their alumni will not become pastors' assistants in the poorer sections of towns, or home missionaries, or even village pastors. They do not "as a rule, settle in the country churches. And these churches know this, and hence few of them, when their pulpits become vacant, seek to have them filled from these sources." Of ninety-two alumni of Cheshunt sent forth in the last twenty years, but ten have settled in places of less than four thousand souls, while in these later years more than a hundred village pastorates are annually reported vacant, notwithstanding the filling of many pulpits with unfit and incompetent men. For these vacancies men must be had, and fit men if possible; men wonted to the life of the people, and fitted to teach them in sacred things.

Now the Bristol and Nottingham Institutes aim to cure the evil at the point where it begins, — to raise the lower ranks

1866. Samuel Morley, Esq., of London, late M.P. for Nottingham, one of the wisest as well as most munificent of English laymen, also observed: "I am persuaded that two classes of students under the same tuition do not answer."

[1] Essay, 1865, on "the probable effect of such institutions as those at Bristol and Nottingham on the Congregational ministry."

of the ministry. "Our object is," says Mr. Hartland, "to make intelligent English preachers, while by actual labor of a semi-pastoral kind, we prepare them practically for this branch of their work in the villages or districts to which they may be sent." "We wish to enable them to use their mother tongue with accuracy and power, to understand its grammar, and to know something of its history. And if we do not propose to introduce them to the riches and glory of more ancient literatures, we make them acquainted as far as possible with the great masters of English thought and writing in different ages." Candidates for admission must be specially recommended for home missionary work. Uneducated men who are already in active service are resorting to these institutes. The colleges meantime are fuller than ever; some men have been sent to them from the institutes who would never have thought of entering them; while those retained would never have gone to other institutions, or to any at all. The adjacent colleges, also, with larger attendance, are restricting themselves more to the higher education. At Bristol where there is but one instructor, the course of study extends over two or three years (as individual cases may require) and includes the English language and literature, logic, Christian evidences, biblical literature and exposition, systematic divinity, homiletics, and ecclesiastical history. The comparative range of instruction will be best seen by placing side by side in detail the two years' course at Nottingham, and the last three years of the five years' course at New College. Nottingham has three instructors, and the literary course — also of two years — is pursued along with the theological. At New College a two years' literary course precedes the theological, in which the elementary study of Hebrew, elements of natural and revealed theology and evidences, etc., and exercises in scripture exposition and the composition of sermons are carried along with science and the classics. At Nottingham Rev. J. B. Paton, M.A., teaches theology, and Rev. H. Ollard, F.S.A., Ecclesiastical History, etc. At New College, Rev. Robert Halley, D.D., teaches

Theology, Rev. S. Newth M.A., F.R.A.S., Ecclesiastical History, etc., Rev. Maurice Nenner, Hebrew, Rev. J. H. Godwin, Philosophy.

Nottingham Institute.

First Year.

Doctrinal Theology: Hodge's Outlines, Wardlaw's Theology, with Lectures. Paley's Evidences and Horae Paulinae.

Biblical Criticism and Interpretation: General Introduction: Transmission of Ancient Books; Formation of Canon. Exegesis of Gospels, Ep. to Romans, and one historical book of Old Testament.

Stewart's Elements, Wayland's Moral Science, Whately's Rhetoric.

Lectures on Preaching: Sermons and Plans. Pastoral Theology, one hour a week. Lectures on Missions. Six hours a week open-air preaching, with house to house visitation. Six hours ditto on Sunday. Occasional preaching in churches. Recitations and reading two hours Monday P.M.

Mosheim, first four centuries, with other authors.

Second Year.

Doctrinal Theology completed. Butler's Analogy.

Introduction, Westcott's. Gospels completed. Ep. to Hebrews and one Pastoral Epistle. One prophetical book of the Old Testament, and some of the Psalms. A small portion of the Greek Testament read weekly.

Whately's Logic, Chambers's Social and Political Economy. Notes from other authors.

Homiletics as in first year. Pastoral Theology and Evangelistic training ditto.

New College.

First (Third) Year.

Lectures on the Grounds of Authority in Theology: Natural Religion and Evidences of Christianity; Analysis of standard works (Butler).

New Testament (Greek) Criticism and Interpretation: Lectures (1864) on the Grammar of the New Testament Dialect. Exegesis of Gospels. Old Testament (Heb.) Gen. i.–iii.

Locke, Books I. II., with Lectures on the Intuitions and Conceptions of the Mind.

Homiletics.

Classics, extra class, twice a week.

Second (Fourth) Year.

Doctrinal and Polemic Theology (2d course): Analysis of Standard Works; Lectures on Inspiration and Authority of Scripture.

Exegesis of Ep. Hebrews (Greek). 2d class in Hebrew: Genesis and Psalms; Old Testament Criticism, with Chaldee and Syriac or Arabic.

Locke, Books III. IV., with Lectures on the Convictions and Feelings of the Mind.

Homiletics: Sermons and Essays.

Ecclesiastical History: Introduction and Conflicts of Christianity; Diffusion; the Fathers.

Classics as before. Translations into Hebrew.

Third (Fifth) Year.

Systematic Theology (3d course): Christian Ethics; Christian Institutions.

Mosheim, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

[A more advanced course for students who remain three years].

Criticism, etc: Three Eps. John (Greek.); Judges i.–viii., Job i.–xii. (Heb.), with Chaldee and Syriac or Arabic.

Lectures on the Will and Conscience.

Sermons and Essays; Pastoral Theology.

Ecclesiastical History: Heresies, Controversies, Apologists.

Translations from English into Hebrew.

One of the chief differences between these two institutions and the classes they represent, will hardly appear from this comparison; namely, the training given in each in public speech. The New College students preach through their whole term of professional study. So do those of all the other colleges. But at the institutes training for this is made still more a specialty. The kind of labor for which the students are trained obliges it. "They are to be speakers," says Mr. Paton, "throughout their whole lives. Every day, in private or in public, out of doors or in doors, they are to 'preach and teach Jesus Christ.' But if this is to be their peculiar function, their supreme duty, would it not be folly in us to neglect the training of the body for this work? The vocal organs should be exercised and disciplined in such men, just as the fingers of a pianist and the arm of a mechanic are suppled and strengthened for their proper employment. They come to us with their excrescent roughnesses, annoying faults in their speech which vex the ears of their hearers, and hinder the word they speak. These have then to be ground off on grinding-stones that never cease rolling. Everything possible must be done to make the men simple, urgent, natural speakers. Hence assiduous, even daily, attention must be paid to their speaking." That this is done, the fear entertained, in some quarters that they will crowd men from the colleges out of important pulpits because of their popular gifts and a certain ready, vivacious aptness and force of expression witnesses.

Another noteworthy point of difference is, that New College has a preliminary two years' course in arts, while at Nottingham all that is done in that way is also compressed into the same two years with theology. The New College course in arts has in excess of the other, mathematics, classics, German (or French), Logic, Botany, Zoology, and as much moral philosophy as is required for the B.A. degree in the University of London. The Nottingham course, on the other hand, has more of English literature on its collegiate side, with the study of words and language (Marsh, Müller, Angus, and Trench for text-books), more of composition, with political and physical geography in excess of the other, and also English history — its great epochs; Oriental and European history; the history of civilization, and that of Nonconformity. It is claimed that the Nottingham course, though obviously so crowded, — they are all crowded compared with those of American theological seminaries, — "cannot be made an easy by-way into the ministry; for the severity of the literary and theological and practical training is not surpassed elsewhere. It is a special rather than a partial course. It is intended to be thorough as far as it goes.

It is evident from the facts now brought forward that the superiority of dissenting preachers to those of the establishment is largely due to their better professional training. Some months since a number of members of the House of Commons declared in debate that the only religious instruction at the universities is in certain books of the Bible and Paley's Evidences. The declaration is hardly questionable. At one of the Oxford colleges the students were required by the Founder's Statute to speak Latin and Greek; it was enjoined on the fellows of another to speak Hebrew; but it is as true to-day as it was ten years ago, that "theology is not studied as a science"[1] in any of them. Pulpit eloquence is an unknown art. The university sing-song and drawl which are heard from the lips of "dons" and eminent place-men everywhere, show how an expressive and forcible utterance

[1] Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol. iv. p. 788.

of their mother tongue is despised. But the great want of the English pulpit, even in the chief of the dissenting bodies, is a larger infusion of sinewy and profound theology. "In American preaching, taken generally," says Dr. Vaughan, "there is a good measure of intelligence, the enunciation of sound doctrine and of right principle, with a grave sort of earnestness, but it is sadly wanting in emotion, embracing little of the persuasive. In this deficiency we perhaps see an effect of climate.[1] But why should secular oratory in America be impassioned, and religious oratory so much wanting in that element?" An acquaintance with the metaphysical profundity and force of the early American pulpit might have suggested to our venerable critic an intellectual cause, instead of a physical one.[2] Perhaps an acquaintance with our fervid Methodist divines and the preachers of the more southern states would have made the climatic suggestion inadmissible. On the other hand a healthy infusion of metaphysics into English preaching might impart the same grave earnestness, and deepen, but nowise lessen, its effectiveness and power. Another great want of the dissenting pulpit is a mastery of the relations of science to religion. In thirty years but four Congregationalists have taken the degree of Bachelor of Science at London University. It used to be the complaint, says the Vice Chancellor, that British universities did not recognize anything scientific out of the pale of the old existing learned professions. In consequence many Englishmen degraded themselves with "spurious German doctorates of philosophy." But "the degrees of Bachelor and Doctor of Science recently established by the University of London, obviate the objection. The distinction is free to all who present themselves as candidates, and obtainable on

[1] It is not a little amusing to find him also ascribing to our weather at once the mediocrity and limitations of American scholarship, the lack of bloom and endurance in American women, and the absence of pleasantry in American social intercourse!

[2] It was our fortune to inform this worthy divine, in his own land, before he was deputed to the Boston Council, of the nature of the contents of the Memoirs of Hopkins and Emmons published by our Congregational Board of Publication.

the one sufficient and necessary condition of competent acquirements." And it is now appropriately urged upon the dissenting ministry that the battle-ground with the unbelief of the age is largely scientific. Possibly more attention cannot well be given to scientific subjects in the curriculum of the English colleges until there is more mathematics taught in the preparatory schools. At present "comparatively few enter college who could solve a simple algebraic equation." Still it is not a little singular that an American divine, a Western divine — the lecturer on the connection of science and religion in Chicago Theological Seminary, and author of the Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation — should be needed in England to lecture on such subjects; crossing the ocean once and again for the purpose.

It is also clear that the Congregationalists of England are going at once in two different directions in respect to ministerial education, which are parallel with, or supplemental to, each other. They are improving zealously their method of preparing a learned and their method of preparing an unlearned ministry. By the latter they hope to reach the poor and industrial classes, substantially composing the Wesleyan membership of six hundred thousand, and regarded heretofore as accessible only to the Wesleyans. They mean also to reach those whom other Christians do not — an immense proportion of the English people. They are confident of raising the whole ministry to a higher educational level by raising the lower grade. They expect to make every grade practically more effective. In respect to more learning in the pulpit they are manifestly tending towards theological seminaries of the American pattern. But they have anticipated us all in special courses, in which Chicago Seminary led our way, and Andover now receives a most noble, timely, and wise endowment.[1] Long since the plan of making sound, hearty, plain preachers in their mother tongue, men mighty in the scriptures and familiar with the people, was familiar

[1] Thirty thousand dollars have been recently given, by Miss Sophia Smith, for supporting an abridged system of theological education at Andover.

to them, as long ago as Mr. Frost's scheme of 1845. While even a course of lectures on missions by our patriarchial ex-secretary our seminaries have now for the first time, they have a special institution for missionaries. They maintain similar courses of instruction and drill for home missionaries, for whom we have not yet even lectures by well-furnished and experienced men. On the other hand, the subdivision of departments, accomplished at Yale and talked of in other quarters, is to them impossible; and the idea of auxiliary lecturers, inaugurated first in the West, seems never to have occurred to them. More varieties of sacred training exist among them than among us, many more; they tend to more still; and stubbornly slow as Englishmen generally are to vary from prescription, they have not hesitated to advance where we have halted, lest the thorough education which we made the chief end of theological seminaries should suffer abatement. Accepting an American biblical journal as the first of its class in the English tongue, we may expect that they will yet build in Old England — with their characteristic, wide-reaching munificence — a "school of the prophets" to rival the oldest and best endowed in New England. In their twofold movement which is here traced, every friend of sacred learning and of the ascendancy of truth over the great English-speaking race must fervently wish them success. Something like it, in other circumstances and with other details, is going on in American Congregationalism; and our several experiences and results may be mutually instructive. We are all, unquestionably, on the way to the solution of some difficult problems. May the great Head of the Church give us foresight, energy, and promptness, along with enlarged and pliant views, and the best understanding of our time and of his work.

Do we not need at once to diversify our American theological education? It seems to be admitted on all hands that we do. Does the pulpit need to be brought down to the people, that the masses may listen, believe, and be saved? Not as it does in England, not at all; for the question whether

the pulpit anywhere should be made level with the people depends upon the question what the level of the people happens to be. There is no such popular ignorance here as there; no such chasm between the intelligence of hearer and preacher. In view of the tendencies of science, philosophy, and all educated thought, the crying necessity of even higher culture for most ministers in our land need not be stated. But in a land of common schools their grade of learning may be constantly elevated and the scope and adaptiveness of sanctuary instruction not be lessened, or the sympathies of pulpit and pew removed from each other. On the other hand, in view of the flood-tide of European ignorance and dense, seething, irreligion that empties itself upon our shores and spreads over our prairies, and climbs our mountain slopes, in view too of our limitless southern work, must we not have an army of heralds of the cross, with hearts aflame and lips touched with sacred fire, who can have access to and power with every grade of intelligence, and lack of intelligence, among our swelling and heterogeneous millions? Can mortal tongue or pen tell how much we need them? The question whether the Congregational faith and order shall extend among freedmen and ex-slaveholders and non-slaveholders of the south, it will presently be seen, is just the question whether we can produce such men, and enough of them. We are compelled to multiply and diversify our appliances for their education.

But let this be done, it is said, by way of caution and pleading, only within existing institutions of the usual, not to say almost invariable, type. Add special courses rather than institute special schools; found new professorships for a particular class of pupils in an old seminary, rather than found a new seminary for that particular class. "It is far more consonant," urges a late anniversary Address,[1] "with the spirit of all good learning." It is more ecomomical; it is more wise. We need "not only a more finished culture, (for) one order of mind, but also an adequate culture (for) more orders of mind." It is best for the humbler and more

[1] Prof. Parks Address before the Am. Ed. Soc., May 30, 1865.

practical workmen to go to the old and well-esteemed seminaries. They need their stimulating and elevated influence, need to "acquire a knowledge of themselves by knowing those brethren who are more lettered than they"; there will be fewer differences of opinion, and less humiliation and jealousy; "ministers who are trained in the same school are less exposed to mutual envy than ministers who are trained in different schools."

Unquestionably our historical tendency has always been to one type of theological institutions, and that the most complete possible. The Bangor Seminary began on a plan resembling that of Bristol and Nottingham. It was not long in learning to aim to be the fellow of Andover. The effort at Gilmanton in the same direction died out, overborne by the leading tendencies of New England. Our newest school, now second in its successful gathering of candidates for the ministry, purposes first of all to reproduce Andover and New Haven and Bangor beyond the Lakes. The requisites for admission — except in the special course — are a collegiate education or its equivalent.[1] It is likely that the next sacred school to be endowed and manned on the Pacific coast will be shapen after the same pattern. Is it enough to go on repeating this type of agency with some addition thereto? Will its products meet all our country's exigencies? Do they? The reasoning in its favor falls in apparently with the spirit of American equality; but the people to be saved are to be regarded as well as those who by preaching are to save them. The plea of the Address seems to be supported and strengthened by a consideration of the ultimate tendencies of Congregationalism; yet these do not forbid a variety of theological schools. The variety seen in England is owing in part to the combination of collegiate studies with

[1] Constitution of the Chicago Theological Seminary. Students in the special course "shall possess such literary attainments as shall be judged by the Board of Instructors necessary to success in the gospel ministry." This course has recently been reduced from three to two years. The theological training is the same as in the regular course.

theological; it is due somewhat to distinctions in English society. Less of these last will exist when reform triumphs, and odious obstacles of caste now hindering both the gospel and Congregationalism, give way.[1] Many of these diverse modes of education have relation to "orders and conditions of men." We are without such orders, but not without different conditions. Our political economy promotes division of labor. Our soil and industry necessitate diversities of life. Our national development causes dissimilitudes of occupation and interests. Our wide domain — now widening again — gives them all verge and room. These all in their turn produce unlike and multiform habitudes of mind. The American character is not one, but many, and is becoming more. Our history has at last brought within the scope of Congregational evangelization types of character unimagined by our fathers. And Congregationalism must needs work for the masses, however various or heterogeneous they be. Is it certain that our great cities will not presently furnish, like those of foreign Christendom, unmanageable masses of immense and terrible heathenism, if we do not at once evangelize on a greater scale, and with more variform adaptation than we have ever dreamed of doing? In a population now rushing past that of Boston, which itself is ceasing to be the Puritan city, our great interior metropolis, Chicago, already has a hundred and fifty thousand who neglect the worship of God. Such cities under our gigantic railroad system must multiply; manufactures just beginning to overspread the central West multiply them. The immigration alone, which the suppression of the rebellion and the condition of Europe again accelerates, would create them. Let us widen our view. Let us learn from other lands. If we cannot do what we can-

[1] "The chief hope of conciliating the working men to our religious institutions, and through them to religion, is the diminution of the fearful class-feeling which at present separates the upper and lower ranks of English society."—The English Independent. The remarkable Working Man's Conferences lately held in London and the Provincial towns, could not have been held in this country because, we have no such class-feeling, and no need of conciliating the working men as a class.

estly would, let us wisely do what we plainly must. The system of our New England fathers, east and west, north and south, must work towards ultimate spiritual equality through present inequalities. The genius of Congregationalism, for example, favors a church architecture that meets the average mind of the masses. But this may be only the last consummate product of the ripest Christian democracy. We are too crude, our social life too little assimilated to our principles, to realize it as yet. Even in cities we have the plainness of the Plymouth church along with the elaborate embellishment of the Broadway Tabernacle and the New England church of Chicago. If we must diversify in these lesser matters, must we not in more important things — the spiritual agencies that teach how to convert sinners and cherish and develop saints? The special courses at Andover and Chicago are one step in the right direction. They cannot be too amply endowed, or made too efficient. But may we not discreetly, and with the approbation of Christ, add the Bristol and Nottingham methods to our one American plan? We can better diversify theological education than English Congregationalists can, for we have not cumbered and overloaded it with collegiate education in the same course. Where the methods just named originated they were meant for classes of ministers already in existence, to give something of culture to preachers who else would have nothing, Are they not indispensable here to call some of those classes into existence? Is it quite certain that, in the great manufacturing hives of the future central West, on the margin of the plains now first penetrated by our iron thoroughfares stretching off to the Pacific, among the gathering toilers of our mountain territories, and where the "poor white trash" and the freedmen of the south and southwest are yet to hear for the first time a free Puritan gospel, we need only the culture of Andover and New Haven, which can never be else than distinctively scholarly, and never ought to be; that we do not need new and deftly fitted modes of Christian service, imparting the same sound interpretation and strong and saving

theology, with a ready, direct, and lissome suiting to multiplied and heterogeneous habits of life and mind, which our prescriptive culture has not yet attained? The secret of the extension of New England religious life, southward at least, is wrapped up in the question: Can it produce more than one type of ministerial power? Can we have all other necessary types if we only add special courses where the life and drift of the institution, however admirable in itself, may prove overpoweringly adverse thereto? The most plausible argument for doing only this, and nothing more, is not adduced in the Address referred to; namely, a certain tone respecting biblical and theological scholarship which may be imparted to men who never themselves can become scholars. But more may be lost by this in a special course than is gained, since it may be done at the expense of more fitting and indispensable qualifications, in the circumstances, for the peculiar work for which the men are indispensable. Besides the equalization and sympathy between the more literate and the more practical brethren will not fail if we adopt the larger and more varied plan. Ministerial caste and envy must be destroyed by our life rather than by our studies. And American life is the great equalizer; the western work, pastoral and home missionary, shows this everywhere; the more lettered and the less lettered, however previously trained, are equally tested, and by the same tests; the rich and the poor in learning meet together. Nothing but life and labor thoroughly equalizes; for this the world is the true seminary. And certain it is, that multiply new phases of ministerial preparation and service as we may, whether some of them are on theory desirable or not, they will all in the result prove too feeble and too few. Doubtless, if all our seminaries of the established type were supplemented with special courses, and we have, on the borders of our home missionary field, as many and as various institutions of other grades as Great Britain has, and laymen were as much enlisted in the work of saving souls by persuasive Christian speech as a few are beginning to be, the multitudes who would still lack the word of life would be appallingly great.

ARTICLE V.

NOTICES OF RECENT GERMAN PUBLICATIONS.

FROM OUR GERMAN CORRESPONDENT.

SLEEP AND DEATH, AND THE PHENOMENA OF SOUL-LIFE CONNECTED THEREWITH. A psychologico-apologetical inquiry.[1] — The aim of the author of the above work is, by investigating those states commonly indicated by the words "the night-side of the soul," to gain a fuller view of its essence, and to show more clearly its destination to an immortal existence. He thinks such an inquiry into sleep, death, and the related phenomena of second sight and the like, specially fitted to further the object in view, because in connection with them the soul withdraws itself, as it were, to a certain degree from its corporeal organism, and sinks into its own esoteric depths. The work is divided into two main parts: I. Sleep and Death, and the related psychical phenomena. II. The higher lighting up of the soul in the hour of death. In the first part are discussed such matters as the following: Sleep, its rise and course; the continuity of self-consciousness and activity in sleep. Dreams, their nature and rise; their prophetical character; their moral and religious character; as revelations; the confusion of the soul in dreaming. Mixed States, as, for example, somnambulism; the power of anticipation; prophetic clear-sight among heathens and Christians; the various species of second-sight. In the second part: the phenomena of apparent death, which he calls death incomplete; completed death; the intensification of the powers of the soul in face of death. The author adduces an immense number of most striking and interesting facts bearing on the several points brought under discussion, and whether one agree with his deductions and hypotheses or not, he must be allowed to have evinced wide reading, considerable subtilty, and to have produced a most curious and suggestive work. We know no treatise on the subject so comprehensive and so safe as this.

APOCRYPHAL APOCALYPSES.[2] — The inexhaustable Tischendorf has here partly republished, but mainly edited for the first time, the following

[1] Schlaf und Tod nebst den damit zusammenhängenden Erscheinungen des Seelenlebens. Eine psychologisch-apologetische Erörterung. Von Franz Splittgerber. pp. 493. Halle: Fricke; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 2 thaler.

[2] Apocalypses Apocryphae. Edidit Const. Tischendorf. Lipsiae: H. Mendelssohn; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 40 sgr.

apocryphal books: The Apocalypses of Moses, of Esdras, of Paul, and of John; Johannis Liber de Dormitione Mariae; Liber de Transitu Mariae Virginis; Additamenta ad Acta Apostolorum apocrypha and ad Evangelia apocrypha. The several documents are accompanied by notes, prolegomena, various readings, and in part translations. It is a most interesting addition and contribution to apocryphal literature. The getting up is all that could be desired; the price very moderate; and the reputation of the editor beyond praise from us. We may mention here that the above volume is one of a series, including Evangelia Apocrypha, Acta apostolorum apocrypha, and De Evangeliorum apocryphorum similiumque librorum origine et usu, issued by the same eminent editor. In these days no theologian should neglect examining the extant apocryphal Christian literature.

The opening Verses (1–18) of the Gospel of John.[1] — This is a series of ten meditations, or lectures delivered before a mixed public, by the author of the valuable Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, and of one of the most authoritative systems of Lutheran Theology. The titles of the lectures are: The Positive and Negative Design of the Gospel of John; The Word; The Life and Light; John the Baptist; Darkness; Sonship; The Incarnation of the Word and the Glory of the Incarnate One; The Only-Begotten, the Temple of God and his Baptism; Law, Grace, and Truth; and the Supper of the Lamb. The meditations are thoroughly orthodox, Lutheran, and warm.

The Historical Influence of Don Chasdai Creskas' Religious Philosophy.[2] — Who was Don Chasdai Creskas? He was a Spanish Jew, who lived and wrote towards the end of the fourteenth century; but who, though of a highly respectable family and a man of eminent philosophical ability, has hitherto remained so unknown that even Munk, the celebrated French scholar, does not mention him in his sketch of the History of Jewish Philosophy. His principal work or Adonai, "Light of God," was written in the interest of orthodoxy, and was directed mainly against the liberalism of Gersonides and Maimonides, and their followers. He defends the Bible against the prevailing Aristotelic philosophy. Dr. Joel gives a clear account of the doctrines of this Light of God, and deserves the attention of all who are interested in inquires of this character.

[1] Der Eingang des Johannes Evangeliums. Von. Dr. F. A. Philippi, Professor of Theology in Rostock. Stuttgart: Liesching; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866.

[2] Don Chasdai Creskas' religionsphilosophische Lehren in ihrem geschichtlichen Einflusse. Von. Dr. M. Joel. Breslau: Skutsch; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866.

THE IDEA OF ABSOLUTE PERSONALITY; OR, GOD AND HIS RELATION TO THE WORLD, IN PARTICULAR TO HUMAN PERSONALITY.[1]—It is high time that theologians of all schools should set about a revision of the traditional doctrine of the nature and attributes of God. This may perhaps startle some of our readers; but we assert it, because in our view the current representations of God are not purely Biblical, but an unsatisfactory mixture of false philosophy and revelation. If this were the proper place we could trace back the former elements to their source. As long as our teachings on this subject are marked by their present vagueness and self-contradictoriness — we can compare our ordinary theological image of God to nothing but an image of gold and clay — we shall never be able fully to defend the Incarnation of Christ, or overthrow those nearly related, though apparently opposed errors, Deism and Pantheism, — errors which are now stalking through the ranks of the cultivated and scientific with greater boldness than ever. We welcome, therefore, any attempt in this direction, even though we may not agree with it in all respects; especially when its leading feature is a thorough discussion of that which is common to God and man — personality. Dr. Hanne's work treats of the historical development of theism, and its conflicts with deism and pantheism; the following are its principal headings: (1) The beginnings of theism among cultivated heathens prior to the advent of Christ, and the ancient idea of deity as substance, their fundamental metaphysical error; — Plato and Aristotle are here carefully noticed; (2) The development of Christian theism in the early church; (3) Theism during the Middle Ages; (4) The struggles of Theism with Pantheism and Deism since the Reformation, and the evolutions of modern philosophy in this sphere since the time of Kant. His exposure of Hegel is masterly. Though the positive results of Dr. Hanne's treatise is rather a *testimonium paupertatis* for philosophical speculation than anything else, still as a history, and as indirectly drawing the mind back to the grand unity and vitality of the Biblical teachings regarding God, we regard it as not unworthy of attention.

CONFESSIONS; OR, THREE BOOKS OF FAITH.[2]:— Another work by the same author, in three parts: first, monologues; secondly, poems; thirdly, articles. The first are on the following subjects: Modern questionings about Faith; Glances in the forecourt of Faith; Passages from my own life on the forecourts of Faith; State of the church at the present day;

[1] Die Idee der absoluten Persönlichkeit, oder, Gott und sein Verhältniss zur Welt, insbesondere zur menschlichen Persönlichkeit. Von. Dr. F. W. Hanne. 2 vols. 2d ed. Hannover: Rümpler; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1865.

[2] Bekenntnisse oder Drei Bücher vom Glauben. Von. Dr. F. W. Hanne. 2d ed. Hannover: Rümpler; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1865.

Faith and Reason; The Wretchedness attendant on the Conflict between Reason and Faith. The third part contains discussions of the Idea of the Image of God; Prayer; and the Sacraments. Much that the author advances is opposed to our English orthodox view of matters; but as representing the thinking of thousands in Germany, perhaps in America too, and as the production of so able a man, Hanne's Confessions deserve a careful perusal.

Time and Eternity.[1] — A small treatise, by an able man, on an important subject. Dr. Fabri is the author of the Letters against Materialism, noticed in a previous number of the Bibliotheca Scara. The result at which he arrives is, that time is an objective law of formation or development inherent in every created being, in each after its own peculiar manner; or otherwise expressed, time is nothing but the law of creaturality which adheres to all created beings. Eternity is a mode of existence differing in kind from the temporal mode; it is the state of perfection; it is the true present; i.e. the state in which the dualism between ought and being is done away with. We do not think Dr. Fabri has cleared away the difficulties attending the subject; but still his treatise is suggestive.

The Clementine Homilies and Recognitions.[2] — A carefully edited edition of an ancient production falsely attributed to Clemens Romanus, which has become of great importance since the Tübingen School used it in support of their theory of the rise and progress of the Christian church. The learned author promises to issue also a commentary on the text.

History of Protestant Theology.[3]—The important work whose full title is given below, forms one of a series, whose publication was commenced under the auspices of the late King of Bavaria, Maximilian II. The series in question, entitled The History of the Sciences in Germany, is divided into three sections, the first of which is devoted to theology, philosophy, and philology; the second to general history, jurisprudence, political economy, and other general sciences; the third to the physical sciences. The task of writing the history of Protestant theology was

[1] Zeit und Ewigkeit. Von Dr. Fabri. Barmen: Langewiesche; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1865.

[2] Clementina. Edited by Dr. P. de la Garde. Leipsic: Brockhaus; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1865.

[3] Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie, besonders in Deutschland nach ihrer principiellen Bewegung und im zusammenhang mit dem religiösen sittlichen und intellectuellen Leben dargestellt von Dr. I. A. Dorner. München: Cotta; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867. Price, 3 thalers, 20 sgr.

entrusted to Dr. Dorner; that of writing the history of Roman Catholic theology, to Dr. Werner. We shall now very briefly indicate the design, spirit, and compass of Dr. Dorner's work. It has been very differently received, as might be expected, by Protestants and Roman Catholics. The latter are ill-pleased, as well they may be; for, though any one who is acquainted with its author would feel sure beforehand that he would be guilty of no injustice and no unnecessary polemic; that, on the contrary, his work would be marked by breadth, justice, and sobriety; he would still be prepared to expect that vigor, distinctness, and thorough Protestantism which are always hateful to Romanism. This new work of Dr. Dorner's is in every respect a worthy counterpart of his History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ. It is scarcely a history in the common sense of the term; for it does not give a detailed account of the various theological schools, conflicts, systems, works, and the like, which have filled out the three hundred years since the Reformation under Luther. Such a task would have required many volumes instead of one. It is rather a history of the principle of Protestantism in its varied developments, specially in Germany. Not two hundred pages of a work of nine hundred and eighteen pages are devoted to the Protestantism of other countries, — a circumstance which may surprise some. Dr. Dorner has taken this course, not from narrowness or ignorance, but in the conviction that while in other countries Protestantism has found fuller practical development, Germany has been the main seat of theological investigation. Nor can this be denied. In our opinion the church has had its chief history in England and America; theology has had its chief history in Germany. And our judgment will be found confirmed by German Church Histories; for the German part refers almost solely to theological movements; the other parts refer chiefly to practical movements. While we are quite sensible of the important position occupied by theology in the life of the church — its importance is too frequently underestimated in America and England — we must say that we would rather see the practical element outbalancing the theoretical than *vice versâ*. For after all, the mission of the church in the world is primarily the practical one of regenerating human life, or, in common phrase, of saving souls; and the theoretical is one element, but only one, in this process of salvation The point of these remarks is directed, however, not against Dr. Dorner, who would probably not object to our position; but against other German writers, who sin against foreigners both from narrowness and ignorance. The work is divided into three books, the first being devoted to the first age of Protestantism, the second to the separate life of the two Evangelical Confessions (Lutheran and Reformed); the third to the nineteenth century, or the Regeneration of Evangelical Theology. The introductory chapters on the negative and positive preparations for the evangelical principle, or for the Reformation considered in its theological aspects, those on Luther, and the section treating of the

formal and material principle of Protestantism, or of the scriptures and the doctrine of justification by faith in their mutual relations, are most masterly. In these days when historical criticism has acquired such vigor and authority, the last-mentioned sections ought to be earnestly studied by every one who wishes to arrive at clear views regarding the relation of the scriptures to our faith and salvation. Dr. Dorner's references to the course pursued by theology in England and America, though brief, are marked by thorough fairness, and indicate its significance in few but very vigorous and accurate strokes. But we must here close our notice, though the work richly deserves a detailed review. It is a book to be studied — studied long and attentively; and as such we introduce it to the notice of our readers.

Commentary on the Gospel of St. John.[1]—Though this is not a German work, since it has come into the hands of your German correspondent, he feels he ought to refer to it. It is also deserving of notice. Pasteur Godet has produced an able and readable apologetic and theological commentary on the Gospel of John. The introduction, which includes the usual chapters, is admirably done, and puts a number of points very clearly and forcibly against Baur, Strauss, Renan, and the whole of the so-called critical (really uncritical) school. The commentary, so far as we have been able to examine it, is judicious, warm, and up to the mark. It does not profess to be either learned or edificatory; it will however be found to be edifying by scholars, as indeed every thorough book written by an earnest man is.

Judaism at the Time of Christ.[2]—Dr. Langen, who is Roman Catholic Professor of Theology at Bonn, and has written a meritorious book on the Last Days of the Life of Jesus, has here given a sober, painstaking work on a very important subject. His treatise is not brilliant, lacks points, and seems to have no proper wholeness, but is still serviceable. It treats first of the sources of our acquaintance with the opinions of the Jews about and at the time of Christ, which are, 1. (what he, in Romish manner, calls) The canonical books of the Old Testament in the Jewish Hellenic age; that is, Sirach, 1st and 2d Maccabees, Wisdom; 2. The non-canonical books which arose in Palestine; that is, Henoch, The Psalter of

[1] Commentaire sur l'Evangile de Saint Jean. Par E. Godet, Pasteur. 2 tomes. Paris: Librairie Française et Etrangère; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1864, 1865. Price, 13½ francs.

[2] Das Iudenthum in Palästina zur Zeit Christi. Ein Beitrag zur offenbarungs- und Religions-Geschichte als Einleitung in die Theologie des neuen Testaments. Von Dr. Joseph Langen, Professor der Katholischen Theologie an der Universität zu Bonn. Freiburg: Herder; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 1 thaler, 24 sgr.

Solomon, The Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan, Josephus, 4th Maccabees, the Book of Jubilees, The Ascension of Moses, 4th Esdras, The Testments of the Twelve Patriarchs, The Ascension of the Prophet Isaiah; 3. The non-canonical books of Egyptian origin, that is, The Septuagint, The Sibylline Books, 3d Esdras, 3d Maccabees, Philo; 4. Later Jewish Literature, as, Talmud, Later Targums, Midrashim, Sopar, Jezirah, Seder Olam, Apochryphal Gospels, and the like. The second section is devoted to a connected exposition of the religious views then prevailing in regard to God, the Logos, the Holy Spirit, Angels and Demons, Anthropology, the Messiah, Eschatology. The subject is one of such vital importance, in view of the attempts made to show that Christianity is a mere development of elements at work in the age at which it arose, that we bid a hearty welcome to every new essay to throw light on it.

Christianity in Harmony with Culture.[1]—The less said about this book the better. It is a wretched hash — a resurrection of vulgar rationalism. The harmony which Schenkel establishes between Christianity and modern culture is one-sided, consisting in an emasculation of the former. We warn our readers against this and all the books of the so-called liberal party in Germany, save as emetics for unbelief, to be prescribed to sincere inquirers and real thinkers. This first volume treats of religion and the Bible.

Comparative Symbolics.[2]—A cheap reprint, convenient, attractive in form, of Winer's Comparative Exhibition of the principal doctrines held by the various confessions, including the Romish and Greek churches, the Lutheran and Reformed, Arminianism, the Quakers, and Socinians. It is an invaluable book on the subject.

God and Nature.[3]—The aim of Dr. Ulrici's work is to show that natural science itself, impartially and accurately considered, necessitates our assuming that God is the creative originator of nature. His point of view will be seen from the following words: "Nature and the knowledge thereof is the touchstone both of religious ideas and of philosophical inquiry into

[1] Christenthum und Kirche im Einklang mit der Cultur entwickelung. Zwanzig Betrachtungen von Dr. Daniel Schenkel. Erste Abtheilung: Religion und Bibel. Wiesbaden: Kreidel; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867. Price, 1 thaler, 10 sgr.

[2] Comparative Darstellung des Lehrbegriffs der verschiedenen christlichen Kirchenparteien nebst vollständigen Belegen aus den symbolischen Schriften derselben. Von Dr. G. B. Winer. Berlin: Schlawitz; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 1 thaler.

[3] Gott und die Natur. Von. Dr. Hermann Ulrici. 2d ed. 8vo. pp. 770. Leipzig: Weigel; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 3 thalers, 24 sgr.

the ultimate grounds of being and happening. If the belief in God rests on truth, every new step in advance taken by natural science must needs confirm, strengthen, and throw additional light on the belief. For if there is a God in the religious sense of the term, nature is his first and oldest revelation. I have applied this touchstone as sharply and exactly as I was able, and I have arrived at the result that modern science, so far from favoring pantheism, materialism, and atheism (as many affirm), conducts us to exactly the opposite conclusion." The first section of the work reviews the ontology of natural science under such heads as Matter and Atoms; Force, Matter, and Law; Light, Warmth, Magnetism; the Organic Forces; the Psychical Force; Soul and Body. The second treats of the Cosmology of Natural Science, under such heads as, the Process by which the Solar System and the Universe were formed, according to Kant, Laplace, Burmeister, and others; Origin of Organisms; Stages in the formation of the organic creation and its chief types. The third treats of God as the necessary postulate and condition of a scientific ontology and cosmology. The fourth section, of God as the necessary condition of natural science itself. The fifth contains a speculative examination of the idea of God and of its relation to nature and humanity.

We have seldom, if ever, had in our hands a book so full of interesting matter, soberly and clearly put as this. The various positions of natural science, in all its branches and in its principal French, German, American, and English representatives, are accurately described, examined, and shown to bear rather favorably than unfavorably on the theistic question. The work is a remarkably well-stored armory of weapons against materialism in all its forms and consequences. If it were not so voluminous, it ought to be translated.

The following list contains some of the principal theological works published during the year 1865, and not already noticed in the Bibliotheca Sacra.

Auberlen: Beiträge zur christlichen Erkenntniss. Seven essays on various scriptural subjects. Good.

Beck, Prof. at Basle: Ueber die wissenschaftliche Behandlung der christlichen Lehre. Favorably characterized by the one remark: "It is not knowledge that is opposed to faith; but one faith to another, and self-faith to faith in God."

Bleek: Einleitung ins Alte Testament. Critical but sober.

Bleek: Vorlesungen über Colosser, Philemon, und Ephesier.

Böhmer, Pastor: Die offenbarung Johannis. A new view of this very difficult book, referring it partly to past, chiefly to contemporary events; but partly also to the close of the Christian despensation. A painstaking work.

Jacobson: Evangelisches Kirchenrecht. A new and good work on the legal relations and position of the Evangelical church of Prussia.

Keil and Delitzsch: Commentaries on Kings and Isaiah. Sound and learned.

Drechsler: Commentary on the Prophet Isaiah. Good, and not necessitating so great a knowledge of Hebrew as usual. Reprinted.

Kleefoth: Das Buch Ezechiels. Commentary on Ezekiel by the Lutheran Pope of Mecklenburg.

Kirchmann: Ueber die Unsterblichkeit. A work whose aim is to show that the true immortality is the immortality of all that has being (alles Seienden). The author has a subtile mind, but perverse.

Hoffierichter: Religionslehre. Lectures expounding the views of the German Free Religionists, or Associationists. Of little value.

Huber: Die Idee der Unsterblichkeit. History and defence.

Köpler, Prof.: Nacherilische Propheten. An Orthodox commentary, well spoken of by critics.

Küper: Das Priesterthum des alten Bundes. A discussion of the Priestly office and its laws; of the laws relating to sacrifices, and a brief history of the Old Testament priesthood. Mainly archaeological.

Dieckhoff: Lutherische Lehre von der Kirchengewalt. Very Lutheran.

Ebrard: Kirchengeschichte. Reformed point of view. Of some value.

Frank, Prof.: Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie. Rather rationalistic and of course taking little notice of American and English works.

Fürst: Geschichte des Karaerthums. Very learned.

Gerhardi loci theologici. A cheap and well-printed republication of a most eminent work.

Gerlach: Die römischen Statthalter in Syrien. On the question of the date of the birth of Christ, with reference to a Latin inscription discovered by Professor Buttmann, of Berlin. Good.

Guericke: Church History. Ninth edition in several volumes.

Gregorii Nysseni Opera ed. Oehler. Well printed and correct.

Lange: Geschichte des Materialismus. Plenty of material, but worked up in a sceptical spirit.

Luthardt, *Kahnis*, *Brückner:* Die Kirche nach ihrem Ursprung, ihrer Geschichte und ihrer Gegenwart. Interesting and popular.

Nitzsch, Lic. Dr. F.: Augustinus Lehre v. Wunder. Exhaustive.

Oehler Victor F.: Der Knecht Jehovah's in Jesaiah. 2 vols. In the main orthodox. Thorough and comprehensive.

Schmidt, Dr. W.: Dogma von Gottmenschen. Main idea seems to be *πάντα ἀνθρώπινα, πάντα θεῖα.*

Strauss: Der Christus des Glaubens: Die Halben und die Ganzen. Both books bitter and of no value, except as showing whither their author has advanced.

Sulze: Glaubenslehre. A mystico-rationalistic view of Christian doctrine, by a prominent Hanoverian pastor.

Thenius, Dr.: Das Evangelium der Evangelien. Apologetic; good.

Volkmar: Ursprung unserer Evangelien. Tübingen point of view.

Wangemann: Christliche Glaubenslehre. A popular system of theology from the strict Lutheran point of view. Cheap.

Wendt: Kirchliche Ethik. Clever, but curious.

Wilkii: clavis Novi Testamenti. A republication under a new and competent editor.

Zeller: Kirchliche Statistik Deutschlands. Authoritative, but not complete.

v. Zezschwitz: Apologie des Christenthums. Able, though sometimes fanciful.

Ziethe: Leben Jesu. A popular painstaking *resumé* of the fruits of the labors of the learned.

Erdmann: Geschichte der Philosophie. 2 vols. The part treating of modern philosophy is considered a masterpiece of clearness.

Brandis: Handbuch der Geschichte der griech-römisch. Philosophie. Very full in point of extracts or summaries.

Frauenstädt: Das sittliche Leben. A disciple of Schopenhauer.

Ueberweg: Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. 3 vols. Cheap, well arranged and full of literary information.

Jenerbach: Gottheit, Freiheit, und Unsterblichkeit vom Standpunkt der anthropologie. That is, as having no existence at all.

ARTICLE VI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Felton's Lectures on Greece.[1]

These volumes are a worthy memorial of the eminent scholar whose name they bear. Published in elegant style, and embellished with a very life-like portrait, they contain the fruits of a life devoted to the study of Greek literature. They come, after the numerous valuable editions of single and complete works of Greek authors which have made President Felton's name so familiar to American students, as a survey of the whole field of his studies, and will add to his reputation for exact and comprehensive learning and genial culture.

[1] Greece, Ancient and Modern. Lectures delivered before the Lowell Institute by C. C. Felton, LL.D., late President of Harvard University. 2 vols. Boston. Ticknor and Fields. 1867.

In the easy and attractive style of the lecturer, the subjects are treated rapidly, but with a rare facility in arrangement and condensation that omits nothing essential to give an appreciation of what Greece was from the earliest to the latest times.

This first course of lectures comprises the Greek language and poetry, both ancient and modern. The opening ones upon the Origin and Classification of Languages, the Ethical Affinities of the Indo-European Tongues, and the Historical Value of the Greek Legends, give the results of the recent science of linguistics in a cautious and conservative manner. Passing to Homer, the Homeric Question is treated in a similar spirit. The argument for unity of origin and a personal Homer is put with great force of evidence and refreshing warmth of conviction. The lectures on the Dramatists are enlivened by frequent suggestive comparisons with modern literature, and especially with Shakespeare, as "the best commentator on the Greek dramatists," and himself "the most classical of the moderns, because standing nearer to nature than they."

The second course on the Life of Greece, is a lively picture of the domestic, social, civil, and religious life of the Greeks. The mass of facts is enlivened by a constant comparison with modern life and frequent touches of that humor which plays through the Author's editions of Aristophanes' Comedies.

The second volume contains two courses, on the Constitutions and Orators of Greece and Modern Greece. Many of our maxims in law and politics, which have been often traced to a Roman origin are shown to have come from Greece — mother of a free civil order as well as "of arts and eloquence." The lecture on Greek Slavery and the views of Plato and Aristotle compared with Paul's and the Christian doctrine of human relations, is suggestive and valuable. The most eloquent passages in the volumes are in the admirable lecture on Demosthenes. The sketch of the history and literature of Modern Greece gives completeness to the whole work.

The facts and views presented in the above volumes are of course, in the main, not new. The field is one that has been long and thoroughly worked over in every part of it. But the comprehensiveness of the work, and its fresh spirit and method make it one that will be welcome to the general student. It is well adapted too, we think, to be used as a college textbook, or at least, as a guide in exercises in archaeology and the history of literature. The author describes scenes he has visited, and we look upon Greece as it is through an eye that thoroughly observed and enjoyed the scenes. He writes too, of her past, with hardly an exception from familiarity with the original sources, and we have gained thus, in permanent form, an important original contribution to the literature illustrative of Greece.

Atwater's Manual of Elementary Logic.[1]

Our first comment, as we take up this attractive volume, is the vain wish that Messrs. Lippincott and Co. had printed the Logic of our college days. If our text-book had been printed on paper so fairly tinted, with so clear a type and a page so open, with less than half the amount of text contained even in Whately, which was by no means an unwieldy book, the presumption to the contrary with which we started, would have been in great measure overcome. If any subject needs the aid of an attractive mechanical presentation to the young student, it is logic.

And as we examine the book to see whether the contents are worthy of so attractive an exterior, our favorable impressions are abundantly confirmed. The author disclaims any intention of offering "any new contribution to the science of logic," except as his "way of illustrating known truths may have shed some new light upon them." Neither does he offer an exhaustive discussion of the subject. He aims to present the elements of the science in a form suited to the wants of teachers and learners, and in proportions somewhat reasonably related to the time usually allotted to the study in schools and colleges. And in this work he has shown excellent judgment, with command of his subject. To say so much, and say it so well, and to bring the most essential facts and principles of the science, with varied illustrations, within the compass of this little manual, requires and proves high ability in the science, with that experience in the lecture-room for which the author is so favorably known.

And beyond the circle of those for whom the book was written, we commend the treatise to those who like to have at hand a *vade mecum*, clear, compact, and thorough, containing the essence without the details of the science, as developed by its ablest modern masters.

Froude's History of England, Vols. vii., viii., ix. and x. New York: Charles Scribner and Co.; Boston: W. H. Piper and Co. — This last instalment of a history which has done so much to awaken a new interest in the times which it portrays, and to excite a doubt at least respecting the generally received judgment concerning certain prominent characters, fully sustains the reputation of the author. While we hesitate about adopting particular judgments of Mr. Froude, we are fascinated by the power of the narrative and the living interest which events are made to assume. To those who wish to see how old and well-known events can be made almost as vivid as if they had happened within our lifetime, we would commend the chapter which describes one of the most atrocious and appalling events

[1] Manual of Elementary Logic; designed especially for the use of Teachers and Learners. By Lyman H. Atwater, Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the College of New Jersey. 12mo. pp. 244. Philadelphia: B. Lippincott and Co. 1867.

of a wicked age — the massacre of St. Bartholomew. We suppose that we must wait patiently for the succeeding portions of this history, for we believe that no more volumes have yet been issued in England.

Ecce Homo, Ecce Deus, and Deus Homo.

Ecce Homo.[1]

The various reviews of this volume, many of which have appeared to us altogether premature, have compelled us to give a brief notice of the volume, although we had intended to defer all notice of it until its complement had appeared. Nothing is easier than to commend this work, and nothing is easier than to condemn it; for it has promising excellences and ominous faults. Had the writer of it been governed by a predominant desire to excite the curiosity of thinkers, he could not easily have achieved a more signal success. After the reading of the first chapter it is difficult to delay the reading of the second, and after perusing the entire volume it is tantalizing to be denied the immediate perusal of the volume which is to follow it. One rare art of a preacher is to discuss a topic so as to awaken his hearer's inquisitiveness to understand the topic succeeding. "What will he say next?" is the question which will be sure to keep his auditors awake. Here is the consummate art of a novel, and the present volume, although often abstract, and in general unimaginative, has yet to a scholar the attractiveness of a romance.

The work is condemned by some as superficial. Perhaps it is not so profound as certain expressions in it indicate. Perhaps the writer has "builded better than he knew." But whether he meant to suggest or not, he certainly does suggest many deep thoughts; and there lie under his peculiar and often artificial style, not a few recondite principles of philosophy.

It is supposed by many that the author of this work will yet prove himself to be orthodox. Perhaps he will be found to come up to the standard of such schools as that of Neander. But if he be orthodox according to a stricter standard, he must contradict many, and modify more, of his present statements. He is supposed by others to be heterodox. He may be so; but if he be, he must retract a large number of his assertions, and qualify a still larger number. The fact is, the work does not pretend to be symmetrical, and we do not regard it as self-consistent. But the apparent contradictions of it arouse the reader's curiosity, and like acid and alkali produce a mental effervescence. Who is the author of the volume? If he be evangelical he will be no mean defender; if he be anti-evangelical he will be no harmless opponent of the true faith. Hence there has been a general inquisitiveness to learn whether the book were written by Professor Seeley of the London University, or by some one of twenty others to

[1] Ecce Homo: a Survey of the Life and Work of Jesus Christ. 16mo. pp. 355. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1866.

whom it has been ascribed. The very concealment of the writer's name, as in the case of Junius's Letters, has intensified the interest in his work. *Omne ignotum pro mirifico.*

It has been well said that "the solar system, so long as it was viewed from the earth as a centre, was an inextricable web of confusion"; but as soon as "a standing-point for the imagination was found in the sun, everything fell into its right place." When we shall have read the author's treatise on "Christ as the Creator of Modern Theology and Religion," that complement to the "Ecce Homo" may show us that various ambiguous passages in the present work have a false meaning, although now they may be interpreted as true; or that they have a bad signification, although now they may seem to have a good one. We understand the author as denying the right of men to form a complete judgment with regard to the present volume of "half-truths," because the volume was intended to be "a defective and incomplete thing," and a fragment of a whole; and the completed work may give a continuity to that which now appears disjointed, and may show that to be proper and natural which now has the appearance of affectation.

The volume is marked by originality; still it is an originality of style more than of thought. There is a charming freshness in the treatise; but if its ideas were expressed in their wonted technical form the freshness would be dried up. Hence it is said by some that the work has no solid worth. But not every village or city or university can furnish an author who is able to clothe an ordinary thought with such an apparel that it shall awaken the admiration of men as if it were a new discovery; and to publish a mere fragment which shall arouse the interest of two continents, excite some evangelical writers to condemn it as rationalistic, and some rationalistic writers to condemn it as evangelical; comfort many Christians with the hope that a new ally has been raised up for them, and embolden many infidels with the assurance that a new implement of warfare against Christianity has now been invented. There must be a fault somewhere, or there would not have been this indefiniteness; but perhaps the very cause of the ambiguity will be the secret of a new power in the completed treatise.

Ecce Deus.[1]

In many respects this volume resembles Ecce Homo. It is marked by originality of conception, and by pithiness of style. It is also characterized by an affectation of novelty, and an apparent straining after effect. It abounds in extravagant statements, more extravagant than those in Ecce Homo. Thus we read: "Christ must be more than a good man, or worse than the worst man; if he be not God, he is the devil" (p. 23). Commenting on the feast given to Jesus by Simon the Pharisee, and the remarks of

[1] Ecce Deus: Essays on the Life and Doctrine of Jesus Christ, with Controversial Notes on Ecce Homo. 16mo. pp. 363. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1867.

Jesus to the woman who washed his feet, the author says: "A case like this does more to confirm the Godhead of Jesus Christ than can be done by a sanhedrim of theologians, armed with the genius and the lore of ages. We have in it all the God we need" (p. 97).

The volume presents various caricatures of the Calvinism which prevails at the present day. The author says (pp. 32, 33): "It has been suggested by the narrowest and hardest school of theologians that God may, as a sovereign, damn anybody without being held accountable, or without giving any shadow of reason to his creatures." "The fatherly instinct of the human race, to which Christ himself appealed instantly, without flutter or misgiving, says: 'If God calls all men, and yet determines that only a few shall come; if he mocks men by offering gifts which he has rendered them powerless to accept; if he makes some vessels of dishonor, and then breaks them to pieces because they are not vessels of honor; if he can sit on his judgment-seat and see men going down to hell because he determined from all eternity that they should not go to heaven; if when he says 'whosoever' he means but a few, — then let all honest and noble men leave him alone in his hateful heaven, and go down to hell in company with poor injured creatures who have deserved better at his hands."

If the author can cite any passages of the older Calvinistic writers which palliate such a misrepresentation of their belief, he certainly cannot cite any passages of the modern Calvinistic school which give him any excuse for such a caricature.

His views of sin and regeneration are as inaccurate as his views of divine sovereignty. He says: "Little children are included in the kingdom of heaven; and in this particular Christ's idea of the church, which must be the true idea, is totally different from current ecclesiastical notions. It is now taught that children have to be converted; but Christ taught that men were to be converted, and to be like little children — a direct inversion of narrow theological churchmanship" (p. 102).

But notwithstanding the pert and flippant style of many passages in this volume, it is eminently suggestive, and is entitled to much of the commendation which we have bestowed on Ecce Homo.

Deus Homo.[1]

Professor Parsons is well known as an acute jurist, a learned Professor in the Law School of Harvard College, and an ingenious advocate of the Swedenborgian theology. His present volume (with many dissimilarities), bears some resemblances to Ecce Homo and Ecce Deus; like them it contains many startling sentences, and boldly assumes various disputed propositions. For instance we read that "in one sense every devil is in his own

[1] Deus Homo: God-man. By Theophilus Parsons. 16mo. pp. 455. Chicago: E. R. Myers and Chandler. 1867.

heaven: He is in that condition of things than which he conceives of nothing better, desires nothing better, and would enjoy nothing better; for if he could he would at once have something better" (p. 152). "The fires of hell are the life-loves of those who are there. They are given to them, not that they may be wretched, but that they may have all the enjoyment which they have left to themselves the possibility of having" (pp. 153, 154). The finally lost "may have all that they conceive of enjoyment. They have as much of this as they can be persuaded to have, or coerced into a fitness for by a discipline which is suited to them" (p. 157). Like other Swedenborgian works, the present volume spiritualizes the plainest utterances of the Bible, and abounds in mystical theories. It is, however, more rational than the majority of the Swedenborgian treatises, and suggests many valuable thoughts in singularly pertinent language.

LIBER LIBRORUM: its Structure, Limitations, and Purpose. A friendly Communication to a reluctant Sceptic. 16mo. pp. 232. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1867.

It is doubtful whether the Ecce Homo and the Ecce Deus would have been written had not Renan published his Life of Christ; and it is doubtful whether the "Liber Librorum" would have been written had not the Ecce Homo been published. The works are exceedingly unlike each other in various respects, yet are all tinctured, more or less, by one peculiarity. The chief aim of the Liber Librorum is to prove that, although the Bible is inspired, yet it is not infallible; although it "*contains* and embodies the word of God," yet it is not "from first to last and in all parts the word of God." Under the head of inspired scripture the author classes "all that we are told of God *beyond* what may be gathered from his works and providential government of the world; all the information we have as to our future destiny, every prophetic intimation, every elevating and purifying truth which man would not otherwise reach" (p. 64). According to this theory, then, in order to prove that any truth is given by inspiration of God, it is necessary to prove that men could not learn that truth by their own unaided reason. If we can learn that truth without inspiration, then the truth is not given by inspiration. But how can we prove that the Bible is inspired in reference to that one truth? It is, according to our author, inspired in reference to no truths discoverable by reason; it is very erroneous in many of its teachings; what evidence have we that it is inspired in reference to those truths which the unaided reason cannot discover? If the biblical assertions that the biblical writers are inspired do not prove that these writers are inspired where our own reason teaches us that they speak the truth, how do these assertions prove that these writers are inspired where our own reason does not antecedently teach us that the writers speak the truth?

What are the truths which our unaided reason cannot discern? Are

they the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of election, the doctrine of eternal punishment? Our author says: "Even in the New Testament, doctrines are by many supposed to be taught, such, for instance, as that of election, and the eternal sensitive torment of unbelievers, which are inconsistent with declarations found elsewhere regarding God's love to his creatures and his pitifulness to their infirmities, while other doctrines, like that of the Trinity, appear to contradict the Divine unity" (p. 144; see also pp. 163–166).

In the third chapter the author of this treatise explains the "*principle* by the help of which we may, without weakening faith in scripture as a whole, separate its parts, and distinguish between that which is divine and that which is human" (p. 76). We make this separation by means of "*the verifying faculty*, and [we] regard it as being neither more nor less than *reason enlightened and sanctified by the Holy Spirit.*" Every man must, of course, judge for himself whether his own reason is enlightened by the Holy Spirit; and thus the Bible is submitted to every individual's own judgment with regard to the inspiration of particular parts of it. It is very evident that this theory diminishes the authority of the sacred volume as a spiritual guide, and proportionately diminishes its claim to be termed the Liber Librorum.

Biblical Dictionaries and Cyclopaedias.

Ministers of a former generation, who were not acquainted with the German language, made use of the various dictionaries of the Bible prepared by Wilson, Jones, Brown, Calmet, Buck's Theological Dictionary, the Pictorial Dictionary of the Bible, the Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge, etc. At the present day we have Dr. Eadie's Biblical Cyclopaedia, Fairbairn's Imperial Dictionary, Hook's and Eden's Dictionaries, and various biblical and theological dictionaries prepared by our Sabbath-school and Tract Societies. There are three works of this description to which we desire now to call our reader's attention:

Kitto's Biblical Cyclopaedia, edited by Dr. J. L. Alexander.[1]

We incidentally noticed and highly commended this work in Vol. xxiii. p. 171. The biography of Dr. Kitto has all the interest of a novel. We regard his Cyclopaedia as his most important contribution to Biblical Literature. Dr. Alexander has largely enriched it. Its varied articles are written in a lucid style, and are well fitted for their purpose. Among the contributors to the original and present work, are the late Dr. John Brown, of Edinburgh, Dr. Cairns of Berwick, Dr. Candlish, Dr. Davidson, Dr.

[1] A Cyclopaedia of Biblical Literature, originally edited by John Kitto, D.D., F.S.A. Third edition, greatly enlarged and improved. Edited by William Lindsay Alexander, D.D., F.R.A.S., etc. In 3 vols. 8vo. pp. 872, 876, 872. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black. 1862–1866.

Donaldson, Dr. Eadie, Dr. Ewald, Prof. Hävernick, Dr. Hengstenberg, Dr. Robert Lee of Edinburgh, Dr. Mansel, and Dr. Tholuck of Halle. Large and valuable contributions are of course made by Dr. Kitto and Dr. Alexander. The volumes are beautifully printed, and are enriched with elegant plates. That Dr. Alexander, with all his multifarious duties, should find the time for this elaborate production, is a marvel. May his example of energy and industry be a stimulus to American as well as British pastors.

American Edition of Smith's Dictionary of the Bible.[1]

Of Dr. Smith's Dictionary we have on various occasions expressed our high appreciation. The American edition of it is to be published in monthly numbers, two of which have already appeared. It will contain numerous corrections of the English edition, and also numerous and important additions to it. The writers for the American work have many advantages which were not possessed by the writers for the English work. Their labors will be superintended by Professor Hackett, than whom the American publishers could not find a more accomplished editor. The accuracy of his collaborator, Mr. Abbot, is proverbial. We have been delighted with the American work as far as we have examined it, and have no hesitation in pronouncing it indispensable to every pastor who will keep himself familiar with the literature of the Bible. It is eminently a reliable dictionary.

Cyclopaedia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature.[2]

We have examined this volume with some care and much pleasure. There are critics who affirm that it contains errors. They might have made this affirmation without opening the volume. It is impossible to prepare any work of this kind without an intermixture of error. All our encyclopaedias and dictionaries are unavoidably disfigured with mistakes. But the present volume, when compared with the majority of our books of reference, may be highly commended for its accuracy. It evinces learning and faithfulness. It is of course more favorable to the Arminian school than if it had been prepared by Calvinists. It is more copious and complete in those articles which will more particularly interest the Methodists, than in those which will more particularly interest other denominations. When we consider the design of the work, we cannot pronounce this a fault. We regard the work as one of great value to all denominations

[1] American edition of Dr. William Smith's Dictionary of the Bible. Revised and edited by Professor H. B. Hackett, D.D., with the co-operation of Mr. Ezra Abbot, A.M., Assistant Librarian of Harvard University. New York: Hurd and Houghton. 1867.

[2] Cyclopaedia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature. Prepared by the Rev. John McClintock, D.D., and James Strong, P.T.D. Vol. i. A.B. 8vo. pp. 947. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1867.

of Christians. We trust that it will have, as it deserves, an extensive circulation, not only in the large and important sect for whose use it was primarily intended, but also in the other sects to which it affords much information otherwise inaccessible.

LANGE'S COMMENTARY. Theological and Homiletical Commentary on the New Testament; specially designed and adapted for the use of Ministers and Students. Edited by Rev. Dr. P. Schaff, assisted by leading divines of the various evangelical denominations. New York: Charles Scribner and Co.

The fourth volume of this Commentary on the New Testament contains: The Epistle General of James, by J. P. Lange, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Bonn, and J. J. Van Oosterzee, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Utrecht, pp. 148; The Epistles General of Peter, by G. F. C. Fronmüller, Ph.D., Pastor at Kemnath, Würtemberg, pp. 96, 53; The Epistles General of John, by Karl Braune D.D., General Superintendent, etc., at Altenberg, pp. 201; The Epistle General of Jude, by G. F. C. Fronmüller, Ph.D., Pastor at Kemnath, Würtemberg, pp. 34. All these commentaries are translated by Rev. J. Isodor Mombert, D.D., Rector of St. James's Church, Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Dr. Mombert is an excellent scholar and faithful translator. He has chosen to admit into his translation some words which will trouble a plain English reader, as for example, "hamartology," "ascetico-rigoristic," and the like. But we must remember that it is eminently difficult to translate the German of Lange into our simple, vernacular English. The present volume is entitled to the commendations, and is subject to the criticisms, which have been pronounced on the preceding volumes of this extensive work. It is a thesaurus of suggestions, many of which will guide the mind into the truth, and all of which may be examined with profit.

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE SCRIPTURES. A recast, with enlarged Views of a former Work on the Subject; together with a copious Analysis of the Religious System promulgated during the Patriarchal, Jewish, and Christian Dispensations, and of the Human Developments under them. By J. H. McCulloch, M.D., author of Researches, Philosophical and Antiquarian, on American Analytical Investigations of the Credibility of the Scriptures. 2 vols. pp. 402, 414. Baltimore: James S. Waters and Son. 1867.

The author of this treatise has certainly exhibited a rare degree of patience, diligence, and perseverance in his work. His views are not orthodox, his learning is not extensive, his logic is not exact; but he is an independent thinker, and amid all his errors seems to be searching for the truth. He is too ready to hazard his mere conjectures where the mind craves evidence. He is too little disposed to respect the opinions of men who

have examined the same topics which he canvasses, and examined them with more intellectual power, and with the aid of a larger erudition.

The Doctrine of Justification: An Outline of its History in the Church, and of its Exposition from Scripture, with special Attention to recent Attacks on the Theology of the Reformation. The second series of the 'Cunningham Lectures.' By James Buchanan, D.D., LL.D., Divinity Professor, New College, Edinburgh. 8vo. pp. 514. Edinburgh: S. and T. Clark; London: Hamilton and Co.; Dublin: John Robertson and Co. 1867.

Dr. Buchanan has a high reputation as a preacher, and the present treatise will not lower him in the public esteem. He defends with much earnestness the old methods of explaining the doctrine of justification. Some of his historical statements are inaccurate, and some of his explanations are vague. He defines justification as "man's acceptance with God, or his being regarded and treated as righteous in his sight, — as the object of his favor, and not of his wrath; of his blessing, and not of his curse" (p. 17). But on p. 255 he says: "That justification, in the scriptural sense of the term, denotes the acceptance of a sinner as righteous in the sight of God, and that this acceptance must necessarily include or imply the pardon of his sins, is the most general and comprehensive statement of the doctrine of the scripture on this point." He concludes his treatise with the "clear and comprehensive words of the Westminster divines, 'Justification is an act of God's free grace, wherein he pardoneth all our sins, and accepteth us as righteous in his sight, only for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and received by faith alone'" (p. 411). The latter definition is the main one which Dr. Buchanan defends, and it may mean the same, or may not, with the definition which he gave on p. 17. The words "blessing" and "curse," "favor" and "wrath," in the first definition are too ambiguous. Similar criticisms may be made upon other definitions in the volume. The question "whether regeneration or justification has the precedency in the order of *nature?*" Dr. Buchanan considers as "of but little practical importance," and is satisfied with the assertion that neither is "prior or posterior to the other in point of *time*," that "they are *simultaneous* gifts of the same free grace," that no unrenewed sinner is justified, and that every believer as soon as he believes, is pardoned and accepted of God" (pp. 403, 404). We think that a scientific theologian will not rest content with this answer. Still we regard the work of Dr. Buchanan as rich and edifying.

Homiletics and Pastoral Theology. By William G. T. Shedd, D.D., Baldwin Professor in Union Theological Seminary, New York. 8vo. pp. 429. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1867.

This volume contains twelve chapters on Homiletics. One of the best of these is the ninth, entitled "The Reciprocal Relations of the Preacher

and Hearer." We think that this chapter would be improved by a definition of the term "divine anger." Does Professor Shedd mean to teach that the divine anger as a moral attribute is different from the divine benevolence as a moral attribute? "Complacency and displeasure," he says, "are the two specific characteristics, in which reside all the vitality of the doctrine that God is personal" (p. 263). Does the term "displeasure" here mean displacency of conscience? Or does it mean the voluntary rejection of sin? Or does it mean a sentiment which is not an act of conscience, but is an involuntary indignation toward sin? But is an involuntary sentiment which is not an act of conscience a personal characteristic? And is a displeasure which is a mere act of conscience a moral attribute?

The volume contains six chapters on Homiletics. In his third chapter the system of John Locke is mentioned "as the most self-consistent, and at the same time moderate, of all the systems of materialism" (pp. 359, 360). We think that such expressions as these are unjust. The volume, however, contains many valuable discussions, and is well fitted to quicken and strengthen the mind of the reader. It will stimulate the clergyman to high Christian scholarship.

THE BIBLE WORD-BOOK: A Glossary of Old English Bible Words, by J. Eastwood, M.A., St John's College, and W. Aldis Wright, M.A., Librarian of Trinity College, Cambridge. 16mo. pp. 564. London and Cambridge: Macmillan and Co. 1866.

It appears from the preface that this work is in large measure the result of original and independent investigation. It is full of instruction. Its worth may be illustrated by reference to the word "atone," which is analogous to "atwixt," "atween," "atwo," and means to reconcile, make one. Some of the old English sentences quoted are the following: "Since we cannot *atone* you"; "There is mirth in heaven when earthly things made even *atone* together"; "I am glad I did *atone* my countrymen": "That set such discord 'twixt agreeing parts which never can be set *at onement* more"; "*Attonement*, a loving againe after a breache or falling out"; "For hereof is it [Sunday] called in the commune tongue of the Germanes Soendach, not of the sonne as certayne men done interprete, but of reconcilynge, that if in the other weke dayes any spotte or fylthe of synne be gathered by the reason of worldly busynesse and occupations, he shold eyther on the Saterdaye in the eventide, or els on Sundaye in the mornynge reconcile hymselfe, and make an onement with God" (pp. 43, 44).

THE SOLITUDES OF NATURE AND OF MAN; or, the Loneliness of Human Life. By William Rounseville Alger. 16mo. pp. 410. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1867.

This work is divided into four parts: the Solitudes of Nature; the Solitudes of Man; the Morals of Solitude; Sketches of Lonely Characters.

We regret that we are obliged to omit a large part of what we had intended to publish on the work, but our readers will gain a fair idea of the work from its description of the celebrated German philosopher, Schopenhauer, who died at Frankfort in 1860. He is correctly described as "gloomy," "snappish," "irritable," "suspicious," "jealous," "self-conceited." He usually called his fellows of the race, not "men," but "bipeds." He asserted that he was not a man-hater but a man-despiser." He says: "I have lifted the veil of truth further than any mortal before me; but I should like to see the man who could ever boast of being begirt with worse contemporaries than I have had." "In this world there is very much that is very bad, but the worst thing in it is society." "The jabber of companies of men is as profitless as the idle yelping of packs of hounds." These are fair specimens of his ordinary conversation. He died suddenly, with his Indian Bible, the Oupnekhat, lying on the table, and the gilded statuette of Gotama Buddha on the mantel-piece. Of this inveterate pessimist and misanthrope, Mr. Alger says, that if the Christian heaven be a verity, pardon cannot be wanting to him; he is there with the Saviour: "if that heaven be the dream he thought it, why then he is where he aspired to be, with Kapila, Sakya Muni, and the other conquering kings of mind, blent in the unknown destiny of the All, clasped in the fruition of Niruána" (pp. 358–365). The entire volume is characterized by this spirit of indifference or opposition to the evangelical system. It is written with freshness of style, and an affluence of information, is replete with interesting and curious statements; but its religious character is unhealthful.

The Fatherhood of God, considered in its General and Special Aspects, and particularly in Relation to the Atonement; with a Review of Recent Speculations on the Subject. By Thomas J. Crawford, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburg. Second edition, revised and enlarged, with a Reply to the Strictures of Dr. Candlish. 16mo. pp. 450. Edinburg and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1867.

This work contains able refutations of the theories of Maurice, Campbell, Robertson, Young, and Bushnell on the atonement. Its chief value consists in these refutations. In his first edition Professor Crawford calmly criticised certain views of Dr. Candlish on the Fatherhood of God; in the present edition he responds to Dr. Candlish's reply. Dr. Crawford writes with precision and dignity. His present volume will reward a thoughtful study.

The Silence of Scripture. By the Rev. Francis Wharton, D.D., LL.D., Rector of St. Paul's Church, Brookline, Mass. pp. 122. Boston: E. P. Dutton and Co. 1867.

"Archbishop Trench speaks of the Bible's silence as being more expressive than other books' speech; and Dr. Wordsworth, of the silence of revelation as itself inspired; and Dr. Arnold, of inspiration being marked by

what it does not say, as well as by what it does." This volume proposes "to take up for exposition and application some of the points in which this silence may be observed:" "to notice the practical inferences to be drawn from the silence of scripture in some of those instances in which this silence is most marked." The volume treats of the silence of scripture in regard to the Creation of the World, the Origin of Evil, Divination, Liturgy, Creeds, The Virgin Mary, The Lord's Personal Appearance and its Relations. The style of Dr. Wharton is clear and strong. He gives many felicitous illustrations of just and sound principles. He often introduces original sentences which are apothegms. His book merits an extensive sale.

History of Brown University: with Illustrative Documents. By Reuben Aldridge Guild, Librarian of the University. Author of Life, Times, and Correspondence of James Manning, etc. 8vo. pp. 443. Providence, R. I. 1867.

This is a superbly printed volume, adorned with twelve engravings, and reflecting great honor on the Providence press. Among other records it contains an historical sketch of the University, an account of its library, of its charter, of its finances, of its buildings, of its commencement exercises from 1770 to 1866. It thus unfolds the germs of the history of the State of Rhode Island, and also of the Baptist denomination in the United States. It is accurate in its minutiae, and gives various striking illustrations of the large influences flowing from particular measures and particular individuals. The names of all the benefactors of the college, and of all the students who were engaged in the recent war are here recorded, and many rare documents are here preserved from oblivion. Mr. Guild has given to other colleges an example which they may well copy. He has also shown the great value of a faithful librarian to a university.

The Aeneid of Virgil, translated into English Verse, by John Conington, M.A., Corpus Professor of Latin in the University of Oxford. pp. 482. New York: W. J. Middleton. 1867.

A lively and graceful translation, suggesting in an eminent degree the beauty and sprightfulness of the original.

The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament, considered in Eight Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford, on the Bampton Foundation. By Thomas Dehany Bernard, M.A., of Exeter College, and Rector of Walcot. From the second London edition, with improvements. 12mo. pp. 258. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Co.; Cincinnati: G. P. Blanchard and Co. 1867.

This is a highly valuable treatise, showing that "the progress of doctrine through all church history is a progress of apprehension by man, not of communication by God."

Essays, Philosophical and Theological. By James Martineau. 12mo. pp. 424. Boston: William U. Spencer. 1866.

Comte's Life and Philosophy; John Stuart Mill; Nature and God; Science, Nescience, and Faith; Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought; Cerebral Psychology: Bain; Revelation — What it is not, and What it is; Personal Influences on our Present Theology: Newman, Coleridge, Carlyle; Theology in its Relation to Progressive Knowledge, — these are the titles of the nine essays comprising Mr. Martineau's volume. They are powerfully and brilliantly written. Sometimes they fail in precision of style, often in accuracy of thought, but almost always they are indicative of genius in their author.

After the appearance of this American volume Mr. Martineau sent to the London Inquirer the following important communication: "In your 'Literary Notes' of last week, mention is made of a volume of Essays, published with my name by Mr. W. V. Spencer, of Boston, United States. In your enumeration of the contents, I observe an essay entitled 'Revelation — What it is not, and What it is.' Will you allow me to say that I have no claim to the authorship of that profound paper? Last year the publisher sent me for correction a list of essays which he attributed to me, and from which he proposed to make up the present volume. In that list the paper on 'Revelation' is not mentioned, so that I had no means of saving the author from an unhappy mistake of his identity."

Charles Wesley, seen in his finer and less familiar Poems. 16mo. pp. 398. New York: Hurd and Houghton. 1867.

We are delighted to see this volume, edited as it is by so competent a scholar as Rev. Frederic M. Bird. It exalts our estimate of Charles Wesley. We have seen various criticisms condemning Mr. Bird's republication of Mr. Wesley's celebrated Polemics, entitled "Universal Redemption," "The Horrible Decree," "Predestination," etc (pp. 186–213). But they are of historical value, and they illustrate Mr. Wesley's misapprehensions of the Calvinistic doctrines, and the importance of our not encouraging such misapprehensions. We hope that Mr. Bird will favor the public with still larger results of his hymnological researches.

Studies in the Gospels. By Richard Chenevix Trench, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. 16mo. pp. 326. New York: Charles Scribner and Co. 1867.

It is needless to say that this volume will interest the student of the Bible. Dr. Trench is a man of such various learning that he will gain a larger number of educated readers than he would have if he were more profound.

Discourses on the Lord's Prayer. By Caleb Webb. 16mo. pp. 176. London: Houlston and Wright. An interesting volume.

History of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin. By J. H. Merle D'Aubigné, D.D., author of the History of the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, etc. Vol. IV., England, Geneva, France, Germany and Italy. pp. 491. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers.

Our readers are familiar with the preceding volumes of this history, as well as with the other works of its author. He dissents from Mr. Froude in regard to various items of history, and particularly in regard to the character of Henry VIII.

The Apocryphal Gospels, and other Documents relating to the History of Christ. Translated from the Originals in Greek, Latin, Syriac, etc., with Notes, Scriptural References, and Prolegomena. By B. Harris Cowper, editor of the Journal of Sacred Literature, etc. 16mo. pp. 456. London and Edinburg: Williams and Norgate. 1867.

The study of the Apocryphal Gospels suggests some of the strongest arguments for the inspiration of the New Testament.

Bible Pictures, or Life-Sketches of Life-Truths. By George B. Ide, D.D., author of "Battle Echoes," etc., etc. 12mo. pp. 437. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Co.; Cincinnati: G. S., Blanchard and Co. 1867.

The Massoreth Ha-Massoreth of Elias Levita; being an Exposition of the Massoretic Notes on the Hebrew Bible; or the Ancient Critical Apparatus of the Old Testament. In Hebrew, with an English translation and critical and explanatory notes. By Christian D. Ginsburg, LL.D. 8vo. pp. 307. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer. 1867.

Christian Home-Life: A Book of Examples and Principles. 16mo. pp. 228. Boston: American Tract Society.

Hints and Thoughts for Christians. By Rev. John Todd, D.D. 16mo. pp. 260. New York: American Tract Society.

We have received from the house of Robert Carter and Brothers, New York, the following new publications, of which the two volumes of Dr. Guthrie deserve especial attention. They are of great practical worth.

Out of Harness. Sketches, Narrative and Descriptive. By Thomas Guthrie, D.D., editor of Sunday Magazine. 16mo. pp. 388.

Our Father's Business. By Thomas Guthrie, D.D., editor of the Sunday Magazine. 16mo. pp. 278.

Helena's Household. A Tale of Rome in the First Century. 12mo. pp. 422.

Yesterday, To-day, and Forever. A Poem in Twelve Books, by Edward Henry Bickersteth, M.A., Incumbent of Christ Church, Hampstead, and Chaplain to the Bishop of Ripon. 16mo. pp. 447.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

BY REV. E. P. BARROWS, D.D., LATELY PROFESSOR OF HEBREW LITERATURE IN ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

No. I.

It is proposed to discuss, in a series of Articles, the related subjects of *Revelation* and *Inspiration*, not so much in their details as in their fundamental underlying principles, and with special reference to the errors of modern times.

The Terms defined and distinguished.

It is necessary, at the outset, to have a clear idea of the meaning of these several terms. This will give at once their relation to each other, and their difference.

Revelation (Latin, *revelatio*, from *revelo*, *to unveil*, *throw back the veil*; Greek, *ἀποκάλυψις*, from *ἀποκαλύπτω*, *to uncover*, *lift off the cover*) properly signifies the act of unvailing, and so disclosing a person or thing that was before hidden. So the scriptures speak of "the revelation of the righteous judgment of God";[1] and of "the revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ."[2] Then, by an easy transition, the word is

[1] Rom. ii. 5, and so often.

[2] 1 Cor. i. 7; 2 Thess. i. 7; 1 Peter i. 7 13. But in 1 Cor. i. 7 our Version uses the word *coming*, and in 1 Peter i. 7 the word *appearing*.

applied to the *truth itself* which is revealed. Of this latter usage we have some examples in the New Testament. "When ye come together," says the apostle, "every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation, hath an interpretation," where "a revelation"[1] is manifestly something revealed by God's Spirit. So when he speaks of "visions and revelations of the Lord,"[2] and of "the abundance of the revelations,"[3] the word comprehends the things made known to him by the act of revelation. So also the last book of the New Testament is called "the revelation of Jesus Christ,"[4] as containing the future events revealed by him. In this secondary sense the word "revelation" is exceedingly common in theological usage.

In neither its primary nor its secondary usage does the word "revelation" refer to the manner of the disclosure. It insists only upon the fact that it is something that was before hidden. It is therefore, as theologians say, eminently *objective*. It directs attention to something existing without the mind, which is in some way uncovered to its view. The agent of revelation may be man ("Unto thee have I revealed my cause,"[5] Heb. גִּלִּיתִי, Gr. ἀπεκάλυψα), but in New Testament usage is exclusively God; and it is with divine revelation alone that we are now concerned. It is further to be noticed that the scriptures do not employ the word "revelation," or its corresponding verb, of truths known to man by the light of nature, although they represent God as the author of such light. Instead of this they use other terms, as, "God hath manifested it unto them"[6] (ἐφανέρωσε, a word which is also used of supernatural manifestation). They restrict the words *reveal* and *revelation* to disclosures which God makes to men by his immediate interposition, that is, in a supernatural way.

Inspiration (Latin, *inspiratio*, from *inspiro*, *to breathe into*),

[1] 1 Cor. xiv. 26. [2] 2 Cor. xii. 1.
[3] 2 Cor. xii. 7. [4] Rev. i. 1.
[5] Jer. xi. 20; compare Ecclesiasticus xlii. 1 (Eng. version, xli. 23)
[6] Rom. i. 19.

in its application to the human mind, signifies primarily a *breathing into the soul;* that is, the communication to it from without of thought and feeling in a spiritual and invisible manner. Even in its lower usage, as when we speak of the inspiration of a scene, it retains this idea. In theological usage it denotes *the inward illumination of the soul by the Holy Spirit in the knowledge of divine truth*, and thus includes not simply the communication of new truth, but also the illumination and guidance of the mind in respect to truth already known. Our Saviour said to his apostles: "When they shall lead you, and deliver you up, take no thought beforehand what ye shall speak, neither do ye premeditate; but whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye; for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Ghost." [1] The Holy Ghost would be given them not to supersede the rational exercise of their own faculties, but to enlighten and guide them in using these faculties. If they needed, they should receive new revelations. But more commonly, we may well suppose, the gift of what they should say in such circumstances consisted in a supernaturally communicated fulness of remembrance, clearness of vision, and correctness of choice in respect to truths already known. This office of the Divine Spirit is very distinctly stated by the evangelist John: "The Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you." [2] We must not confound with the gift of inspiration the ordinary illuminating and sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit, though both are alike supernatural. In the first place, the primary end of the two is different; that of the former being the communication of truth to men, that of the latter the salvation of men through this truth. In the second place, the gift of inspiration raised the apostles and evangelists above error in the communication to men of divine truth, whether orally or in writing, as we shall endeavor to show in a future number. No such infallibility can be claimed by

[1] Mark xiii. 11. [2] Jno. xiv. 26.

ordinary Christian teachers. In this respect the apostles had no successors. The ordinary influences of the Holy Spirit do indeed guide men wholly in the direction of truth. But no man, since the days of the apostles, can claim that he enjoys divine illumination and guidance of such a kind as to raise him above all error. In the beginning of the gospel infallible teachers were necessary, but they are not needed now, since we have in the apostolic records a sure and sufficient rule of faith and practice.[1]

From the above definitions the distinction between the terms "revelation" and "inspiration" is manifest. Since the former has no reference to the manner of the disclosure, it does not necessarily imply any inspiration. The very highest forms of revelation recorded in the Bible were purely objective; that is, addressed to men in an outward way. Such was the giving of the law on Sinai; for "all the people saw the thunderings and the lightnings, and the noise of the trumpet, and the mountain smoking";[2] and the ten commandments were spoken to the whole assembly "out of the midst of the fire, of the cloud, and of the thick darkness, with a great voice."[3] Such also, in a most emphatic sense, was the whole revelation made to men by Jesus Christ. To call him a prophet, speaking by inspiration of God, would be a low and inadequate view of his office. He was more than a prophet; he was the Son of God, who dwelt from eternity in the bosom of the Father, knew all his counsels, and came to testify to men what he had seen and heard with the Father.[4] On the other hand, we have examples, among many others, of revelation by inspiration in its purest form, in the case of Samuel, who foretold to Saul, with circumstantial minuteness, the incidents that should befall him on his journey homeward;[5] of Elisha, who had an inward vision of all that Gehazi did when he ran after Naaman's chariot;[6] and of Philip the evangelist, to whom the Spirit said; "Go

[1] See in the Appendix, Note i.
[2] Ex. xx. 18.
[3] Deut. v. 22.
[4] Jno. v. 20; viii. 38, 40.
[5] 1 Sam. x. 2–6.
[6] 2 Kings v. 20–27.

near, and join thyself to this chariot." [1] Between such simple forms of inspiration and revelations that are purely outward and objective, there are, in the manifold wisdom of God, many gradations, — visions in trance, visions in dreams, voices from the inner sanctuary and from heaven, appearances of angels, and the like, — in respect to some of which it would be difficult to say whether they are to be regarded as objective or subjective; nor is the decision of this question necessary, since the end in all cases is the communication of divine truth.

More important is the distinction between *particular* and *general* inspiration. For the accomplishment of special ends the Divine Spirit has sometimes used unholy men as his instruments. So the Spirit of God came upon Balaam, and he uttered prophecies concerning the covenant people which the church has always regarded as a precious legacy of truth. But Balaam had no general illumination and guidance from heaven, such as Moses enjoyed, when, for example, he addressed the people on the plains of Moab and recorded his exhortations in the Book of Deuteronomy; such also as Isaiah had when he described the future glories of Zion; and the apostles, when they preached and wrote concerning the Saviour and his gospel. When we come to discuss the question of the inspiration of scripture, it will be shown that such men enjoyed a constant illumination and guidance from God, which raised them above error in the communication of truth, and thus invested their writings with divine authority.

Order of Investigation.

This is of the highest importance; and we have endeavored to indicate it by the title given to this series of Articles: *Revelation and Inspiration.* We cannot begin by saying: This book is in the canon, and therefore it is of divine authority; for how do we know that it ought to be in the canon? Nor can we begin with the affirmation: This book is inspired, and therefore it is of divine authority, and as such has a right to

[1] Acts viii. 29.

be in the canon; for how do we know that it is inspired? We cannot receive its inspiration on the simple testimony of the writer. In connection with the seal of heaven his testimony is indeed of the weightiest character; but even Christ himself did not demand men's faith without a heavenly attestation. To the Jews he said: "The works which the Father had given me to finish, the same works that I do bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me"; [1] and again: "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works; that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him." [2] Nor can we receive the inspiration of a book on the simple testimony of "the church"; for then we must come at once to the Romish dogma of the infallibility of the church, which is but resting our faith on a merely human foundation. Nor, again, can we receive a book as inspired simply from the character of its contents, however important as an element of judgment this may be. For if we rest our belief on such a ground alone, we virtually set up human judgment as the test of inspiration, and this is rationalism. Looking at the question on every side, we shall find ourselves constrained to inquire first of all: Has God made to men a supernatural revelation, and have we an authentic and reliable record of it? Here we must proceed according to the acknowledged laws of evidence, not anticipating the particular question of inspiration. Having established by irrefragable proof the fact that God has made to men a revelation of himself in a supernatural way, and that the record which we have of this revelation is authentic and credible in the common acceptation of these terms, we shall then be in a position to go further, and demonstrate the inspiration of this record. After this will naturally come the question: What particular books have the seal of inspiration, and are, on this ground, entitled to a place in the sacred canon. The robust English common sense of the writers who, in the last century, defended Christianity from the assaults of infidelity

[1] Jno. v. 36. [2] Jno. x. 37, 38.

naturally led them to adopt this rational method. They did not begin at the outset by flourishing the doctrine of inspiration in the face of men who denied revelation, and with it the facts on which the proof of inspiration rests; but they met them on their own chosen ground, the question whether God has made a revelation of himself to man; and having fairly won this field, they found it easy to win the whole. It is a sign of the times, portending not evil but good, that the enemies of revealed religion, open and secret, are again mustering their forces on this old battle-ground, where they have been so often routed. They have found out that they cannot admit the genuineness and authenticity of the Gospels and the Pentateuch; for if they do, the day is lost to them, since these two citadels command the whole ground, and whichever side has possession of them is victorious. Here then we must meet them as good soldiers of Jesus Christ; for here the battle for and against Christianity is to be decided.

False a priori Assumptions against Revelation.

Before proceeding to consider the direct proofs of revelation, we shall examine, in the remainder of the present number, two false assumptions by which unbelievers attempt to set aside *a priori* all possible evidence of a supernatural manifestation of God to men.

1. *The pantheistic assumption against the possibility of the supernatural, and therefore of revelation.* In outward form pantheism has many modifications. But its essence consists in the identifying, or at least the confounding, of God with nature. He who assumes that God is nature, or that nature is God, identifies the two formally and perfectly. He who assumes, with Spinoza, that God is substance — the only real substance — and that everything particular and phenomenal is the modification of an attribute of this substance, makes God not the free author of nature, but simply the ground in which its modifications inhere; so that, according to this scheme, substance, with the modes of its attributes, constitutes

the indivisible whole of nature, above and beyond which there is absolutely nothing. And since substance cannot, according to this philosophy, produce substance, there can be no such thing as creation, but only a perpetual and necessary flow of phenomena without beginning or end. He who assumes, again, with modern impersonal pantheism, that God is the absolute Spirit in the process of self-evolution; that he does not possess self-consciousness as absolute, but first comes to self-consciousness in the finite human spirit; and that the universe is only this self-development of the infinite spirit, comes substantially to the same result as Spinoza — the denial of creation, true liberty of will, and final ends.

We notice, first of all, the close affinity of this impersonal pantheism with various heathen systems which were once supposed to have become superannuated. Its relation to Grecian polytheism, as held by men of a philosophical turn of mind, is nearer than one might at first suppose. For though the Greeks had "gods many, and lords many," these were neither self-existent nor independent deities, but were all subject alike to the control of fate. And what was this fate to which gods as well as men were subject? In mythology, indeed, the poets personified it in the persons of the three sisters, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos; but as a philosophic dogma, it corresponded very well to the unconscious, absolute spirit of modern pantheism; only that the Greeks did not carry out the idea of this absolute principle that controlled all things in the universe to the logically consistent result of making all things, gods and men included, an evolution from it in a pantheistic way.[1] But this is done in Brahminism, according to which nature is only a determination of Brahma to definite forms in quantity and quality — a self-limitation, and thus a self-evolution of Brahma, the only reality, which must ultimately absorb all things again into itself. It is manifest, therefore, that Brahmanism, to say nothing of Buddhism, has a remarkable agreement with

[1] See in Appendix, Note ii.

modern pantheism, only that the latter system, under the unacknowledged influence of Christianity, has cleared away the myriads of gods which belong to the former, and left only man as that evolution in which the absolute Spirit first attains to self-consciousness. According to both systems, as also Buddhism, the universe is but a perpetual evolution without beginning or end, under the concatenation of natural cause and effect, in which the element of free creative, and therefore miraculous, power has no place.

We notice, again, that the system now under consideration, like every other form of pantheism, rests on a basis of pure hypothesis. The pantheist sits down in his study and dreams out a system for a universe. He then writes a volume, assuming throughout that this is the true system of our universe, explains what he can in accordance with his system, and denies everything that is contrary to it, no matter what may be the weight of evidence by which it is sustained. He insists on the necessity of coming to the investigation of this great question without bias (*unbefangen*); yet who more biased than he? He has formed his system *a priori*. He has made his Procrustean bed, the universe must be laid into it, and everything that exceeds its dimensions, as supernatural creation and revelation plainly do, must be lopped off. The necessity of an *a priori* position for the comprehension of nature is not denied. Without it nature will be only a mass of phenomenal facts, not an intelligible system. But no man may thrust upon us his *a priori* system, his system of the universe in its subjective idea, without substantial grounds of proof. On what ground, then, can the Hegelian pantheist ask me to believe that God is the absolute Spirit in the process of eternal self-evolution, becoming objective to itself in nature, and returning to itself through the human spirit, in which it first comes to self-consciousness, and that all reality is only an element in this process of self-evolution? The three possible grounds are *intuition*, *demonstration*, and *probable argument*. The first of these we may dismiss summarily, since neither Spinoza nor Hegel, nor any other pan-

theist has ever been astride of the universe, and able to look through its principles intuitively. Spinoza, in his Ethica, pursued the method of rigid *demonstration*, after the manner of geometry, from definitions and axioms. But his definitions, with the propositions based upon them, are fatally defective, and fail to furnish any true comprehension of the actual universe. The seventh definition, for example, of his Ethica, Part i., allows to *absolute substance* (which in his system is God, the only reality, of which all forms of finite being are only modes without any real substance) merely an outward freedom — freedom from determination in its operations by anything without itself — but no real inward freedom, such as belongs to a self-conscious person, who does not act from necessity, but freely determines his own acts in the light of his own reason. He expressly denies that will in God or finite beings can be free. God's operations, which are but the operations of the universe, are fast bound in the adamantine chain of natural cause and effect, each operation flowing necessarily from a preceding operation, and so backward without end (Ethica, Part i. Prop. xxxii). God acts from the necessity of his own nature, without any power to forbear acting, or to act otherwise, just as it follows from the nature of a triangle from eternity to eternity that its three angles are equal to two right angles (Ethica, Part i., Prop. xvii. and Scholium). It follows by logical necessity that God cannot act in view of final ends (*causas finales*), or indeed in view of any end (Appendix to Ethica, Part i.).[1] Thus he allows no real ground for holiness in God, or for holiness and sin in finite beings. In all essential results modern impersonal pantheism agrees with the scheme of Spinoza. It is but atheism dressed out in a philosophical garb, admitting God in name, but denying him in reality. It is built on baseless assumptions, and therefore the demonstrations to which it pretends are baseless also.

If now we look to *probable argument* the case stands thus: That any *a priori* scheme of nature may claim our respect,

[1] See in Appendix, Note iii.

it must give an intelligible account of nature in both her constitution and course; since nature from her inmost depths cries out that she is not her own interpreter, but must be interpreted in the light of a power above her and independent of her. That an *a priori* system of nature may command our assent, it must, once more, admit the reality of holiness and sin in finite beings. But this involves the reality of finite, and therefore created, substances, which are neither parts nor modifications of Deity. We may add that an *a priori* scheme of nature ought to be in harmony with both the course of human history and the true wants and instinctive cravings of humanity, and not fatally out of joint with both. Let us apply these tests to the pantheistic scheme, everywhere placing in contrast with it the scriptural doctrine of one absolute, free, personal God, who is before nature, above nature, independent of nature, the free author of nature, and in whom nature finds both an intelligible explanation and a final end.

First, a true system of the universe must give an intelligible account of nature. Nature is not a simple essence, but a complicated *system*, having innumerable parts, between which there is manifest *adaptation*, that is, *the fitting of part to part* for the accomplishment of an end. This is but saying that nature is throughout full of the marks of a designing mind; for relations that are not in themselves necessary need an explanation, and if they be relations that accomplish an end, we refer them at once to an intelligent cause; since the very idea of an end includes that of a designing mind that proposed to itself this end. But the modern pantheist, having confounded nature with God, and made God an absolute impersonal essence, first coming to consciousness in man, precludes himself from every possible explanation of the innumerable proofs of design with which the universe is filled. To him nature is an endless evolution of being, bound together by the chain of natural cause and effect — not intelligent, free, creative cause, choosing and determining its ends, but blind and necessary cause. He can see that the cause A

produces the effect B; that B, becoming in turn a cause, produces the effect C; that A and B acting together produce the effect D; and so on without end. But of the series itself, in which the marks of design are everywhere manifest, he can give no account. The attempt to explain nature as a whole by reasoning from cause to effect, is as if one should think to give the whole account of a complicated machine by explaining how its parts act upon each other; whereas it is the existence of the machine itself that is to be accounted for. To make nature, with its ceaseless evolutions, eternal, does not help the matter. It only makes the marks of design eternal, and then an eternal designer is needed. An eternal evolution of nature no more explains itself than one that is finite in duration. Though the pantheist introduce into his system any number of gods and demigods, as does Brahminism, these are only parts of nature, and cannot help to explain nature. His system knows nothing outside of the chain of natural cause and effect, and therefore his gods need to be accounted for as much as any other phenomena in his universe.

That we may have, then, a true comprehension of nature, we must rise to the conception of an absolute *person*, who is before nature, above nature, and the author of nature; upon whom nature is dependent, while he is absolutely independent of it; of whose power nature is a *product*, but is not a *part* of his being. To this eternal, uncreated Spirit we customarily ascribe the power of causality, but in a very different sense from the causality of nature. The causality of nature is unconscious and blind, but the causality of God is self-conscious and intelligent. The causality of nature is necessary, every one of its operations being absolutely determined by preceding operations, — every *causa causans* having been first a *causa causata* — so that the idea of true liberty does not belong to it. The activity of nature can be called free only in the sense of being unobstructed; as water is free to flow down an open channel, or the worlds are free to move through empty space. But God's causality is inwardly and

morally free. He acts in the light of his own infinite reason, when he chooses and as he chooses. All truth is ever before him, and he acts in view of truth. But we must not conceive of motive in the divine mind as if it were analogous to the moving forces of nature; for these forces are themselves the causes, and they determine the effects that follow in a necessary way. But in the divine action God himself, the free personal Spirit, not truth, is the cause. The causality of nature constitutes an endless chain, in which every link is conditioned by the preceding. No link explains itself, and therefore the chain as a whole must have an explanation from without itself. Not so the free, self-originated, and self-controled causality of God. His acts are not conditioned in a necessary way by previous acts. He can begin to act where there has been no prior action. By his eternal, uncreated power he can, as the absolutely free Spirit, bring into being a system of nature, and impose upon it such laws as he sees good. If this system of nature be our universe, with all its powers and activities, then it finds at once an explanation out of itself in its great author. Thus we come to a comprehension of nature in both its constitution and its final end. It is what it is by God's power and for his good pleasure. Considered in its several parts, nature has many subordinate ends. The inorganic mass is subservient to vegetable life, and this to the animal kingdom; while all these lower orders of being minister to man, the appointed head of this world. But man himself, and in man all nature, is created for the glory of God; so that God himself is the final end of all things.[1]

The objector may say: You have not succeeded in eliminating from the universe the incomprehensible. You have only shifted it from nature to him whom you make to be the author of nature. We answer: That something must be eternally self-existent, and therefore incomprehensible, all admit. The real question is where we shall place the incomprehen-

[1] See this subject discussed in an able and fundamental way in Hickok's Rational Psychology, Part iii.

sible; whether in nature, where it manifestly involves contradiction, or in God, where no contradiction can be alleged against it. Nature is complex. She consists of parts having innumerable relations to each other, which are obviously not necessary, and therefore demand explanation. Nature is a vast system of adaptations as means to ends, which is only saying that nature is the product of intelligent mind. We might as well say that a fount of type arranged for the compositor's use, or a page of type ready for the press, is to be received as an ultimate, incomprehensible fact, without an attempt at explanation, as that all the adaptations of nature, with the beneficent results accomplished by them, exist somehow in an incomprehensible way. The arrangement of the type demands an explanation; and so nature from her inmost depths cries out: I must and will be accounted for. But no man in his sober senses will ascribe to the infinite, self-existent mind complexity of parts. If some Christian writers have spoken of the *adaptations* in the divine mind, of the nice *adjustings* and *balancings* of his faculties, they have used language which is either very poetical or very false. Adaptations, adjustings, and balancings belong to a *system* that is planned and put together by a higher intelligence. God is not a system. He has no parts, and therefore no adaptations of parts. Borrowing language from the lower sphere of nature, we do indeed speak of God's different attributes. But we are not to conceive of them as parts that could be added or taken away, and therefore adjusted to each other. We say of God that he is self-existent, eternal, and unchangeable in his being. These are only different sides, so to speak, of viewing the same absolutely simple essence. Who supposes that God could be self-existent without being eternal and unchangeable? We might as well attempt to separate length in matter from breadth and thickness, as one of these attributes of the eternal mind from the other two. We ascribe to God, again, intelligence, power, and love. But if we speak understandingly, we mean that the same absolute, uncompounded, free Spirit knows, acts, and loves. Nature

is *designed*. She demands that an account be given of the innumerable adaptations of means to ends which are found in her. But God is the self-existent, eternal *Designer*. In his being there are no traces of *adaptation*— of the putting together of parts which can be conceived of as existing separately for the accomplishment of an end. Of him no account is to be given. He is the everlasting I AM.[1]

It has sometimes been argued that if nature requires for her explanation a designer higher than herself, much more must the being of God, who is higher than nature, be explained by the assumption of a still higher designer, and so backward without end. This is true pantheism which makes the universe, God himself included, to consist of an everlasting chain of necessary cause and effect. If a man cannot rise above this law, which binds together in its adamantine chain all the operations of nature, to the conception of a free, intelligent author of the universe, who gives origin to a law of natural cause and effect, but is not himself included in that law, then the objection holds good. His pretended God is not God, for he has no real freedom. He causes by an inward necessity of his nature, and is himself caused by a necessity lying back of him. He is a part of nature and not her free author. But when we have risen above nature to the conception of a free author of nature, we are not required to go further. All arguments from the excellence and greatness of God's nature to the necessity of a cause above him are simply impertinent. It is not because of the greatness and excellence of nature that we infer her origin from a designing mind, but because nature is a vast and complicated *system*, filled throughout with marks of design. Self-existence, eternity, and simplicity of essence do not by any means imply a low nature. On the contrary, we naturally think of the uncaused cause of all things as spiritual and infinite — "a Spirit infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." Here our reason is satisfied, and we ask not to go further.[2]

[1] See in Appendix, Note iv.

[2] See further on the argument from design in the Appendix, Note v.

A strong argument might also be made from the *course* of nature as indicated by geology. This science shows conclusively that our earth was once in a state of igneous fluidity incompatible with the existence of vegetable or animal life. These must, therefore, have had a beginning, which implies creative power; for the only rational conception of life is that of an immaterial entity endowed by the Creator with an organizing and formative power over matter. That any possible juxtaposition and arrangement of dead atoms — and this is all that purely material organization means — should constitute or produce life is an absurdity. Organization is the product of life, not life of organization.

Geology further reveals the fact that there have been repeated catastrophes in the history of our planet, destroying the previously existing systems of life, after which new systems have appeared. Here again we see the hand of a Creator. So far as the argument from design is concerned, it is not necessary to feel any anxiety in view of the fashionable theory of development. If established, it would only throw the immediate creating and adjusting agency of God further back in the system. The proofs of design would all remain intact. Should a mass of metal come without any visible agency into a fount of type, and these, again, into a set of pages ready for the press, we might say that the whole process took place through an inward law of development; but we should he compelled to refer the law itself to a designing mind. Just so the internal law which, according to some, has developed the materials of nature into the present orderly system must be accounted for, and this can be done only by going back of the law to a free, intelligent Author of it.[1] But this theory is not sustained by the facts

[1] Since the present article was written, Prof. Bascom's Article on Cause and Effect, published in the April number of the Bibliotheca Sacra for the present year, has come to hand, in which this matter of development is well handled. The substance of his argument is contained in the following sentence: "If matter in its qualities, forces, involves order, — measured, systematic, related action; if it holds inlocked a physical universe, then does this thought, this wisdom, uttered in and through matter itself, springing from it centrally, rather than laid

of nature, and is utterly incompetent to bridge over the gulfs by which her successive systems of life are separated from each other. This can be done only by the creative energy of a personal God, such as the scriptures reveal to us. Here much might be said; but after the full discussion of the evidences of a designing mind with which nature is filled, it is not necessary to enlarge further.

In the second place, a true system of the universe must be in harmony with the great fact of *the existence of holiness and sin in finite beings*. If any truth whatever shines by its own light, it is that of the eternal distinction between right and wrong, and consequently between holiness and sin; for holiness is the free, conscious, intelligent conformity of a personal being to right, and sin is his free, conscious, intelligent departure from it. Our idea of right and wrong is not that of an abstract difference which exists somewhere in the universe, but of a moral obligation which rests on us personally to do the one and avoid the other. The ground of this obligation — or, if one prefers, the necessary condition of it, — we intuitively see to be our real inward freedom, with the solemn responsibility that comes from the possession of it. We are made in the image of God. As such we are true free agents. We have not the absolute freedom of God any more than his absolute knowledge and power. But we have freedom in reality, not in name only; and this is the ground of the commands, threatenings, and promises addressed to us in the Bible. If we deny our freedom, conscience gives the lie to the denial. We know that our acts of holiness and sin are our own in such a sense as nothing else in the universe can be called ours — our own, because we are the real free authors of them. We know that guilt is a terrible reality, for we feel in our consciences the venomed stings of remorse,

upon it outwardly, require explanation, and bear back the mind to a personal, intelligent being, the seat of this reason, the source of the wise way in which these forces are matched one against another, are bound one with another" (p. 310).

which no sophistical reasonings can avail to pluck away. With the clear insight of reason we see also that our fellow-men are free, responsible beings like ourselves, and we always treat them as such.

But the idea of a person endowed with reason and conscience, who is a free cause, and as such capable of holiness or sin, is that of a true spiritual substance, created indeed by God, and therefore finite and dependent upon him, but no part of his being. Here scriptural theism and pantheism are at direct issue. Pantheism knows no substance but God. Everything finite is but an evolution of the absolute being, and can have no separate being of its own; and if no separate being, no separate efficiency. In a pantheistic universe there can be sin only in name, since what men call sin is only an evolution of Deity itself. It is sin only to our finite apprehension, but considered with reference to the whole, "whatever is is right," in the most literal sense, for it is a self-determination of God himself. According to the phraseology of modern impersonal pantheism, God first comes to self-consciousness in man. Man is, therefore, the very highest evolution of Deity in this world; and if man sins, then Deity sins in its highest manifestation, an absurdity not to be tolerated. Hence the inevitable tendency of pantheism to resolve all sin into apparent error; error which is such only in a finite view, and which will rectify itself in the progress of the evolution of Deity.

This great fact — the reality of sin, which has its roots deep down in the reality of created, finite, spiritual substance, of which, with its high endowments of reason and moral freedom, God is the author, but which is not itself a part of God; which acts by virtue of the power that God has given it to act, while its acts are its own and not God's; and which in its finiteness may act wrong, and thus bring upon itself guilt and desert of punishment — this great fact is the rock upon which every form of pantheism, open or concealed, must make shipwreck. All schemes of philosophy which have for their object to bring the human will, whether in a covert or open

way, under the law of natural cause and effect, thus depriving it of real inward freedom and responsibility, however stoutly freedom and responsibility may be held in name — all such schemes, when traced to their ultimate principles, will range themselves under some form of pantheism, personal or impersonal. Good men sometimes favor such a philosophy in the interest of some scriptural doctrine, as that of men's dependence on divine grace, or that of God's universal sovereignty. These are precious truths to be firmly maintained. But in the manner of maintaining them we are not at liberty to set aside another truth which shines by its own light, and which God assumes as the basis of his dealing with men. If we can reconcile the great fact of human freedom and responsibility with these plain doctrines of scripture in a metaphysical way, well and good. But if not, we must still hold them all together in the humble assurance that the comprehension of their inward philosophical relation to each other involves, not contradictions, but intuitions beyond our present power.[1]

In the third place, a true system of the universe must be in harmony not only with the course of nature, but also with *the course of human history*. Since men are moral beings their union in society makes a moral system, to be administered by moral means and influences. Such a system must, of necessity, have progress and a history. Since, moreover, men are not all good or all evil (the ultimate grounds of which fact we do not propose to consider here), the history of human society must exhibit a perpetual conflict between righteousness and wickedness. The point now insisted on is that the course of human history furnishes abundant evidence that the destiny of man is not left simply to itself, but that all along the line of its progress there is an overruling Providence, which guides and shapes it in the interest of truth and righteousness. This superintending hand of a personal God is not so clearly seen in short periods of time as in those

[1] See in Appendix, Note vi.

which are of great extent. In the language of scripture: "One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." The divine plans are so vast in extent of time, so complicated, and carried forward by such unsearchable methods, that it is impossible to affirm what will be the immediate fate — fate as apparent to our limited view — of any good or bad enterprise. The cause which has justice, and therefore God, on its side, may be subjected to crushing defeats, such as shall seem for the time to annihilate all hope; while the cause of wickedness and oppression triumphs, and goes on gathering new strength for a long period of years. But sooner or later there will come, as a French writer has remarked, a fifth act in the tragedy, in which righteousness triumphs and wickedness is overthrown; and then this fifth act will be seen to have grown out of the calamities of the previous acts. If there be in the beginning of the conflict more than one Bull Run, there will come at last a Gettysburg, a Vicksburg, and a Five Forks. And these Bull Runs and Five Forks may be separated, not, as in our late civil war, by a comparatively short interval of time, but by dreary centuries, since God's eternal government makes but little account of long and short.

This is a vast theme, on which volumes might be written; but we content ourselves with the above brief hints. The impression which the course of human history, viewed on a broad scale, makes on the mind of every candid observer is expressed in such passages of scripture as the following: "Even as I have seen, they that plough iniquity and sow wickedness reap the same."[1] "He made a pit and digged it, and is fallen into the ditch which he made. His mischief shall return upon his own head, and his violent dealing shall come down upon his own pate."[2] "The righteous shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance; he shall wash his feet in the blood of the wicked. So that a man shall say, Verily there is a reward for the righteous; verily he is a God that judgeth in the earth."[3] "The righteous shall see it" [the

[1] Job iv. 8. [2] Ps. vii. 15, 16. [3] Ps. lviii. 10, 11.

providence of God as described in the preceding verses] "and rejoice; and all iniquity shall stop her mouth. Whoso is wise and will observe these things, even they shall understand the loving-kindness of the Lord." [1] We waive the question of the inspiration of these passages. We quote them simply as in harmony with the course of human history; as giving the true impression which the observation of it makes on the thoughtful mind. Cold, dreary pantheism knows no providence. It consigns the destiny of the world to blind fate, or, at best, to the successive generations of man, in whom the absolute substance of Deity in its endless self-evolution "first comes to consciousness." It is wholly out of joint with the reality of human history, and this marks it as a false theory.

Finally, a true system of the universe should be in harmony with the real wants of humanity. If this argument be considered indirect, its logical validity cannot be denied. It rests on the principle of induction. Adaptation is the great law of the universe.

> "Beneath the spreading heavens
> No creature but is fed."

The true wants of sentient beings are everywhere provided for. The world itself, with all that it contains, is in harmony with man's intellectual nature. Light is not more perfectly fitted to the eye than is nature to the human understanding. If the body finds in nature the food which it needs for its sustenance, so does she furnish the mind also inexhaustible stores for its instruction, development, and discipline. But man, as a spiritual and moral being, has a dignity and excellence to which nature can lay no claim, and has wants high above the capacity of nature to satisfy. In the deep yearnings of his spirit he longs after a nobler good than can be found beneath the natural heavens, even the spiritual good of communion with a heavenly Father who can care for him in the weakness and dependence of his finite nature; to whom he can go in trouble for help and comfort; to whom he can

[1] Ps. cvii. 42, 43.

confess his sins with childlike penitence, that he may receive forgiveness for them; with the contemplation of whose infinite uncreated glories he can refresh, strengthen, and purify his own spirit; and who may be his everlasting stay when flesh and heart fail. *Our Father in heaven* — this is the keynote of the gospel, and the keynote also of man's spiritual nature. The personal God of the Bible satisfies all the wants of humanity. Nothing but sin can alienate the human spirit from him. To the good man his presence is "as the light of the morning when the sun riseth, even a morning without clouds; as the tender grass springing out of the earth by clear shining after rain." It warms, cheers, and vivifies his soul, and fills it with pure and serene gladness.

But pantheism buffets in the face all these deep, spiritual cravings of humanity. Its deity is an impersonal substance that can be neither loved, confided in, nor approached in prayer. To pray in trouble is natural to man. But pantheism sends man to himself for prayer; since it is in man that the absolute substance called deity first comes to self-consciousness. We ask pantheism for bread, but it gives us a stone; we ask of it a fish, but for a fish it gives a serpent; we ask of it an egg, but it offers us a scorpion.

We have seen how scriptural theism gives a true comprehension of nature in both its constitution and its course; how it is in harmony with the great fact of holiness and sin in finite beings, with the course of human history, and with the deep spiritual wants of humanity; and how, in all these respects, pantheism is utterly wanting. Considered as a philosophical system (and in this light alone we now contemplate it) pantheism must be rejected as self-condemned, and the theism of the Bible received as the true system of the universe. But the moment we rise to the conception of a free personal God who is before nature, the author of nature, and independent of nature, all assumptions against the possibility of the supernatural vanish. He who made nature can act above nature; that is, he can act in a manner which is, qualitatively considered, creative. This is the true

idea of miraculous power, whether its particular form be that of the creation or annihilation of substance, or the suspension, counteraction, or intensification of the laws of nature.[1] In truth it is as *natural* to man to believe in the *supernatural*, as in the being of a personal God. It is only pantheism that would do violence to nature without man and in man. Uncorrupted human nature has its home in scriptural theism; and we may say of all pantheistic attempts to drive it from its blissful habitation:

"Naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurret."

2. *The assumption against the proof of miracles from the alleged fallibility of all human testimony.* Here we encounter at once Hume's famous Essay on Miracles, the gist of which lies in the following assumptions: Our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact is experience; miracles are contrary to universal experience; it is not contrary to experience, on the other hand, that human testimony should be fallible; therefore a wise man, who proportions his belief to evidence, cannot allow the infallible experience of the world against miracles to be overcome by the fallible testimony of men in their favor. Foreseeing, however, the monstrous conclusions to which these assumptions logically carried out must lead, he is careful to qualify them by the remark that no testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, so as to make it a just foundation for a system of religion, and adds: "I beg the limitations here made may be remarked when I say that a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; though perhaps it will be impossible to find such in all the records of history." His aim in this distinction is, as we shall presently see, the denial of the supernatural, and not of what is contrary to all known human experience. He stands therefore, in reality, on the panthe-

[1] See in the Appendix, Note vii.

istic platform, and he virtually acknowledges as much when he says of miracles resting on a religious foundation: "But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without further examination. Though the being to whom the miracle is ascribed be, in this case, Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become a whit more probable, since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions in the usual course of nature." The reader will notice the cool assumption here made that the Deity has manifested and can manifest his attributes only "in the usual course of nature," which is the very question at issue. If, then, there be a personal God, and he determine, in his wisdom, to manifest himself in a *supernatural way*, — one that is properly *miraculous* — Hume decides that it is impossible; and directs us not only to "reject the fact, but even reject it without further examination." This decision of Hume against "religious miracles," as he calls them, must rest either on the pantheistic theory already reviewed, according to which a true miracle is an impossibility, or on the ground that Hume knows that a personal God, who made nature and is independent of nature, never did and never will manifest his attributes in a supernatural, that is, a properly miraculous way. This last assumption is so absurd that it needs no labored refutation. We might, therefore, well content ourselves with opposing to Hume's sophistry the proofs of a personal God. But we propose to examine the chief points of his argument:

First, we inquire what he means by *experience*. From some passages in his Essay we should naturally infer that he meant *personal* experience — the experience of each one's senses. But the absurdity of this is manifest. Unless a miracle were wrought in the heavenly bodies, enduring, more-

over, through the space of a natural day, it could not be a matter of personal experience to the mass of mankind. And then it would be personal only to that generation; the next generation would be compelled to receive it on testimony alone. Hume himself virtually admits that by universal experience he means the experience of mankind as confirmed by universal testimony, so that he comes at last to human testimony to rebut human testimony; and this he often does in the course of the Essay, weighing evidence against evidence. "A miracle," he tells us, "is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." And again: "There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation." The correctness of his definition of a miracle we will not here discuss. It is sufficient to remark that "a firm and unalterable experience" and "a uniform experience" can be known only from the universal testimony of mankind. He comes, therefore, to the absurdity of opposing against miracles the testimony of *all* men in *all* ages — for this alone is the testimony of "a firm and unalterable" and "a uniform" experience — to the actually existing testimony of *some* men in *some* ages. In other words, he first assumes that there has never been any experience of miracles, and then opposes this assumption to all testimony in their favor.

Secondly, we inquire what he means by a miracle; for on this point the Essay is confused and inconsistent. He sometimes applies the term to what is simply unprecedented; as that, to use his own illustration, there should be in a given month and year "a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days." This he thinks could be established by human testimony, because it might be explained from natural causes. But immediately afterwards he affirms that no amount of testimony could convince him that a dead person, after being interred for a month, had again appeared alive; evidently

because such an event could not be accounted for by any law of nature; in other words, would be truly miraculous. And he adds that if this miracle were alleged in the interest of any new system of religion, "this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without further examination." His reasons for this extraordinary principle of action will be presently considered. Here we notice only the distinction made by Hume between an *apparent* miracle, which he admits might be established by competent testimony, and a *real* miracle, which he would reject in the face of all possible testimony. To make all plain he adds, in a note: "A miracle may be accurately defined *a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.*" For reasons already given we do not regard the word "transgression" as appropriate to the definition of a miracle. It is rather the immediate act of God *above* nature, preventing the effect of nature's laws, or accomplishing results to which these laws are not of themselves competent. And as to miracles "by the interposition of some invisible agent" other than God, they are rather superhuman than miraculous events. It is only in loose and popular language that they can be called miraculous, as being above both the sphere of nature and of man. But not to criticise further Hume's definition, we accept, as of vital importance, the distinction between what is only unprecedented and seemingly miraculous, and a true supernatural interposition made by God himself, or by "some invisible agent" *under his direction.*

Thirdly, we notice Hume's glaring inconsistency in regard to the argument from "uniform experience." His hypothetical so-called miracle, "a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days," is as contrary to uniform experience in any intelligible sense of the words, as anything can be. But here he holds that the fact could be established from the united testimony of the men of the age in which it occurred. But

the same united testimony would not establish the fact of a resurrection from the dead, especially if alleged in the interest of a system of religion. Why this distinction? Because in the former case the event might be explained from natural causes, but not the latter; in other words, because Hume assumes that a real miracle is impossible, which is precisely the assumption of pantheism. He knows better, therefore, than to rest his argument against "religious miracles" on that "uniform experience," the validity of which he has just denied in the case of his assumed miracle of "a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days." Deserting the argument from uniform experience, he proceeds to impeach upon entirely new grounds the testimony by which the miracles recorded in history are sustained. This carries us to an entirely new field of inquiry, which we hope to consider at length in a future number. At present we briefly remark that if the existence of a personal God, who is before nature, above nature, and the author of nature be once admitted, it is absurd to affirm either that he cannot manifest himself to man in a supernatural way, or that he cannot give to men satisfactory proof of the fact. As to Hume's allegation that there is in mankind a fondness for the marvellous which leads to self-delusion, it is sufficient to reply that if this be a genuine instinct of humanity, it is reasonable to believe that there is provision made somewhere for its legitimate gratification; though, like every other instinct, it is liable to abuse and perversion. It only proves that God has made man in harmony with the supernatural system to which he belongs. As to Hume's further attempt to disparage all "religious miracles" on the ground of the multitude of impositions practised on the world by designing men, we may well ask: Does anything valuable exist in this world that is not counterfeited; and does not the counterfeit imply the reality? Why have we counterfeit bank-notes? Because the genuine notes exist and are so valuable. Why have we pretended philanthropy? Because there is such a thing as true philanthropy, and the world honors it. If we hear a man declaiming against all

goodness as simulated and unreal, we infer at once, not that no goodness exists, but that he is destitute of it. Let the same reasonable rule of judgment be applied to the question of miracles, and we are satisfied.

Fourthly, we notice Hume's false assumptions in regard to human testimony. In accordance with that false materialistic philosophy, which restricts all human knowledge to the testimony of the senses,[1] he affirms that our belief in the veracity of human testimony rests on experience alone. The very opposite of this is true. It is natural for men to speak the truth. In doing this they only follow the law of their being. Falsehood, on the other hand, is something artificial and unnatural, something invented for selfish purposes. Men speak the truth simply because it is the truth, but they never utter falsehood for its own sake. They are either deceived by a hasty judgment, or they seek to deceive others for base ends. It is natural moreover, for men to believe testimony. It is only by experience that they learn to distrust the word of others; and then always on one of the two grounds above stated — a hasty judgment or an attempt to deceive for selfish ends. When we can be assured that a man has had full opportunity to form a correct judgment in a given case, and that he has no interest in deceiving us, we always give credit to his words. With regard to the correctness of his judgment, we decide partly from the nature of the event to which he testifies, and partly from what we know of his character as an accurate or a careless observer. With regard to the honesty of his purpose, we judge partly from his known moral character, and partly from his relation to the thing affirmed. If it be something in which he has a personal interest, we hesitate. But if it be something in which he has no such interest, or which is against his interest, we give him full credence for meaning to speak the truth.

Thus far we have considered only the isolated testimony of individuals. But when the testimony of separate and

[1] See in Appendix, Note viii.

independent witnesses is combined, its force may be increased as every one knows, not in the simple ratio of their number, but a thousandfold, or even a millionfold, so as to be raised high above all reasonable doubt. It is not even necessary in all cases to inquire concerning the moral character of the witnesses. The concurrence of testimony may be itself of such a nature as to preclude every possible explanation except that of the truth of the event in question. To discuss this matter at large would be to write a treatise on the laws of evidence, a work which we do not propose to undertake. We simply add that it is by no means necessary that the event thus certified should come within the range of any past experience. We can conceive, for example, of a populous island in the Pacific Ocean on which a meteoric stone has never fallen, and the inhabitants of which have no tradition of such an event as having occurred there or elsewhere. To them the descent from the sky of a mass of iron would be contrary to uniform experience in any intelligible sense of the words. But every one knows that it could be established beyond doubt by the testimony of a comparatively small number of witnesses. The man who should seriously attempt to oppose to their testimony, the "firm and unalterable experience" of the past would only be laughed at for his folly. If afterwards the inhabitants of that island should learn that the descent of meteoric stones is not uncommon, when a large portion of the earth's surface is taken into account, they would indeed be able to refer the particular phenomenon on their island to some general law of nature, and thus to anticipate its possible recurrence among themselves; but their conviction of the truth of the event would remain the same as before. They did not believe it because they could bring it under a general law of nature, but on the ground of unimpeachable testimony.

Let us next suppose that a man appears claiming to be a messenger sent by God to perform for men an important work and to communicate to them important truth in respect to their spiritual and eternal destiny; that, in support of this

claim he performs a series of works which are manifestly miraculous — heals by a word withered limbs, instantly restores paralytics to their full strength, opens the eyes of men born blind, raises the dead to life — that he performs these and other like miracles from day to day openly and in the presence of friends and enemies, and that the severest scrutiny only compels foes as well as friends to admit their reality. Why should any man deny that such a series of miracles could be established beyond all reasonable doubt by human testimony? Not on the ground, certainly, that they are contrary to "a firm and unalterable experience"; for so was the descent of iron from heaven to those islanders, and so also was the supposed "total darkness over the whole earth for eight days," which Hume admits could be established by human testimony. The only remaining ground for denying them is the assumption that a true miracle is in and of itself incredible; and here we come back again to the pantheistic position of the impossibility of the supernatural, and therefore of the miraculous. To the man who believes in the being of a personal God there can be no such impossibility. He who made nature can reveal himself to men in a supernatural way. Whether he has ever done so is a legitimate question for human testimony. That testimony in *some* circumstances is fallible, is a true proposition. But that testimony in *all* circumstances is fallible is false. There can be a concurrence of testimony of such a character as to establish anything that does not involve a contradiction, and that without respect to the question whether it has ever come within the range of known experience. Can there be any greater absurdity than that one should admit the being of a personal God who made nature, and yet deny that he can reveal himself in a way that is above nature, and thus properly miraculous? And if he can thus reveal himself, has he indeed no power to certify to mankind the fact? "Professing themselves to be wise they became fools," says the apostle. What greater fool in the garb of a philosopher than the man who, admitting the being of God in the scriptural sense

of the word, affirms that he either cannot make to men a supernatural revelation, or cannot certify it by credible testimony?

In the next number we propose to consider some of the popular assumptions of the present day against the necessity and reasonableness of a supernatural revelation from God; and this as prefatory to an exhibition of the direct evidence that God has made such a revelation.

APPENDIX.

Note I.

Singularly enough, rationalists and high-toned evangelical men sometimes meet, not in their metaphysical speculations alone, but also on other ground. There is a class of naturalistic theologians who find no difficulty in admitting that David and Isaiah, Jesus and Paul, were inspired. But so also, according to their theory, were Homer, Socrates, and Plato, Dante and Milton; for with them inspiration is only the exaltation of the natural faculties. Thus they dilute inspiration into a nonentity. On the other hand, we have heard men earnestly maintaining that all Christians are inspired, because all enjoy the supernatural illumination and guidance of the Holy Spirit. Their intention, doubtless, was to exalt in human apprehension the heavenly gift of the Spirit. But they did it in such a way as to confound things which differ essentially. This is not the error of the Montanists, for they believed in a true, ecstatic, inspiration of their prophets. It is rather the error of misusing a necessary theological term in such a way as to obscure a distinction of great importance. Although the *idea* of inspiration is found abundantly in both the Old Testament and the New, the noun *inspiration* does not once occur in the Bible, and the corresponding participial adjective but once: 2 Tim. iii. 16: "All scripture is *inspired of God*" (Gr. θεόπνευστος, which the Vulgate well renders *divinitus inspirata*). The terms *inspired* and *inspiration* have become household words in the church, because they are needed to express a definite scriptural idea. To this they ought to be restricted.

Note II.

In the Prometheus of Aeschylus, for example, Prometheus, by virtue of the prophetic spirit which dwells in him, foresees the fated order of events, in accordance with which Jupiter, through a marriage into which he will enter unaware of its results, is to be hurled from his throne; and he boasts

of this in the presence of Io and the Chorus. Mercury is sent to demand of what marriage he speaks, but he refuses to tell. Then Jupiter in his rage can only hurl upon him his thunderbolts, without the ability to extort from Prometheus the dread secret, or to change the irresistible order of Fate, to which he is himself subject, in common with all things else in the universe.

Note III.

The seventh definition of Spinoza's Ethica, Part. ii., reads thus in the original: "Ea res *libera* dicetur, quae ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur: *necessaria* autem, vel potius *coacta*, quae ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione." In what sense God is a *free cause* he explains in two corollaries appended to his seventeenth proposition, that "God acts from the laws of his own nature alone, and without compulsion from any one":

"Coroll. I. Hinc sequitur 1. Nullam dari causam, quae Deum extrinsice vel intrinsice praeter ipsius naturae perfectionem incitet ad agendum.

"Coroll. II. Sequitur 2. Solum Deum esse causam liberam. Deus enim solus ex sola suae naturae necessitate existit (per. prop. ii. et Coroll. 1. prop. 14), et ex sola suae naturae necessitate agit (per. prop. praeced.). Adeoque (per. def. 7) solus est causa libera; q. e. d."

Notice *how* he makes God to be a free cause. It is "by definition 7" given above. He immediately proceeds in the scholium which follows to deny to God all true moral freedom, making all things to flow from the infinite nature of God under the law of strict necessity, in the same manner as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles. He also denies to God intellect and will; or affirms that if they pertain to the eternal essence of God, they must differ *toto coelo* from our intellect and will, and can agree in nothing but name; just as the living animal dog differs from the dog as a celestial sign. Thus much for pantheistic freedom. It is baptized with the name of bread, but is in reality a stone. See further his arguments against free-will, divine or human, and against the idea that God acts in view of final ends in Prop. xxxii. and what follows to the end of Part i.

Note IV.

They tell us that there can be no philosophy of the absolute; that beyond the finite personality can have for us no significance. If they mean that we cannot comprehend the absolute in the mode of its existence, this has always been admitted. But if they mean that we cannot apprehend the absolute as having a real existence, the proposition is false. Absolute duration and absolute space are to our finite minds incomprehensible; but

we apprehend them both as necessary existences. In like manner we can apprehend the being of an absolute personal God, though we cannot comprehend the mode of his existence.

We have not an *ultimate* comprehension of anything *finite*; as, for example, the great law of gravity, the chemical affinity of atoms, the organizing power of life, the power of the will over the muscles of the body. But we apprehend these things as incomprehensible facts. Let us be reasonable enough to apply the same distinction to the question of a personal God.

The objection, moreover, is a two-edged sword, which cuts both ways alike. If I cannot comprehend how there can be an absolute personality, neither can I comprehend how such a personality may not be. How absurd to limit the possibility of being by my finite comprehension! And what shall we say of the pantheistic scheme which makes the universe an eternal self-development of the absolute, itself impersonal and unconscious, but first coming to consciousness in man? Is that comprehensible? It is not on the naked ground of incomprehensibility that we reject the pantheistic system, but because of its manifest contradictions.

Note V.

The proposition: *Design implies a designer* is, properly speaking, a truism; since the very idea of design is of that which has been designed by some one, who is of course the designer. It is desirable to ascertain by an analysis wherein lies the essence of design. Design, then, belongs only to those relations which may be called contingent, that is, which are not in and of themselves necessary, and which precisely for this reason need to be accounted for; and which, moreover, accomplish intelligible ends. To necessary relations, that is, relations which we cannot conceive of as separable, we never ascribe design. Let us take, for example, a molecule of matter. Waiving the question whether its existence is itself proof of a Creator, we remark that however small we choose to make it, it must still have, from the very idea of matter, the three dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness. We cannot conceive of either of these as separable or absent. Consequently in these three relations we have no evidence of design. If the molecule is to exist, it must exist as long, broad, and thick; that is, it must exist in space. If there be in the molecule design, it must be back of this necessary relation to space in the idea of matter as a conception of the divine mind. Again, the molecule must exist somewhere in time, and in one of the two states of motion or rest. If, moreover, there be two molecules, they must have towards each other some relation of distance and direction. In such relations, which cannot be conceived of as absent, we do not find the marks of design. But now let us take a fount of type. Both the regularity and the diversity of form in the different

letters give unmistakable marks of contrivance. But passing by the argument from this source, let us suppose that we see the different letters all regularly arranged in separate compartments. We know at once that this arrangement is neither necessary nor accidental; that is, we know that it is the product of intelligence. How much more when we see the letters put to actual use in a page of type ready for the press.

Precisely the same argument for an intelligent author is furnished by nature, only upon an immensely higher and grander scale. The ultimate atoms of matter — ultimate so far as analysis can go at present — like the letters of a fount of type, have different properties, and thus different offices. These properties are not necessarily inherent in matter; for if they were, all atoms of matter would have the same properties. They accomplish, moreover, by their combinations, intelligible ends without number. It is then an imperative demand of reason that they be referred to an intelligent author. Oxygen and hydrogen, for example, uniting in their atoms, form water; oxygen and calcium form quick-lime; oxygen and silicon, silex, which in its comminuted form is sand; ogygen and carbon, carbonic acid. Water and quick-lime, again, by their union form hydrate of lime, and this united with sand, by the help of more water, forms mortar; carbonic acid and quick-lime uniting form carbonate of lime, which in its compact form is marble; marble and lime together enter as materials into the structure of the stately edifice. And so we might go on without end. Under the formative power of life, the combinations among the primitive atoms are immensely more complicated and wonderful; and every new combination, in respect to either proportion or kind, gives new properties and new uses. Thus starch, by successive additions of oxygen, becomes first sugar, then alcohol, then vinegar. In this way material nature, in her ultimate elements, gives irrefragable proof of a designing Author who not only moulds matter, but who gave to matter originally its inmost essence. And if we rise from dead matter to the living orders of nature, we see everywhere immense systems of adaptation, which we instinctively refer to the same designing Author.

But if we rise to the free, uncreated, personal Author of nature, there is in his nature nothing that is contingent and separable; nothing, therefore, that bears the marks of adaptation from a source without himself. He is simply incomprehensible.

Note VI.

There are some definitions of human freedom given by men at the farthest possible remove from anything which they would have regarded as pantheistic in principle, which, nevertheless, we must hesitate to admit. Such is the following: *The will is as the strongest motive.* If this means the motive which actually prevails, it is a truism; if the motive which is intrinsically the strongest, it is false; for the strongest intrinsic motive is always

on the side of righteousness. If it be said that the strongest motive is that which appears the strongest, this brings us to another definition: *The will is as the greatest apparent good.* Here again we must ask how much is included in this good? Is it mere sensitive gratification in the widest sense, or does it comprehend also the high spiritual and moral good of doing righteousness? If so, this always appears to reason and conscience as something imperative; something which ought to be chosen before all sensitive gratification for the sake of its own supreme excellence. Moral choice always lies precisely here, being exercised between objects differing in kind, and not simply in degree. When we do a base and wicked act we feel at the time and afterwards a sense of self-degradation and guilt — *remorse*, which bites like a serpent in view of our having acted not simply imprudently and unfortunately, but wickedly. If it be said that when a man sins his mind is engrossed with the contemplation of the lower object to the exclusion of the high spiritual good of holiness, we answer: Granting this to be so, it is because he has voluntarily turned away his mind from the imperative claims of righteousness, and this is free sinful action. There is one other scheme which virtually makes God the only efficient agent in the universe, and all human exercises, holy and wicked alike, the product of his creative power. God himself produces right or wrong volitions in the human heart; and these, it is affirmed, are free, because God creates them free. But this is a contradiction in terms; as if one should affirm that a crooked line is straight because God creates it straight.

Spiritual bondage to sin, the bondage of sinful passion and habit, is an awful reality. That we may be delivered from it we need the help of divine grace. But we should never forget that God holds us responsible not only for *being* in this bondage, but also for *continuing* in it, because, as conscience testifies, we thus continue as the free, responsible subjects of his law. Let us beware of confounding *motive* in free, rational beings with *motive force* in nature. In nature the motive force does everything, and the effect follows of necessity. But in the moral world the man himself acts freely in view of the motives which are before him, making his election among them; and — to anticipate the truth of revelation — God holds him responsible under the high sanctions of heaven and hell, to make the election according to righteousness. If the songs of heaven and the wailings of hell be a fiction, then may we begin to raise the inquiry whether human freedom be not also a fiction — a thing of name and not of substance, as too many metaphysicians have made it. But if heaven and hell be realities, then must human freedom and responsibility be confessed to be realities also.

Note VII.

The essence of a miracle is the exercise of God's immediate power above nature, such as he employs in creation, although the result may not be the

production of new substance. How the waters of the Jordan were arrested in their course when the Israelites passed over we cannot tell. The scriptural narrative seems to indicate that they impinged against an invisible, immaterial wall, by which the waters that came down from above were brought to a stand, "and rose up upon a heap very far from the city of Adam." But for anything that we can tell, this wall may have been the pure will of God, so that here was a counteracting of the laws of nature by power of the same quality as in creation, but not creation itself. When the Saviour fed vast multitudes with a few loaves and fishes there would seem to have been creation in the literal sense of the word. How he instantaneously healed maladies of all kinds, and raised the dead to life by the exercise of his divine power we cannot explain. It is sufficient for us to know that he did all that was in each case necessary. When we attempt to explain the particular mode of miraculous operation in a given case, we involve ourselves in inextricable difficulties. Take, for example, the miracle recorded in the Book of Joshua, by which the sun and moon stood still in the midst of heaven. Respecting the mode of this there has been much speculation. Some have affirmed that the earth was arrested in her diurnal revolution. Undoubtedly God could stop the earth on her axis, and with this all calamitous effects; for he could arrest and control every particle of her substance at the same instant. But it does not follow that this was the way which his divine wisdom chose. If the rays of the sun and moon were so deflected by his divine power as to reach the earth in a constant given direction, then to human vision — and this is all that the *end* of the miracle required — the sun and moon would stand still in the midst of heaven. We have not the presumption to affirm that this was the way; but we simply set the hypothesis over against another, which appears to us less probable. A reverent spirit will receive the fact of a miracle upon sufficient testimony; but when the inquiry is concerning the mode of its operation, it will answer: "O Lord God, thou knowest."

Note VIII.

We do not perceive with the senses *cause* in nature, but only *sequence*. Hence the astounding error of materialism in confounding antecedent and consequent with cause and effect. Again, we do not perceive human veracity, but only human statements and their accordance with facts. Hence, in like manner, the denial of veracity as an original principle of human nature. But after all the materialist runs his ship on the very rock which he seeks to avoid. Whence that belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature on which he insists? It is not given by the senses, but by the understanding. It rests on a deeper belief in the reality, permanent being, and unchangeable properties of finite substances; all which ideas are gained through the understanding, and not through the senses.

ARTICLE II.

THE SECOND ADVENT AND THE CREEDS OF CHRISTENDOM.

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The rule of faith with all genuine Protestants is the infallible word of God. In all matters, both of faith and practice, its authority is supreme. In every question of which it professes to treat, or upon which it distinctly touches, the decisive inquiry must be: What does the word of God say? Against all doctors and decrees, all councils and confessions, it stands, and must stand, as the only infallible authority and final arbiter.

But the creeds or confessions of the church are entitled to the greatest respect, and must have weight with all who do not prefer their own wisdom to the collected and tried wisdom of ages. Some creeds are the common inheritance, and express the common faith of all, or nearly all, who name the name of Christ. Others, though less generally received, yet embrace large portions of the church, and, on most points, teach what is recognized as "the faith once delivered to the saints." The creeds universally received, in ancient and modern times, by the Roman, Greek, and Protestant churches, as well as those portions of other creeds or confesssions, containing doctrines in harmony with them, and recognized by all orthodox denominations, must be presumed to accord with the divine word. Were it not so, the whole church of every age, and in every land, must have been allowed to fall into error, a supposition scarcely reconcilable with the care which Christ exercises over his church, or with the gracious promises he has given. The *quod semper*, *quod ubique*, *quod ab omnibus* must, if not absolutely authoritative and final, at least weigh much with all who do not despise authority.

It is proposed in this Article to submit the doctrine of the

Second Advent, or certain features of it, as currently held and zealously taught by many at the present day, to this ordeal, and thus to judge how it agrees with the general faith of the church, as set forth in the standards of highest authority. Millenarians vaunt the antiquity and catholicity of their views. They profess their doctrines to be not only the doctrines of the Bible, but of the church in her best and purest days, and as taught and defended by her greatest teachers. Indeed, were we to believe some of this school, to question their dogmas is to doubt not only the voice of the church, but the very voice of God himself, and to incur the guilt of disbelieving divine revelation. It is boldly taught that the reason men do not believe the doctrine of Millenarians is because they do not believe the Bible. The biblical view of this important subject we do not intend here to discuss, but to compare the prominent and distinguishing points of Millenarianism with the creeds of the church.

There is a special propriety in examining this subject at the present time. The pulpit resounds with the doctrine of Christ's speedy coming to reign in person on the earth. The press teems with publications — volumes, tracts, and occasional sermons — inculcating the same views. Passing events are seized hold of to illustrate and confirm the oracular utterances of the pulpit and the press; and if individuals "be not shaken in mind, or troubled," it is from no lack of repeated announcements and warnings.

With considerable difference of views in some of the details, Millenarians are generally agreed on the following prominent and distinguishing doctrines, viz. 1. That the Second Advent of Christ will be pre-millenial; and 2. That he will reign in person, with his glorified saints, on the earth, a thousand years prior to the general resurrection and final judgment. Some have held and taught a very gross view, and placed the happiness of that period chiefly in sensual gratifications and enjoyment. Justin Martyr may be cited, as perhaps the best, and least objectionable, representative of the system in ancient times, and substantially followed by the advocates of

this doctrine at the present day. In his dialogue with Trypho the Jew, Trypho inquires: "Tell me truly, do you believe that this place, Jerusalem, will be rebuilt, and do you expect that your people will be gathered together and rejoice with Christ, and with the patriarchs and prophets, and with those of our race, and of those who became proselytes before the coming of your Christ?"

Justin replies: "I and many others hold these sentiments, and believe assuredly that this will come to pass. ..... I and those Christians who are in all things orthodox, understand that there will be a resurrection of the flesh, and a thousand years in Jerusalem, built and adorned and enlarged, as the prophets Ezekiel and Isaiah and the rest declare" (Dialogue with Trypho, chap. lxxx).

The two points stated may be regarded as the fundamental doctrines of the system, and upon these its advocates are united. They discard the idea of the world's conversion by means of preaching the gospel, with the accompanying influence of the Holy Spirit. They do not expect the heathen to be given to Christ for his inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for his possession, while he remains in heaven at the right hand of the Father. But they announce the coming and personal reign of Christ as the great hope of a groaning and perishing world. They look for no deliverance or salvation for our race until he comes in power and glory to establish his kingdom and reign over the earth.

It is easy to see that the truth on this subject must be of very great importance in the work of evangelizing the world. If our actions are to be moulded by our views, and our works in any degree correspond with our faith, then is it of vital importance whether we believe in the power of the gospel and the Spirit of God to regenerate the world, or whether we must look for some other agency for the accomplishment of this grand design. If the world is not to be converted to Christ, and sinners saved, by the foolishness of preaching, then we should know it, and should cease to look for such results. If the coming of Christ in person be indeed the

grand remedy, then our attention should be directed to this as our only hope and confidence. But if Christ will not come until the end of this world, and then for a very different purpose from that of reigning here in person on the earth, our duty is to labor and pray that all the ends of the earth may see his salvation, and turn unto the Lord. The difference between us and Millenarians is one therefore of the highest moment doctrinally and practically, and in regard to which the church cannot afford to be indifferent.

There have been two periods in the history of the church especially prolific in the production of creeds or confessions. The former in the early ages, particularly from about the time of the Council of Nice, A.D. 325, and extending some centuries onward, or from the beginning of the third to the seventh century. The latter, the period immediately connected with, and succeeding, the great Reformation of the sixteenth century. The intervening period added very little to the confessional stores of the church.

We begin our comparison with the creeds of the former period, giving special prominence to the three ecumenical or general creeds — the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian. These have had a degree of authority awarded to them, that, next after the word of God, must challenge our respectful attention and regard.

1. *The Apostles' Creed.*

This, if not absolutely the oldest written creed of the Christian church, at least claims to be, and probably is, the oldest in substance and fact. Giving little heed to the fable of Rufinus as to its origin, we may, nevertheless, admit it to be truly Apostolic. Long before we have any satisfactory evidence of its existence in writing, we are assured that it was engraven on the hearts and lived in the consciousness of the followers of Christ; and that it embodies the faith of the first disciples of our Lord. It has been recognized by the Catholic, Greek, and Protestant churches, and is perhaps better known, and more frequently repeated throughout

Christendom than any other composition, except the Lord's Prayer. In simplest form and fewest words it expresses the faith of the church in her earliest years, and now, after the lapse of ages, and when extended over the earth. Its well known words touching the Second Advent of Christ in our own tongue, are: "From thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead." The Textus receptus of the original has: Greek, *ἐκεῖθεν ἐρχόμενον κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς*. Latin, inde venturus judicare vivos et mortuos.

Upon this article, the learned and judicious bishop Pearson, in his Exposition of the Creed, says: "That the end for which he shall come, and the action which he shall perform when he cometh, is to judge"; and that he, "at his coming shall gather together all those which shall then be alive, and all which ever lived, and shall be before that day dead: when, causing them all to stand before his judgment seat, he shall judge them all according to their works done in the flesh."

As this creed was designed to express the great doctrines of redemption, and as it was in the heart of the church during the very period when some would have us believe that Millenarianism was almost universally received, and as it took its definite written form just after the most flourishing period of that system, it must appear strange that it could find no place in such a summary of the Christian faith.

2. *The Nicene Creed.*

The Nicene Creed is better known, and more generally recognized than any other, except the Apostles', and in the Oriental church it has entirely superseded that confession. It has in its original form *καὶ ἐρχόμενον κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς*, and in the amended Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan *καὶ πάλιν ἐρχόμενον μετὰ δόξης κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς*, "And will come [again with glory] to judge the quick and the dead." Between the Apostles' and the Nicene there is even a verbal agreement, and the meaning is clear.

3. *The Athanasian Creed.*

This creed, usually fixed about the close of the fifth or beginning of the sixth century, and the next most important symbol of the early church, has the following: Inde venturus est judicare vivos et mortuos. Ad cujus adventum omnes homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis. Et reddituri sunt de factis propriis rationem. "Whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. At whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies, and shall give account of their works."

An examination and brief analysis of these venerable confessions of the church, on the point under consideration, will give the following results:

1. All agree that Christ our Lord will come again. This has always and everywhere been a prime article of the Christian faith. Christ has come once in the flesh, but he is still to the church the ὁ ἐρχόμενος.

2. All agree that the object of his coming is "to judge the quick and the dead." This they testify with one voice; and, as preliminary to it, all confess the resurrection of the dead.

3. All imply, and one (the Athansaian) distinctly states, that this resurrection and judgment will take place at his coming (ad cujus adventum). No other view could be gathered from the language of these creeds; and they have been so understood by all who had no peculiar theory of their own to support.

4. All are silent about any pre-millenial coming, or personal reign, or any of the peculiar doctrines of Millenarians, and clearly enough inculcate directly the contrary. They simply know Christ coming to raise the dead, and judge the world.

In vain will any one seek for any shadow of countenance or support for Millenarianism in these early exhibitions of the Christian faith. By their silence they give no encouragement to such a doctrine, and, by a fair and natural interpretation of their language, they teach truths directly opposed to the entire system.

It will help to throw light upon this subject, and confirm what has been said about these creeds, if we produce other creeds of the same general period — creeds not so generally received, or highly prized, yet nevertheless not without their value, and especially important as evincing the common faith of the church, by her most distinguished teachers in that age. Of these creeds numerous collections have been made. We will chiefly make use of the collection found in the Appendix to Pearson's Exposition of the Creed, introducing from other sources such additional creeds as we deem desirable.

The first is that of Irenaeus, about A.D. 180.

Καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἐν τῇ δόξῃ τοῦ Πατρὸς παρουσίαν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα, καὶ ἀναστῆσαι πᾶσαν σάρκα πάσης ἀνθρωπότητος ..... καὶ κρίσιν δικαίαν ἐν τοῖς πᾶσι ποιήσηται, "And his [Christ's] coming from heaven in the glory of the Father, to gather again in one all things, and raise the flesh of all mankind: that, according to the will of the invisible Father, every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things on the earth, and things under the earth, to Jesus Christ our Lord and God and Saviour and King, and that every tongue should confess to him; and that he should exercise just judgment upon all."

Next is that of Tertullian, of which there are three several different forms in his writings: 1. Venturum judicare vivos et mortuos per carnis etiam resurrectionem, "Will come to judge the quick and the dead, through the resurrection of the flesh." 2. Venturum cum claritate ad sumendos sanctos in vitae aeternae et promissorum coelestium fructum, et ad profanos judicandos igni perpetuo facto utriusque partis resuscitatione cum carnis resurrectione, "Will come with glory, to take the saints into the fruition of eternal life and the heavenly promises; and to condemn the profane to everlasting fire, having first raised both the one and the other by the resurrection of the flesh." 3. Venturum judicare vivos et mortuos, "Will come to judge the quick and the dead."

Creed of Lucian the martyr: Et iterum venturus cum gloria judicare vivos et mortuos, "And will come again with glory, to judge the quick and the dead."

Of the Apostolical Constitutions: "And will come again with glory, at the end of the world, to judge the quick and the dead."

Of Eusebius of Caesarea: *Καὶ ἥξοντα πάλιν ἐν δόξῃ κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς*, "And will come again in glory, to judge the quick and the dead."

Of Cyril of Jerusalem: *καὶ ἐρχόμενον κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς*, "And will come to judge the quick and the dead."

Of Epiphanius: *ἐρχόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι ἐν δόξῃ κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς*, "Will come, in the same body, in glory, to judge the quick and the dead."

Of Basil the Great: *ὅθεν ἔρχεται ἐπὶ συντελεία τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου ἀναστῆσαι πάντας καὶ ἀποδοῦναι ἑκάστῳ κατὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν αὐτοῦ*, "Whence he will come, at the end of this world, to raise all, and give to each one according to his deeds."

Of Augustine: etiam inde venturum *convenientissimo tempore*, et judicaturum vivos et mortuos, "Whence he will come again at the appointed time, and judge the quick and the dead."

Some others might be added to this list; but they perfectly agree in sentiment, and for the most part in letter, with those cited, as these do with the three ecumenical creeds. In no creed or confession of that age is there found any trace of Millenarianism. They all testify to Christ's coming to raise the dead and sit in judgment, and some of them specifically place it at "the end of this world," and thus unite the general resurrection and final judgment with the coming of our Lord. So far, then, as the early creeds of the first six centuries are concerned, they are unanimous on this subject. Directly and indirectly they are witnesses against the Millenarian doctrine, as constituting no part of the general faith of the church.

It would be foolish, however, to attempt to conceal the fact that during a part of this period Millenarianism was prevalent, and that some distinguished teachers of the church gave to it the sanction of their authority. Before passing from this period, a brief notice will be taken of the leading facts

in the history of this doctrine during these centuries. And it is believed that an impartial survey will show that there is nothing to conflict with the statement just made, as to Millenarianism constituting no part of the acknowledged and confessed faith of the early church.

1. The immediate successors of the apostles, the so-called apostolic Fathers, furnish no evidence in their writings of the existence of any such doctrine. The allusion in Barnabas (chap. xv.) to the period of a thousand years, forms no exception to this statement. Nor is there any mention of it by the early Apologists—Tatian, Athenagoras, or Theophilus of Antioch. "It is known," says Semisch, "that neither in the Epistles of the Roman Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp, nor in the apologetical writings of Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus of Antioch, can any trace be found of Millenarian opinions" (Life and Times of Justin Martyr, Ryland's translation, Vol. ii. 374). This must certainly appear very strange if it were a doctrine taught by the apostles. Undoubtedly their immediate successors, and who had learned directly from them the doctrines they taught, would not have been ignorant or silent on such a subject if it had the least shadow of apostolic authority. And this must appear the more singular when it is remembered that this doctrine has especially flourished in times of persecution and trials, such as these early confessors and martyrs experienced, and may well be supposed, if true, to have presented great attractions to men like Ignatius and Polycarp who sealed their faith with their blood. Instead of this, however, we find them profoundly silent, as though it had never entered their mind or engaged their thoughts. This silence of the apostolic Fathers on this subject must forever be fatal to the theory of those who would have this the primitive apostolic faith.

2. In the latter half of the second century this doctrine appears with considerable prominence, so much so that some have represented it as the universally received faith. During this period it can boast of such advocates as Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, names most sacred in the annals of martyrdom,

and these again followed by Tertullian, Cyprian, and others. No one during these early ages has given more distinct utterance, or by his authority given greater weight to this doctrine, than Justin Martyr. With him it was evidently a favorite doctrine, and one that he regarded as not only orthodox, but as constituting a part of a complete orthodox faith. Semisch has shown that they are mistaken who cite Justin to prove that this was deemed absolutely essential to a sound faith; but that Justin regarded it as included in the most comprehensive and fully-developed faith of believers. The statement that it was the universal faith of that age is certainly too strong. The remains of Christian literature of that precise period are quite scanty, and our means of forming an intelligent and satisfactory judgment, not the best; but the fact already noted, that it could find its way into no authorized or general statement of doctrine is not in its favor. It only appears as the view of individual teachers, and, as we shall see, met with prompt and decided opposition. Neander, so distinguished for his caution and fairness says: "Our knowledge of the times is too defective to enable us to assert that at any one period it was universally prevalent" (History of Doctrines, Bohn's edition, Vol. i. 249). "Whenever we meet with Chiliasm in Papias, Irenaeus, Justin Martyr, everything goes to indicate that it was diffused from one country and from a single fountain-head" (Church History, Vol. i. 651). This country was Phrygia, and to Papias, bishop of the church in Hierapolis, is the credit given of giving currency to this doctrine. Some, indeed, have charged the origin of the system on the heretic Cerinthus, and thus brought upon it additional disrepute. The most reasonable and best authenticated account is, that it was of Jewish origin, and crept into the church along with other Judaizing opinions, and for a season found advocates among church teachers. But, as Neander observes, it "is not to be understood as if Chiliasm had ever formed a part of the general creed of the church" (Church History, Vol. i. 561).

3. It soon met with the most vigorous opposition from

within the church and by the most distinguished teachers. The wild extravagances into which it ran, even in the hands of such as Irenaeus, was not well adapted to win it favor or friends.[1] Both east and west it excited alarm by its gross and sensuous representations, and the very manner in which it was opposed showed that it had no very strong hold on the enlightened judgment, and that it was not recognized as any part of the divinely established and received faith. The remark of Stanley is as truthful as it is piquant: "The fancies of Millenarians, however innocent and natural, and however widely diffused among small circles, have always been resisted by the robust sense of the universal church" (History of Eastern Church, Introduction, p. 70). Unfortunately for its success in these early times, it became associated with some of the rank errors of the age, and thus brought upon itself a double condemnation. Caius at Rome and Origen at Alexandria were among the first to raise the note of alarm. Nepos and Coracion undertook successively its defence, and a division of the church at Alexandria was threatened. But the doctrine could not stand the test of a rigid examination. Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, assembled his clergy, and, after several days discussion, succeeded in convincing even the leaders of their error, and all renounced the Millenarian faith. After the third century only an occasional name is

[1] As an illustration of the extravagances into which even good men may run on this subject, the language of Irenaeus, quoting from Papias, may be cited: "The days will come in which vines will grow, each having ten thousand boughs; and on each bough ten thousand branches; and on each branch ten thousand twigs; and on each twig ten thousand clusters; and on each cluster ten thousand grapes; and each grape, when pressed, will yield twenty-five metres of wine; and when any one of the saints shall take hold of one of the clusters, another will cry out: I am a better cluster, take me, and on my account give thanks to the Lord. In like manner, a grain of wheat will produce ten thousand heads, and each head will have ten thousand grains; and each grain will yield ten pounds of fine clean flour; and other fruit, seeds, and herbage in like proportion" (Irenaeus, Contra Haereses, v. 33). It would not be difficult to furnish a parallel to this from Millenarian writers of the present day, although the extravagance is generally in some other direction. Examples will readily occur to the intelligent reader.

found in its support; prominent among whom is the eloquent Lactantius. Jerome, if he did not reject or directly oppose the doctrine, spoke of it in such an ironical manner as was well calculated to bring it into disrepute, whilst Augustine did much to banish it from the church, by placing it in the catalogue of heresies. From the time of Augustine, for more than a thousand years, it had little countenance or support from the church. Its currency was not of long duration, and its spurious character was soon detected and branded by the advocates of a pure faith. Dr. Shedd with truth remarks, that "the period between the year 150 and 250 is the blooming age of Millenarianism; and yet even in this period it does not become the catholic faith, as embodied in the catholic creed" (History of Doctrines, Vol. ii. 392). But its bloom soon passed into utter decay; for if we regard the statement of Baronius as a little highly colored, yet its general truth cannot be questioned, when in the annals of A.D. 411 he says "the figments of the Millenaries being now rejected everywhere, and derided by the learned with hisses and laughter, and also being put under the ban, were entirely extirpated."

As it is not the design of this Article to give the history of this doctrine, but to bring it into comparison with the creeds of the church, we may pass on more than a thousand years and resume our task with the creeds of modern times. During these thousand years no changes were made in this article of faith. The second great period in the history of creeds begins with the Reformation of the sixteenth century. Protestants found it necessary to give to the world a declaration of their faith; and as the hosts of Protestantism became divided, each new party defined by a creed or confession its doctrinal position. The Romish church also set forth new definitions and explanations of her faith, to meet the supposed exigencies of her case. Compared with the creeds of the earlier period, those of this later age are distinguished for their length, minuteness of detail, and introduction of minor differences of opinion. Each denomination or sect deemed it important to give the utmost prominence to its own dis-

tinctive peculiarity, and thus the ranks of Protestantism were divided, and have been kept divided, by differences upon points that were tolerated in the early church without the least division or discord.

But we have only at this time to do with the most prominent of these confessions as bearing upon our subject; and we begin with the mother symbol of Protestantism.

The Augsburg Confession, A.D. 1530.

The Seventeenth Article treats of "Christ's return to Judgmen," De Christi Reditu ad Judicium. Referring to this Article, Hagenbach, in his History of Doctrine, observes: "The fanatical notions of the Anabaptists concerning the restitution of all things, and Millenarianism, were rejected by the Protestants" (Vol. ii. 370). Melanchthon, in the Apology, says: "Our adversaries receive, without exception, the Seventeenth Article, in which we confess that Christ will come at the end of the world, to raise up all the dead," etc. How decidedly their Romish adversaries were opposed to everything in the shape of Millenarianism is well known to all in any degree conversant with the history and doctrines of that church. So that the Augsburg Confession was understood on all sides as in complete harmony with the old received catholic faith on this subject.

The Article itself reads as follows: Item docent, quod *Christus apparebit in consummatione mundi ad judicandum*, et mortuos omnes resuscitabit, piis et electis dabit vitam aeternam et perpetua gaudia, impios autem homines ac diabolos condemnabit, ut sine fine crucientur.

Damnant Anabaptistas, qui sentiunt hominibus damnatis ac diabolis finem poenarum futurum esse.

Damnant et alios, qui nunc spargunt judaicas opiniones, quod ante resurrectionem mortuorum pii regnum mundi occupaturi sint, ubique oppressis impiis.[1]

[1] It may serve to illustrate the views of Melanchthon, the writer of this Confession, to quote a brief extract from his Loci Communes (Pars ii. De regno Christi): "Atque hoc Judaicum delirium saepe in ecclesiam irrepsit: fuerunt

"It is taught that Christ will appear at the end of the world (German, 'am yungsten Tage, at the last day') to sit in judgment, and that he will raise all the dead, and will give to the righteous and elect eternal life and endless joys; but wicked men and devils he will condemn, and they shall be tormented without end.

"The Anabaptists are condemned, who hold that there will be an end to the punishment of condemned men and devils.

"Others are also condemned, who are now scattering Jewish notions, that prior to the resurrection the righteous will possess a temporal kingdom (German, 'ein weltlich Reich'), and all the wicked will be exterminated."

Upon the import of this Article it is unnecessary to offer a lengthy criticism. Besides not one word to favor the Millenarian theory, and in express terms condemning such views, as "Jewish notions," it distinctly places the Second Coming of Christ at the end of the world, and the object of his coming to be to exercise his office as Judge of the quick and the dead. Holding most firmly, as the Reformers did, to the ancient creeds, they could teach no other doctrine, and could not but condemn any views so directly in conflict with this doctrine as Millenarianism manifestly is. And such is the view of all who adhere to the Augsburg Confession in good faith, and where Millenarian views have prevailed in the Lutheran church, they have been tolerated only as not being fundamental errors. They have no place in, and can find no shelter under, this oldest and most celebrated Protestant confession.

The Tetrapolitan Confession, A.D. 1530.

This confession presented at the same Diet of Augsburg, on the part of those who could not subscribe the Augsburg Confession, is an additional witness to the faith as then held. It has, as it professes to "differ in nothing from the Fathers and the common consent of Christians (nihil a patribus, nihil

enim et olim fanatici spiritus Chiliastae et Pepusiani, qui tale regnum anabaptisticum somniarunt."

a communi Christianorum consensu variamus)," the declaration in harmony with the settled faith, concerning Christ's coming: Ad dextram patris evectus est unde eum expectamus judicem vivorum et mortuorum, "Whence we expect him as Judge of the quick and the dead." — Cap. ii. (Niemeyer's Collectio Confessionium, p. 746).

The First Confession of Basle, A.D. 1534.

Art. iv. Disput. x. Inde venturum esse ad judicandum vivos it mortuos, "Whence he will come to judge the quick and the dead" (Niemeyer, p. 92).

The First Helvetic or Second Basle Confession, A.D. 1536.

Art. xi. Hunc (Christum) venturum ad saeculorum omnium finem, verum, rectumque judicum, ac sententiam, in omnium carnem, ad id judicium prius suscitatam, laturum ..... expectamus, "We expect him to come at the end of the world (German, am end der welt), the true and righteous Judge, and to pass sentence upon all flesh, being raised up first for this judgment" (Niemeyer, p. 117).

The Second Helvetic Confession, A.D. 1564.

Art. xi. Redibit autem Christus, adserturus suos, et abolituros adventu suo Antichristum, judicaturusque vivos et mortuos. Resurgent enim mortui et qui illa die (quae omnibus incognita est creaturis) superstites futuro sunt, mutabuntur in momento oculi, etc. ..... Damnamus praeterea Judaica somnia quod ante judicii diem aureum in terris sit futurum seculum, et pii regna mundi occupaturi oppressis suis hostibus impiis, "But Christ will return to receive his own, to destroy by his coming Antichrist, and to judge the quick and the dead. For the dead will rise, and those who on that day (which is unknown to all creatures) shall be alive, will be changed in the twinkling of an eye. ..... Moreover, we condemn Jewish dreams, that before the day of judgment there will be a golden age in the earth,

and that the righteous will possess the kingdom of the world, and their wicked enemies be destroyed" (Niemeyer, p. 486).

These two Helvetic confessions are quite decisive in their statements, and entirely agree with other Protestant confestions, as well as with the ancient symbols on this subject: 1. They place Christ's coming at the end of the world (ad saeculorum omnium finem, "am end der welt"); not at the beginning of the millenium, or a thousand years before the last great conflict between Christ and Satan. 2. He comes to raise up the dead and pass judgment upon all men. This is distinctly stated to be the object of his coming. He comes, not to establish a kingdom on the earth, but to receive his own to himself (in sedes beatas sine fine). 3. These "Jewish dreams" of a temporal kingdom are severely condemned.

The Heidelberg Catechism, A.D. 1562.

Quaest. xlvi. Quomodo intelliges illud: Ascendit ad coelos? Quod aspicientibus discipulis, Christus de terra in coelum sublatus est, atque etiamnum nostra causa ibidem est, et erit, donec redeat ad judîcandum vivos et mortuos, "That Christ, in the sight of his disciples, was taken up from the earth into heaven; and that he continues there for our interest, until he come again to judge the quick and the dead" (Niemeyer, p. 440).

According to this Christ remains in heaven, acting in behalf of his people, until he comes to the judgment of the last day. There is no personal coming prior to that grand and solemn occasion.

The Belgic Confession, A.D. 1562.

Art. xxxvii. Postremo credimus ex Dei verbo, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, quando tempus a Deo praestitutum, quod omnibus creaturis est ignotum, advenerit, et numerus Electorum completus fuerit, e coelo rursus venturum, idque corporaliter et visibiliter, sicuti olim illuc asscendit, cum gloria et majestate, ut se declaret judicem vivorum et mortuorum. ..... Omnes enim antea mortui e terra tunc

resurgent. ..... Qui porro ultimo illo die superstites erunt, nequaquam morientur more reliquorum, sed momento et jactu oculi, immutabuntur, "Finally, we believe from the word of God, that when the time appointed by God shall come, which is unknown to all creatures, and the number of the elect shall have been completed, our Lord Jesus Christ will come again from heaven, and this corporally and visibly, as formerly he ascended thither, with glory and majesty, that he may declare himself Judge of the quick and the dead. ..... For all that were already dead shall then rise from the earth. ..... Moreover, those who are alive at that last day, will not die after the manner of others, but in a moment and the twinkling of an eye will be changed" (Niemeyer pp. 387, 388).

Here it is expressly taught that Christ will not come until the last day, and when the number of the elect shall be completed, that at his coming, not a part, but all the dead shall rise, and that he will appear as the Judge of the living and the dead.

The Scotch Confession, A.D. 1560.

Art. xi. Sicut etiam sine dubio credimus, ultimum judicium futurum, ad cujus executionem, certo confidimus, eundem Dominum Jesum visibiliter rediturum, sicut visus est ascendere, et quod tunc tempus recreationis et restitutionis rerum omnium veniet, finiter credimus, "Thus also we believe, without doubt, that there will be a final judgment, to whose execution we with certainty expect the same Lord Jesus visibly to return, as he was seen ascending, and that then will come the time of the renewing and restoring of all things" (Niemeyer, p. 345).

The Anglican Confession, or Thirty-nine Articles, A.D. 1551–1562.

Art. iv. Christus vere a mortuis resurrexit ..... in coelum ascendit, ibique residet, quoad extremo die judicandos homines reversurus sit, "Christ did truly rise again from

death ..... and ascended into heaven, and there sitteth, until he return to judge all men at the last day" (Niemeyer, p. 601).

This Article is definite in itself, limiting Christ's return to the last day, until which time he remains seated in heaven, and when he does come it is to judge all men. But these Articles in the older form, as the Articles of Edward VI., had besides this Fourth Article, also the forty-first, thus:

Qui millenariorum fabulam revocare conantur, sacris literis adversantuo et in Judaica deliramenta sese praecipitant, "Those who are endeavoring to revive the fable of the Millenarians oppose the sacred scriptures, and run headlong into Jewish follies" (Niemeyer, p. 600).

This leaves no doubt about the views of those who compiled this confession. The very thing is pointed out by name, and reprobated in the strongest terms.

The Westminster Confession and Catechisms, A.D. 1643–1648.

Confession, Art. viii. "And shall return to judge men and angels at the end of the world." Larger Catechism, Quest. 56. "Christ ..... shall come again at the last day in great power, and in the full manifestation of his own glory, and of his Father's, with all his holy angels, with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trumpet of God, to judge the world in righteousness."

His coming is here set down "at the last day," and for the purpose of judging the world. These are not all, but they embrace the chief and most important of the Protestant confessions, and among the others there will be found no dissent from the views here expressed. We have chosen to cite the words of these confessions, that they might be allowed to speak for themselves. Their own testimony is more convincing than anything we could say of them. We have here the united testimony of Luther and Melanchthon, of Zwingli and Bucer, of Calvin and Knox, of Ursinus and Olevianus, of the great Anglican divines, Episcopal and Presbyterian,

joined by the whole Protestant church of the sixteenth century. Among them all there appears no discordant or conflicting testimony. They were jealous of the honor of their Divine Redeemer, and devoted themselves to his glory. For the welfare of his kingdom they lived and labored They all believed in his kingdom as being spiritual, and were unanimous in their testimony to the following points:

1. That Christ will continue to occupy his mediatorial throne in heaven until all the redeemed are gathered into his fold. Exalted to be a Prince and a Saviour, he will extend his kingdom and subjugate the world to his sway, by the power he exercises on that throne, and not by coming in person to establish an earthly kingdom, or to reign visibly over the world.

2. That Christ will not come again until the end of the present world. His coming is identified with the end of this dispensation, or of the present world as under the providence and grace of God. His coming ushers in an entirely new order of things, terminating the probation of this earth, and commencing the period of retribution.

3. That when Christ does come it will be to the general resurrection and judgment of the last day. A partial, literal resurrection of saints to dwell upon the earth before the general resurrection, as well as a personal reign of Christ over this world, is a doctrine unknown to the faith of the Reformers.

It remains that we compare in this examination the Catholic and Greek confessions. The Catholic church boasts of her faith as truly apostolic, having received it and handed it down unimpaired from the apostles. However she was constrained by the upheaving of the great Reformation to give to the world a new exposition and confirmation of her faith. It is entirely foreign to our purpose to examine the claims of the Catholic church to apostolicity, or to discuss the soundness of her teachings. It has been indeed a mooted question where the true doctrines of the Catholic church are to be found, or what are to be considered as her symbolical writ-

ings; and upon this subject her own authorities are not entirely agreed. The most reliable authorities name the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent (Canones et Decreta Concilii Tridentini), the Tridentine or Roman Catechism (Catechismus Romanus, ex Decreto Concilii Tridentini), and the Profession of Faith (Professio fidei Tridentinae), contained in the Bull of Pius IV., 1564, giving the greatest weight to the first of these documents. Möhler, who may be regarded as the very highest authority on this subject, says in reference to the Canons and Decrees of Trent and their symbolical character: "Every other writing that may bear such a title is only a deduction from this formulary, or a nearer definition, illustration, or application of its contents, or is in part only regulated by it, or in any case obtains a value only by agreement with it, and hence cannot in point of dignity, bear a comparison with the original itself." It may not be amiss in passing to observe that a doctrine need not be suspected because of being found in the creed of that church, for confessedly most of the great doctrines are retained and zealously defended by her, however she may have corrupted and destroyed the truth by admixtures of error. She has never been charged with unsoundness or false teaching on the particular point under consideration, but has adhered closely to the ancient creeds and the faith of the Fathers.

1. *Council of Trent, Sessio* III., A.D. 1546.

The decree concerning the faith — de symbolo fidei — has in reference to Christ: Sedet ad dextram Patris, et iterum venturus est cum gloria judicare vivos et mortuos, cujus regni non erit finis — "sitteth at the right hand of the Father, and will come again with glory, to judge the quick and the dead; of whose kingdom there shall be no end." The symbol adopted was simply the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan, and, of course, does not differ on this doctrine. The Tridentine Profession of Faith includes the same formula, and all authorized teachers of the church are expected and required to conform to its doctrines (Sarpi, Hist. Concil. Trent).

2. *The Catechism of Trent*, A.D. 1566.

This catechism, published by authority of the council, Sessions xxiv., xxv., and officially endorsed is of very high authority in the Catholic church. In it we find the following:

De vii. Articulo, Caput viii.

1. Quis est septimus articulus, quamque sententiam includit? "What is the seventh article, and what doctrine does it embrace?"

Inde venturus est judicare vivos et mortuos, "Whence he will come to judge the quick and the dead." And it is added: Cujus Articuli, ea vis est et ratio, summo illo die, Christum Dominum de universo hominum genere judicaturum esse, "Of this article this is the force and meaning, that at the last day Christ the Lord will judge all mankind."

2. Quotuplex est Christi adventus?

Sacrae literae duos Filii Dei adventus esse testantur; alterum cum salutis nostrae causa carnem assumpsit, et homo in virginis alvo effectus est; alternum, cum in consummatione saeculi ad judicandos omnes homines veniet. Hic adventus in sacris literis dies Domini appellatur, etc., etc. Thus rendered by T. A. Buckley (London 1852), "For the sacred letters bare witness that there are two comings of the Son of God, one, when for our salvation he took upon him the flesh, and was made man in the womb of the virgin; the other, when he shall come at the end of the world to judge mankind. This coming is called in scripture, the day of the Lord; of which the apostle saith, The day of the Lord shall so come as a thief in the night; and our Lord himself, But of that day and hour no one knoweth" (Cat. Rom. ex Decreto Concilii Tridentini, etc.).

As illustrating and confirming the faith of the Catholic church on this subject, we may cite one or two additional authorities. The extended Catechism of P. Collot, doctor of the Sorbonne, translated and published by authority of Archbishop Hughes, has Article vii.

2. "What mean those words: Whence he shall come to

judge?"—"That at the end of ages he shall visibly descend from heaven, and shall come in majesty to judge all mankind, and render to every one according to his works."

2. "When shall he come down again?"—"At the end of ages, or at the end of the world, which is the same thing; for, when ages are at an end the world shall end too."

3. "For what purpose shall he come?"—"To judge all mankind. He came the first time to save men. The second time it will be to judge them."

Archbishop Kenrick in his Theologia Dogmatica, Vol. ii. 413, says of gross Chiliasm: A foedo hoc errore semper abhorruerunt universi Ecclesiae Patres," which we prefer to leave untranslated.

The Greek church, besides the Nicene Creed, and the decisions of the seven ecumenical councils, held prior to the schism between the East and the West, gives greatest prominence to the Orthodox confession, *Ὀρθόδοξος Ὁμολογία*, prepared by Peter Mogilas, the metropolitan of Kiev, A.D. 1642. This confession, questions 57, 58, teaches in strict harmony with the ancient creeds and that of the Catholic church.

Orthodox Confession, A.D. 1642.

Ἐρώτησις νή.

Τί μᾶς, διδάσκει τοῦτο τὸ ἄρθρον τῆς πίστεως;

Ἀπ. Τρία πράγματα· πρῶτον πὼς ὁ Χριστος μέλλει νὰ στρέχῃ διὰ νὰ κρίνῃ ζῶτας καὶ νεκρούς, καθὼς δ' ἴδιος λέγει διὰ λόγου τοῦ (*Ματτ. κε. λα.*), "Christ will come to judge the quick and the dead, as he himself testifies in his word (Matt. xxv. 31)." It cites also in proof, 2 Tim. iv. 1: "Who shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and his kingdom" (Libri. Symbolici Ecclesiae Orientalis, E. J. Kimmel, 1843).

Enough has been said to show that the confessions of the church, ancient and modern, Protestant, Catholic, and Greek, give no countenance to Millenarianism, but with entire unanimity teach a doctrine wholly irreconcilable with the first principles of that system. In modern, as in ancient times,

there have been found individuals of learning and piety who advocated this doctrine, but it has had no strong hold on the faith or life of the church, and it has uniformly exhibited a tendency to run into the most extravagant and foolish calculations and opinions. It is not intended by any means to charge all who embrace Millenarian views with such extravagances, but the history of the doctrine shows that in every age where it has prevailed, it has been thus distinguished. Modern Millenarianism, it might be easily shown, while boasting some gifted men, presents no exception to this statement. It may well be asked, can a system utterly destitute of any foundation in the common faith of Christendom, as expressed in all her great confessions, and directly opposed to it, have any just claim upon our regard?

Purposely little has been allowed in this discussion besides the creeds themselves, and just what seemed necessary to make out a somewhat connected statement. No witnesses have been cited from the Middle Ages, as this was not a confessional period. But we may, in closing the Article, listen to one that speaks the language of Christendom—one standing midway between the earlier and the later confessions, and echoing them both, echoing the common faith of Christians through all the ages. The faith of Christ's believing ones is sometimes more truthfully expressed in such a manner, than in formal creeds, or doctrinal treatises, or learned dissertations. About the year A.D. 1250, Thomas De Celano, a Franciscan monk, in words which have awakened a response in the hearts of millions, Protestant as well as Catholic, and which enter into the worship of a large part of Christendom at this day, sang:

Dies irae, Dies illa!
Solvet saeclum in favilla,
Teste David cum Sybilla.

Tuba mirum spargens sonum
Per sepulchra regionum,
Coget omnes ante thronum.

Quantus tremor est futurus,
Quando Judex est venturus,
Cuncta stricte discussurus.

Mors stupebit, et natura,
Quam resurget creatura,
Judicanti responsura.

ARTICLE III.

NATURAL THEOLOGY: THEORY OF HEAT.

BY REV. EDWARD W. MORLEY, PITTSFIELD, MASS.

PART I.—THEORY OF HEAT IN ITS RELATION TO WATER.

The welfare of man is more closely dependent on the agency and laws of heat than on any other physical force. It concerns his most constant and imperative necessities. Houses and clothing are needful mainly because they protect us from cold. Food is required to produce the vital heat which is the condition of comfort and the source of motion, while it is itself produced by the heat of the sun. All the phenomena of climate and of the weather are controlled by the laws of heat. Every motion on the earth (except that of aerolites and the tides), and every dynamic power which man can create or direct, is ultimately the work of heat.[1]

As this agent relates to the more simple and tangible wants of man, we may expect that its laws will give very plain indications of the character of their Author. As it affects the material conditions of man at so many points, we should look for very copious evidence. This is true to such an extent that this Article will be confined to a single subdivision of the subject; namely, some proofs of the knowledge and goodness of God derived from the laws of heat as related to water.

1. The boiling-point of water affords proofs of the wisdom and goodness of God.

There is no physical necessity that this should occur at two hundred and twelve degrees of the Fahrenheit scale. As far as we know it might have been made the same with the boiling-points of oil of turpentine, alcohol, or ether. We shall see the benevolence of the present adjustment by noticing some of the consequences which would follow if any change were made.

[1] See Heat considered as a Mode of Motion: By John Tyndall, F. R. S., (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1863), pp. 446, 447.

The amount of vapor given off at ordinary temperatures by any liquid depends on the temperature at which it boils. If the boiling-point of water were the same as that of alcohol, the vapor given off by the ocean would be two and a half times as much as at present.[1] Such an excess of aqueous vapor would produce continual rains and inundations, and would make the air too damp for animal, and too cloudy for vegetable, life. If water boiled at the same temperature as ether, the vapor rising from the ocean would be more than twenty-five times as much as at present.[1] In such a state of things no man could see the sun on account of the clouds; the rain would be so excessive as to tear up the soil and wash away plants; inundations would be constant, and navigation would be impossible in the inland torrents which would take the place of our rivers. In winter the snow of one day might bury the houses.

If, on the other hand, water boiled at the same temperature with oil of turpentine, the vapor given off by the ocean would be less than one fourth of its present amount.[1] In this case rain would be a rarity like an eclipse of the sun, the dryness of the desert of Sahara would be equalled in a large part of the globe, which would therefore be bare of vegetation, and incapable of sustaining animal life. Plants would be scorched by unclouded sunshine, springs and rivulets would be dry, and inland navigation would cease; for nearly all the rain would be absorbed by the porous earth.

We see then that the boiling-point of water has been adjusted to various relations. It is adjusted to the capacity of space to contain aqueous vapor in a transparent state; if it were higher than two hundred and twelve degrees the earth

[1] See Elements of Chemistry, Theoretical and Practical. By William Allen Miller, M.D., LL.D., Part i. Chemical Physics (From the Third London edition. New York: John Wiley, 1864), table p. 274. The tension of the vapor of water at 68° F. (the most suitable temperature mentioned), is 0.686; of the vapor of turpentine, 0.168; of the vapor of alcohol, 1.732; and of the vapor of ether, 17.117. $\frac{.168}{.686} = \frac{1}{4}$ nearly; $\frac{1.732}{.686} = 2\frac{1}{2}$ nearly; $\frac{17.117}{.686} = 25$ nearly. The density of aqueous vapor is assumed constant.

would be scorched by an unclouded sun; if it were lower, it would droop under continual shade. It is suited to the demand of plants for water; if it were higher, they would suffer from drouth; if it were lower, they would be torn up by floods. It is in harmony with the texture of the soil; if it were higher, the earth would absorb all the rain which falls; if it were lower, the soil would often be washed away by the surface torrents after a shower. It is adapted to the elevation of the continents above the sea; if it were higher, rivers with their present inclination would be so shallow as to be often dry; if it were lower, most rivers would be so deep as to be torrents, while the land would be covered with floods.[1]

But some one objects: "We have no right to assert that the constitution of water has been adjusted to the other objects to which it is related. This may have been fixed first, and other things adjusted to it." Certainly; but the fact of *adjustment* remains. Whether the key or the lock be made first, we equally see the skill of their maker in the accuracy of their mutual adaptation.

It may be said: "If the boiling-point of water had been higher or lower, other things would have been so arranged that these injurious consequences should be avoided. Plants might have been made so as to require less moisture, and thus no evil would have followed."

This objection assumes what we are attempting to prove: If the Author of nature is wise and good he will in some way avoid the evils mentioned above. Then the question comes: Is he wise and good? This we can answer by looking at the nature of the contrivances he uses. We examine the delicate mechanism of a chronometer; we are told that if a certain part were the hundredth of an inch shorter, a slight jar might stop its motion at any time, while if the same part were as much longer, excessive friction would destroy all accuracy. We remember that if the chronometer either stops or is in

[1] On this topic the following may be consulted with advantage: Tyndall on Heat, p. 130; Miller, Chemical Physics, p. 272 seq.; Nichol, Cyclopaedia of the Physical Sciences, p. 208.

error, the ship may be lost; and we cannot avoid the conclusion that some skilful artist both knew of these evils and made choice of the means of preventing them. If the boiling-point of water were slightly different, the evils mentioned above would follow. They have been avoided, and we cannot resist the conclusion that the present adjustment was adopted by one who knew what would be the evils of any other, and who chose to avoid them. Then he is wise and good.

2. The adjustments of the freezing-point of water exhibit the wisdom and goodness of God.

No physical necessity is known by virtue of which water must freeze at thirty-two degrees, and not rather thirty degrees higher or lower. The results which would come from a change in either direction show that the selection of the present freezing-point, rather than any other, is a mark of benevolence.

If the freezing-point of water were raised ten degrees, in Massachusetts very few weeks of the year would be free from frost. The climate of Okak, "where the missionaries inform us that on the first of May, 1837, their yard was covered with snow to the depth of from five to eight yards, and in August it snowed anew,"[1] would almost be equalled in some parts of New England. This state of things may not imply a degree of cold injurious to animal life, as the winter might on the whole be no colder than now; but it would destroy vegetation, partly by frequent frosts, which would cut down individual plants, and partly by the shortness of the summer, which would prevent whole species from maturing seed. Rivers would be closed to navigation much longer than now, and the salt water of our harbors would often freeze.

If, on the other hand, the freezing-point of water were lower by thirty degrees, the consequences would be yet more serious. Ice keeps the water under it at a temperature a little above thirty-two degrees. If water could cool down to zero before receiving this protection, the polar seas would become immense reservoirs of perpetual cold which aqueous

[1] Quoted in Nichol, Cyclopaedia of the Physical Sciences, p. 401, *b*.

and aerial currents would diffuse through the temperate zones. Snow would not fall to protect the roots of plants till most of them had been destroyed by cold; and most of the snow which now falls without harm to animals would fall as rain at a temperature near zero, and kill every being exposed to it. If the discomforts and blustering winds of our March thaws came at zero, they would be unendurable.

Thus the freezing-point of water is adjusted to the mean temperature of spring and summer, being far enough below it to save plants from destructive frosts. It is also adapted to the length of summer and autumn, permitting the plants of each latitude to mature their seed. It is in harmony with the capacity for endurance possessed by animals, saving them from the consequences of a rain or a thaw at zero.

Does one believe that this adjustment is the result of accident or chance? He should believe that two and two are four by accident, that every event has a cause by accident. Such a belief is an accident which happens to no sane mind. Does one think that possibly an ignorant contriver stumbled on so happy a medium? Ignorance would stumble on something as inept as this opinion. Does any one doubt whether, after all, a malevolent being may not have chosen so beneficent a relation of means to ends? Only malignity towards infinite benevolence can sanction a mode of reasoning so at variance with all our laws of thought. We cannot resist the tendency of our minds to infer that this particular adjustment was made because its consequences were known and its benefits regarded as desirable. Then its Author is wise and good.

3. The high specific heat of water affords further proof of the wisdom and goodness of God.

The specific heat of any substance is the quantity of heat required to raise its temperature one degree, taking for our unit the quantity of heat expended in warming the same weight of water one degree. As a stiff and a flexible bow require very different amounts of strength to bend them equally, different bodies require very different amounts of heat to warm the same weight equally.

It is a fact which has elicited much attention, that the specific heat of water is greater than that of any other known substance. The heat which would warm one pound of water eighteen degrees and one half, would raise the temperature of a pound of lead from thirty-two degrees to its melting-point.[1] The heat which would warm a pound of water thirty-one degrees, would make a pound of gold red-hot.[2] The heat which would boil three pounds of ice-water would melt nineteen pounds of ice-cold lead.[3]

Were the specific heat of water small, the extremes of summer and winter would be too excessive.

Through its enormous power of storing up heat, the ocean acts the part of a balance-wheel, preventing sudden or great variations of temperature. A part of the sea, three hundred and twenty-five feet deep, having the same area as Massachusetts, contains so much heat that by cooling one degree it would warm all the air over that State forty degrees.[4] If the specific heat of water were the same as that of mercury, forty degrees would be reduced to less than one and one third,[5] and the effect of the ocean in moderating the extremes of heat and cold would be but a thirtieth of its present amount. How important this influence is, may be inferred from a comparison of two places, one of which feels its full power, while the other receives a smaller share. The eastern coast

[1] Fusing point of lead [Miller, Chemical Physics, p. 248], 620° F.; specific heat [*id.* p. 241], 0.0314, water being the standard; $[620° - 32°] \times .0314 = 18.46°$.

[2] Lowest temperature at which metals become luminous [Miller, p. 121], 977°; specific heat of gold [*id.* p. 242], 0.03244; $[977° - 32°] \times .03244 = 30.66°$.

[3] Fusing point of lead [Miller, p. 248], 620°; specific heat [*id.* p. 241], 0.03140; latent heat of fusion [*id.* p. 247], 9.65°; $\frac{212° - 32°}{(620° - 32°) \times 0.03140 + 9.65°} = \frac{19 \text{ lbs.}}{3 \text{ lbs.}}$ nearly.

[4] Corrected height of barometer at Cambridge, Mass. [Guyot, Tables Meteorological and Physical, third edition, series D, folio 85], 30.010; specific gravity of mercury at 32° [Lardner, Hand-book of Natural Philosophy; Hydrostatics, Pneumatics, and Heat (London, 1858), p. 65], 13.598; specific heat of air [Miller, p. 237], 0.2375; $\frac{325 \times 12 \text{ in.}}{30.01 \text{ in.} \times 13.598 \times 0.2375} \times 1° = 40.24°$.

[5] Specific heat of mercury [Miller, p. 241], 0.03192; $40.24° \times .03192 = 1.28°$.

of Iceland is only twenty degrees colder in January than in July;[1] the surrounding water stores up in summer the heat which would be injurious, and returns it to the air in winter when it is needed. But Jakoutsk, in the interior of Siberia, farther from the compensating power of the ocean, suffers a variation of more than a hundred and fourteen degrees in the mean temperatures of those months.[2] No man can tell from what extremes more terrible than this even Jakoutsk is saved by the large specific heat of water. If this were the same as that of lead, or one thirty-second part of its present amount, this compensating power of the ocean would be so small as to be of no avail. The winter of New England would too closely resemble that of Jakoutsk, where mercury is frozen more than three months of the year, and the summer that of Soudan, where sealing-wax melts and ether boils in the shade.

Were the specific heat of water small, bodies of water on the earth would receive too much heat in summer.

Green River in Williamstown has a temperature during August of sixty-nine and a half degrees.[3] Shallow pools become somewhat warmer than this. If water had the same specific heat as lead, a thirty-second part[4] of its present amount, the heat which warms a river three degrees would be sufficient to warm it ninety-six degrees. Small rivers would therefore become too hot for animal life during August. They would almost boil away on a hot day. The amount of vapor given off would be excessive; fogs would be constant, and the miasma resulting would be intolerable and destructive. This vapor would come down in torrents of rain, as we have indicated above, tearing up the earth, sweeping off vegetation, and destroying the works of man.

[1] Nichol, Cyclopaedia of the Physical Sciences, p. 727, and Johnston's Physical Atlas, Isothermal Charts and accompanying text.

[2] 114.26°, Dove, Report of British Association, Meeting at Oxford, 1847, p. [16] (following p. 376); Nichol and Johnston, loc. cit.

[3] From Manuscript Observations by Professor Dewey, Library of Williams College.

[4] Specific heat of lead [Miller, p. 241], 0.03140 = $\frac{1}{32}$ nearly.

From this survey it would seem, therefore, that the specific heat of water has been adjusted to other parts of the system to which it is related. It is adjusted to the specific heat and to the weight of the atmosphere, and the variations of the seasons are not too excessive. It is adapted to the conditions of comfort for animal life, and the changes from heat to cold are neither too large nor too rapid. It is in harmony with the amount of heat received by the earth from the sun, and therefore water does not become too hot in August. It is suited to the amount of water on the land, so that lakes do not become so nearly dry as to cause miasma. It is adapted to the consistence of the soil; rains are not so copious as to wash it away. It is adjusted to the laws of vision, and fogs do not render eyes useless. If such thoughtful and benevolent provisions do not prove that their cause is wise and good, nothing can be proved.

4. The high latent heat of water affords proof of the wisdom and goodness of God, perhaps more strikingly than the preceding.

In melting any solid a certain quantity of heat is expended, not in making it warmer, but in causing a purely *mechanical* change, in forcing asunder the particles of the body. This heat is said to become latent. The latent heat of melted ice is enormous. To melt a cubic yard of ice already at the temperature of thirty-two degrees, requires all the heat produced by burning a bushel of charcoal.[1] This heat would raise seven hundred and five pounds of cast iron from thirty-two degrees to its melting-point.[2] To melt a ton of ice already at thirty-two degrees, demands as much heat as would raise fifteen hundred and twenty-six pounds of copper,[3]

[1] Miller, p. 246; applies to *elm* charcoal.

[2] Fusing-point of cast iron [Miller, p. 248], 2786°; specific heat [*id.* p. 241], 0.11379; latent heat of water at 32° [*id.* p. 247], 142.65°; weight of cubic yard of most compact ice, about 1550 lbs.; $\frac{142.65^\circ}{(2786^\circ - 32^\circ) \times .11379} \times 1550$ lbs. = 705.6 lbs. As specific heat increases with temperature, this is somewhat too large.

[3] Specific heat of copper [Miller, p. 241], 0.09515; fusing-point [*id.* p. 248], 1996°; $\frac{142.65^\circ}{(1996^\circ - 32^\circ) \times .09515} \times 2000$ lbs. = 1526.7 lbs.

or four thousand four hundred and thirty-two pounds of gold,[1] or fifteen thousand four hundred and fifty-two pounds of lead[2] each from thirty-two degrees to its melting-point. All this heat is expended without warming the ice a thousandth of a degree.

If the latent heat of water were small, the cold of winter would be too great.

When water freezes, its latent heat is communicated to the air, which is at this time colder than the ice. The amount of heat thus given off is very great. The freezing of Lake Superior two and a half feet thick would be sufficient to warm all the air over the lake forty-one degrees.[3] The air is warmed just as much as it would be by an equal area covered nine and three quarter inches deep with red-hot cannon balls.[4] Thus in colder climates water becomes a very powerful equalizing agent; when the air is colder than thirty-two degrees, the water by freezing gives out this latent heat, and prevents the air from becoming too cold. The heat of summer and the cold of winter are thus made to counteract each other. But if water had the same latent heat as mercury, this equalizing effect would be only one twenty-eighth of its present amount, and the cold of winter would be too extreme.

If the latent heat of water were small, the transitions from autumn to winter and from winter to spring would be destructively sudden.

[1] Specific heat of gold [Miller, p. 242], 0.03244; fusing-point [*id.* p. 248], 2016°; $\frac{142.65}{(2016° - 32°) \times .03244} \times 2000 \text{ lbs} = 4432.8 \text{ lbs.}$

[2] Specific heat of lead [Miller, p. 241], 0.03140; fusing-point [*id.* p. 248], 620°; $\frac{142.65°}{(620° - 32°) \times .0314} \times 2000 \text{ lbs.} = 15452.4 \text{ lbs.}$

[3] Combining data given in note 4, page 657, and note 2, page 659, with the specific gravity of ice [Miller, p. 100], 0.923, we have $\frac{30 \text{ in.} \times .923 \times 142.65}{30.01 \text{ in.} \times 13.598 \times .2375} \times 1° = 40.76°$.

[4] Combining data given in notes 2, page 657, 2, page 659, and 3, page 660, with the specific gravity of cast iron [Lardner, p. 65], 7.20 and the formula for solidity of spheres, we have $\frac{142.65° \times .923}{.11379 \times (977° - 32°) \times 7.20 \times .5236} \times 30 \text{ in.} = 9.74 \text{ in.}$

When a ton of water freezes it gives out enough heat to raise one hundred and forty-three tons of water one degree.[1] Till this heat is carried away by the air no more water can freeze. This takes time; hence congelation is retarded, and transitions to greater cold are made more uniform. It is a fact of common observation that near a river the weather is always milder while it is freezing than afterwards. In the same way when a ton of ice melts, it absorbs enough heat to cool one hundred and forty-three tons one degree; till this amount is replaced by the sun and air, no more ice can thaw. The changes from water to ice and the reverse are therefore produced as slowly as is necessary to secure a sufficient interval between radical changes in the seasons, and to preserve vegetation from too rapid freezing. Trees are found by lumbermen in Maine frozen so hard that they cannot easily be cut till they thaw. They can endure such cold because the process of freezing is so gradual that the organs of the tree have time to adjust themselves to it. But if water had the same latent heat as mercury, this retarding influence would be only one twenty-eighth as much as at present, and trees in northern latitudes would freeze with such rapidity as to be riven in pieces.

If the latent heat of water were small, the transition from winter to spring would bring destructive floods.

Were the latent heat of water the same as that of mercury, the amount of heat which thaws half an inch of ice or six inches of snow would thaw fourteen inches or fourteen feet. One sunny day in spring might do much more than this, and every spring would bring such floods that no work of man could be placed near a river, for it would be undermined, crushed, or carried away. No meadow could be cultivated, for it would be alternately torn up and covered with boulders, gravel, and sand. The tremendous flood caused by an eruption of lava which covered a deep snow lying on the sides of Etna, or a similar deluge in Quito, which filled up valleys with six hundred feet of mud, stopped the course of rivers

[1] Latent heat of fusion of ice [Miller, p. 247], 142.65°.

and made new lakes,[1] are hints of what we might expect every spring, if the latent heat of water were like that of mercury, and the ice and snow which now melt in twenty-eight days should therefore melt in one sunny afternoon.

We see, then, that the latent heat of water has been carefully adjusted to other parts of a system on which the welfare of sentient beings depends. It is adjusted to the amount and to the specific heat of the air; it is large enough to warm the atmosphere as much as is needed to make the winter tolerable. It harmonizes with the structure of plants, changes between seasons are not too sudden, trees do not freeze fast enough to destroy them. It is adjusted to the amount of snow, and hence to the amount of vapor which produced that snow, to the length, size, and inclination of rivers, and to the amount of heat received from the sun, so that we are delivered from an annual inundation on an immense scale.

Was it accident or necessity by which the latent heat of water was thus adjusted to the welfare of organic life? An accident or a necessity so thoughtful, so benevolent, deserves a far nobler name.

5. Further proof of the divine wisdom and goodness is seen in the law of expansion of water.

Most substances expand with heat. Some, on the contrary, contract with heat and expand when cooled, like india-rubber.[2] Some expand in one direction and at the same time contract in another, like Iceland spar.[3] Some substances have a point of maximum density; whether they are warmed above or cooled below that point, they expand in volume and become specifically lighter. Rose's fusible metal is an instance.[4]

Here it is obvious that there is a wide range of selection.

[1] Lyell's Principles of Geology (New York, 1865), pp. 411, 412, and pp. 469, 470.

[2] Tyndall, Heat, etc., pp. 101, 102.

[3] Tyndall, Heat, p. 100; Miller, pp. 187; 211, 212.

[4] Thomson, Outlines of Chemistry, etc., p. 27.

Water might uniformly expand with heat, it might uniformly contract with heat, or it might have a point of maximum density; and this point might occur at any number of degrees above or below the freezing-point.

If the first of these laws of expansion were adopted for water, rivers would freeze solid in winter.

Water, as it cools at the surface, becomes heavier and sinks. If this process went on down to thirty-two degrees, the lower strata would become coldest, and would freeze first. The freezing of the upper strata would be progressively easier, and the whole would become solid. This would destroy all the life contained in our lakes and rivers. Ice forming in channels would be as destructive to shipping as are sunken rocks, while it would be far more difficult to avoid.

If the first of these laws of expansion were adopted in the case of water, rivers would not thaw in spring.

Should ice form on the ground, under the current of a river, it would remain there, kept down by adhesion and by the superincumbent pressure. In spring the sun could not melt it; his rays could not penetrate the water above it. The warm winds could not melt it; they cannot touch it. The warmer water of the surface could not melt it with sufficient rapidity. Thus no rivers in this latitude would melt till summer or autumn, while many would be always frozen.

If the first of these laws of expansion were adopted, the banks of our rivers would be barren and uninhabitable.

Ice-houses may be filled with solid ice in a few cold days by letting water fall slowly on the surface of the ice already formed. There is scarcely any limit to the thickness which ice will attain when kept covered with a thin stratum of water. Were the first of these laws of expansion adopted, so that ice began to form under water rather than at the surface, as indicated above, the channel of a river would soon be filled with ice, the stream being still fed by springs would overflow its banks, this inundation quickly freezing would force the water to rise still higher, freezing as it rose. Thus nearly all the water which now during the winter runs under

the ice of our rivers to the sea would lie in a solid form on their banks. The waters of spring flowing over this mass would protect it from melting. In this way large rivers in northern latitudes might become perpetual glaciers, while the meadows around small streams, now the most fertile parts of the land, would be made the most barren by the ice which would remain till summer or autumn.

We thus see that the first law of expansion would bring disastrous consequences. But if the second were adopted equal disasters would follow.

If water, like india-rubber, uniformly contracted with heat, the surface of the ocean would always be the coldest, for the warmer strata would sink. Much of the present animal life in the sea could no longer exist in this case, for it could endure neither the cold of the surface nor the pressure at a depth. The cold of the surface of the ocean would also lessen evaporation, and the consequent dryness of the land would be fatal to many species of plants, and dangerous to man.

If now the third law is adopted, most of its possible adjustments fail to obviate these evils.

There is no physical necessity that the point of maximum density of water should occur a few degrees above its freezing-point. It might be forty-five degrees below the point of congelation as in fusible metal;[1] it might be as many degrees above. But if the maximum density of water should occur at sixty or seventy degrees, all the evils of adopting the second law of expansion would remain; if it were below the freezing-point, the effects of the first law would still be felt. This point is therefore carefully adjusted to the wants of organic life by placing it higher than the freezing-point, but higher by only the four hundred and eightieth part of the measured range of temperature, so as to avoid all the evils which would be the result of the first or second laws of expansion. Lakes do not become solid, for when the upper stratum of water has cooled to thirty-nine degrees it no longer sinks, and the inferior strata can assume a lower tem-

[1] Thomson, Outlines of Chemistry, etc., p. 27.

perature than this only by conduction, which in water is a very slow process. A coating of clay and sand five eighths of an inch thick will contain melted iron for twenty minutes without becoming too warm for the hand.[1] Water is a yet poorer conductor of heat,[2] and therefore in winter it cools from the surface with great difficulty. But when the temperature of the air is above thirty-nine degrees, the warmer stratum is at the surface, and evaporation is unchecked.

One point is to be noticed. This protection against becoming solid, which lakes and rivers need, would be useless or hurtful in the case of the ocean. Currents carry to equatorial climates the cold strata which sink from the surface. Hence that adjustment of molecular forces on which the temperature of maximum density depends, is so modified by the addition of salt that it occurs below the freezing-point.[3] For this reason not much ice is formed upon the surface of sea water, and ascending currents of warmer water are thus permitted to exert an important ameliorating influence on climate.

Thus it is seen in how many respects the expansion of water has been so adjusted as to promote the comfort of sentient beings. It harmonizes with the condition of lakes and rivers; if fresh water had no point of maximum density, they would become solid in the winter, and would not thaw in summer. It is suited to the conditions of organic life; if this point of maximum density were much higher, many species of salt-water fish would become extinct; if it were seven degrees lower, fresh-water fish would die. It is adjusted to the convenience of agriculture; if the point of maximum density were seven degrees lower, our most fertile and most conveniently situated meadows would be covered with ice till harvest time. It is adapted to the demands of

[1] Nichol, Cyclopaedia of the Physical Sciences, p. 167.

[2] Lardner, Hand-book, etc., p. 356.

[3] Temperature of congelation [Miller, p. 200], 27.4°; of maximum density, [*ib.*] 25.38°.

vegetation; if water contracted for many degrees above the freezing-point, rain would be too scanty.

It is therefore evident that of the three laws of expansion which might be given to water, only the last is consistent with the comfort of sentient beings, while of the many variations of this which are possible, only one is useful. No greater range for selection and adjustment occurs in any human mechanism whatever. No human work can less reasonably be ascribed to accident or necessity. No human contrivance more imperatively demands that we refer it to the skill and goodness of a designing mind.

6. Further proof of the wisdom and benevolence of God may be derived from the sudden expansion of water at the moment of becoming solid.

Some liquids in the act of congealing undergo a sudden contraction. It is for this reason that silver and copper cannot be made to take the exact shape of the mould in which they are cast.[1] Some liquids pass to the solid state with no appreciable change of bulk. Sulphuric acid is an instance.[2] Some liquids, on the contrary, suddenly expand as they become solid. It is on account of such an expansion that cast iron and type metal take an accurate impression of a mould.[3]

Water, in freezing suddenly, expands about one twelfth of its bulk with almost irresistible force.[4] By the freezing of half a pint of water in a cavity, a large anvil has been burst with such violence as to hurl a sledge hammer several yards.

If water did not thus expand in freezing, the effects on rivers and lakes would be disastrous.

Were ice heavier than water it would sink immediately after its formation. If it were neither heavier nor lighter it would soon contract as its temperature falls; it would then have a larger specific gravity and would sink. The channels

[1] Lardner, p. 304; Miller, p. 100.
[2] Lardner, p. 304.
[3] Lardner, p. 304; Miller, p. 100.
[4] Miller, p. 100 (cf. Lardner, p. 303).

of rivers would thus be filled up, and the stream overflowing its banks would cover them with ice. This, being under water, would not readily thaw in spring, as has been mentioned before. In this case, also, icebergs floating from the polar seas would not rise above the surface of the ocean, and would thus give ships no warning of their approach. In the waters of warmer latitudes they would sink; having so nearly the same specific gravity with water, they would easily be carried about by currents at the bottom of the sea. No science or seamanship could avoid such movable rocks and shoals, while no art could ensure the safety of an oceanic telegraph under the influence of such destructive agents. The channels of our rivers would be closed to navigation for part of the year by the same cause. It may readily be seen that the same results would follow if the expansion of water in solidifying were so small as not to produce a buoyancy which compels ice to float in water, whatever may be their relative temperatures.

Did not water thus expand in freezing, the soil would be less fertile.

The expansion of moist earth in solidifying extends to every particle, breaking up hard clods, and thus rendering the soil more fertile by making it so soft that the roots of young plants can easily penetrate it. Although this influence may be unnecessary in warmer climates, yet wherever the severity of the winter materially shortens the season of vegetable growth, it is of great importance. Further than this,—much of the soil of every zone was produced from the solid rock by this agency. Water penetrating the substance of the rock is frozen; by its expansion it rends off flakes of disintegrated material, which quickly crumble to arable earth. Every one has noticed with what ease pebbles may be picked from the surface of conglomerate; the fact is owing to this agency. The softer rocks which can be reduced to soil by other means do not yield all the elements necessary to healthful vegetable life. No quartz could be decomposed by sun and rain, but this element is indispensable to the growth of wheat. If,

then, it were not for this power which can break down any rock that absorbs moisture, much of the fertility of the soil would be wanting.

The sudden expansion of water in the act of freezing, then, gives evidence of that careful adjustment to its place in the world which has been seen in its other qualities. It is suited to the condition of lakes and rivers; were it not for this provision they would freeze nearly solid, would cover their banks with ice, would remain frozen through the spring, and would be made innavigable. It harmonizes with the chemical constitution of plants, by providing them with those elements which are essential to them. It is adjusted to the mechanical conditions of vegetable life; it softens the earth so that the rootlets of plants can penetrate the soil.

If all liquids expanded at the moment of congelation we might have supposed that the injurious consequences described had been prevented by the necessary limitations of the nature of matter. This is so far from being the fact that we find a range of selection as wide as that occurring in the adjustment of any human mechanism whatever. From this variety we are compelled to believe that nothing but knowledge and goodness can have selected the only suitable law.

7. The fact that water is a non-conductor of heat likewise indicates the divine wisdom and goodness.

It is so poor a conductor that the heat received at the surface of the ocean is not conveyed downwards, but retained at the surface, thus promoting evaporation. If it were not for this provision, the amount of rain would be too scanty.

The non-conducting power of water is in curious harmony with its solvent power. Much of the usefulness of water as a detergent depends on the fact that its solvent power is increased by heat. If this higher solvent power were possessed at a lower temperature, the water of rivers and lakes and of our wells would resemble that of mineral springs in the amount of saline and earthy matter held in solution by it; were it a good conductor of heat, at the temperature at which it has this high solvent power its domestic use

would be difficult, as the hand could not endure contact with it.

The non-conducting power of water has more important relations to vegetable life. The roots of biennial and perennial plants lose their vitality if exposed to a cold excessively below the freezing-point. Hence soon after they are frozen and fitted for their season of rest snow covers them with a non-conducting garment, while the gentle warmth which the summer sun imparted to the soil is slowly conducted back to the surface.[1] Part of this protecting power of snow is due to its texture, but part it possesses in common with water. Were it not for this protection the consequences to vegetation in the higher latitudes would be disastrous.

To the same property of water is it due that the thickness of ice on our lakes and rivers is kept within bounds. When a layer of ice twelve inches thick is formed, in order that another inch may be added, an amount of heat must be given out through each square foot of surface which would warm twenty-four pounds of lead from thirty-two degrees to a temperature above its fusing-point.[2] Through such a poor conductor as ice, this takes place slowly. Had ice the conducting power of lead or of gold, our rivers would freeze nearly solid. The evil results of such a state of things require no further description, and both the knowledge which could anticipate them, and the goodness which chose to prevent them are proved, if anything can be proved.

8. One proof of the divine wisdom and goodness is seen in a curious adjustment between the attraction of the particles of water for each other and their attraction for atmospheric air.

Water at ordinary temperatures holds in solution a small amount of air. If this be expelled, water may be heated even a hundred and forty-eight degrees above its boiling-

[1] Somerville, Connection of the Physical Sciences, (London) p. 288.

[2] Uniting the data used in note 3, page 657, the latent heat of water, 142.65° and the weight of a cubic foot of ice, 57.5 lbs. nearly, we have

$$\frac{142.65^\circ}{(620^\circ - 32^\circ) \times .03140 \times 9.65^\circ} \times \frac{57.5}{12} \text{ lbs.} = 24.31 \text{ lbs.}$$

point.[1] At this temperature a slight jar will cause a violent explosion; for in a fraction of a second the water is converted into two hundred and sixty times its own volume of steam.[2] The homogeneity of the fluid prevents it from boiling at the proper temperature; if air is dissolved in water it is no longer homogeneous; some particles of water are ready to separate into steam, and the process once commenced goes on quietly. The tremendous attraction of particles of water for each other is necessary for several reasons; but unless this attraction can be quietly destroyed, water is useless for culinary purposes. Therefore, besides all the other qualities which fit water for its place, this, whose minuteness almost eludes our notice, is indispensable, and the Author of these qualities has the wisdom and goodness to add this.

9. The wisdom and benevolence of God are seen in the fact that the latent heat of aqueous vapor is very great.

In converting any liquid into vapor a certain amount of heat disappears, being transformed into the force which separates the particles of the liquid. This is called latent heat. The latent heat of aqueous vapor is very great. To convert one pound of water into vapor without raising its temperature the hundredth of a degree demands an amount of heat which would make nine pounds of iron red-hot.[3] The rain which covers an acre one inch deep, in its conversion into vapor absorbs enough heat to raise three hundred and eighty-five tons of iron to its melting-point.[4]

The latent heat of aqueous vapor is not only absolutely but

[1] "Even as high as 360° [F.] in an open glass vessel." Miller, pp. 256, 257.

[2] Latent heat of steam at 212° [Miller, p. 266], 966.6°; expansion of water in becoming vapor at 212° [*ib.*], 1696 volumes; $\frac{360° - 212°}{966.6°} \times 1696 = 259.68$.

[3] Using data in notes 2, pages 657, 659, and 670, $\frac{966.6°}{(977° - 32°) \times .11379} \times 1$ lb. = 8.99 lbs.

[4] Latent heat of aqueous vapor at 68° [Lardner, p. 346], 1067.4; fusing-point of iron [Miller, p. 248], 2786°. This amount of rain weighs about 113 tons. Combining these data with the specific heat of iron $\frac{1067.4°}{(2786° - 32°) \times .11379} \times 113.07$ tons = 385.14 tons.

relatively very great. Comparing equal weights it is more than twice that of any other liquid known. The advantages which come from this provision cannot be estimated too highly.

It is by this provision that rain is diffused through the temperate zones.

It is somewhat difficult to distil mercury, because the vapor condenses so easily that it falls back as a mercurial rain almost as soon as it leaves the surface of the liquid. The latent heat of its vapor is so small that it is quickly lost. It is by giving to the vapor of water a latent heat absolutely and relatively very great that rain and moisture are conveyed to all parts of the earth. If water were like mercury in this respect, winds could carry their stores of rain but a few leagues, and coasts receiving moist winds from the ocean would be deluged with rains like those of Cherrapoongee at the mouth of the Ganges, where forty-four feet have fallen in six months, and even thirty inches in twenty-four hours.[1] Such a denudation of the soil would be caused that our fertile coasts would become barren moorlands, and many harbors would be destroyed. Lands more remote from the sea would suffer like the west declivity of the Andes, the winds which should bring it rain having lost every drop in passing over the eastern slope. New England would be dry like the great African desert, for no clouds could transport aqueous vapor to so great a distance from its source. Great Britain, too, would suffer; her rains are produced in the Caribbean Sea, and unless the vapor of water had a latent heat nearly eight times as large as that of oil of turpentine [2] it would never cross the ocean, but would precipitate itself on the Atlantic.

It is by this provision that tropical regions are kept so cool as to be habitable.

The heat which becomes latent in the vapor of water would make the same weight of water red-hot if kept under

[1] Lyell, Principles of Geology, p. 200.

[2] Miller, p. 265.

pressure.[1] All this heat is carried away, and the remaining water left cool. At the equator so immense an amount of heat is made latent by evaporation and transferred beyond the tropics, that in July the temperature of the hottest parts of Mexico is only sixteen degrees greater than that of Andover. The heat which otherwise would make the tropical zone like the Australian desert, where if a match falls on the ground it instantly ignites,[2] becomes latent, and is transferred to regions where its power for good is as great as would be its influence for evil were it not removed.

It is by this provision that heat is carried from tropical to extra-tropical regions.

One pound of aqueous vapor gives out in condensing, as much heat as nine pounds of red-hot iron give out in cooling to zero.[3] A rain covering the ground one inch deep brings to every acre heat enough to make one-thousand one hundred and twenty-two tons of iron red-hot.[4] A rain of this depth covering the State of Massachusetts is sufficient to warm all the superincumbent atmosphere eleven degrees.[5] A snow of the same weight, about twelve inches in depth, would warm the air more than twelve degrees.[6] Every one has noticed that it does not snow in very cold weather; this is largely owing to the fact that the condensation of vapor which precedes its fall has already warmed the atmosphere.

Many facts show how important an ameliorating influence is thus exerted on cold climates. It is necessary that there be

[1] Sum of latent and sensible heat of steam [Miller, p. 266], 1178.6° F. Solids become luminous at 977° F. [*id.* p. 121].

[2] Dove, Distribution of Heat, Note on p. 22.

[3] From previous data; $\frac{1067.4°}{977° \times .11379} \times 1 \text{ lb.} = 9.6 \text{ lbs.}$

[4] From previous data; $\frac{1067.4°}{(977° - 32°) \times .11379} \times 113 \text{ tons} = 1122 \text{ tons.}$

[5] From previous data; $\frac{1 \text{ in.}}{30.01 \text{ in.} \times 13.598 \times .2375} \times 1067.4° = 11.01°.$

[6] Latent heat of aqueous vapor at 32° [Miller, p.266], 1091.7°; combining previous data we obtain $\frac{1 \text{ in.}}{30.01 \text{ in.} \times 13.598 \times .11379} \times (1091.7° + 142.65°) = 12.74°.$

cold climates; for if the sun directly warmed all parts of the earth alike, there would be no winds, and no rain except on the ocean. It is also necessary that such climates be warmed indirectly, or many of them would be unfit for civilized life. We can estimate the amount of heat thus imparted to temperate and frigid zones by comparing the amount received at more and at less favored places. The Faroe Islands have a mean temperature thirty-one degrees higher than Jakoutsk in the same latitude. The islands are visited by the sea breezes before their vapor has been condensed, and has thus given out its store of latent heat, while Jakoutsk receives only the residual amount after the moist winds from the Caribbean have warmed nearly a whole continent. In January, when the winds are more thoroughly despoiled of their treasures of heat before reaching Siberia, Jakoutsk has a temperature below the freezing-point of mercury, while the Islands, though lying within two hundred and forty miles of the frigid zone, have a temperature above the freezing-point of water. Yet the size of the Siberian rivers shows that the ameliorating effect of the condensation of vapor is very great, even in that climate, and the difference between a more and a less favored place may serve as a hint of the importance of the total effect.

To the high latent heat of aqueous vapor is it due that rain visits every part of the earth which needs it. To the same adjustment it is owing that these cooling influences within the tropics, these warming processes in colder climates, and these equalizing results in all climates are possible. Were it not for this careful adaptation, many parts of the globe now affording pleasant homes for man would be too cold in winter, too hot in summer, or too hostile to vegetable life to support him except under intolerable conditions. Were the latent heat of the vapor of water the same with that of the vapor of the oil of turpentine, Massachusetts would have a climate in winter like that of Jakoutsk, where mercury remains frozen three months in the year; and New Orleans would have a climate nearly like the Australian desert men-

tioned above, or like the sandy parts of Southern Arabia, a country "of which Hagi Ishmael says, 'the earth is of fire and the wind flame.'"

If the fly-wheel of a steam-engine were not large, it would move so irregularly as to inflict injury. If the axis were not strong it would break. The constitutional tendencies of our minds compel us to refer these adaptations of size and strength to the intention of the maker. They are not the result of accident, nor the work of an ignorant or malicious designer. In the same way the laws and the constitutional tendencies of our minds demand an intelligent cause for such skilful adaptations as these, and a benevolent cause for adjustments so benign.

10. The high radiating power of aqueous vapor exhibits the same wisdom and goodness which are seen in the other properties of water.

The fact that the vapor of water has a very high latent heat has been mentioned, and some of the advantages of such an arrangement have been noticed. But some of the more important of these would be lost unless another careful adjustment of the qualities of water were made. Before vapor can be condensed into rain its latent heat must be given off in some way. No other method sufficing, it must escape by radiation; unless, then, water has a power of radiating heat commensurate with its power of rendering it latent, rain would be too scanty, for the vapor of water could not condense. Accordingly we find that the radiating power of aqueous vapor is enormous; therefore, at the proper time, it easily loses its latent heat, and is precipitated as rain. One pound of vapor, before it becomes liquid, must give off, to bodies nearly as warm as itself, enough heat to render nine pounds of iron red-hot; if it parted with its heat as slowly as does polished silver, rains would be almost unknown, and plants would receive but an insufficient moisture from dew. But no one contrivance of the Author of nature is thus rendered nugatory by the want of another; this result was anticipated; those means were chosen which would avoid

these evils, and the skill and benevolence of God are again both illustrated and proved. This was no result of a constitution made necessary by fate, for it contains every mark of design which the most ingenious human mechanism ever displayed.

11. The power which aqueous vapor possesses of absorbing radiant heat adds further proof of the divine wisdom and goodness.

Some substances permit rays of heat to pass through them, as light passes through glass. Some are opaque to heat, while others, unlike both the former, suffer certain rays of heat to penetrate them, but stop others, as red glass permits the passage of red rays of light, but intercepts others.[1]

Now if the vapor of water were transparent to rays of heat, the mechanism of the winds would be hopelessly disordered.

It is well known that winds are due to the fact that the lower strata of the atmosphere becomes warmer and therefore lighter than those immediately above them. Hence they rise, and the surrounding air rushing in to fill the partial vacuum causes all the phenomena of the winds. Heat must be communicated to the air either by conduction, convection, or radiation; the first is not practicable, for air is a non-conductor; the second is insufficient, and only the third remains. But air itself can absorb but a minute fraction of radiant heat,[2] and unless some new provision is made, even the heat which might be imparted by conduction or convection would be lost by radiating ineffectively into empty space. But without winds both animal and vegetable life would be in danger; for on them depend the purity of the air and the diffusion of rain. Now in the lower strata of the air there is a small fraction of aqueous vapor, about a two-hundredth part of the entire atmosphere,[3] and this minute fraction absorbs more than sixty times as much radiant heat as the whole remaining air.[4] Here is the source of the winds; if the vapor of water were transparent to rays of heat, the

[1] Miller, p. 226; Tyndall, Heat, etc., *passim*.
[2] Tyndall, p. 362 et seq.
[3] Tyndall, p. 390.
[4] Tyndall, p. 398.

atmosphere would fail to fulfil two of its most important offices.

If aqueous vapor were transparent to radiant heat the extremes of day and night would be intolerable.

By day the surface of the earth receives heat from the sun, while at night it is cooled by radiating heat into a space whose temperature is far below zero. Unless something be thrown over the earth as a cloak protecting it from this cold, absorbing and retaining the heat which is radiated by the earth, on every evening in this latitude the thermometer would fall probably below the freezing-point, and nearly all vegetable life would be destroyed.[1] Now the air cannot protect us, for heat passes through it more readily than light through glass. But the small fraction of aqueous vapor contained in air has a power of absorbing radiant heat many thousand times greater than air possesses. So immense is this power that Tyndall estimates that more than ten per cent of the heat escaping from the earth is stopped by the infinitesimal amount of vapor contained by the air within ten feet of the ground.[2] A hint of the value of such protection is given us by those climates where the air is comparatively dry. In the great African desert, where the heat of the day is such that ether will boil in the shade, the unchecked radiation of night is such that water will freeze.[3] In the Australian desert where a match dropped on the sand by day will instantly inflame, the same thing is true.[4] These terrible extremes are due to the fact that the air is comparatively dry; were it entirely so they would be intolerably greater. Such extremes would be felt all over the earth did the vapor of water allow free passage to rays of heat.

These are evils which would follow were aqueous vapor transparent to radiant heat. But if it were opaque, the earth would be unfitted for organic life.

[1] Tyndall, p. 405. [2] Tyndall, p. 398.

[3] Tyndall, p. 405; Rede Lecture on Radiation, by Tyndall (New York, 1865), p. 35.

[4] Dove, Distribution of Heat, p. 22.

Our globe is warmed by heat which passes through the entire atmosphere. The atmosphere always contains aqueous vapor; if this were opaque to radiant heat it would intercept the sun's rays. Becoming itself warm, it would radiate this heat, but only half of it would reach us, the remainder being radiated away from the earth. There would be no insupportable extremes now, for both day and night would feel a similar intensity of cold. The upper strata of the air, first receiving the sun's heat, would be warmer than the lower, and there could be no winds. The earth being cool, evaporation would be too scanty to supply rain, and would merely fill the atmosphere with enough vapor to intercept most of the sun's heat, and make the whole world like the frigid zones.

But if watery vapor must not be transparent to rays of heat, nor yet opaque; if it must not permit them a free passage, but must on no account intercept them; it must have some very peculiar relation to radiant heat. Accordingly we find that its power of absorbing heat is elective. It absorbs with tremendous energy all the heat radiating from a body at a low temperature; it is utterly powerless to stop rays of intense heat.[1] The intense heat of the sun passes freely through the air and the vapor contained in it, and warms the earth. The warm earth then radiates a heat of low intensity, the vapor in the atmosphere stops this almost as abruptly as an iron door intercepts light. Thus "the atmosphere acts the part of a ratchet wheel in mechanics; it allows of motion in one direction, but prevents it in another."[2] It keeps the heat of the earth from passing out, but permits the sun's heat to enter.

As far as we know, watery vapor might sustain either of these three relations to radiant heat. The selection of one of these laws rather than another seems to be as purely a matter of intelligent adjustment as the making the lever of a watch thirty hundredths of an inch in length, rather than

[1] Tyndall, Heat, etc., p. 320.

[2] Tyndall, Glaciers of the Alps (Boston, 1861), p. 243.

twenty-nine or thirty-one. In the latter case we are certain that a mind directed the manufacture which knew the evils to be avoided, and chose to prevent them. The argument in the former is no more abstruse, nor the conclusion less certain.

In this survey of the relations of water to heat we have seen that the temperatures of its boiling and freezing points, and the amounts of its specific and of its latent heat are exactly adapted to its place in the system on which the welfare of organic life depends. Its laws of expansion while remaining a fluid and while becoming solid, as well as its non-conducting power and its attraction for atmospheric air, are further instances of the same adaptation. Lastly, in the state of vapor, its high latent heat, its great radiating power, and the peculiar properties of its power of absorbing radiant heat, exhibit the most subtile ingenuity of contrivance, and produce the most important and advantageous results. Thus all the qualities of water agree in proving the wisdom and goodness of their Author. All the laws of logical thought compel us to the same conclusion. All the constitutional tendencies of our minds conspire to give intensity to this conviction, to exalt our idea of his character, and to deepen our reverence.

But the concurrence of all these arguments is a new and independent argument. The combination of separate indications has the force, not of their sum, but of their product. If only one grain of gold were to be found in the soil of California, it must have a source, and the auriferous quartz is proved to exist. But if we cannot turn our eyes downwards without seeing gold, if we cannot find a single grain without perceiving another touching it and a score surrounding it, the evidence is as much more luminous than before as is day than night. So if water were adjusted to the welfare of sentient beings in but one of the modes discussed above, the ingenuity of the contrivance and the benevolence of the result would sufficiently indicate the character of its cause. If we should find not another atom of proof in all nature, no candid mind could reject this. But if we find so many lines

of proof converging and concentrating themselves around one point, and so much evidence condensed in the texture of a single substance, and compressed as if there were not room in nature to contain all the testimony to the character of God unless space is *economized*, the force of our conviction will be irresistible.

And yet the evidences of benevolent design which have been mentioned are but a small part of those concealed in the constitution of water. Nothing has been said of its relations to other departments of natural philosophy; nothing of its chemical properties; nothing of its adaptation to vegetable life; nothing of its adjustments to animal life and comfort, except as it more remotely affects them through the agency of heat. But it is in the line of its more immediate relations to organic existence that this substance affords the most copious and convincing proofs of the divine wisdom and goodness.

These pages, too, are but a hint of the contribution which the somewhat recent science of heat is ready to make for the uses of natural theology. The very nature of the agent called caloric, and the mechanism provided for its distribution, both stand prepared to contribute an argument which shall combine all the fascination of a fairy tale with all the majesty and more than the authority of law. The relations between heat and the processes of the arts, its relations to organic life and all its relations to the other substances which occur in nature, are also ready with a rich harvest; and here is but a handful from one corner of the field.

These qualities of water indicate the infinity of some of the attributes of God. They *prove* that his knowledge, for instance, transcends any limits which we can define or even imagine, but they *indicate* that it has *no* limits. In the same way, they prove that his power extends beyond any boundary which the human intellect can assign or even conceive, but they as clearly indicate that it has absolutely *no* boundary and *no* limit; that this attribute is infinite.

The qualities of water indicate the infinity of some of the

divine attributes by the wealth of contrivance which they display. They impress us as the work of a being who can afford to be lavish of his skill. We cannot but feel that one whose knowledge was less than infinite would husband his resources, would prudently economize his stores.

They indicate this infinity also by the number of the relations to which they are adjusted. For instance, the boiling-point of water sustains relations to every species of plant and animal on the globe, to the structure of every soil and every rock on its surface, to the elevation of its mountains, to the slope of its continents, to the conducting power and temperature of its interior, to the temperature and distance of the sun, and to the shape of the earth's orbit. In every one of these countless relations, all is harmony. Yet this one is but a minute fraction of the sum of those adjustments by which water is suited to its place in nature, and among them all there is no clash, no discord, nothing but harmony. We cannot resist the conviction that he who can form a plan so intricate and so vast in its details, and can execute a plan so vast in its proportions and so comprehensive in its results, can make and can carry out any plan whatever. We are forced, by a necessity which no sane mind which is aware of the facts can evade, to believe that in those attributes displayed in this part of his works, God is infinite.

ARTICLE IV.

AUTHORSHIP AND CANONICITY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

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[The following Article consists of extracts from lectures, introductory to the study of the Epistle to the Hebrews, which were delivered to the Junior Class in Andover Theological Seminary during the past term. They are published by request, and without material alteration. In them the author has attempted little more than to collect the scattered evidence in the case, and to present it fairly].

In investigating the authorship of this Epistle, we must remember that as the writer has not told us his name, nor afforded us any means of ascertaining it beyond a doubt, and as there is no uniform and unbroken tradition on the subject, we must content ourselves with the balance of *probabilities*. Our conclusion must of necessity be built up of indirect and incidental evidence.

A. Among the general and admitted characteristics of the author are the following:

1. He does not study to *conceal* his name; he assumes that he is known to his readers: cf xiii. 18, "Pray for us," etc. 19, "That I may the sooner be restored to you." 22, sq. "Timothy has been set at liberty; with whom, if he come shortly, I will see you," etc.

2. He was one of the *distinguished* teachers of apostolic times. This is proved by the fact that he writes to an *entire church* (apparently) — indeed by the general *tone* of the Epistle.

3. He was a *born Jew*; — the whole tenor of the Epistle puts this past question.

4. He was not one of those who heard the Lord in person; but, in common with his readers, received the gospel *mediately*, from those who *were* ear-witnesses; cf. ii. 3.

5. He was intimate with Timothy, the faithful friend and companion of Paul (xiii. 23).

B. The last-mentioned characteristic of the author (namely, intimacy with Timothy), is one of the signs which the Epistle is thought to afford that it was written by Paul. This opinion let us examine, considering first the *internal* and then the *external* arguments in reference to it.

Internal arguments in favor of Paul as its author: These may be comprised under three heads:

1. Facts or allusions contained in the Epistle:

a. In x. 34 the text. recept. runs τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου συνεπαθήσατε, "ye sympathized with" (Eng. vers. "had compassion on me in") "my bonds." This is naturally taken as an allusion to "*Paul* the prisoner." But the reading of the text. recept. is hardly sustained. A (B ends with ix. 14, and the passage is wanting also in C) — D, 47, etc.; Syr., Arab. Erp., Copt., Arm., Vulg.; Chrys., etc., support the reading τοῖς δεσμίοις — "ye sympathized with *those in bonds*" — which has been adopted by Griesbach, Lachmann, Scholz, Reiche, Tischendorf, Bleek, Delitzsch, Lünemann, Alford, etc.

b. In xiii. 19 the writer says: "I beseech you to *pray* for me ..... that I may be *restored* to you the sooner:" ἵνα τάχιον ἀποκατασταθῶ ὑμῖν. This language, it is said, implies that the writer is a *prisoner*, and so favors the theory that he is Paul.

But we reply:

(1) It is true that the solicitation of their *prayers* for his restoration implies *hinderances* which those prayers might have some effect in removing (τάχιον); but

(2) ἀποκατασταθῶ does not of itself mean restored *from imprisonment*, while the subjoined ὑμῖν shows that here it *does* mean restored "*to you*," i.e. merely *from* absence; and

(3) v. 23 ("with whom [Timothy], if he come shortly, *I will see you*") shows that the writer was *personally* at liberty.

c. In xiii. 23 we read "Know ye that our brother Timothy has been set at liberty" (ἀπολελυμένον). Timothy was the companion of Paul; was with him during his confinement

at Rome; and if we render *ἀπολελυμένον* "sent away" on business, we may find a probable coincidence with Phil. ii. 19, "I trust ..... to send Timotheus shortly unto you." 23, "Him therefore I hope to send presently." Our Epistle was written (it is said) by Paul during this absence of Timothy.

But the more natural and obvious meaning of *ἀπολελυμένον* is not "sent away," but "*liberated*"; see the lexicons.

d. In xiii. 24, the writer sends salutations from "those of Italy," *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας*. This, it is alleged, corroborates the above indications, by showing that the Epistle was written from Rome, and therefore probably by Paul.

This argument turns upon the meaning of the debated phrase *οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας*. The possible interpretations may be classified under the two generic senses of *ἀπὸ*; namely, *local separation* and *origin*.

Taken in its primary sense of local separation, it may have reference,

Either (*a*) to the *persons*; in which case it denotes that the persons referred to are (together with the writer) "*away from*" Italy, although belonging to it. This, as it is the more obvious, seems also in the New Test. to be the more usual meaning of the phrase; cf. Matt. xv. 1 with Mark vii. 1; see also Acts vi. 9; (x. 23?); xxi. 27. Contrast, too, 2 Tim. i. 15, *οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ*.

If we adopt this interpretation in the present instance, we are met by the question: How comes the writer to send a salutation from the *Italians* alone, and not also from the *native* Christians of the place where he is writing? To this question it is hard to find a satisfactory answer.[1]

Or (*b*) it may refer to the *salutation;* as if two local prepositions had been blended into one, so that the full expression would run *οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀσπάζονται ὑμᾶς*. For other instances of this attraction, or rather pregnant con-

[1] Bleek, Lünemann, et al. regard the party as fugitives from the Neronian persecution, and as temporarily sojourning where there are no native Christians.

struction, cf. Matt. xxiv. 17; Luke xi. 13; Col. iv. 16. See Win. § 66. 6; Jelf, § 647; Kühn. ii. § 623, p. 318.

This interpretation is favored in the present case by the usage of the Greek epistolary style, which, as is well known, often employs those forms of expression (tenses, etc.), which are correct in reference to the reader of the letter, rather than to the writer. Buttmann, however (Grammatik des neutest. Sprachgebrauchs, pp. 323, 324, cf. p. 83), adopts the construction which follows.

If *ἀπό* be taken to denote *origin*, the phrase is very like "the men of Italy," i.e. "the Italians." Cf. Matt. xxi. 11; Mark xv. 43, etc. (Cf. the use of Art. with *ἀπό* to denote a genus in such phrases as *οἱ ἀπὸ σοφίας*, i.e. docti, Lob. Phryn. p. 164.)

In this case the *present* locality of the persons in question is, strictly speaking, left undecided. It must be determined, if at all, upon other grounds. If in the present instance we suppose (*a*) that the persons referred to were (with the writer) in some place *out* of Italy, we encounter again the same difficulty which lay in the way of interpretation (*a*) of the former class, namely, Why is no mention made of native Christians?

If, then, we allow the circumstances of the case to decide that the phrase here means (*b*) Italians *in* Italy, we are still pursued by the question of locality, and asked, Italians *outside* of Rome? or, *including* the Christians of Rome?

Many have thought themselves compelled to reply "*the former*, viz. Italians *outside* of Rome." Otherwise it is supposed the Roman Christians would have been mentioned also; hence they say the Epistle was probably written *outside* of Rome. But this conclusion is as doubtful as the assumption upon which it rests. Even supposing the author to be writing from Rome, why need he in the greeting make separate mention of the Roman Christians? The generic term includes the specific — the Romans were also Italians. And just because it is the more comprehensive term, it is the more weighty and eligible. So in Acts xviii. 2 Aquila is spoken

of as ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας, and then just afterwards comes the more specific ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης.[1]

We conclude, therefore, that the phrase in question does not furnish with certainty a definite indication of locality. It may have been used by one writing from Rome; on the other hand, it may not have been. Hence (so Winer as above) no solid argument for the place where the Epistle was written can be found in the words; nor for the opinion that Paul was its author, so far as that opinion depends on their proof of the place.

2. The Epistle exhibits *doctrinal* resemblances to the epistles of Paul. Here we touch one of those points upon which discussion has been most ample. We have not space to consider all the arguments which have been advanced. Many of them need no consideration. Certainly we may quietly assume that an epistle written, as all must confess the Hebrews to have been, in the apostolic age by a leading Christian teacher to primitive Christians, harmonizes with the teachings of Paul relative to the preferableness of Christianity over Judaism, — its superiority as respects knowledge, motives, efficiency, permanence. The Christian system, with its characteristic doctrines, precepts, promises, sanctions, is indubitably taught in it. But we are concerned only with doctrinal *peculiarities*. The New Test. exhibits several well-marked types of doctrine. All have much in common, yet each has its distinctive characteristics. Accordingly biblical theologians speak of the Pauline type of doctrine, the Petrine, the Johannean, the Jacobic. We recognize the general appropriateness of such distinctions, however theologians may disagree when they come to define them minutely. Now the precise point of inquiry is: To which of these different patterns of doctrine does our Epistle belong? Do the views of truth presented in it accord with — *coincide* with, rather, for there is always harmony among inspired writers, even where there

[1] 1 Cor. xvi. 8 sq., where Paul, in writing from Ephesus, says (v. 19) "the churches of *Asia* salute you," is not a parallel case, for in v. 20 he appends an additional salutation from the Ephesian brethren distinctively.

is not unison — does its distinctive cast of doctrine coincide with Paul's? This question many writers answer in the affirmative. That answer, as we shall see subsequently, cannot be accepted without qualifications. And yet it is true that in many particulars the doctrinal views of the author, and his mode of presenting them, are Pauline:

a. God is spoken of as the final cause and the efficient cause of all things ii. 10, δι' ὃν ..... δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα.

So (substantially) Paul in Rom. xi. 36, ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα.

b. Christ is represented

(1) As the "impress" (χαρακτήρ) of God's substance, i. 3.

So (again only substantially) Paul in Col. i. 15, ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν ("image") τοῦ θεοῦ; so 2 Cor. iv. 4.

(2) As the instrumental agent (δι' οὗ) in creation, i. 2.

So (precisely, Jno. i. 3; substantially) Paul in Col. i. 16, ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα.

(3) As exalted on account of his sufferings, ii. 9, διὰ τὸ πάθημα ..... ἐστεφανωμένον.

So Paul in Phil. ii. 9, διὸ καὶ ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸν ὑπερύψωσε.

(4) As having suffered once for all, ἅπαξ ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων, etc., ix. 26 (cf. x. 12).

So Paul in Rom. vi. 10, τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ.

(5) As having vanquished death, ii. 14.

So Paul in 1 Cor. xv. 54, 55, 57; 2 Tim. i. 10

(6) As exercising a constant intercessory agency vii. 25, πάντοτε ζῶν εἰς τὸ ἐντυγχάνειν, etc.

So (and substantially in 1 Jno. ii. 2 also) Paul in Rom. viii. 34, ὃς καὶ ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν.

(7) As awaiting supreme dominion, x. 12, 13 "from henceforth expecting," ἕως τεθῶσιν οἱ ἐχθροὶ αὐτοῦ ὑποπόδιον τῶν ποδῶν αὐτοῦ.

So Paul in 1 Cor. xv. 25, ἄχρις οὗ ἂν θῇ πάντας τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ.

c. The Mosaic law is represented as given through the instrumentality of angels ii. 2, ὁ δι' ἀγγέλων λαληθεὶς λόγος.

So Paul in Gal. iii. 19 ὁ νόμος ..... διαταγεὶς δι' ἀγγέλων; yet so also Stephen in Acts vii. 53, ἐλάβετε τὸν νόμον εἰς διαταγὰς ἀγγέλων. From Joseph. Ant. xv. 5, 3 this appears to have been a current Jewish opinion.

3. Passing to the characteristics of *form* which favor the opinion that the Epistle was written by Paul, we notice

a. The general distribution of topics. Most of Paul's epistles divide themselves into two parts: a didactic or doctrinal portion, followed by a hortatory or practical. The same arrangement of materials—a little obscured by incidental exhortations in the former part—is traceable in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and is wanting in the epistles of John, Peter, James, and Jude.

b. In chap. x. 30, we find Deut. xxxii. 35 freely quoted *ἐμοὶ ἐκδίκησις, ἐγὼ ἀνταποδώσω, λέγει κύριος*, "To me belongs vengeance, I will recompense, saith the Lord." This quotation corresponds exactly neither with the Hebr. (לִי נָקָם וְשִׁלֵּם "to me vengeance and recompense") nor with the Sept. (*ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐκδικήσεως ἀνταποδώσω*, "in the day of vengeance I will recompense"), but does agree word for word with the language of Paul in Romans xii. 19.[1]

c. Some of its *imagery* resembles Paul's:

(1) The "word of God" is compared to a "sword," iv. 12.

So Paul in Eph. vi. 17, *τὴν μάχαιραν τοῦ πνεύματος, ὅ ἐστι ῥῆμα θεοῦ* (yet this may have been a current figure; see the references to Philo in the Comm. on Hebr. l.c.).

(2) Inexperienced Christians are called "babes," have need of "milk," v. 13.

So Paul in Rom. ii. 20 *διδάσκαλον νηπίων*, Eph. iv. 14; Gal. iv. 3; 1 Cor. iii. 1; (yet this, too, seems to have been a current designation, cf. Thol. in Rom. l.c., and Wetst. in Matt. xv. 14).

Experienced Christians are styled "full-grown" persons, adults, and are said to use "solid food," v. 14.

So Paul in 1 Cor. xiv. 20.

(3) The Mosaic dispensation, in comparison with the Christian, is as a "shadow" to the substance; x. 1, *σκιὰν γὰρ ἔχων ὁ νόμος τῶν μελλόντων*, cf. viii. 5.

So Paul in Col. ii. 17, *ἅ ἐστι σκιὰ τῶν μελλόντων.*

[1] This coincidence has been explained by supposing either that our author derived his language from the lips or the writings of Paul, or that both employed a form of the passage familiarly current, or that both drew from some common source (e.g. the paraphrase of Onkelos, so Mey. after Fritz. on Rom. l. c.; per contra Tholuck, Comm. p. 23 sq.).

(4) Christians are said to be "made a spectacle (*θεατριζόμενοι*)" by reproaches, etc., x. 33.

So Paul in 1 Cor. iv. 9, *θέατρον ἐγενήθημεν τῷ κόσμῳ*, etc.

(5.) Christians are exhorted "to run the race" set before them, etc., xii. 1.

So Paul in 1 Cor. ix. 24, *οὕτω τρέχετε ἵνα καταλάβητε*. Cf. Phil. iii. 14.

(6) Abraham, before Isaac's birth, is described in relation to offspring as "having become dead," *νενεκρωμένου*, xi. 12.

So Paul in Rom. iv. 19, *οὐ κατενόησε τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα ἤδη νενεκρωμένον ..... καὶ τὴν νέκρωσιν τῆς μήτρας Σάῤῥας* (cf. the language of Porphyrius in Kypke, Observat. Sacr. ii. 164).

d. Single expressions coincide with Paul's:[1]

(1) The use of a neuter adj. with the article instead of a substantive of quality. See vi. 17; xii. 13, 21. Cf. Rom. i. 19, ii. 4, iii. 1, etc.

(2) "The God of peace," xiii. 20.

So Paul in Rom. xv. 33, *ὁ δὲ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης*, and five times more.

(3) Christ is called (viii. 6, ix. 15, xii. 24) *κρείττονος διαθήκης μεσίτης*.

So Paul in Gal. iii. 19 (of Moses) 20; 1 Tim. ii. 5. (Yet so Philo of Moses, Vit. Mos. ii. 678, line 14. Mangey; Fabric. Cod. Pseudepig. Vet. Test. i. 845; Wetst. N. T. ii. 224. Cf. Grimm's N. T. Lex. sub verb.).

(4.) The language of the 5th Ps., "Thou hast put all things in subjection under his feet," is applied to Christ, ii. 8.

So Paul in Eph. i. 22; 1 Cor. xv. 27.

(5.) The words *παῤῥησία* and *καύχημα* are used to describe the Christian's state of mind, iii. 6, etc.

So (John also and) Paul in Eph. iii. 12, etc.; and (substantially) Rom. v. 2.

[1] Here, as under the preceding head, the lists of examples are greatly extended by several writers. But it is better to confine ourselves to those which are obvious. Even from these we should perhaps be compelled to deduct a considerable number were we thoroughly acquainted with the current and common forms of speech when the Epistle was written — at least among Hebrew Christians. Only what is distinctive and peculiar furnishes a solid basis of comparison, and what *is* so we can judge but imperfectly at the best.

(6) The phrase ἀπάτη τῆς ἁμαρτίας (iii. 13) resembles Paul's ἀπάτη ἀδικίας in 2 Thess. ii. 10, yet cf. Win. § 30. 2. b. β., 7th. ed. p. 178.

(7) The expression ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀκοῆς (iv. 2), is used (without art.) by Paul in 1 Thess. ii. 13.

(8) The writer is "persuaded he has a good conscience," xiii. 18; Allusions to his "conscience" are characteristic of Paul; Acts xxiii. 1; xxiv. 16; Rom. ix. 1; 2 Cor. i. 12; 2 Tim. i. 3.

Remark: Respecting the argument made to rest upon such resemblances both of thought and of expression as have been specified, it must be confessed there is danger of forming an incorrect estimate. The significance of such resemblances is not always so great as it at first appears to be. At this distant day it is often impossible for us to distinguish with certainty between what is peculiar to individual writers, and what was common to them and their age. And in any age a collation of contemporary writers of similar station and training upon the same general subject, would no doubt exhibit coincidences of thought, of expression even, surprising to those who have never made such an experiment. We have already noticed several resemblances between our present Epistle and that to the Romans, one of which amounted to verbal identity. This single case has constrained some of those even who deny that our Epistle was written by Paul (e.g. Bleek, deWette), to confess that its author was probably familiar with the Epistle to the Romans. But marked resemblances — amounting sometimes almost to verbal coincidence — can be detected between the Epistles of Paul and the first Epistle of Peter (deWette cites seventeen parallels, Einl., 6 te. Ausg. p. 382 sq., Froth.'s Trans. p. 342; see also Hug ii. § 166, Fosdick's Trans. p. 629; cf. also 2 Pet. and Jude); and again between this same Epistle of Peter and the Epistle of James (deWette and Hug, as above). Yet the independent authorship, the genuineness of these several epistles, is not questioned on this account. Resemblances far more numerous and more striking — coincidences of language as well as of thought — exist between our Epistle and the writings of Philo. Bleek (i. 398 sq.) has selected (cf. J. B. Carpzov, Sacr. Exercitt.

in S. Paul. Epist. ad Hebr. ex Philone Alexandrino, etc.) a list of twenty-two. And, strange to say, among them is an instance corresponding precisely to the case of verbal identity just alluded to between our Epistle and that to the Romans. In Heb. xiii. 5 we read the quotation "I will never leave thee nor forsake thee." These exact words are not to be found in the Old Test. (cf. Josh. i. 5; Gen. xxviii. 15; Isa. xli. 17, and Deut. xxxi. 6, 8; 1 Chron. xxviii. 20), yet they are given identically in Philo (de confus. linguar. ed. Mang. i. 430, 26). But such agreements do not make us entertain the supposition, that the works of Philo and our Epistle had the same author.[1] They are far outweighed by the probabilities on the other side. To such probabilities we must have regard in judging of the evidence that Paul wrote our Epistle.

We turn then to the internal evidence on the other side, i.e. conflicting with the opinion that the Epistle was written by Paul:

For convenience' sake it may be arranged under the same three classes (viz. personal, doctrinal, formal); which we will notice in inverse order:

1. Indications of a *formal* nature, conflicting with the opinion that Paul was the author:

a. Not without significance is the absence of an opening salutation; the omission of all mention of the name of author or readers; and in general the meagreness of the personal references and the treatise-like nature of the Epistle. In these respects the Epistle differs confessedly from the acknowledged productions of the apostle.

Of these differences three explanations have been offered (Hug, Einl. ii. 420 sq., Fosdick's Trans. p. 599 sq.):

(1) (Pantaenus urges) that Paul omitted the introductory formula "Paul the apostle," etc., out of modesty, because he knew himself to be distinctively an apostle to the Gentiles, and regarded the Lord himself as the "apostle" to the Hebrews (iii. 1).

[1] Here, again, some (Bleek, de Wette, Lünemann) account for the coincidence by the supposition that the inspired author quotes from Philo; Delitzsch (Com. p. 669) supposes that Deut. xxxi. 6 assumed that form in the liturgic or homiletic use of the Hellenists.

But we reply, the explanation is inadequate. It merely gives us a plausible reason why Paul may have avoided calling himself "an apostle." It does not tell us why he avoided all mention of himself. It explains the omission of the office; but it leaves unexplained the omission of the man — the chief difficulty. Had he chosen, he could have dropped "apostle," and called himself "Paul the servant of Jesus Christ," or "Paul the prisoner of Christ Jesus," or simply "Paul;" as he did, for obvious reasons, in writing to the Philippians, to Philemon, to the Thessalonians. (In reference to Paul's modes of salutation see Rückert on Gal. i. 1 or Ellicott on Phil. i. 1.)

(2) The second explanation is (that of Clement of Alexandria) that Paul concealed his authorship, at least in the first part of the Epistle, from motives of policy, in order that the readers might come to its perusal without prejudice.

But we reply:

(*a*) The Epistle, as we have seen, does not warrant the supposition that the writer wished to conceal himself.

(*b*) (In the absence of public carriers) concealment in such a case — at least from those into whose hands the messenger delivered the letter — seems hardly possible.

(*c*) If practised by the apostle under such circumstances, it would when detected have reacted to the disadvantage of him and his epistle.

(3) A third explanation is, that a personal salutation would have been incongruous with the rhetorical character of the composition.

This is true. And this admitted, the difficulty in the case swings back upon us with all its weight. Is it probable that Paul would write in such an exceptional way? and write so to the Hebrews? Would he not have been likely to begin in this case, as in others (witness Ep. to Gal. and Cor. and his speech at Athens), by an endeavor to secure the good-will of his readers?

Now it is said, because Paul prefixed his name to other letters it was not necessary for him to do so in every case.

The explanations of the omission which have been given are unsatisfactory it must be confessed, but it does not follow that there is not some satisfactory explanation, though lying quite beyond our present knowledge or conjecture (Davidson's Introd. to N. T. iii. 210).

Very true. But we are concerned in this discussion not with possibilities, but with probabilities. And how stands the case? Here is a writing whose authorship is in dispute. It differs in its general form as well as in distinct particulars — differs undeniably — from every other known composition (and there are thirteen such) of a certain author to whom it has been ascribed. And all attempts to account for the admitted differences fail. Now the question is, on which side does the probability of his being the author lie? so far as these differences go.

b. The way in which the Old Test. is employed in our Epistle differs from the mode in which it is employed by Paul; and that in three particulars.

(1) As respects the *quotations themselves:*

Paul quotes freely, very often from memory, apparently; but the author of our Epistle hardly allows himself, at least in the larger and more important quotations, to depart in the slightest from the sacred text. His punctilious accuracy leaves the impression that he must have verified his quotations by turning to the letter of the text.

(2) As respects the *source* from which the passages are taken:

Paul very often gives evidence of having had the Hebrew in mind; indeed frequently follows it, discarding the Sept. version and translating for himself. Our author, on the contrary, quotes uniformly from the Septuagint. The Epistle apparently does not contain more than a single exception to this remark (x. 30). The Sept. is followed even where its renderings depart from the Hebrew, e.g. xi. 21 (ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκρον τῆς ῥάβδου), xiii. 15 (καρπὸς χειλέων); it is not only followed, but employed sometimes as the foundation of the argument (e.g. x. 5; ii. 7). This variation from Pauline usage in

quotation occurs in an epistle written to Jews, and, as is commonly supposed, to Palestinean Jews.[1]

(3) As respects the phraseology with which they are *introduced:*

Paul in quoting from the Old Test. frequently gives the *name* of the author, as "David says," "Moses says," "Isaiah cries," etc., even though the passage quoted introduce God as speaking in the first person (e.g. Rom. x. 19, 20). Still more frequently he designates the quotation as "scripture," by the formula *γέγραπται, καθὼς* (*ὡς*) *γέγραπται, κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον, κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον, λέγει ἡ γραφή.*

These formulas *never* occur in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The quotations are referred *directly to God;* either by using the formula "God says," and the like (and this even in passages where God is spoken of in the third person, e.g. i. 6, 7, 8; iv. 4; vii. 21; x. 30), or "the Holy Spirit says," etc. (iii. 7; x. 15), or by regarding Christ the Son as the speaker (ii. 11–13; x. 5, 8 sq.). There is but a single exception, ii. 6 (*διεμαρτύρατο δέ που τὶς λέγων κ.τ.λ.*).[2]

c. The Epistle exhibits characteristics of *expression*, characteristics both negative and positive, which indicate that it was not written by Paul.

Preliminary Remark 1. It must be remembered here, as in fact throughout, that the reasoning is cumulative; single particulars in themselves light, when taken together may constitute a weighty argument.

Preliminary Remark 2. As respects the question of authorship, the number of coincidences or of differences in expression is of far less significance than their nature.[3]

[1] It has been noticed that the quotations of Paul from the Sept. coincide for the most part with the readings of the Vatican codex, while those of the Epistle to the Hebrews agree still more predominantly with the Alexandrian codex; this circumstance seems to indicate that its author was accustomed to a somewhat different form of the text from that used by the apostle.

[2] xii. 21 from Deut. ix. 19 cannot correctly be reckoned as an exception.

[3] The last edition of Webster's Dictionary comprises upwards of one hundred and fourteen thousand words. Yet "few writers or speakers use as many as ten thousand words, ordinary persons of fair intelligence not above three or four

To begin with the *negative* characteristics alluded to (see Christian Examiner for 1827, p. 509):

(1) There are certain forms of expression which are favorite with Paul, but which do not occur in this Epistle. The expressions referred to are of a general nature, such as would be pertinent in any epistle, such as disclose to us a writer's habits of expression.

(*a*) The phrase ἐν Χριστῷ occurs seventy-eight times in the Epistles of Paul, but not once in the Epistle to the Hebrews, although the length of this epistle (exclusive of quotations) bears to the total length of the thirteen Pauline Epistles "somewhat more than the proportion of one to seven."

(*b*) The phrase ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός (with various modifications as respects arrangement and pronouns) occurs in Paul's epistles more than eighty times (according to Thol., Com. p. 52, it is found eighty-six times in the Epistle to the Romans, and twenty-six times in 1 Cor.). But it does not occur in the Epistle to the Hebrews; we find instead ὁ κύριος two (or three xii. 14?) times; Ἰησοῦς nine times; Χριστός (with or without the art.) nine times; Ἰησοῦς Χριστός three times; and ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς once.

(*c*) The word εὐαγγέλιον, "the gospel," occurs sixty-one times in the other epistles; it is not met with in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

(*d*) The appellation πατήρ is used of God forty-four times by Paul. The only instance in which it is used by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews is in the phrase "Father of Spirits" (by way of antithesis to "fathers of our flesh," xii. 9).

Passing to *positive* characteristics, there are

(2) Certain forms of expression which the author of our Epistle substitutes for synonymous expressions employed by Paul.

thousand" (Marsh's Lects. on the Eng. Lang. p. 182). Our current translation of the Bible contains fewer than six thousand. The vocabulary of the Greek New Test. numbers about five thousand words, exclusive of proper names; and it is believed that the number of different words employed in our Epistle (quotations and proper names not included) is about seven hundred.

(*a*) In the phrase *καθίζω ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ θεοῦ*, etc., where Paul (twice Eph. i. 20; Col. iii. 1) uses the verb transitively, the writer to the Hebrews substitutes (four times) the intransitive use.

(*b*) The word *μισθαποδοσία* is used in our Epistle (three times) where Paul employs in the same sense (and connection cf. 1 Cor. iii. 8, 14 with Heb. ii. 2; and 1 Cor. ix. 17 with Heb. x. 35) the simple *μισθός*.

(*c*) The phrases *εἰς τὸ διηνεκές* (three times and *peculiar* to our Epistle) *εἰς τὸ παντελές* (once) and *διαπαντός* (twice; in Rom. xi. 10 it stands in a quotation from the Old Test.) are substituted for Paul's (less elegant, cf. Sturz, de Dialect. Maced. et Alex. p. 187) *πάντοτε*.

(*d*) *μέτοχον εἶναι, γίνεσθαι* is (four times) used where Paul employs *κοινωνὸν* (*συγκοινωνὸν*) *εἶναι, κοινωνεῖν*, etc.

(3) Other expressions are *peculiar* to this Epistle: such are

(*a*) The use of *παρά* and *ὑπέρ* (with acc.) after a comparative, five times in our Epistle, never in Paul's; and comparison by means of the formal *ὅσον . . . . . τοσοῦτο* (four times).

(*b*) *ἐάνπερ* (three times); never used by Paul.

(*c*) *ὅθεν*, "wherefore," six times in our Epistle; never in Paul's. Connectives have been styled "the physiognomy of speech." In addition to the characteristic conjunctions just mentioned the Epistle to the Hebrews exhibits, generally, greater variety and delicacy than Paul in the use of connectives.

Other characteristic expressions might be adduced, such as the phrase *οἰκουμένη μέλλουσα* ii. 5 (to denote the "consummate Christian dispensation"), *κρείττων* frequently used in a peculiar sense, the employment of feminine verbal nouns in *σις* which nearly all belong to literary Greek (Winer, Grammatik, 7th ed., p. 89, middle); but

More convincing in its bearing on the question of authorship than particular coincidences or differences of phraseology is

(4) The *general* difference of its style and diction from that of the Pauline Epistles. This difference is marked. Paul as a writer is rugged, abrupt, impassioned, digressive, unequal.

He writes like a man with a full heart, bent on uttering himself, and not very solicitous about the mode, provided he makes himself understood. With all this the Epistle to the Hebrews is in contrast.

(*a*) The language used in it is more pure, idiomatic, ample; not classic of course. Classic Greek had disappeared. Nor is the composition as pure in language and correct in construction as the writings of its author's native Greek contemporaries. Even Philo and Josephus, educated Jews, could not rid their style of national peculiarities.[1] Hebraisms, both lexical and grammatical, are to be found in our Epistle (Thol. as above), though by no means so many as some writers have alleged (cf. Davidson, Introd. iii. 242 sq., after Tholuck, Com. p. 26 sq.). But the statement, notice, is a *comparative* one. The language of our Epistle is less Hebraistic; its constructions are more idiomatic than those of the Epistles of Paul; of this assertion from the nature of the case no direct proof can here be attempted; yet its truth might be illustrated by the frequent and varied use of participles, particles, etc.

(*b*) The *style* is less impassioned than Paul's; more regular and periodic in structure; more rhythmical and euphonious. In short, the careful selection of the words, the delicate poise of the sentences, the musical flow of the periods, accord far better with the supposition that our Epistle was the leisurely composition of a man of scholastic training, than the product of the apostle Paul.

These statements cannot be adequately illustrated by the quotation of single passages. Still, one or two particulars may be specified, in which this rhetorical elaborateness of style becomes apparent.

a. Although many of its sentences are long and complex, in some cases even including parenthesis within parenthesis

[1] Josephus tells us (contr. Apion. i. 9; Opera ed. Hav. ii. 442) that in the composition of his History he employed assistance in reference to the Greek, and even amid his boasting he is constrained to confess his deficiencies (Antiq. xx. 11, 2; ed. Hav. i. p. 982). For critical judgments respecting Philo's Greek see Tholuck's Com. p. 48, note.

(xii. 18 sq.; vii. 20 sq.), yet their termination is adjusted to the beginning with careful accuracy. It is doubtful whether there is a single instance of anacoluthon in the Epistle. A marked contrast this to the grammatical inaccuracies of structure characteristic of almost all of Paul's longer periods.

β. The selection of stately words and full-sounding phrases: e.g. πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως etc., with which the Epistle begins; μισθαποδοσία, μεγαλωσύνη, ὁρκωμοσία, αἱματεκχυσία, and the like, cf. the employment of ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ θεοῦ (i. 3) for Paul's simple εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ. So, again, Paul's expression ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ θεοῦ καθήμενος (Col. iii. 1) is expanded in the Hebrews even into ἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ θρόνου τῆς μεγαλωσύνης ἐν ταῖς οὐρανοῖς (viii. 1).

(5) *Testimony* on this head. The difference as respects language and style between the Epistle to the Hebrews and the thirteen acknowledged Epistles of Paul has been conceded from the first.

Clement of Alexandria (towards close of second century) virtually admitted this by adopting the supposition that the Epistle had been translated by Luke, and on that account resembled in style the book of the Acts (see Kirchhofer, Quellensammlung u. s. w. p. 241; Euseb. H. E. vi. 14).

Origen († 254) is very explicit: "The style of the Epistle entitled 'To the Hebrews' has not the rudeness of the language of the apostle who confessed himself to be rude in speech, that is in diction; but the epistle is better Greek in the texture of its style, as every one able to judge of differences in style would confess," etc. (Kirch. p. 4; Euseb. H. E. vi. 25). This is the testimony of men to whom Greek was vernacular.

Jerome, the great biblical scholar of the West, testifies that "the Epistle to the Hebrews is believed not to be Paul's, because its style and diction differ from his" (Kirch. p. 178).

The same opinion finds fresh utterance with the revival of letters and the Reformation.

For the Roman Catholics speaks Erasmus, asserting that

"its style has no affinity with Paul's," but "differs in every respect" (in his annotation on xiii. 24; Opera vi. 1023–24. the passage is given in full by Alford, Proleg. to the Epistle p. 33 sq.).

For the Reformers, Luther; who says "it is not St. Paul's because it employs a more ornate diction than St. Paul is accustomed to" (cf. Bleek, Com. i., note [338]).

Calvin; who declares (in the Preface to his Commentary on the Epistle, Tholuck's ed. p. 380) that "its mode of discourse and style testify plainly enough that its author was another than Paul."

A similar judgment has been given by Grotius, Valckenaêr, and others; and at the present day this opinion is almost unquestioned.

Those who, notwithstanding the difference of style, hold to the opinion that Paul was the author, offer three suggestions in explanation of this difference:

First, That it is to be accounted for by assuming a considerable interval of time to have elapsed between the composition of the other thirteen epistles and that to the Hebrews. In that interval the apostle's style (it is said) may have undergone a change; similar to that which John's seems to have undergone between the composition of the Apocalypse and his Gospel.

But this explanation (to mention no other objection to it) is overthrown by the fact that the Epistle, if the work of Paul, must have been written (as all our knowledge of the apostle's history compels us to believe) at the farthest only a year or two after the latest of his other epistles. And such an interval is too short for such transformation in a style which during ten or fifteen years preceding showed no tendency towards such a change (Davidson, iii. 295, dates the earliest of Paul's epistles, 1 Thess., at A.D. 52, while according to him the Epistle to the Heb. and 2 Tim. were written A.D. 63).

Secondly, Others have conjectured that its studied style is owing to its being addressed to Jewish readers; readers to whom the apostle to the Gentiles has addressed no other epistle.

But this explanation is unsatisfactory. For, Hebrew or Hellenistic readers would have been among the last duly to appreciate this unusual purity and finish of Greek style. In writing to the cultivated Corinthians he does not bestow any special care upon his style. And yet that this matter had engaged his attention he shows by the half-apologetic confession he makes that he is "*rude* in speech" (ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ, 2 Cor. xi. 6). Finished Greek, therefore, we should not expect that *he* would have attempted to write, who "to the Jews *became as a Jew*"; nor would they (probably) have been especially gratified with it, accustomed, as they were, to speak and to write a more Hebraistic idiom.

Thirdly, It has been assumed that the style of the Epistle may have taken its cast from the amanuensis to whom it was dictated, and who may have been a scholarly Greek.

But we reply, there is no evidence from the other epistles that the style of the amanuensis sensibly affected the style of the apostle. They were dictated to different persons; yet possess indisputable marks of a common author. Tertius, to whom the Epistle to the Romans was dictated (xvi. 22), was not, to judge him from his name, a Jew; yet the style of that epistle does not differ appreciably from that of the Epistle to the Galatians, which the apostle *seems* to have written with "his own hand" (Gal. vi. 11).

2. We pass to internal evidence of the second class tending to show that our Epistle was not the composition of Paul, viz. evidence of a *doctrinal* nature:

And here it may not be superfluous to repeat the remark, that it is not to be supposed that the doctrine of this Epistle is in any particular irreconcilable with the doctrine of Paul. This, indeed, has been asserted both in ancient and modern times. But the assertion has been rejected by Christendom as unsustained by the facts. The Epistle does differ somewhat in doctrine from the Pauline Epistles. But the differences are not discrepancies. There is one glory of the sun and another glory of the moon; but the radiance of both is light from heaven. The differences resemble those which

are acknowledged to exist between the aspects of truth disclosed to us in other biblical books. John, for example, presents Christianity to our view as spiritual and eternal life in light and love. In James it reveals itself as perfect obedience to perfect law. So we remark:

a. Paul presents Christianity distinctively, as justification before God through faith in the Crucified One. Hence the current terms in his epistles are δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως, or διὰ πίστεως, δικαιοῦσθαι, δικαίωσις, ἔργα πίστεως and ἔργα νόμου, ὀργή and χάρις θεοῦ, ἀπολύτρωσις, καταλλαγή, πνεῦμα and σάρξ.

The fundamental view taken of Christianity in our Epistle is consummated Judaism. Accordingly its characteristic terms are τελειοῦν, καθαρίζειν, ἁγιάζειν, etc.

It results from this fundamental peculiarity of the Epistle that in it

(1) Faith is defined and illustrated (ch. xi.) in its generic, Jewish sense of trust in God's assurances. With Paul, on the other hand, it is generally specific — a sinner's trust in Christ. In the Epistle to the Hebrews it is antithetic to sight; in Paul antithetic (generally, yet cf. 2 Cor. v. 7) to works.

(2) The eternal high priesthood of Christ in heaven is presented as the consummation of the Messiah's career; whereas in Paul's epistles his triumphant resurrection is made prominent. *That* set the divine seal to his earthly work, and declared him to be the Son of God with power.

(3) The "people of God" (ii. 17; xiii. 12), the "seed of Abraham" (ii. 16, contrast Gal. iii. 28, 29) are faithful Jews; at least, little or nothing is said of the truth which Paul makes so prominent, that Gentiles are joint-heirs with Jews of the grace of life.

(4) The Old Test. is interpreted in a spiritualizing, symbolic way; a mode of interpretation indeed, of which traces are here and there to be found in Paul's writings (e.g. Gal. iv. 21 sq.; 1 Cor. x. 1 sq.), but which is so marked in this Epistle as to give it a half-mystical and speculative cast (cf.

Westcott, History of the Canon, 1st ed., p. 51; Riehm, Lehrbegriff des Hebr.-br. p. 183 sq.).

Now it must be admitted, (*a*) that these peculiarities do not by any means constitute so wide a divergence from the Pauline type of doctrine as is to be found in other apostolic epistles; (*β*) that they relate rather to the development and proportion of doctrines than to their substance, — consist of omissions rather than positive statements; and (*γ*) that it is possible to explain them all as owing to what is peculiar in the theme, the aim of the writer, and the character and circumstances of the original readers. Taken by themselves, they can hardly be considered as evidence that Paul was not the author. They would still seem strange to us. It would strike us as remarkable that the apostle's characteristic opinions, which crop out in the other epistles even where neither the readers nor the theme seem to suggest them (e.g. Phil. iii.), should fail to find expression in this, although tempting opportunities present themselves on every page. In the language of Delitzsch (Com. p. 703), "It is, and must remain, surprising that as we dissect the Epistle we nowhere meet with those ideas which are, so to speak, the very arteries of Paul's spiritual system. The apostle to the Gentiles, who through the law became dead to the law, lives in the antagonism between righteousness of faith and of works; he whom the Lord had called to the apostleship, not in the days of his flesh, but from his life of heavenly glory, lives and moves in Christ's resurrection; he who was sent unto the Gentiles, and who was predestined to effect the separation of synagogue and church, lives and moves in the call of the Gentiles to fellowship in salvation. But of these three fundamental doctrines there is to be found only a passing allusion (xiii. 20) to the resurrection." Still it is not so much as independent arguments, but rather as corroboratory indications of authorship, that the doctrinal characteristics mentioned have much weight. These indications are strengthened, further, by the fact that

b. Our Epistle differs somewhat from Paul's in the grounds on which its presentation of truth is made in general to rest:

Paul speaks as the authoritative messenger of God. He often makes reference, indeed, to the Old Testament, but oftener still he quietly assumes plenary authority to declare what had not been revealed to holy men of old.

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, on the other hand, rests his teaching upon biblical statements almost exclusively. It is from the ancient scriptures that he demonstrates the dignity of the Messiah; his superiority to angels, to Moses, to Aaron. It is by the Old Testament that he proves the typical and temporary nature of the former economy and the superiority and permanence of the new. In short, he speaks, "not so much as an inspired messenger, delivering himself of that with which God had entrusted him, but as an enlightened believer in Moses and the prophets, both learning and teaching by a diligent comparison of what the ancient servants of Jehovah had uttered under the inspiration of the Divine Spirit" (An amended Trans. of the Ep. to the Hebrews, b. p. vi., 1847, London: Bagster and Sons; cf. Stanley's Sermons and Essays on the Apostolic Age, 2d ed., p. 366 sq.).

3. Facts, and allusions of a personal nature, inconsistent, apparently, with the supposition that the Epistle is Paul's:

a. There is a presumption against Paul's being the author in the circumstance that the Epistle addresses itself to Jewish Christians. If Paul wrote it, he departed in doing so from his ordinary province of labor (the Gentiles, and where Christ had not been preached, Gal. ii. 9; Rom. xv. 20).

b. If Paul had written to Jewish converts, particularly those at Jerusalem, he could hardly have abstained from justifying his apostolic course, which had brought down upon him their displeasure at his very last visit among them (Acts xxi. 17 sq.). It is difficult to understand, too, how Paul could have given utterance to language implying affectionate intimacy (e.g. xiii. 19).

Should it be conjectured that he adopted this course for the purpose of propitiating his readers, how shall we reconcile with such a supposition the plain terms in which (e.g. v. 11 sq.) he reproaches them with dullness and ignorance?

c. If Paul had written the Epistle to Christians at Jerusalem, he could hardly have alluded in cool historic style, as he does, to the early persecutions and martyrs of that church: "Remember those who have been your leaders, who spoke to you the word of God; whose faith follow, considering the end of their manner of life" (Heb. xiii. 7); "Ye have not yet resisted unto blood, striving against sin" (xii. 4).

Paul had been forward in inflicting these very persecutions. At the death of the proto-martyr, the witnesses laid off their clothes at the feet of Saul, who "was consenting unto his death" (Acts vii. 58; viii. 1, cf 3; ix. 1). How Paul was accustomed to allude to these things, even in writing to third parties, we see in 1 Cor. xv. 9, "I am the least of the apostles, that am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God"; and in 1 Tim. i. 12 sq., "I thank Christ Jesus our Lord ..... for that he counted me faithful, putting me into the ministry, who was before a blasphemer and a persecuter and injurious," etc.

d. Inconsistent with the supposition that Paul is the author, is the passage (ii. 3): "How shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation, which began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard," etc. In this passage the author classes himself and his hearers together, and distinguishes them from those who had received the gospel immediately from Christ. This is in marked opposition to Paul's uniform style of speech on this subject. He constantly insists that he did not receive the gospel through any human channel, but by direct revelation from Christ, and accordingly claims to rank as the co-equal of the other apostles. See Gal. i. 1, 11, 12, 15, 16; ii. 6; 1 Cor. ix. 1; xi. 23; Eph. iii. 2, 3; 2 Cor. xi. 5. This is Paul's style of speech on the subject upon all (other) occasions.

But it is objected, the plural pronoun here may be used "communicatively," i.e. by that rhetorical usage according to which a person employs the term "we," although, strictly speaking, he does not mean to include himself.

We reply, This communicative use of the pronoun is allow-

able in two cases (cf. Christian Examiner for 1829, p. 335),

(1) When employed in a *collective* sense, i.e. when the writer views himself as belonging to a community, and asserts something of the community as a whole, although it may not be true of him considered as an individual. Here belongs the instance quoted from Cicero: "nos perdimus rempublicam."

(2) When used out *of courtesy*, i.e. when a writer in order to avoid immodesty, or to diminish the unpleasantness of the truth he is uttering, speaks as though he referred, in part at least, to himself, although really he has reference solely to others. This use is illustrated by every skilful preacher in almost every sermon.

Now in both these cases, notice, the writer merely keeps a distinction out of view. But in the present passage the distinction is clearly expressed, and the writer (on the interpretation proposed) assumes a false position in reference to it. He designates three separate classes of persons, viz. "the Lord," "them that heard him," and "we"; and in the face of this explicit distinction he puts himself in with the third class. The laws of rhetoric sometimes allow a writer to conceal truth, never to contradict it.

The improbability of Paul's making this false classification of himself in the present case is heightened, by the circumstance that the very weight of the writer's argument here rests upon the pre-eminently direct and trustworthy way in which his readers had come by the gospel. Hence the reference to the "Lord himself." Undeniably his argument would have been strengthened had he been able to appeal to a revelation of truth made to himself direct from heaven. As Paul could have made such an appeal, it is hardly possible to believe that he would not have made it. This passage, then, as Calvin (Com., Tholuck's ed., p. 393; see also the Arg. p. 380) and others have said, is proof that the Epistle was not written by Paul.

It may be added that there seem to be indications that the Epistle was composed after the death of the apostle. Chief among them is the mention (xiii. 23) of Timothy's

release from imprisonment ("know that the brother Timothy has been set at liberty"). This assumption that the fact of his imprisonment is known to the readers, seems to imply that the imprisonment itself can have been neither unimportant nor of short duration. And yet nowhere else in the New Testament — not even in the latest of Paul's epistles (2 Tim.), written as is supposed very shortly before the apostle's death — is there any mention of this imprisonment. At the close of that epistle (iv. 9) the apostle summons Timothy from Ephesus to Rome; and it is not an unnatural supposition that there, as one who had been the apostle's friend and helper, he underwent the incarceration alluded to (Bleek, Einl. in d. N. T. p. 501, 502, cf. Tholuck, p. 22).

It appears, then, that while there are indications in the Epistle itself — indications personal, doctrinal, formal — which suggest the apostle Paul as its author, there is on the other hand much stronger evidence, of all three kinds, against the supposition that he composed it.

Let us turn now to the *external* or *historical* evidence.

1. Pantaenus is the first, so far as we know, who connected the name of Paul with the epistle. Pantaenus was at the head of the catechetical school in Alexandria about A.D. 150. His testimony comes to us at third hand in Eusebius (H. E. vi. 14; Kirch. p. 242). Eusebius quotes Clement of Alexandria as saying: "But now" as the blessed presbyter [probably Pantaenus, Clement's teacher] used to say, "since the Lord, being the Apostle of the Almighty, was sent to the Hebrews, Paul out of modesty, as if sent to the Gentiles, did not subscribe himself an apostle of the Hebrews; both out of reverence for the Lord, and because he, the herald and apostle of the Gentiles, wrote also to the Hebrews *ex abundanti*."

Note. Even this earliest testimony indicates that the Epistle is felt to possess characteristics at variance with Pauline authorship.

2. Clement of Alexandria (†220?) the pupil and successor of Pantaenus, is the next witness. He repeatedly cites the Epistle as Paul's. His most explicit testimony, given in his ὑποτυπώσεις or "outlines" — a summary of the contents of

the Old and New Testaments, has been preserved by Eusebius (H. E. vi. 14; Kirch. p. 241): "'The Epistle to the Hebrews,' he says, 'is Paul's, indeed, but it was written to the Hebrews in the Hebrew tongue; but Luke, having translated it carefully, published it to the Greeks. Hence it is we find the same complexion of style in this Epistle as translated and in the Acts. And that he did not make use of the prefix 'Paul, the apostle' with reason. 'For,' he says, 'writing to the Hebrews, who had taken a prejudice against him and suspected him, he very wisely did not repel them at the outset by giving his name.'"

Note (a) here again we have evidence that the omission of the prefix is felt to be an obstacle to its Pauline origin; and a new explanation of that omission is given. Further (b), the style is acknowledged to be un-Pauline; and, apparently to obviate this difficulty, Luke's connection with the Epistle as translator is alleged.[1]

3. Origen (†254) a pupil of Clement frequently quotes it as Paul's. He is said to make reference to the Epistle more than two hundred times, now without naming either writer or book, now with the phrase "the apostle," and more explicitly "Paul, in the Epistle to the Hebrews" (Kirch. p. 244). The fullest and latest expression of his opinion seems to be that preserved by Euseb. (vi. 25; Kirch. p. 4), a part of which has already been quoted (p. 697): "'The style of the epistle entitled 'To the Hebrews' has not the rudeness of the language of the apostle who confessed himself to be unskilled in eloquence, that is in style; but the Epistle is better Greek (ἑλληνικωτέρα) in the texture of its style, as every one who knows enough to judge of differences in style would confess; on the other hand, again, that the thoughts of the Epistle are admirable and not inferior to the acknowledged writings of the apostle; and that this is true every one will agree who has read attentively the apostle's writings.' To this he afterwards adds: 'In giving my own opinion I should say that

[1] How can modern writers consistently lay great stress upon the assertion of Clement and others that the Epistle was written by Paul, and at the same time reject the accompanying assertion that it was originally written in Hebrew?

the thoughts (*νοήματα*) are those of the apostle, but the language and the composition (*ἡ δὲ φράσις καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις*) those of some one who recorded the apostle's views, who wrote out notes (*σχολιογραφήσαντος*; cf. note in Kirch.), as it were, of what had been said by his master. If any church, then, receives this Epistle as Paul's, let it have credit on that very account, for not without reason have the ancients handed it down as Paul's. But as to who wrote the Epistle, the truth is known to God. The account which has reached us [is various], some saying that Clement, who became bishop of the Romans, wrote the Epistle; some that Luke, who wrote the Gospel and the Acts.'"

In this testimony

Note a. That Origen professes to be giving his own opinion — the opinion of the best biblical scholar of his age.

Note b. That he cannot acknowledge the Epistle to be Pauline in the fullest sense; the thoughts are Pauline, the composition is not.

Note c. That the tradition that it was Paul's was ancient, yet not decisive of the question. The indefinite phrase, "the ancients have handed it down to us as Paul's," seems most naturally to mean that the belief in its Pauline authorship had in former times been the prevalent belief.

Note d. This opinion it is implied that some churches still hold (and are to be commended for holding), and that other churches reject; to say, as even Davidson does, p. 189, that the words "If any church receives this Epistle as Paul's let it have credit on that very account," do not sustain the inference that any church rejected it as his, is unwarranted. The language is hypothetical, it is true; but the phrase "let it have credit" (*εὐδοκιμείτω*) conveys an indubitable implication as to the fact. We do not commend persons for doing what every body does without exception. If a person should say to-day: "If any church holds to the Boston Confession of 1680 let it be commended for doing so," should we think the inference that some churches do not hold to that platform unwarranted?

Note e. That in his judgment the proper author of the Epistle is unknown. Many contend that *ὁ γράψας* in the phrase "who it was wrote the Epistle only God knows," means merely acted as scribe (e.g. Rom. xvi. 22, *ἐγὼ Τέρτιος ὁ γράψας τὴν ἐπιστολήν*. But

the phrase has naturally the same sense here as in the sentence immediately following: "Luke, who wrote (ὁ γράψας) the Gospel," etc. Though Origen thinks that the thoughts of the Epistle are Paul's, yet in the composition of the Epistle Paul was passive (cf. reply to the third explanation of the difference of style, p. 699).

From the time of Origen the Epistle to the Hebrews was currently accepted as Pauline by the Alexandrian and other Oriental churches. By the Synod of Antioch (A.D. 264 sq.) passages from it (chap. xi.) and from the Epistles to the Corinthians are linked together, and ascribed to "the apostle" (Mansi, i. 1038).

But the unqualified assertion that the Oriental writers do not exhibit a single trace of dissent from the opinion that Paul was its author (Olsh. Opusc. p. 95) is not quite true. Eusebius (bishop of Caesarea, in first half of the fourth century, † about 340) often quotes the Epistle as Paul's (Kirch. pp. 247, 248), yet he elsewhere says (iii. 3; Kirch. p. 170) "It ought not to be denied that some have set aside the Epistle to the Hebrews, saying that it is rejected by the church at Rome as not being Paul's." In another passage (H. E. vi. 13; Kirch. p. 240) he even seems himself to reckon it among the "antilegomena": he is speaking of Clement's Stromata, and says: "He has made use in them also of testimonies from the disputed writings (antilegomena), both from the so-called Wisdom of Solomon, and of Jesus the son of Sirach, also from the Epistle to the Hebrews, and from that of Barnabas and Clement and Jude" (cf. Thol. p. 13 sq.; Credner on the Canon, ed. Volkmar, p. 201 sq.).

It appears, then, that the apostle Paul was generally regarded as the author of the Epistle — mediate or immediate — by the Alexandrian and other Oriental Christians, from the middle of the second century downwards. But this opinion cannot be said to have been held with absolute unanimity, nor are there wanting (at least at first) indications, more or less marked, that the character of the Epistle was felt to conflict with it.

The testimony from the West is of a different nature.

Half a century before the Epistle is mentioned in the East, and hardly thirty years after it was written, we find it known and prized at Rome (see below, on the Canonicity), by a man who is believed to have been a fellow-laborer with the apostle Paul (see Phil. iv. 3; yet cf. Ellicott in loc.).

It seems hardly possible that, had the apostle been its author, Clement should have remained ignorant of the fact; or that, the fact once known, knowledge of it should have died out, while the Epistle itself survived. And yet in all parts of the West — in Gaul, Italy, Africa — the Epistle was regarded as un-Pauline.

1. Irenaeus (bishop at Lyons from A.D. 178 on) although making abundant use of all the other epistles of Paul, except Philemon, never quotes the Epistle to the Hebrews. This is negative testimony, indeed; but not without weight, for

(*a*) There are many passages in the Epistle which would have been very serviceable to Irenaeus in his controversies, had he and his opponents acknowledged the work as Pauline.

(*b*) Eusebius (v. 26 p. 212; Kirch. 239) in referring to a work of Irenaeus, no longer extant, speaks of the fact as though sómething remarkable, that "in it he mentions the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the so-called Wisdom of Solomon, subjoining certain sayings from them."

(*c*) Photius (Patriarch of Constantinople and historian, † about 890, cf. Kirch. p. 240) quotes Stephen Gobar, of the sixth century, as recording "that Irenaeus says that Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews is not his."

2. Hippolytus, who describes himself as a pupil of Irenaeus and friend of Origen, and who lived at the beginning of the third century, would not admit that Paul wrote it: "The Epistle to the Hebrews is not the apostle Paul's" (Church History, as preserved in Photius; Kirch. p. 240).

3. The Roman presbyter Caius, also of the first part of the third century, "mentions (according to Euseb. vi. 20; Kirch. p. 243) only the thirteen epistles of St. Paul, not reckoning that to the Hebrews with the rest." Here again Photius endorses the statement.

4. Tertullian († between 220 and 240) makes but a single express reference to it, in a passage soon to be quoted at length (see on Canonicity, p. 720). He apparently has never heard of its being attributed to Paul; but quotes it unhesitatingly as the work of Barnabas.

5. Cyprian († 258), also of North Africa, nowhere mentions the Epistle, and in two passages (Kirch. p. 247) he speaks of Paul as having addressed seven churches, as our Lord did in the Apocalypse; a comparison found also in other ancient writers who refuse to recognize Hebrews as Paul's work (cf. Muratori's Fragment, and Victorinus).

More than a century later writers in the West, (Hilary, † 368 et al., cf. Credner, p. 267) following the Greek church Fathers, begin to ascribe the Epistle to Paul, and this opinion finally becomes general, largely through the influence of Jerome († 420) and Augustine († 430). Even these last two writers, however, exhibit traces of the earlier opinion:

Jerome vacillates (cf. Kirch. pp. 253, 254). His references to the Ep. are numerous. At times he quotes from it unequivocally, as "Paul," or "the Apostle"; at others, as "the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, whoever he may be," or "the apostle Paul, or whoever else wrote the Epistle," and says explicitly "the Epistle to the Hebrews, which Latin usage does not receive"; and again, "by most it is excluded from the number of Paul's epistles"; so too, "many Latins doubt about it." His fullest and latest (A.D. 414) utterance is as follows: After quoting from the Epistle (xi. 8 sq.) he adds, "the Jews of course do not receive these proofs." "We must tell Christians ('nostris'; perhaps 'our Latin Christians') that this Epistle entitled 'to the Hebrews' is received not only by the churches of the East, but by the whole succession of ecclesiastical Greek writers, as if it were the apostle Paul's, although very many ascribe it either to Barnabas or to Clement. And it is of no importance whose it is, as it is the work of an ecclesiastical man (i.e. not a heretic; cf. Bleek, Com. i., note [281]), and is daily read in the churches. But if Latin usage does not receive it among canonical writings, neither

do the Greek churches, using the same liberty, accept the Apocalypse of John; yet *we* accept both; by no means following present usage, but the authority of ancient writers, who for the most part constantly quote proof-texts from both, not as they are in the habit of doing sometimes from apocryphal writings (just as they occasionally use instances even from heathen literature), but as if canonical." [1]

Augustine's bearing toward the Epistle is similar. Occasionally he quotes from it as "the apostle's," but he evidently prefers some indefinite circumlocution: "the Epistle to the Hebrews"; "the Epistle written to the Hebrews"; "the Epistle entitled to the Hebrews," etc., and says expressly "some have feared to receive it into the canon." "Many say that Paul is its author, but some deny it," etc. In one of his controversial writings (cf. Bleek, p. 220), after having gone through with proofs from Paul's epistles, he comes to the Hebrews, and then, as though in justification of his use of it, says, that "although it is uncertain to some, yet as he has read that certain of his opponents have chosen to employ it as a witness for their views, and is influenced more by the authority of the Oriental churches that reckon it too among the canonical books, he will take note of its testimony," etc. (cf. too, Davidson, Introd. iii. p. 183 sq.).

The historical testimony concerning its author, then, exhibits a very remarkable contradiction: The Eastern churches almost unanimously regarded it as directly or indirectly the work of Paul, while among the Western no trace of any such opinion is to be found till after the lapse of two centuries.

An attempt has been made (Spanheim, Wetst., especially Hug, Einl. ii. 412 sq.) to account for this contradiction by a reference to the views of the Montanists and subsequently of the Novatians. Heb. vi. 4 sq. it is said, sustains the views of these heretics concerning the non-restoration of the lapsi, and consequently the Epistle fell into disfavor with the Orthodox.

[1] Here we see Jerome is inclined to merge the question of authorship in the broader and more important question of canonicity; see below.

But the explanation is not satisfactory; for (1) If this had been the reason for the denial of the apostolic origin of the Epistle, numerous and unmistakable indications, not to say avowals of it, would probably be discoverable in the early writers; but such is not the case. (2) These heretics themselves deny that Paul wrote the Epistle! Tertullian's language is very explicit (see below p. 720); and Novatian himself does not so much as mention the Epistle (cf. Thol. p. 17 sq.).

It is said, the denial of its Pauline origin in the West should be disregarded, and the tradition of the Eastern churches credited; for two reasons: (1) The testimony of the East is positive; that of the West negative. (2) The truth of the matter is more likely to have been preserved in the East, where the Epistle was first read and put in circulation.

But (*a*) Even in the East it was not *known* who wrote it. This is evident from the differences in the views held there.

(*b*) The testimony of the West is not wholly negative. Tertullian, e.g. gives testimony as positive as any given in the East, that Barnabas wrote it (yet that testimony the majority of subsequent writers have not hesitated to set aside).

(*c*) The testimony of the West, although negative in the sense that it does not assign the Epistle to Paul as its author, is nevertheless positive in relation to the question: Did Paul write it? When we consider that the Epistle was known at Rome more than half a century before any traces of it in the East have been preserved to us (some thirty years only after its composition), that though treated with respect at the West from that time on, it was never acknowledged or treated as Paul's, while had it ever been ascribed to him on trustworthy testimony, the opinion would not have been likely to become extinct,[1] — the ancient and wide-spread and uniform disbelief in its Pauline origin which existed among Western Christians cannot fairly be set aside as of little

[1] The drift of Christian opinion in such a case is in just the contrary direction, as is well illustrated by the history of this very Epistle.

weight (see Bleek, p. 388 sq.; Riehm, p. 880; cf. Thol. p. 65). We must acknowledge at the least that the testimony of antiquity is far from authenticating it as the work of Paul.

Ancient testimony, then, being what it is — radically conflicting and, when affirmative, perhaps conjectural — we are left exposed to the full force of the internal evidence against the Pauline authorship. That evidence is so various, abundant, strong, as quite to justify the emphatic language of Calvin: "I cannot be brought to acknowledge Paul as its author" (as above, p. 380).

C. The opinion that Paul was indirectly its author: Here, if we would escape confusion, we must distinguish between suppositions which are often blended:

1. We may suppose Paul to have dictated the Epistle, and Luke or some other amanuensis to have penned it.

But on this supposition Paul remains the sole author of it. This was his usual mode of composing. This method does not produce any perceptible diversity in his style. For this reason (and others) this supposition is a useless supposition for our present purpose.

2. We may suppose the Epistle to be the joint production of Paul and some friend; whether we assume that Paul merely appended the conclusion (so, e.g. H. Thiersch, de Epist. ad Hebr. comment. historic. Marburg, 1848, p. 1, bot.), or participated throughout in its composition.

But this supposition, in either form of it, is unnatural and without evidence. We have no reason to believe it to have been any more common anciently to compose letters in such a way than it is to-day. We have no evidence that any other New Testament epistle originated in this way. In reference to the present Epistle the opinion is a mere assumption; an assumption which does not remove the difficulties in the case (cf. Bleek, Einl. in d. N. T. p. 515).

3. We may suppose the ideas to be in the main Paul's, but the composition to be the work of some one else.

Then, according to the ordinary use of language, Paul was not, and "some one else" was, the "author" of the Epistle.

According to common speech, Paul cannot be called the author of the Epistle unless he participated in the work of its composition. He is the author of a work (in the ordinary and obvious sense of the phrase), not who furnishes merely the ideas it contains, but the ideas in the form and expression they bear in that work. We call Luke the "author" of the third Gospel, although not only the facts, but in part the phraseology even, may have come from other sources. The author of our Epistle may have derived many of his thoughts from the apostle; but Paul cannot in the ordinary sense of the term be called its author, unless he were present and active during the work of its composition.

Since Paul, then, cannot be regarded as the author of the Epistle, we proceed to mention

D. The conjectures which have been ventured concerning the author:

Prominent among those to whom it has been attributed are Luke, Clement of Rome, Barnabas; and in modern times Apollos and Silas. [An examination of the arguments urged in support of their respective claims would show that in no case, not even that of Apollos, do they amount to much more than plausibility.]

Such are the indications which the Epistle gives of its author, and such the opinions respecting him which have found currency in ancient and modern times. An impartial consideration of them constrains us reverently to echo the words of Origen, *τίς δὲ ὁ γράψας τὴν ἐπιστολὴν, τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς θεὸς οἶδεν.*[1]

Its Canonicity:

By the canonicity of a book is meant its claim to be numbered among those writings which constitute the final au-

[1] The use of the term "apostle" in reference to the author, both in former and recent times, by those who have hesitated to admit the Pauline origin of the book (e.g. Calvin, Luther, Beza, Delitzsch, etc.) finds its explanation, doubtless, in the fact that the Epistle confessedly breathes an apostolic spirit, and is thought to find warrant in the application of the term to Barnabas, Acts xiv. 14 (cf. Delitzsch, Com. p. 707).

thority in matters of Christian faith. This claim has been extensively supposed, both in ancient and modern times, to be dependent upon the authorship of a writing in question. It has been assumed that only those New Testament writings are authoritative which are apostolic. This is the view of the matter which even Origen († 254) appears to accept in arguing from this very Epistle. He is speaking of the tradition concerning the death of the prophet Isaiah, "that he was sawn asunder," and says that "this is attested by the Epistle to the Hebrews, although recorded in none of the acknowledged (*φανερῶν*) books," and proceeds: "But perhaps some one, pressed by this demonstration, has recourse to the opinion of those who set aside the Epistle as not written by Paul; with this man we need other and separate arguments to prove that the *Epistle is Paul's*" (Epist. ad Afric., see Kirchhofer, pp. 244, 245). For Tertullian, too (see below), and in fact the majority of the early Fathers (cf. Bleek, Com. i. p. 437 sq.), uncertainty respecting the Pauline origin of the Epistle is enough to impair, if not annul, its canonical authority. To the Lutheran theologians, also, this has seemed a warrant for relegating the Epistle into the class of "deutero-canonical" books. In some printed editions of the New Testament (in low-German, Swedish, etc., Bleek, as above, p. 462 sq.; cf. Heppe, Dogm. des Deutsch. Prot. Bd. ii. 229 sq.) this book, together with the Epistles of James and Jude, and the Revelation, have not only been placed together at the end, but have even received the heading "Apocrypha[1] of the New Testament."

But more correct and consistent views on this subject — views of which isolated traces are to be discovered in the early Fathers, and which were explicitly advocated by the Reformed or Calvinistic theologians, as opposed to the Lutherans — are now very generally accepted. According to these views the canonicity of a book is not dependent solely upon its authorship, but upon its general reception as authoritative. Its "*general* reception" notice; for this view does not, like certain false theories of inspiration, make the canonicity of

[1] "Quorum origo non claruit patribus." — Augustine.

a book ultimately nothing but a matter of private judgment, so that every man is left free to accept what books he pleases, according to his private estimate of their contents; but the decision turns upon a question of historic fact. Have the great majority of early Christians recognized the book as belonging to the rule of faith? The testimonies of individuals are of value chiefly as aiding us in answering this question. We attach weight to what was said by Tertullian and Eusebius, Origen and Jerome, not because these men were either more learned or less fallible than biblical scholars at the present day, but because their language is a fair expression of current opinion on the subject. Only so far as it is a truthful exponent of the generally received views of the time, is it of much value to us. As the private judgment of individuals, it stands or falls on its intrinsic merits.

And this view of the grounds of a book's canonicity is more consistent than that which makes it depend upon apostolic origin. For the Gospels of Mark and of Luke on the face of things were *not* written by apostles, and yet not even those scholars who make canonicity dependent upon authorship abate their deference to these books on that account (cf. Bleek, p. 476 sq.). Indeed, the authority of these Gospels would hardly have been diminished had the name of their authors remained uncertain. Who among those scholars that adhere to the uniform tradition that Matthew wrote his Gospel in Hebrew, withholds allegiance in the least from our Greek text, because utterly ignorant when, where, how, it was prepared and passed into currency?

It is this fact of authoritative currency which is decisive; and this in the case of the Epistle to the Hebrews can be pretty well established.

Towards the end of the first century (under Domitian, i.e. before A.D. 96, cf. Uhlhorn in Herzog, Real-Encyk. ii. 726) Clement of Rome wrote an epistle in the name of "The church of God which sojourneth at Rome to the church of God which sojourneth at Corinth." This epistle is found appended to codex A, and is admitted to be genuine. Into

it the author has incorporated numerous ideas and expressions manifestly derived from the Epistle to the Hebrews. Dressel, in his index, refers to as many as twenty-five such instances (Patr. Apostol. opera, 2d ed., p. 669). It is doubtful whether Clement has anywhere unequivocally quoted the Epistle (cf. Thol. p. 2; Euseb. iii. 38; Kirch. p. 248), but he has quietly appropriated its thoughts and language, and woven them into his composition. This circumstance does not warrant the inference (of Eichhorn et al.) that he held the Epistle to be inferior in worth to the other sacred books; for, amid the paucity of Christian books, he and other church Fathers often interweave biblical extracts into their writings without any formula of quotation (Thol. pp. 2, 3). It does show us that he had no occasion to mention its author's name, even if he knew it. His use of the Epistle, it has been said, (Bleek, Com. i. 93 sq.; Einl. in d. N. T. p. 509) does not prove anything more than that he was acquainted with the Epistle, esteemed it, and found it serviceable as he wrote, without making it indubitable that the Epistle was esteemed, or even known, either by the church at Rome or that at Corinth. But when we consider in general, that a writer by employing the words of another implies that he considers them, and that they will be considered by his readers, to be more impressive than his own; and that neither Clement nor the other early writers were in the habit of quoting writings whose authority was not recognized (cf. the language of Euseb. H. E. ii. 23 sub fin.); we must acknowledge that, in the absence of any conflicting evidence, the authoritative reception of the Epistle to the Hebrews at the close of the first century is presumptively established.

In judging of early testimony relative to the authority of the sacred books, we must take pains to conform our views to the facts of history. As a matter of fact, the distribution of Christian writings into two radically distinct classes, canonical and uncanonical, was a gradual process — a process which required centuries for its completion. The successors of the apostles had an indistinct sense, indeed, of a difference

between themselves and their predecessors, which they showed by recognizing practically a distinction between apostolic compositions and their own,[1] but it was only through the lapse of generations that the inspired authority of the sacred books attained to full and explicit recognition.

Letting Clement of Rome, then, speak for the Western churches, we turn to the East. There unequivocal evidence of the authoritative reception of the book in the middle of the second century is afforded us by the fact that it forms part of the Peschito[2] version. The significance of this fact is strengthened by three considerations (cf. Westcott on the Canon, 1st ed. pp. 292, 267 sq.):

(1) This, like the other early versions, was made, not for private Christians, but for churches. It affords proof, therefore, of the wide-spread authority of the books it contains. This wide-spread authority it must have required time for any book to secure; consequently when possessed, it implies that the book is recognized as a heritage from an earlier period, which in this case cannot have been long after the days of the apostles.

[1] The distinction is illustrated in such passages as the following: Clement, in the same Epistle to the Corinthians already referred to, says (§ 47): "Take up the epistle of the blessed Paul, the apostle. What did he write you first in the beginning of his gospel? Of a truth under inspiration he wrote you concerning himself, and Cephas, and Apollos, because even then there had been factions among you. But that faction brought less sin upon you, for ye were partisans of apostles of good report, and of a man approved by them," etc. Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, who was condemned by Trajan sent to Rome and thrown to wild beasts (c. A.D. 107), in an epistle to the Romans written on his journey says (§ 4): "I do not give you injunctions, as did Peter and Paul. They are apostles; I am a condemned man. They are freemen; I am a slave until this present. But if I suffer I shall be the freedman of Jesus, and shall rise free in him," etc. Polycarp, the disciple of John, in a letter to the Philippians, written it is supposed c. A.D. 120, expresses himself as follows (§ 3): "I do not write to you thus, brethren, concerning righteousness in a spirit of self-confidence, but because ye have summoned me to write. For neither I nor another like me is able to approximate to the wisdom of the blessed and glorious Paul; who, when among you, taught accurately and surely before the men of that time the word of truth; who, even when absent, wrote you letters, into which if ye look closely ye will be able to be built up into the faith given you," etc.

[2] Or "Peschittho," for according to Arnold, in Herzog, Real-Encyk. xv. 398, this latter spelling is more correct than the common, Peschito or Peschitho.

(2) This version does not contain a single uncanonical book; but

(3) According to the subsequent views of Christendom the list of books contained in it is incomplete; yet the Syrian churches in succeeding times scrupulously excluded (2 Pet., 2 and 3 Jno., Jude, and the Apocalypse) books which gained recognition in the West. Hence we may presume that the canon was originally selected with care.[1]

Equally unequivocal is the evidence for the canonical acceptance of our Epistle at the middle of the second century which is afforded by the writings of Justin Martyr († c. 167[2]). In his dialogue with Trypho the Jew he expresses himself as follows (Kirchhofer, p. 239): "This is he who after the order of Melchizedek is king of Salem and everlasting priest of the Most High" (evidently borrowed from Heb. v. 9, 10; vi. 20; vii. 12); and again: "About to become both everlasting priest of God and King and Christ"; once more in his First Apol. (c. A.D. 139, under Antoninus Pius), "And he is called both angel and apostle"; which latter term is applied to Christ only in Heb. iii. 1.

In the canon of the North African churches the Epistle appears to have been originally wanting. The canon of the old Latin version seems to have coincided exactly with that of the Muratorian fragment[3] (Westcott on the Canon, p. 282, 1st ed.). The Epistle to the Hebrews was added subsequently,

[1] The version of our Epistle is thought to bear marks of proceeding from a separate translator (Wichelhaus de N. T. versione Syr. etc., Halis. 1850, p. 86 sq. as cited in Westcott, as above, p. 258); but that does not destroy the significance of its reception (yet cf. Thol. note pp. 9, 10).

[2] So commonly; yet the date of his death is uncertain (cf. Semisch in Herzog, vii. 182), and has been fixed by some scholars a score of years earlier; see Mr. Abbot's note on p. 369 of Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, American edition.

[3] This relic, discovered by Muratori in the Ambrosian Library at Milan, contains a list of the sacred books, and gives internal evidence of having been drawn up about A.D. 170. After enumerating the thirteen epistles of Paul, it makes mention of an epistle "to the Alexandrians," under which title some scholars (e.g. Köstlin, Theol. Jahrb., 1854, p. 366; Wieseler, Stud. und Krit. 1847 p. 841; Credner (ed. Volkmar) on the Canon, p. 161; Bunsen, Hippol. i. 365; Tischendorf, Proleg. to ed. vii. p. lxxiii, etc.) suppose our Epistle to the Hebrews is referred to.

and without the author's name. Its Latin text in the oldest forms in which it has come down to us is peculiar and remarkable. It is thought to represent the simplest extant form of the Old Latin. Its peculiarities indicate that it occupied a peculiar position, which probably exempted it from that revision to which books used in public worship seem to have been subjected. The testimony of Tertullian early in the third century confirms the belief that, though known to the North African Christians, it was not accepted as fully canonical. In arguing upon a matter of Christian discipline, after bringing forward proofs from most of the epistles of Paul, and from other books, he continues: "I wish, however, though it is superfluous, to bring forward also the testimony of a companion of the apostles, fitted, as it is, to confirm the discipline of his teachers on the point before us. For there is extant an Epistle to the Hebrews, which bears the name of Barnabas. The writer has consequently adequate authority, as being one whom Paul placed beside himself in the point of continence (1 Cor. ix. 6). And certainly the Epistle of Barnabas is more commonly received among the churches than that apocryphal shepherd of adulterers" (i.e. Hermas). He then quotes Heb. vi. 4–8 and continues: "One who had learnt from the apostles, and had taught with the apostles, knew this, that a second repentance was never promised by the apostles to an adulterer or fornicator. For he expounded the law admirably, and preserved its features to the very life" (De Pudicit. c. 20; see Kirch., p. 242 sq.; translation mostly borrowed from Westcott, pp. 285, 286). From this testimony it appears that in North Africa at the beginning of the third century the Epistle to the Hebrews, though held in respect by many churches, was not put upon a level with the canonical books; and that because it was not considered as the work of an apostle.

From this time, on its canonicity was regarded as dependent upon its authorship. And as Paul was generally believed in the West not to have been its author, it had there a subordinate place assigned it, and was classed among "eccle-

siastical" or "deutero-canonical" books. But broader views of the grounds of canonicity, explicitly advanced by Origen (†254, see Credner, as above p. 183 sq.), banished every doubt of its canonical authority from the orthodox churches of the East. This judgment, endorsed as it was by Augustine, (de peccat. merit. et remiss. i. 27, see above, p. 711; Kirch. p. 253, note[1]; cf. Credner, pp. 184, 397), ultimately secured for it a place in the canon of the West, although as late as A.D. 392 Jerome says (de viris illustribus, c. 59; Credner, p. 267), "it is not regarded as Paul's by the Romans, even at the present day" (cf. too, his letter to Paulinus, A.D. 394; Kirch. p. 15, "a plerisque extra numerum ponitur"; later, A.D. 414, in his Epist. ad Dardanum, Kirch. p. 253, he says: "he himself received it, influenced not by the custom of his time, but by the authority of ancient writers, cf. above, p. 711).

This tardy recognition in the West of the Epistle's claim to canonical rank is not to be overlooked. Still, its influence upon our judgment is neutralized, when we take note that it resulted from the one-sided view that indubitable apostolic authorship is indispensable to canonical authority.[1]

On some accounts our conviction of the validity of the Epistle's canonical claims should be all the deeper because of the opposition which the Epistle has encountered. Its triumph over wide-spread and long-continued opposition demonstrates its intrinsic worth. It is crowned as one that has overcome. It has made good the rightfulness of its hold upon the heart of Christendom by having silenced the hostile utterances of a misguided understanding. And when we hear persons declare at the present day that any doubt respecting its authorship abates their estimate of its authority, when we see men contending fiercely, one for Paul as its author,

[1] Thiersch says, with equal truth and beauty: "It is as with a picture of consummate loveliness which has been held to be Raphael's. Should it be proved not to have been painted by Raphael, but by some one else, we have not by this means lost a classic work of art, but have discovered another master of the first rank." Die Kirche im Apost. Zeitalter, p. 197; cf. Twesten, Dogmatik 3te aufl. i. 436, note.

another for Apollos, another for Luke, we may well repeat to them the words of the Apostle himself: "While one saith I am of Paul, and another I am of Apollos, are ye not carnal? Who then is Paul? and who is Apollos? ..... it is God that giveth the increase."

ARTICLE V.

THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.[1]

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THE argument for the existence of God is exceedingly simple. It involves but one premise, magnificent as this is; but one inference, great as this is. The mind passes from that broad array of facts — that power, skill, and beauty which the universe presents — up to the Creator, the Former of all. This leap of the mind is performed, like all its reasoning, by its own native strength, under the guidance and impulse of ideas inherent in it. As force, design, adaptation, are universal, discoverable by every one everywhere, this conclusion of the existence of a spiritual, supernatural agency has entered every rational mind; robbed, indeed, among the lower races, of its true breadth and import,— passing through Polytheism into mere Fetichism; and among the higher races, sometimes partially expelled again by the tricks of philosophy and of science. Nevertheless the universality and stubbornness of the conclusion show the inherent and necessary character of the ideas which lead to it, and so far prove its justness.

The chief and most conspicuous of these are, cause and effect, and the infinite. Attention has usually been directed to the first to the oversight of the second, and thus the argument has been inadequately grounded and wrongly presented.

[1] This is the first Article of a series on the same subject.

The polytheist reasons from cause and effect, and thus establishes many separate deities over distinct provinces of action. If, with the Greek, he struggles up to a supreme God, it is with very partial success, and an inadequate grasp of the notion. Many of the arguments for the existence of the true God are logically vitiated by the same error. We are taught to arrive at his being from the effects about us which require the interpretation of a cause. The proof thus presented overlooks both the nature of a cause, and the impossibility of arresting the line of reasoning it opens.

The mind will, indeed, often reach and tenaciously hold a just conclusion from partial or from erroneous premises. That which supports its steps may lie hidden beneath the surface, and it fails theoretically to hit the exact points of rest, on which, as pivots, the movement is made. We walk before we understand how we walk; we reason safely before we can analyze our reasonings correctly. Yet, when the occasion for the analysis arises, it is important that it be accurate, or we shall by it cast discredit on our most constant and needful conclusions. We often reject in philosophy our best wisdom, simply because it is more profound than our expositions of it. Revelation is destroyed by interpretation. Let us then expose the two defects referred to.

What is a cause in one relation is an effect in another. What occasions the phenomena which follow it is occasioned by the phenomena that precede it. The ball on the billiard table moves because it has received the stroke of the rod, and that motion, which is itself an effect, is ready to become a cause of motion in the ball lying in its line. That which looking backward is an effect, looking forward is a cause. Cause and effect are the positive and passive poles of the same thing, and a chain which followed downward is a series of effects, followed upward becomes a series of causes. A cause, by the very fact of its being a cause, is instantly overlaid and expressed by an effect. The one is the other coming to the surface, revealing itself, — as the sensations it occasions constitute our notion of matter. Effects are that by

which we know causes. The one is interior, the other exterior and phenominal; the two are inseparable.

The cause, therefore, strictly so-called, is level with the effect; equal to it, and no greater; of the same nature with it, and in all respects measured and defined by it. This notion of cause and effect is one by which we work our way from point to point amid material things and forces, not one by which we can in the least rise above them. However far back we may push with it, we are on the same dead level, enveloped by the same finite and material forces, pursuing through one more phase of development that force which, for aught that we can thus see or say, may be capable of infinite modifications. Indeed, many so believe, and regard matter with the forces which play in and through it, as eternal.

This partial presentation of the argument, resting on causation alone for the proof of the being of a God, is the more unfortunate as, in the progress of science, the notion of cause and effect has been more and more severely developed, and the thoughtful mind assured that there is, in all the play of physical phenomena through indefinite periods, no gain or loss; that if the effects are gathered up they exactly exhaust the cause, and no more, and are thus able to continue it perfectly in further effects. The hammer which strikes the rock and loses its motion, calls forth an equivalent in the vibration of particles occasioned and the heat elicited, as much as the bat whose blow is expended on a ball made to spin through the air. Thus in all directions along the track of science there has been a grading down of causes. Not only have the mysterious and monstrous been brought low, there has also been a reduction of all causes to the exact level of the effects, and that past, in which the imagination has so easily found salient points from which to pass over into the supernatural, reveals to science, under all changes of form and appearance, exactly the same characteristics as the present. The current of forces up which this inquiry after causes leads us to direct our boat, is everywhere the same steady, tranquil stream, giving to our keel, so far as we see fit or are able to explore

it, the same waters in ceaseless flow. Floating on the river itself we never reach a supernatural source. The most we can do is to discover some loss of volume and breadth as we press upward, and much of this even, science shows to be a deceptive transfer and modification of forces. The Nile, unexplored, may be thought to descend from heaven, or gush in full volume from the earth; but exploration divests it of its mythical character, and leaves it like the other rivers of the world.

The simple notion, then, of cause and effect prompts scientific inquiry, but cannot lift us beyond the conditions of such inquiry — the steady flow of natural forces. If points of commencement are thus really reached, they are only points of arrest, and we must have another idea, another clew given by the rational mind, before we can gather up and unite all these lines of force in the hand of the Almighty.

But not only does each cause imply a previous one, but also its perfect equality with the effect. We cannot infer more in the cause than is revealed in the effect. The conception requires the perfect equality of the two, and we break the line of argument as much by going beyond the just inference, and finding more in the cause than we have found in the effect, as we should by falling short of it, and accepting the phenomena without a cause, or with a partial cause incapable of their production. This essential nature of the idea cannot be disregarded or transcended in reasoning from effect to cause without rendering the conclusion invalid by the virtual invalidation of the idea on which it rests. The infinite attributes of God cannot, therefore, by mere causation, be proved from finite effects, however great, even if we are to allow the sudden arrest in a personal being of the argument by which we ascend.

In reasoning from the universe as a finite effect to the Creator as an infinite cause, we do not merely enlarge the cause; we increase it by that unmeasured quantity which lies between the largest finite product and infinite power. But it may be asked: Can we not infer the presence of more

power in a free agent than the work before us actually requires? Doubtless; but not under the notion of cause and effect. On the other hand, so far as this idea has been allowed to enter the domain of liberty, and been brought to explain human action, that action has been looked on as the only possible result of the conditions under which it has occurred, and thus as a complete exponent of the forces then and there present. We have, by this reasoning, been cut off from that amplification of the power of a personal agent by which we infer the possibility of other and more products of action than those actually exhibited. With this notion as the basis of reasoning, we are only able to say of the moral agent as we may of the physical cause, that under other circumstances it might exhibit different results.

The weakness of this proof of a Divine Being, its want of precision, are seen in the language it employs. It infers from certain effects a cause, from this cause a second cause, till, weary of pursuing the inference, it cuts it short in what it calls a first cause, which, taken as a true cause with no further explanation, is a contradiction in terms — an overthrow and denial of the process by which it itself has been reached. There can be no first cause, since on the level of cause and effect merely every cause must itself be an effect. These words are applicable to the same thing viewed in different relations, as connected upward or downward. That which is strictly first must be more than a cause. To suddenly turn a cause into a first cause, is to make of it instantly, by a mere trick of words, a new and transcendent thing — is to call the link of a chain a staple, and then suspend from it the otherwise interminable progression. The question reverts: How came our last link to be a staple? How can we, passfrom link to link, reasoning that one link always implies another, yet find so opportunely a support of a new and different kind on which to hang them all. The necessity, we understand, but not the method by which it is met. This seems to us a slip of the argument. We are carried into the obscure distance, and a new idea suddenly passed upon us as

if it were in lawful continuation of the process thus far pursued. There is due, under the argument, the thousandth or ten thousandth cause, and there is adroitly slipped in its place the first-cause, a totally distinct idea, transcendent in all its proportions. If a first-cause means a cause, our argument has not reached its conclusion; if it means an infinite God, we have smuggled in the notion by giving it a false and inferior label. The Creator thus comes to his own universe only as part and parcel of it.

There frequently arises in connection with this argument thus handled a fatal degradation of Deity. The adjective "first," instead of lifting the notion of a cause up to the true throne of the Infinite, is dragged down by it to some intermediate ground: God ceases to be above the universe, and the entire source of it. Thus Plato could believe, and philosophers of our own day can believe, in God and also in the eternity of matter — in this most weighty chain of causes as not lodged in his hand. The notion of a Deity is called in to explain the order and beauty of the universe, and not its existence. True to this line of argument, the cause is measured by the effect, and God is left a limited agent, working in and on that which he has not created.

So, too, we hear those who would be startled at the assertion of the independent existence of matter, speaking of a nature of things as limiting God's action, and constituting laws external to him; of geometric principles and of right as assigning superior rules to his rational and moral nature. This conception is that of a necessary framework of order found by Deity, anticipating and giving conditions to his action. Thus God ceases again to be the Absolute, in himself the complete and only source alike of things, events, and their rational forms. God as the supreme, uncreated reason finds every law of thought, of rational action in himself, and under these laws of his own mind, as frameworks of order, he constructs a universe. That nature of things which we find, which rules our thoughts and actions, is to God his own nature. Geometric principles arising from the nature of

thought, of mind, do not flow in upon God from matter, but out from God on matter, to and through his universe, receiving its fixed, necessary constitution from those rational powers which shaped it. The immutable foundations of nature are not laid in itself, but rest back on the rock — the Rock of Ages. Mind is the source of law to nature, not nature to mind.

For these two reasons, then, the idea of cause is not the ground of a satisfactory argument for the existence of God. There is an illegitimate substitution of one idea for another — a first-cause for a cause; and there is an inference to a cause broader than the entire aggregate of effects. The notion of cause has an exceedingly important and definite work to do, and it is, therefore, the more liable to be carried beyond its own province. Introduced into the realm of freedom, of spiritual action, it has brought with it nothing but confusion. Motives are not causes, nor are volitions effects. Till the first material result in nerve and muscle is reached, we have no cause proper; and this cause we at once find true to the notion, determining the effects which follow it, and determined by the conditions which precede it. Choice explains volition by its own independent, explanatory powers, with no aid whatsoever derived from the exposition of effects by their appropriate causes. So, too, if we go with the simple idea of cause, ranging up and down the material universe, outside that universe in search of a Creator, we shall fail, either by overpassing our premises in our conclusions, or by dragging down our conclusions, in whole or in part, to our premises, putting them under the fatal lock of our materialistic reasonings.

What, then, is not merely the practically just, but the theoretically correct, the safe form of argument for the existence of God? Explanation in all cases arises under some idea native to the mind. The impulse to know in any given case comes from the presence of an idea; and the satisfaction of knowing, from including the phenomena under the intuitive idea appropriate to them. An event is mentioned in our hearing; we find ourselves prompted to make several in-

quiries concerning it. Under the idea of time we wish to know when it occurred; under that of space, where it happened; and under that of cause, the relation in which it stood to previous events. The impulse to inquire arises from these ideas, and the pleasure of knowledge is due to the reference of the facts in period, place, and causation under them. The rumor of a crime agitates the popular mind. Curiosity is put at rest by learning that it was committed yesterday, at nine o'clock in the evening, in a designated house in Ann Street, Boston, by a specified person, for reasons given. I see one carried by wounded, and am told that he was injured by the fall of a brick in passing from Washington to Court Street. Curiosity is again satisfied. The loosened brick is referable to the gale of wind, while the blowing of the wind is one of those familiar facts which I am content to leave unexplained, or am able to refer with more or less distinctness to general laws.

Other notions furnish kindred explanations; that of freedom to a capricious choice; that of beauty to the admiration bestowed; that of right, to the sense of obligation expressed and to the self-denial incurred.

Thus each original, regulative idea brings to some class of facts a solution in which the mind rests, and without which it will not rest. Among these ideas is that of the Infinite, in its full, personal form of unmeasured wisdom and perfect power — of the Almighty. That such a notion is present to the mind, we need no other proof than the vexation and denial it has brought to philosophy. It has been to all sensational, empirical schools of thought a Bancho's ghost, that would not down; that has disappeared at one point only to reappear at another with new alarm and terror; that has been denied to philosophy to be reclaimed for faith, and has vexed and worried the intellectual eye with proportions it could not measure, and yet with a substance and presence it could not dispute. This veritable idea, appearing ever in the experience of man, often, indeed, under limitations too narrow, in vague, disguised semblance, rather than in full

valid form; rising always in the field of speculation and spiritual thought in one application or another; now as the grand abyss of space in which all things lie cradled; now, as the unmeasured flow of time overstretching on either side the current of events; now, as that boundless, personal, independent Power which laps in its strength the strength of all besides: this original idea has, too, its office of explanation, its stroke of light, and gives the mind rest where rest may not otherwise be found.

The universe as a whole — for the mind finds it made up of parts and periods, definite and measurable, bewildering indeed, by amplitude, but nowhere transcending the simplest coherence of succession; in kind like the phenomena of an hour or the workmanship of a single orb, — this universe grasped in its completeness, its first hour travelled back to by the unbroken flight of the imagination, its utmost border reached across the continuous though indefinite stretch of intervening spaces, calls for explanation; and this explanation the idea of the Almighty is alone able to furnish. For this very purpose is it present to the mind, and herein it finds play, affording the final bourne, the last repose of inquiry.

The infinite, as a simple idea, is applicable to other objects besides God; when we affirm it of his attributes, when we say *the* Infinite, as if he alone were the centre and source of infinity, we take from it its abstract character, unite it with other regulative ideas, as that of liberty, and give it a personal, concrete existence. It is this infinite — the Infinite One — who stands as the adequate source of the universe; and we give this prominence to the fact of infinity because it is the new and peculiar fact which enables this Being, this Person, to gather and hold all things in himself. The other notions present are not those which impart this breadth of explanation, though indeed requisite to it. It is by this union of the infinite and the personal in God that the idea becomes so powerful an intellectual solvent.

There is between this notion of the Infinite and that of a simple cause a difference in office as great as in intrinsic

character. A cause is to an effect what, in the river, the section above is to the section immediately below it, while the infinite is the fountains fed from within themselves, whence all these waters flow. The river as a whole requires the explanation of many springs which maintain it, while all the parts of it are understood by their connection with adjacent portions. What the notion of sequence, continuity, is to the stream, the idea of causation is to the current of events. It, indeed, prompts us to push our inquiries further and further back, but furnishes us neither a motive nor a method of arresting the movement; this is the office of quite another idea. Under the impulse, which the inquiry into causes gives, we cannot, indeed, cast anchor; we must sail by day and sail by night out toward the dim horizon; yet we carry all our conclusions with us, we gather safely on shipboard our store of new discoveries, we pay out our cable of valid connections behind us, and feel no restless yearnings for some final and transcendent position not realized. In short, we have the complacency and the meagre range of positive philosophy; we are content to scatter the mystery for an eye-shot ahead, and keep in telegraphic connection with the admiring throng on shore. With the one idea of causation this is all the mind wishes to do, is able to do. But there is with us the means, and therefore the motives, for a more profound and comprehensive inquiry. The mind is perpetually leaving the point of discovery actually reached, lifting itself, like a bird of passage, high in air, high in contemplation, till the physical universe, with no complete exploration of its confines is yet seen to round off like a globe before it, a definite presentation of that Infinite Power which contains it. We may strive to call back the mind from this its native, inevitable flight, as the trained hawk to its perch, to compel it to hunt and owl at our bid alone; we may decry its intrinsic, upward tendencies as superstitious; but not so can the rational impulse of souls be quelled, the thirst of immortality quenched.

The notion of the Infinite is not arrived at as the result

of an argument, as the running out of a conclusion. It is a notion antecedently and intuitively in the mind, necessary for the comprehension of any actual or supposable work of creation, the only possible point of attachment to which explanation can be hung, and leave the mind at peace forever. The justification of the power lies in its necessity and adequacy, that the mind is impelled to the conclusion, and finds rest in it. And this is the exact justification, and the only justification, of any mental process, for instance, that by which we refer thought to mind, or a shattered ball to the force of a blow, or choice to will.

If we contrast comprehension with explanation ; if we say that an event is explained when referred to its immediate source, and that events and forces are comprehended when taken collectively in their complete relation to their first source, then we say, there is no comprehension of the universe without this notion of the Infinite, as there is no explanation of its parts without that of cause ; and that the broader process has the same logical necessity and validity as the narrower one. An ideal effect we explain by an ideal cause, while an actual effect implies an existing cause. So an ideal universe is comprehended by an ideal Creator, while an actual universe looks for its comprehension to an ever-present Jehovah. There is here simply the mind's necessary action in putting this comprehending idea side by side with, and in full explanation of, the acknowledged facts. The mind rests with the two, and only thus can it rest, as when an event is assigned to a period, a transaction to a place. The infinite entering through the various attributes of God, gives perfect or absolute power, perfect or absolute wisdom, and these, centered in a Personal Being, give us an adequate, and the only adequate, explanation of the universe. This reasoning does its work perfectly, and therein it finds perfect justification.

The most simple processes of mind are those which occasion the most perplexity, if we once doubt their justness and seek a proof impossible to be given. Axioms rest on simple ac-

ceptance; sensations are the postulates, the initiatory points of experience. Science uses without hesitation the notion of cause and effect, and by inseparable association unites the very idea of explanation with it. The reasoning faculties thus long and laboriously disciplined by inquiries into material phenomena, there learn to attach satisfaction, conviction to no result which does not at length reveal this causal connection. It is merely the simplicity and familiarity of the notion which gives the mind, in all its scientific attainments, contentment. When, however, it comes to a problem to which its favorite solution is inapplicable, which lies by inherent nature in a new department, governed by obstinate habit, it forgets to carry with it only principles, and not methods, to accept, as at the first, the simple postulates of the field before it, and work quietly and safely under them. The old laws are brought to the new realm, and the Creator is called a first-cause. Some, struck with the philosophical contradictions of the language, dismiss the notion of a Creator altogether; others, with more faith and less consistency, retain it, yet limit it with their conditions, and darken it with their explanations. In fact, the proof of God's existence is too simple, too independent, too much of its own kind, to satisfy some minds. The two conceptions, the universe and the Almighty, are present to the mind with complete, explanatory power; the second necessary to the first, the first the proof of the second. This is the argument, and the whole of it; and men would believe it quicker if it were more, and more difficult. It is as simple and independent as any process can be; as that we so constantly strive to substitute for it, of understanding two things when one is known as the cause and the other as the effect. Our matrimony of the universe with its Maker is as complete and just a union before the tribunal of the mind as this other wedlock of effects and causes. It is nothing but the deception of familiarity, of repeated application, which makes the one result more satisfactory than the other.

It is evident that the manner in which we conceive of

matter will have much to do with the directness and conviction with which we refer it to the sustaining power of God. Some conceptions are of such a nature as to make it the instant, the constant putting forth of his force; as much filled and inflated with his strength, his life, as the bubble by the breath of him who blows it. Such a conception is that which resolves all things into their constituent forces, into the powers they are capable of exerting, and looks, therefore, upon every property and quality and existence itself, as an active, tense state, like that of a drawn bow, ready to fling the arrow.

There is thus in matter strictly no passivity, no permanence, no more ability to remain as it is without a constant renewing of the force that is in it, than suddenly to exhibit new attributes without the infusion of new power. As in the hydraulic press the entire pressure, silent though active, rests back on the piston, and disappears the instant the force is taken from this its fountain-head, so in this conception, matter in its active and apparently passive forms, maintains itself by a constant exertion of force, and in the language of the figure, needs, therefore, a steady hand on the piston rod to prevent an immediate and universal collapse.

To most minds this conception is not difficult as regards a force like that of gravity, which, instantly renewed, seems to act without exhaustion, to have in it the possibility of unlimited results, and in every moment of time and point of space to stand ready to apply its power. A force like that of cohesion, on the other hand, we are not so ready to regard as continually exerted. It only impresses us, when, by tension its strength is actually shown. A wire straightened by a weight of a hundred pounds, presents itself as exerting more force than when it lies in idle coils; and in the latter form therefore is spoken of as containing latent force.

It may aid us in regarding simple cohesion as a state of intense action to observe how, in the equivalence of forces, the most active may assume the form, or at least be replaced by the most passive. Thus certain amounts of motion, of

light, of heat, of electricity, are equivalent to each other, and to certain amounts of chemical action. In chemical compounds these forces as chemical affinity may lie dormant, that is, unobserved, for long periods, and yet at their expiration return in full measure to their first form of apparent, demonstrative action. Now the force of cohesion, which most of all gives us the notion of dead matter, doing nothing and requiring nothing for its explanation, is very intimately associated with chemical force as affinity, often coming and going with it; while this chemical power is found under careful and varied experiment to be replaced in exact measure by the most active of forces, such as heat and electricity, themselves capable of a further resolution into mechanical power. Thus a metal, losing its cohesion under chemical action, may, as in the Voltaic pile, give rise to electricity, and through it to visible motion, and a resolution of passive into active forces be effected, indicating that the difference between them is one of semblance rather than of substance; and that if the mind seeks a power immediately back of a developed or open force, it should, none the less, back of a dormant or concealed one. Under this conception God is that pivot or centre of power on which the whole universe rests back, from which it streams forth. Thus the work of God cannot exist a moment without him; and every part of it implies his immediate presence.

A strict application of this notion of cause and effect would seem also to lead to this view of matter. Intense activity is often at once developed by matter. An acid may speedily overcome the cohesion of metals, and gunpowder, in explosion, instantly sets free the most terrific power. If these and similar forces are capable of independent existence; if they are inherent in matter; if they come from it instead of flow through it, — then the idea of cause and effect finds sudden and premature arrest. Its office and action in the mind becomes confused and contradictory. The force which shivers a ball requires reference, but not that which holds it together. The action of force here and there is causal, but the exist-

ence of force in its storehouse, matter, is without cause. Thus all is inconsistent; force now demands explanation, anon demands no explanation, and our capricious reasons come and go with the mere accidents of form and position. The force of gunpowder suddenly re-appears, and its presence calls forth no attribution to a higher source, while the creeping of a bug and the fall of a stone seek explanation in the intervention of some force further back than that presented in the movement itself. If force as force ever requires, it should always require, reference to an agency deeper than itself; otherwise, the action of the mind becomes arbitrary and factitious, handling like phenomena with diverse laws.

But this conception of matter is not so established that all accept it. Matter is regarded by many as capable of independent existence, as the source of powers, the centre of properties. Thus the inanimate, physical universe, with all that order and beauty which are the interplay of its own forces, the products of its own laws, resting back for support on, or rather expressing the nature of, matter in its various forms, is a self-sustaining and self-governed product, eneding only the postulate of its own existence for the perfect explanation of all its phenomena, present and progressive. With this prevalent conception of matter, what proof do simply physical facts and events present of the being of a God?

No argument can be derived from the order merely of the world, since that order arises from the very nature of the elements of which it is made, and is wholly referable to that nature. There is no mechanical shaping and transfer of material in the world like that which man occasions. All events proceed under natural forces, that is, forces which inhere in and constitute matter; and, matter being granted in its own nature and properties, nothing more is required to secure a universe. All the order, the adaptations which grow out of the subtile interaction of laws, prove nothing which is not proved by the simple existence of matter, since this harmony and these adjustments are involved in the very nature of matter, in how chaotic soever a form it may at first

present itself. Diffused, impalpable, nebulous, it at once, of its own bent and bias, commences a work of creation, so far as that work is one of new dispositions and combinations, and, at last, issues in a solar system, with all its variety, separation, complication, and beauty of parts, — a system which springs by inherent power from its own germ as certainly as, and not more strangely, than the oak from the acorn, the bird from the egg.

What argument, then, still remains to us for the existence of God, from the mere presence of matter under this conception of it? According to the theory of its nature now spoken of, matter is entirely capable of present, independent existence, and has been, therefore, at all past points of time so capable. We may, then, make three suppositions concerning it; that it sprang into being of its own power; that it has always existed; or that God gave it being. The first supposition is inadmissible, because of the notion of cause and effect. The line of reasoning which this idea imposes is brought thereby to an abrupt and unreasonable conclusion.

But what cuts us off from the second assertion, that it has always existed, and confines us to the third, that it is the work of God? We answer, the simple fact that the one offers a solution, the other no solution of the problem. By asserting the eternity of matter, we simply expand the proportions of the problem so far that we can no longer grasp or handle it, and thereupon dismiss it. Thus the boy asks of his fellow how a large boulder before them came there. The answer is returned: It was always there; and the edge of curiosity is blunted. Such a response is a simple evasion of the question, not a solution of it.

But it may be said: Do you not do the same thing in referring matter to God, and then escaping further inquiry by asserting his eternity? We answer: The eternity of God, infinite in all his attributes, is a proportionate, harmonious idea, which the mind readily accepts; while the eternity of matter, finite and dependent in all other respects, is a disproportionate, unharmonious notion, not consonant with thought.

The unsatisfactory nature of such an assertion is the more felt as, tracing it backward, we find matter constantly changing, assuming more and more primal, elementary forms, thus preserving the similitude of the finite and dependent, and utterly unable to assume that of the infinite and absolute.

If, however, we so far burden the argument as to accept the present independent existence of matter, we cannot afterward deny the possibility of its eternity, sustaining our position by convincing proof derived from the nature of matter itself. Matter that can now exist could always exist, and we may evade its origin by pressing it out of sight. The more tenable point of defense is its constant, absolute dependence.

There will always remain, moreover, in addition to the difficulties now referred to, a very important element unaccounted for by the supposition that matter is eternal, — the order and wisdom involved in the nature and relation of its forces. We may, indeed, refer the wisdom which the world presents to the properties and interaction of the elements which compose it; but the inquiry still returns: How came these elements possessed of such properties, so marvelously related, and capable by blind and inevitable action of reaching results not to be surpassed by the most exalted and perfect wisdom? To make such inimitable perfection as this finally and forever referable to mere matter, is to break down the distinction between it and mind, and refer that to irrational and blind agents which exhibits the utmost stretch and scope of reason.

This is to violate the notion even of cause and effect, and make the fountain less than the waters which flow from it. The wisdom involved is not adequately explained by an unwise cause; the beauty and order by a blind, irrational force. If such a disposition can be made of the physical perfection of the universe, let us no longer infer an intelligent agent from the mere fact of an intelligent product, a builder from a building, a writer from a book. It is found at length that light can come out of darkness, that this mighty flood of thought, that goes pouring on in the world

about us, sprang, like any other waters, out of the earth, and came from the dead, silent, unthoughtful depths of mere physical existence.

We have thus far separated the inanimate from the animate world, because the last presents a distinct phase of the argument. We are not able to show that matter had a beginning; we are able to show that life in its various forms has had a commencement on this globe, and this fact gives our proof a new premise. None deny or cavil at the evidence afforded by geology of successive periods at which the several forms of vegetable and animal life have arisen.

There is here again, however, diversity of conceptions, some giving an easier, more natural foothold to the argument for a Divine Being than others; but no conception is able wholly to evade its force. Some, indeed, would educe all the forms of life necessarily from each other, and finally from mere material forces; but this theory is as yet so purely theoretical, so far transcends, if it does not, as most think, contradict observation, and is burdened with so many objections as not in this connection to claim consideration. If established, moreover, the most it can do is to throw the argument back to the point at which we left it in speaking of material forces alone. If we are to include among the properties of matter the wonderful forces of life, their potential development and order, much more impossible and unreasonable does it become to leave this germ big with a universe, this animate compend of beauty and strength, with no reference to a rational source, this volume of volumes with no ascription to a thoughtful mind.

Most still accept the independent origin of species, if not of species as now classified, yet of other species more inclusive than these. Here, then, the several lines of force represented in distinct, organic products, in plants and animals, are traced to a beginning. These threads of power disappear from the earth, and we intelligibly dispose of them only as we gather them all up in the hand of a Creator. Now, if not before, here, if not elsewhere, the exigency arises which calls

forth the idea the mind has at hand of the Almighty; and the two, the fact and the idea, unite in an explanation which is sound because it is satisfactory.

The conception we have of the nature of vital force, though not capable of reducing the proof below that now given, may considerably enhance it. We may regard this force as inhering in matter as another and new attribute; or we may look upon it as a force above matter, shaping to its own ends the chemical and mechanical forces belonging to the physical elements it employs. On the first supposition vital force is a peculiar property of certain kinds of matter, very different, indeed, from other properties, yet capable of the same independent existence — an existence identified with, and transmitted by, the physical germs which contain it.

The phenomena, therefore, of the organic world, though more complex, more replete with instances of striking adaptations, of means immediately reaching a beneficent end, still transpire, like those of the inorganic world, under the necessary action of forces having no existence except as properties of matter. These germs created, and the various forms of life have through their whole career the same complete evolution from within themselves that belongs to a nebulous mass in the slow circuit of ages, directing, consolidating itself into a sun, planets, and satellites. This view, if the creation of species could be escaped, would at once coalesce with that which regards matter as eternal, and would be ready to postulate the vital force with the other properties of its physical elements.

This theory is burdened with the great difficulty of supposing that that discriminating force which is to give separation and form and office to all the complex organs of the animal body, as that of man, can inhere entire in a microscopic cell, which it is impossible to distinguish by any discoverable difference from those cells which are to be developed into other most diverse forms of life; nay, more, that it can give rise indefinitely to forces like and equal to itself, thus containing within itself a power susceptible of unlimited expansion, able,

as the case may be, to occupy an island, a continent, a hemisphere, a world, with shoots of its inexhaustible self. Owing to its intangible character, we shall lay but little stress on the first difficulty, — that a discriminating, controlling force which must be every instant in every part of the animal during its entire period of growth; that must construct each organ and become in it the source of totally distinct phenomena; that must form the liver and secrete bile therein; the stomach, furnish it as solvents with gastric juices, and set it in peristaltic motion; the eye, and be present to see through it; the ear, and hear by means of it; the brain, and accumulate therein that nervous energy and establish those external connections which make it the organ of thought and the centre of force; the bones and reknit, renew, and enlarge them as the exigency of the plan requires, — that a power like this can hardly be thought of as lodged in its completeness in a microscopic cell, — and will urge the second objection, which is not one of conception merely.

This theory shows no parity between the cause and its effects. One acorn is the source of a million, each as complete as itself, each with the full measure of pristine power. But a force that can be thus subdivided without loss is fabulous, a mythical force, not a natural one. Must we thus get back to miracles in the heart of nature? Either the force of the million did not inhere in the single acorn, or each one of the million has not the full power of the species. It is in violation of the equality of causes and effects that we make the germ pregnant with all the actual and possible progeny of a thousand years.

A more philosophical conception, therefore, is that which looks upon life or "the lives" as working upon matter, organizing it and imparting to it vital power, without being identified as an attribute with any part of it, not even with the germ whence it springs. Thus the life maintains an immaterial existence, as much so as the spirit of man.

This view receives confirmation from the increasing proof that goes to show that all vital phenomena occur in connec-

tion with chemical and mechanical forces, which are neither increased or diminished in volume; that in muscular action there is a destruction of fiber, in thought a decomposition of brain-tissue, in animal heat a series of equivalent chemical changes. Thus throughout, growth stores up in some form of chemical affinity power which, in the constant dissolution and reconstruction of the body, shows itself as muscular, nervous, and vital action. New forces are not created, but old forces are used under new forms and conditions by the vital principle. There is always the taking of something present, the transmutation of power from one form to another, in vital action; as when light and heat furnish the initial forces for building up the tree, which may again by combustion be made to yield light and heat. The combustion of the human body is muscular and mental action, and whenever these appear there is the liberation of power previously held in chemical compounds. Nor is the power thus liberated any more created in the formation of the organic product than in its dissolution. Then, as in previous and subsequent processes, the native force of the elements and agents employed are made available, though under conditions which vital force can alone secure, and for ends which it constitutes.

Careful investigation shows in many cases, and with much probability carries the conclusion to all, that the vital power is what it is by the new conditions which it secures more than by any new property it imparts to matter, or peculiar force it gives rise to in it; that a stream of forces under various forms, as chemical affinity, light, heat, electricity, and motion, is pressing about and passing through its products, and that each vital action involves the employment of one or other of these forces in an amount equivalent to the results wrought.

Thus life becomes an invisible agent, not inherent in matter but acting on it, showing itself as the architect of living things, so deftly using and dexterously intertwining the blind powers of nature as by means of them to cause the plant to

spring freely from the earth, the bird, at the loosening touch of heat, to separate itself part by part from the contents of the egg, and the embryo to renew the form of the parent by materials and forces as inherently capable of one product as another. The pipes of the organ are mechanically filled with wind; the organist touches the keys and gives us the harmony of music. Sufficient forces are present in nature, the lives play upon them, and straightway spring forth flowers and forests, birds and beasts, and man, giving to the world the marvellous harmony of its living things.

This conception of life lifts it entirely away from matter, makes it a purely spiritual power, if not intelligently, at least instinctively, pursuing the divine plan, and prepares the mind for the acceptance of that divine agency with which some at least would identify life, and all must feel it closely allied.

Restating the conclusions now arrived at, we reject in the proof of the existence of God the reasoning from effect to cause, as unable to reach that for which it sets out; and equally unable to arrest its steps if it should reach it. We substitute for the notion of cause another alike native to the mind, that of an infinite Creator. We affirm the existence of such a Being to be proved by the existence of the universe, a product not to be otherwise explained, and thus perfectly explained. The supposition of the eternity of matter we regard as an evasion, not as a solution, of the problem. It also leaves the element of wisdom, and organic products directly traceable to their origin, unexplained. Confirmatory of the conclusion thus reached, though not necessary to it, is that view of matter which regards it as centres of force; and of life, which looks upon it as a power neither identical with nor belonging to matter.

The more we search for God the more he evades us. Let his presence escape us on the right, and we turn in vain to the left. We must find him everywhere if we would find him anywhere. We must reach his power in the stone our foot strikes against; his glory in the sunbeam that parts the

cloud and falls in floods before us; his life and love in the love and life that warm our hearts. Direct, quick, unwavering, must be the flight of the soul heavenward. Unless we accept it fearlessly we cannot beat this spiritual atmosphere or rise in it.

ARTICLE VI.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF BUNSEN.

BY REV. E. BURGESS, LATE MISSIONARY OF A. B. C. F. M. IN INDIA.

When we read the account of the last hours of Bunsen in the interesting obituary notice of him which was published in our journals soon after his death, we should have entertained from it a far higher idea of his Christian character than we did, had we not previously read his "Egypt's Place in Universal History." But having read that work we were puzzled to understand how one who treats the holy scriptures as he does, should even appear to be an evangelical Christian. It was altogether contrary to our observation, and we thought contrary to the observation and experience of the world, that one who adopts principles of interpretation such as Chevalier Bunsen does in the work above alluded to, should give evidence of such a heartfelt reception of the Saviour as is implied in the language of his obituary notice. And we could remove the difficulty only by the supposition that that language, as coming from his lips, had less than its usual meaning, or his mind had undergone a transforming change between the time of his last great literary work going from his hands and his death. Perhaps either supposition is possible. The latter is more agreeable to entertain, though we have seen no evidence of its being fact. Bunsen professes to regard the holy scriptures as of divine authority, and to treat them as

such; yet no one of their bitterest enemies, it seems to us, has done more to undermine that authority.[1]

"Egypt's Place in Universal History" is a work of great pretensions; and we confess ourselves inclined to accord to its author greatness of conception, and great industry and labor in execution; but we cannot say great judgment in selecting materials and putting them together, the whole bearing the stamp of the German mind. We think an English mind of equal ability, and with similar opportunities for research and collecting materials, would have done better, even had its views and principles coincided with those of the German author. Horace Hayman Wilson, the late eminent Sanscrit scholar of Oxford, had his studies been turned towards Egypt as they had been towards India, with the opportunities of Bunsen, would, we think, have produced a more valuable work. There is a great deal of lumbering matter in Bunsen's work. But perhaps this feature is not to be too closely

[1] We find we are not alone in this dilemma respecting the religious character of Bunsen. Since writing the above we have met with the following from the pen of the celebrated writer, the Rev. James McCosh, LL.D.

"The question will be asked, How was it possible for one entertaining such theoretical views, to love his God and Saviour, as Bunsen seemed to love them, supremely? Having a considerable acquaintance with the Hegelian philosophy, and having only a short time before listened to the lectures of some of the most devoted disciples of that school, I think I can understand the inconsistency, though I would never think of defending it. Bunsen had been trained in the first quarter of this century when Schelling and Hegel (of whom he always spoke with profound admiration), ruled in the universities, and he had so lost himself in ideal distinctions and nomenclature, that his words were not to be interpreted as if the same expresions had been used by another man" (The Supernatural in Relation to the Natural, Ap. p. 368).

This is doubtless the true explanation, though we are not sure that we arrive at it by the same conclusion with the learned author who advanced it. For, in the sentence immediately preceding, he thus expresses himself: "I am able to say, what I believe I can say of no other with whom I had so much intercourse, that we never conversed during these five days for ten minutes at a time, without his returning, however far he might be off, to his Bible and his Saviour as the objects that were evidently dearest to him. Some of my British readers will be astonished when I have to add that one evening he told me that he 'was not sure about allowing that God is a being, and he certainly could not admit that God is a person.'" Can such a man be a Christian? Yet does not Dr. McCosh regard him as such?

criticized. We have often found literary lumber-houses very valuable; so much so that we will put up with an author who shows a little vanity in collecting lumber.

We have said the conception of Bunsen's work is a vast one. "Egypt's Place in Universal History!" Egypt! that land of pyramids — whose kings are enumerated in history under thirty distinct dynasties; whose monuments antedate the oldest historic records; whose language has consumed the lives of some of the greatest scholars; the source whence the wisest of the ancient Greeks drew their wisdom; whose empire had extended from the Nile to the Indus, before Greece and Rome had even a name! And can Egypt's place in history be determined and described? Bunsen has attempted it. He has placed himself on her ancient monuments and surveyed the immense periods of her historic existence, and, as he thinks, ascertained her "place" in the history of man.

To his own great industry and learning he has joined that of all the learned Egyptologers from Champollion to Lepsius; in short what human learning and industry could do to fix Egypt's place in history, it would seem has been done by Bunsen in these five volumes. He maintains that her language was in the process of formation as early as 14,000 B.C. At that time it had reached the stage of "complete parts of speech beyond the distinction between full words (nouns, verbs, and adjectives) and formatives." At 13,000 B.C. it had "declensions and conjugations, with affixes, suffixes, and endings." At 12,000 B.C. was the "commencement of symbolical hieroglyphics, i.e. picture-writing"; and "primitive syllabications," with some other improvements, at 11,000 B.C. Then at 10,000 B.C., or thereabout, happened Noah's flood (see Synopsis of the Four Ages of the World, below).

It is not our design to review Bunsen's work as a whole. It is too deep in monumental lore for us to attempt such a task. We only design to set before the readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra his system of Chronology, with a few friendly

criticisms thereon. It will be seen from the above statements that he sets aside entirely the commonly received opinions respecting the creation of man, as derived from the Hebrew sacred scriptures. While he professes great reverence for those scriptures, by a curious principle of philosophical interpretation, he deduces conclusions that destroy their authenticity and value. If plain language can be made to mean what Bunsen makes of it, it can be made to mean anything or nothing, to suit the interpreter's purpose. The Christian geologist can admit, without violence to the principles of interpretation or controverting scripture, that the earth has existed for millions of years, but he cannot in the same manner admit that man has existed on the earth more than six or seven thousand years.[1] And just here is the point of attack on the Bible where infidels are making their most strenuous efforts. During the past few years there have been numerous alleged discoveries of "flint implements, the works of human art," found in such geological formations as prove their existence before the Mosaic date of man's creation on any received system of chronology.

Again, the bones of man are found in connection with those of "extinct species of animals," and in "undisturbed geological formations," where they must have been deposited before the date assigned by Moses to man's creation.[2] And

[1] Yet still, should conclusive evidence compel us to admit that man has existed on the earth for a longer period than the Mosaic account allows, even according to the Septuagint, it would scarcely affect the general authority and correctness of the Bible. The data on which rests the epoch of man's creation in our received chronology are stated in a comparatively brief space which would be occupied by a few lines in an ordinary volume (Gen. v. 3–32 and xi. 10–13). The data consist of a genealogical record of the patriarchs, from Adam to Abraham, the essential part consisting in numbers. Now should irrefragable evidence — as yet such evidence has not been produced — compel us to admit that this record as we now have it, does not give the true time since the creation of man, the admission does not necessarily affect the divine authenticity of the Bible. The passage may have been corrupted, something may have been left out which was in the original record.

[2] It is sufficient to refer the reader to Sir Charles Lyell's recent work on the "Antiquity of Man" for these general statements.

now Bunsen, the great German scholar and antiquarian, and a Christian, comes out with an immense array of learning to show that man existed on the earth 20,000 (perhaps 40,000) years before Christ. It is with Bunsen's system, that of chronology, that we are now concerned. We shall give that system, and the principal facts and reasons on which it rests, as near as we can, in the author's own words. In general, we think, these facts and reasons need only to be stated in order to be discarded as insufficient for the basis of such superstructure.

At the risk of being somewhat tedious to a portion of our readers, we present in full the first part of our author's synopsis of his system.

"SYNOPSIS OF THE FOUR AGES OF THE WORLD.

"First Age of the World.

"Ancient Antediluvian History, from the Creation to the Flood, — Primitive Formation of Language and the Beginning of the Formation of Mythology.

The Historical Primitive World (I. II. III.). (1–10,000 Year of Man; 20,000–10,000 B.C.)

First Period (I.). — *Formation and Deposit of Sinism* (20,000–15,000 B.C.).

Primitive language, spoken with rising or falling cadence — elucidated by gesture — accompanied by pure pictorial writing; every syllable a word, every word a full substantive, one representable by a picture.

Deposit of this language in Northern China (Shensi) in the country of the source of the Houngho-Sinism. The earliest polarization of religious consciousness: Kosmos or Universe, and the Soul of Personality. Objective worship, the firmament; subjective worship, the soul of parents, or the manifestation of divine in the family.

Second Period of the World (II.).—*Formation and Deposit of Primitive Turanism:* The eastern polarization of Sinism (15,000–14,000 B.C.).

Pure agglutinative language: formation of pollysyllabic words by means of unity of accent (word accent).

Origin of particles, words no longer substantive and full, but denoting the mutual relation of persons and things; finally of complete parts of speech.

Deposit of this stage of formation in Thibet (Botya language).

Germ of mythology in substantiation of inanimate things and of properties.

THIRD PERIOD (III.). — *Formation and Deposit of Khamism and the Flood:* Western polarization of Sinism (14,000–11,000 B.C.).

Formation of stems into roots producing derivative words: complete parts of speech beyond the distinction between full words (nouns, verbs, and adjectives) and formative words, 14,000

Declensions and conjugations with affixes and endings; stage of the Egyptian, 13,000

Commencement of symbolical Hieroglyphics, i.e. picture-writing; but without the introduction of the phonetic element or designation of sound, 12,000

Deposit of this language in Egypt, owing to the earliest immigration of West-Asiatic primitive Semites. Invention of, or advancement in, hieroglyphic signs: primitive syllabarium, 11,000

THE FLOOD.—*Convulsion in Northern Asia.* Emigration of the Arians out of the country of the sources of the Oxus (Gihon) and Jaxartes, and of the Semites out of the country of the sources of the Euphrates and Tigris, 11,000–10,000

SECOND AGE OF THE WORLD.

Ancient Postdiluvian History — From the Emigration after the Flood down to Abraham in Mesopotamia. Formation of the Historical Tribes and Empires of Asia, 10,000–2878 B.C."[1]

We will not occupy space with the details of this "age." Suffice it to say the author exhibits the same wonderful knowledge in regard to the history of the "Egyptian deposit" from 10,000 down to 4,000 B.C., as in reference to the preceding age. He gives definite dates for numerous events in the civil and religious history, e.g.

"The Formation of Osirism,	10,000 B.C.
Close of the Republican period,	9,086 B.C.
Duration of the sacerdotal kings, according to Manetho, 1855 years: end of the sacerdotal kings,	7,231 B.C.
Beginning of hereditary kings in lower Egypt,	5,413 B.C.
Duration of them according to Manetho, 1790 years: end	3,624 B.C.
Perfect formative language,	4,000 B.C.
Menes, the first king of the first Dynasty,	3,623 B.C.
Abraham,	2,878 B.C.
The Exodus,	1,320 B.C."

It is safe to say in general, that such a mass of pure assumption as our author has here put forth is nowhere else to be found in any professedly historical or chronological

[1] Egypt's Place in Universal History, vol. iv. pp. 485–497.

work. He frequently says, "according to Manetho," while Manetho affords not the least support for the declaration put forth on his authority.

The following sentences are valuable as showing our author's manner of assuming his premises and drawing his conclusions, as well as exhibiting a cardinal principle of his work:

"But if we find almost four thousand years before our era, a mighty empire possessing organic members of a very ancient type, a peculiar written character and national art and science, we must admit that it required thousands of years to bring them to maturity in the valley of the Nile. If again its language be shown to be a deposit of Asiatic, and by no means the oldest formation, it will be admitted upon reflection to be a sober conclusion that we require some 20,000 years to explain the beginnings of the development of man, which have been only once violently interrupted in its primeval birthplace" (Vol. iv. p. 21).

"The question as to the place of Egypt in historical chronology is thus at once changed to that of its place in the whole development of man. We pass out of the domains of chronology and history, into that of pure philosophy" (Vol. iv. p. 22).

We have here a statement of a fundamental principle of the author; a principle by which he is guided, and which underlies his whole work. It is the founding of a system of chronology on the principles of philosophy. We are fond of philosophy when it is sound and in its place; and we do not assert that it has no connection with chronology. When the materials for a strict historical chronology do not exist, we have no objections to philosophy doing her utmost to elucidate and present probable truth. But the danger is that she will transcend the limits of her just domain. This we think she has done under the guidance of Bunsen. She magnifies the difficulties arising from the received chronology of Bible history, and then resorts to expedients that destroy the truthfulness of that history. Certainly in such a work as this she should be watched, and her supposed facts and her expedients be severely scrutinized. If our faith in Bible history is to be undermined by philosophy, let us know what is proposed in its place.

The principal facts on which the author rests his system,

and the mode of argumentation, are foreshadowed in the following extracts.

"Philosophy has discovered the existence of two vast branches of cognate organic languages, the Semitic and Iranian. The stage anterior to Semism is Khamism. This antecedent stage is antediluvian. People history is postdiluvian. We find in it, thousands of years before Menes, first of all a world-wide empire — the realm of Nimrod, the Kushite, ... which probably embraced Egypt as well as Western Asia, the district of the Euphrates and Tigris.

"If we connect these views with the historical development before us, we shall find in the first place ancient history divided into antediluvian and postdiluvian. For the former we require 10,000 years, which we can prove proximately to be the extent of the latter period before Christ" (Vol. iv. p. 24).

"The legends of the classics about colonies from Egypt, in so far as they have any historical foundation, are explainable, just as are the expressions in the Bible that Kanaan, who was driven back out of lower Egypt, was the son of Kham"[1] (Vol. iv. p. 30).

"I must, on the other hand, repudiate all historical connection between the Helleno-Italic mythology and the Indians, or even their patriarchs the Iranians and Bactrians" (Vol. iv. p. 31).

"We start, therefore, with this premise, that in the Egyptian, we have obtained a fixed chronological point, and in fact the highest in general history. In it we find a perfectly formed language which we can prove to have been in existence about the middle of the fourth millennium B.C. We have, moreover, the means of determining approximately the epoch of the beginnings of regal government immediately before Menes. We, therefore, arrive at the very threshhold of the foundation of language" (Vol. iv. p. 45).

With regard to "the premise" here named, with which the author starts, we simply remark here, that we do not admit it. Nor do we admit the existence of the "perfectly formed language" which he says he "can prove to have existed in the middle of the fourth millennium B.C." See remarks on this point below.

"The result of criticism goes to prove, however, that we cannot compute by the ordinarily received chronology, the interval between the above starting-point of the present life of man, and the oldest conquests in Asia — those of Nimrod, or the interval between them both and Abraham, the first historical personage in the Semetic reminiscences.

"On the other hand, the period of 21,000 years which has been adopted

[1] A reference to the expulsion of the Shepherds from Egypt.

by all the great astronomers of the day for the deviation of the earth's axis, brings us to two resting-places. The consequence of the deviation is a change of the proportion of the cold and heat at the poles, the greatest of which gives eight days more cold or heat.

"At the present time, in the northern temperate zone, spring and summer are seven days longer than autumn and winter; in the southern hemisphere, consequently, the proportion is reversed.

"In the year 1248 this favorable change in our hemisphere had reached its maximum, namely, eight days more warmth, and therefore the same number of days less cold. Consequently after a gradual decrease during 5250 years, in the year 6498, the two seasons will be in equilibrio, but in the year 11,748 (5250 years more) the hot period will have reached its lowest point.

"Now if we calculate backwards 5250 years from 1248, we shall find that in the year 4002 B.C. the two seasons must have been in equilibrio in our hemisphere. In the year 9252 B.C. the cold season had attained its maximum. The opposite or most favorable division of heat and cold took place, therefore, in the year 19,752 B.C.

"This epoch explains very simply the reason why the north pole is surrounded with perpetual ice only from about the seventieth degree, when at the south pole it is found at the sixty-fifth. In other words, the history of progressive human civilization with which we are acquainted is comprised within one hemisphere, and under climacteric accidents the most favorable to advancement.

"Now as we must suppose that the date of the commencement of our race was the most favorable both for its origin and continuance; and as, on the other hand, the catastrophe which we call the flood would have arrived at the next unfavorable period for our hemisphere, that epoch, the central point of which is the year 9250 B.C., would seem the most probable one for the change in climatic relations. This assumption is confirmed by the most ancient monuments and traditions.[1] The chronology of Egypt shows still more clearly than traditions preserved in the Rabbinical Book of the Origines, that the flood of Noah could not have taken place later than about 10,000 B.C., and could not have taken place much earlier.

"The only question therefore is, whether the history of the human race, and consequently the origenes of the primitive world, date from the above-mentioned favorable epoch, about 20,000 B.C., or whether we are justified in going back to the last epoch but one, or about 40,000 B.C." (Vol. iv. 52–54).

[1] What monuments and traditions? As far as we know, even our author has failed to specify them; unless such a specification is intended by his brief allusions to the mythological periods of some of the ancient nations.

The following extracts show an important part of the argument adopted to maintain these assumptions:

"The formative words in the Egyptian mark the transition from Sinism to Khamism, — from the particle language to the language of parts of speech. ..... The earliest Turanism to the east of Khamism marks the first stage of organic language, i.e. of language with the parts of speech. The second is Khamism, i.e. the stage of language we meet with in Egypt" (Vol. iv. p. 558).

"The shortest line from inorganic language to organic is that of Sinism through primitive Turanism to primitive Semism, the deposit of which in the valley of the Nile we have in Egyptian. The last emigration was probably that of the Arians to the country of the five rivers. The oldest hymns in the country of the Punjaub go back to 3000 B.C. This community of language must then, at all events, be supposed to have existed much earlier than 3000 B.C. They had consequently at that time long got over the stage of underived Iranism and Semism. Between 10,000 and 4000 B.C the vast step in Asiatic advancement from Khamism to Semism, and from Semism to Iranism, was made. If the step from Latin to Italian be taken as a unit, this previous step must be reckoned at least at ten or at twenty" (Vol. iv. p. 562).

"From all this it appears that the period of one great revolution of the earth's axis (21,000 years) is a very probable time for the development of human language in the shortest line; and that the double of this, which we should be obliged to suppose, would be a highly improbable one" (Vol. iv. p. 563).

"It has been shown at the commencement of this volume, that we may hope by a combination of researches and observations to establish that mankind has only terminated one astronomical period, and commenced the second in the year 1240 of our era, and there are reasons for placing the intermediate catastrophe in the most unfavorable part of that period, or about 10,000 B.C. As to subdivisions, if too large a space has been assumed in this one, there is room enough for it in the other. We see no reason for going back to a preceding epoch of 21,000 years; but less than one period is impossible, were it only because of the stubborn fact of the strata of languages. To what point then is Egypt brought back by this calculation? To the middle at least of the ninth millennium of man, as the period of the immigration of the western branch of our race into the valley of the Nile. But this is the very close of the primitive world in the strict sense, that is to say, of the history of our race before the great convulsion of that part of central Asia, to which we turn as the cradle of mankind. This convulsion, which we know as the flood of Noah, in all probability coincides with that epoch of the northern hemisphere when the temperature was lowest, or from 9000 to 10,000 B.C., just as the origin

of our race coincides with that period of it when the temperature was highest, which was 10,500 years earlier.

"If this principle be correct, the Egyptians can have known nothing of the flood, allusions to which we find everywhere among the Iranians and Semites; and in truth no such tradition is current among them, any more than it was among the old Turanians and Chinese" (Vol. iv. p. 564).

In regard to the above hypothesis of the great antiquity of man on the earth, and the arguments in support of it, we think little needs to be said by way of confutation. We must, however, briefly state the reasons why we do not receive the hypothesis, and think the arguments inconclusive. We might use the words "absurd," "irrational," and other stronger disparaging epithets, in relation to the author's reasoning, and think ourselves justified in their use. But the use of such terms generally weakens an argument. For what one calls absurd, another regards merely as inconclusive, a third, fair reasoning, and a fourth, sound argument. We therefore will endeavor to meet the argument of our author in a sober, matter-of-fact style of reasoning.

And first as to his astronomical argument. The substance of the argument is this: On account of "the deviation of the earth's axis" the northern and southern hemispheres enjoy unequal degrees of heat and cold. When this difference is at the extreme, the seasons of "spring and summer are eight days longer than autumn and winter." But "the history of progressive human civilization with which we are acquainted, is comprised within one hemisphere, and under climacteric accidents the most favorable to advancement." These "favorable climacteric accidents" are the seasons of spring and summer being longer than autumn and winter. Therefore as man has mostly lived in the northern hemisphere his creation must have taken place when the heat was greatest in this hemisphere, i.e. about 20,000 B.C., and the flood must have taken place about 10,000 B.C., when the cold was at its maximum.

In regard to this argument we remark: First, we neither admit the premises or the conclusion. Having passed some

fifteen years in the southern part of that belt which has been most densely peopled by the race, we have a little experience that bears directly on the point. We thought and felt decidedly, that the cool season was more favorable to physical and mental vigor, to physical and mental development, than the hot season. And, if we mistake not, such were decidedly, the thoughts and feelings of all in that land who had much to do in the various spheres of bodily and mental activity. So that if we were to use Bunsen's premises we should draw the conclusion the opposite to that which he has drawn. We confess we should never advance this argument to prove that man was created about 10,000 B.C.; but we think it worth as much in support of such an epoch of the creation as that of our author in favor of the higher one of 10,000 years earlier.

Again, in point of fact, in what climate has the race of man attained to the highest degree of development in both body and mind? If we look at the present generation we certainly cannot point to the mildest parts of the temperate zone as furnishing the best specimens of intellectual and physical vigor. Edinburg and Glasgow are almost 56° N. Lat; London is almost 52°; Berlin is farther North, and Paris is about 49° N. It is true that, as we go back into the early historic times, we find the region of human superiority a little further South. Greece is between 37° and 45° N., and Italy between 40° and 46° N.; and Palestine and Egypt and Chaldea were still further south. But the ancients were not equal to the moderns. The reason was, they, through love of ease, delighted in the softness of tropical climates, where a little effort suffices to meet the wants of a degenerate physical nature. They settled along the banks of such streams as the Nile, the Euphrates and Tigris, the Indus and Ganges. It was when they settled in the more northern and cooler climates that the greater strength of body and mind was developed in the race. Where, we would ask, was the garden of Eden? Mount Ararat is in about 40° N. Lat.; and since geologists tell us that the mighty currents which have

swept over the earth, the marks of which are now seen on the solid rocks, were from north to south, and that which caused the deluge of Noah was probably in the same direction; the ark floated south during that one hundred and fifty days, hence the garden of Eden was north of the mountain where it rested, and was, therefore, about in the middle of the temperate zone; whereas, according to our author's theory and argument it should have been further south. We beg our readers not to spend time to criticize this argument, for in itself considered it will not bear criticism. We only put it forth to meet the reasoning of our author. In fact, the line of argumentation is about parallel to his, and equally conclusive. If we placed any value on the argument from heat and cold as aiding to fix the epoch of the creation of man, we should be inclined to place the epoch at the time when the heat and cold of our hemisphere were in equilibrio, which would be for the last time (according to our author) about 4002 B.C. This differs only two years from the commonly received chronology. But we do not believe in this heat and cold argument. Even if we should admit the premises, that the time when spring and summer are eight days longer in our hemisphere than autumn and winter, is most favorable to human development, it would by no means follow that the creation of man took place at that time.

Our author speaks of some ancient traditions that favor his theory of great antiquity of the race of man on earth. We do not know to what traditions he alludes in this connection. He does indeed, in other places in his volumes, speak of the mythological-ancient historic periods of the Egyptians, the Chaldeans, and the Hindus. Thus the Egyptians have a history of 24,925 years[1] before Menes; the Chaldees reckoned in Saroi, Neroi, Sossi, and as usually interpreted, 432,000 years before the flood of Xisuthrus; and the Hindus have their Kalpa of 4,320,000,000 years, which they call the day of Brahma.[2] We have not time to give our theory in this

[1] Eusebius, Chronicon Book ii.

[2] See translation of the Surya Siddhanta, Jour. Am. Orient. Soc., Vol. vi. ch. 1, vs. 15–17.

place of the origin of these immense periods in mythological history. We confess that at first sight it seems to be a little remarkable that those three people should have introduced such periods into their mythology. But when each case is considered separately, we find an almost entire want of evidence that these large numbers had their origin in a more ancient existence of man on earth than the Mosaic chronology indicates.

We turn now to occupy a little space on our author's geologico-linguistic argument in support of his hypothesis: The argument for the great antiquity of the race based on "the strata of languages." It would not be fair to press too far the want of analogy in important respects, between rocks and language. We will admit the fundamental idea involved in the reasoning, namely, change in language proves lapse of time. But while we admit this, we do not admit the correctness of his reasoning when he infers such vast durations as proved by this change.

We shall not take time and space for any very labored argument in confutation of Mr. Bunsen's reasoning from "the strata of language." The bare statement of the theory in his own language, as given above, is sufficient for the sober philologist and philosopher. We shall content ourselves with stating a few difficulties and objections that, in our mind, lie in the way of receiving his theory.

In giving the characteristics of the first age of the world, our author places the "formations and deposits of Sinism 20,000–15,000 B.C.," "in Northern China." This was the "primitive language" of the race, "spoken with rising and falling cadence." How does he know this? He arrives at the conclusion, it seems, through philosophical reasoning, and that based on imagination instead of facts. He says: "The shortest line from inorganic language to organic is that of Sinism through primitive Turanism to primitive Semism, the deposit of which in the valley of the Nile we have in Egyptian" (see above). How does he know this? We know the shortest line between any two points is a straight

line. But we do not see that the line designated above is straight. But, crooked or straight, the line must pass through Khamism and be extended on to terminate in Iranism.

Now, to what extent do any facts in history or philology support this reasoning? Have we not Sinism still, and Turanism and Semism — Khamism being admitted to be dead, and only known from its cropping out a little in Egypt. If Iranism — the latest and highest type of language according to our author — is the result of the laws of development of language, why is there still so much Sinism and Turanism and Semism in the world? It is true our author speaks of primitive Turanism and Semism; but the laws of development ought to have carried the whole body of human language on to the latest and highest formation, Iranism. That such has not been the result, shows that the laws have not operated according to his hypothesis, and vitiates the whole reasoning.

Our author alludes to the development of the ancient Latin into the modern Italian. He says: "If the step from Latin to Italian be taken as a unit, this previous step must be reckoned as at ten or at twenty," and then infers "that 21,000 years is a very probable time for the development of human language in the shortest line." This allusion to the Latin and Italian is directly in point. It points us to a fact which we can understand. But how does this fact fit in with our author's reasoning? We have a change in language and the duration of time in which this change took place. But it is important to notice that the modern language has taken the entire place of the ancient one, and covers the ground occupied by it, and the ancient now exists as dead language. And, according to the principle of our author's reasoning, Iranism ought to cover all the ground occupied by its predecessors, and they be found only as dead languages. As he has it, Sinism developed into Turanism, and this latter into Khamism, and this again became Semism, and Semism, Iranism, which he seems to regard the most perfect language. But we have still spoken Sinism and Turanism and Semism,

if not in their primitive, still in their pure, forms. Now, if there is such a law of development as our author has made the foundation of his reasoning, why did not all Sinism develop into Turanism, and this latter into Khamism and so on? We cannot see.

When geologists speak of the Azoic, the Palæozoic, the Mesozoic, and the Cainozoic; of the Eocene, the Miocene and Pliocene; of the old and new Red Sandstone, we understand that the later formations merely succeeded the former, and were from new materials. But this cannot be the principle of the formation of Bunsen's strata of languages. Each succeeding stratum came forth from its predecessor; a supposition which is manifestly entirely unsupported by any facts in philology. What facts are there to show that Iranism was developed from Semism; i.e. that the Indo-European languages are from the Semitic? Are not some of the oldest records of the race now found in the Iranian languages? Again, are not some of the Semitic languages as perfect as the Iranian? The same comparison may be instituted between the latter and some of the Turanian family. There may be more learning in the Sanscrit, the Greek, Latin, and German than there is in the Arabic, the Ethiopic, the Hungarian, Turkish, Tartar, or Finnish languages — the difference being easily accounted for; but do not the latter languages have all the marks of fully developed specimens of human language that are found in the former? And while changes may be expected to take place through the lapse of time, in the Semitic and Turanian tongues above specified, yet will they ever be in their structure more like the Greek, Latin, Sanscrit, and German than they now are? Yet Bunsen's hypothesis and reasoning require such a result.

The truth is, that from aught that appears from any facts which comparative philology has collected or history recorded, there is no reason to think that the origines of the Chinese, of the Tartar, and other Turanian languages are more ancient than those of the Semitic and Indo-European tongues. In fact, it seems far easier to us to account for Sinism and

Turanism by regarding them as offshoots from an ancient Semitico-Iranism, than it is to dispose of the difficulties attending the reverse process which Bunsen adopts. It is easy to imagine that parties of unliterary, wicked members of the early communities after the flood, being impatient of restraint, should wander away over the Imaum and Tien-shan mountains into Mongolia and Mantchouria, where they would degenerate, and when the more literary and cultivated of the same ancestry should discover them centuries after, they would appear to be a distinct race.

Hugh Miller (Testimony of the Rocks, p. 272), speaking of tribes degenerating and perishing, quotes an account of "great multitudes of native Irish," who (1611–1689) "were driven from Armagh and the south of Down into the mountainous tract extending from the Barony of Fleurs eastward to the sea." ..... "In Sligo and northern Mayo the consequences of degeneration and hardship exhibit themselves in the whole physical condition of the people, affecting not only the features but the frame. Five feet two inches on an average, pot-bellied, bow-legged, abortively featured, their clothing a wisp of rags, these spectres of a people that were once well-grown, able-bodied, and comely, stalk abroad into the daylight of civilization, the annual apparition of Irish ugliness and Irish want."

This scrap of history appears to us exceedingly valuable, as throwing light on our subject. The author quoted says nothing of the language of the degenerate tribe. But this of course must have partaken of the degeneracy of the body and mind. And does not this item of history fully account for the fact of tribes of the human family being found in various parts of the earth that are very low in the scale of civilization, — but just above the brutes, — without the supposition of an original half-monkey condition as the primeval state of the human race for ages after the creation of the first individuals. We reject, then, the hypothesis of Bunsen. Both facts and philosophy are against it. We believe that Sinism and Turanism — to adopt our author's nomenclature

— are the degenerate offshoots from an original stock, from which the Semites and Iranians are directly descended. And, while we would not claim for the language of this original stock, the most ancient — perhaps going quite back to the flood — the culture of the ancient Sanscrit and Greek, yet we reject decidedly the idea of such an infancy of human speech, extending through centuries, ages, as Bunsen and writers of his school are fond of supposing.

But our author has another argument for the great antiquity of our race, especially in Egypt. In the area of Memphis is the statue of Rameses II. Around this statue, the sediment is nine feet four inches deep. The date of Rameses (in his system), is 1391–1225 B.C. say, 3214 years before 1854 A.D. This gives the increase of three and a half inches for each one hundred years. But the sediment is thirty feet deep below the statue. And a fragment of pottery was brought up from a depth of thirty-nine feet below the surface. This depth requires a period of 10,285 years previous to Rameses, or about 13,500 before 1854, which "appears to establish the fact that Egypt was inhabited by men who made use of pottery about 11,000 B.C." [1]

In regard to this fact and reasoning, it is only necessary to remark, that there are half a score of suppositions, all plausible, each of which would altogether alter the conditions of the problem, and vitiate the result.[2] The piece of pottery might have been dropped into a well, or deep hole; their may have been a canal; the channel of the river may have been diverted; the increase of sediment may not have been uniform. The rate of increase may have been entirely different as we go back into antiquity.

A recent Report upon the Physics and Hydraulics of the

[1] Egypt's Place in Universal History, Vol. iii. Pref. p. xi.

[2] Since writing the above, we have seen a statement of facts that fully and finally disposes of this piece of "Nile pottery." Sir Gardener Wilkinson has discovered marks upon the fragment that clearly indicate "an age not exceeding two hundred years prior to the Christian era." See Church Review, Jan. 1866, p. 527.

Mississippi River,[1] has come to the conclusion, from many considerations, that the mouth of the river was once about two hundred and twenty miles above where it now is, and that the river is now building out into the Gulf new land at the rate of two hundred and sixty two feet every year. At this rate we have a period of about 4400 years, as the time required for the growth of the delta to its present extent. Now is not the Mississippi as old as the Nile? And why may we not prove the age of the world as well from the American "father of waters" as from the Egyptian? But alas, we have another report that alters the data, which says: "It is calculated that from 1720, a period of eighty years, the land has advanced fifteen miles into the sea, and there are those who assert that it has advanced three miles within the memory of middle-aged men."[2] This gives an increase of nine hundred and ninety feet a year, which would give about 1150 years as time for the formation of the delta.

We have no objections to geologists speculating about the formation of the deltas at the mouths of the large rivers of the earth, but let them be more agreed, and more certain of their data, before they attempt to frame from those data an argument to controvert the truth of the Bible. From the very nature of the case they never can be sure of their data. Much of Bunsen's reasoning to support his "assumption" of a great antiquity of the race of man, both from the "strata of languages" and the "strata of mud," is based upon data imaginary and uncertain. As if we should say, "If nine feet four inches of sediment has formed around a statue in Memphis since the time of Rameses II., how long did it take the Mississippi to extend its mouth two hundred and twenty miles into the Gulf of Mexico?" We say this statement with the mathematical result according to the fig-

[1] "Prepared by Captain A. A. Humphreys and Lieutenant H. L. Abbott, of the United States Topographical Engineers"; and reviewed in the North American for April 1862.

[2] Major Stoddard's Treatise on the State of Louisiana, quoted by James Hildreth in his "Campaign to the Rocky Mountains," p. 240.

ures, would be on a par with much that is found in Bunsen's pretentious volumes.

We must devote a little space to our author's chronology of the patriarchs, especially to his era of Abraham. We have here some rich specimens of "philosophy." We need do little more than exhibit the philosopher's theory in his own words.

"We will now take a glance at dates. Here the first step undoubtedly must be to abandon the views and system adopted by the narrator, from the impossibility of an historian dealing with men who beget children like other people at the age of thirty and live more than four hundred years afterwards. Those upon whom this consideration fails to make an impression may still be staggered by the fact, that upon this calculation the patriarch Noah lived down to the time of Abraham[1] without troubling himself about the history of the world. Neither can we venture, like the authors of the Septuagint, to falsify the text,[2] and in order to get rid of the disproportion, add one hundred years to the ages of these geographical patriarchal monsters at the time of their marriage. We have, therefore, but one alternative — to ascertain which of the two is the really traditional date, that of the ages after the birth of the first son, or that of the whole date; to ascertain, in other words, whether the narrator had the authority of tradition for the former date, and, in order to assist his chronology, added at random, thirty or forty years to their ages when the first son was born; or whether he found the whole sum total recorded, and deducted from it whatever suited his purpose.[3] The fact of his not stating the sum total would incline us to adopt the former view. But in the immediately preceeding entries about Noah and Shem, we can prove that the complete sum total is the actual traditional date. In each case it is six hundred years, which was shown to be the original Chaldaic equation between lunar and solar years. We must therefore assume that it is so here also."[4]

The postdiluvian times to Abraham are thus disposed of (the tabular form being somewhat abridged for the sake of space):

[1] This is a real objection or difficulty if we adopt the Hebrew chronology, but it entirely vanishes if we adopt that of the Septuagint.

[2] This is amusing, standing, as it does, in connection with the author's radical alteration of the text of scripture.

[3] On such suppositions what becomes of the inspiration of the scriptures, or even of their authenticity? Yet our author professes great reverence and regard for the Bible. He would not alter a date.

[4] Our eyes have not fallen on this proof. We know that Josephus (Antiq. i. iii. 9) speaks of a "great year" of six hundred common years; but what has that to do with the six hundredth year of the life of Noah, as the date of the flood, and the duration of Shem's life? It is all assumption.

"There are three periods or divisions:

A. Sem (Arapakithis), i.e. the primeval land of the Kasdim (Chaldees), the frontier mountains of Armenia towards Assyria, 438 years.

B. Selah, "The Mission," 433 years; Heber, the settler over the river (Tigris), 464 years; Peleg, derivation, partition, 439 years; Yohtan (father of thirteen South Arabian races).

C. Re'Hu, district of the shepherd country of Edessa (Rohi), 239 years; Serug (in Osroëne, Sarug, west of Edessa), 230 years.

D. Nahor goes to Ur of the Kasdim (Chaldees), 148 years.

Terah leaves Ur of the Chaldees and goes to Haran (Karra), a day's journey south of Edessa, 275 years (70+205).

Nahor sets out from Sarug to Ur of the Chaldees, 148 years (29+119).

Terah sets out from Ur to Haran, that is back towards Osroëne, on the way to Canaan. He lives 205 years. At the age of seventy he begets three sons in Ur."

"There is a remarkable closeness between the first three (geographical historical) dates, Arphaxad, Selah, and Eber: Arphaxad 438 years, Selah 435, and Heber 464.

"Supposing Arphaxad to represent the duration of the Semitic settlement Arapakithis, the mountainous district above Assyria, prior to the memory of man. 'The Mission' would represent the journey towards the plains three years before the close of this migration, and 'Heber' would represent the period when the migrating race passed over the Upper Tigris on their way to the Upper Mesopotamia. The year four hundred sixty-four would in that case be the one in which they entered Mesopotamia proper, and the tribe must have remained in a compact body two hundred and thirty-nine years before a portion of them commenced the great migration southward, the result of which was the foundation of the kingdom of Southern Asia" (Vol. iii. p. 367). "This would make nine hundred and thirty-three years to Nahor the grandfather of Abraham" (i.e. 464+239+230=933 years) (Vol. iii. p. 369).

Sober criticism on the above would be entirely out of place. We venture to affirm that there is not within the whole compass of literature another such perversion of an evidently plain historical narrative into a monstrous historico-chronologico-geographical jumble.

"Noah was six hundred years old when the flood of waters was upon the earth" (Gen. vii. 6). This six hundred years is "the Chaldaic equation between the lunar and solar years." "And Noah lived after the flood three hundred and fifty years." This is "half of another equation with a surplus of fifty years." Only fifty more! "Arphaxad lived five and

thirty years, and begat Salah; and Arphaxad lived after he begat Salah four hundred and three years, and begat sons and daughters" (Gen. xi. 12, 13). This four hundred and thirty-eight years represents "the duration of the Semitic settlement in Arapakithis, the mountainous district above Assyria, prior to the memory of man." And the sacred writer probably, "in order to assist his chronology, added at random the thirty-five years when the first son was born" (!) "And Salah lived thirty years, and begat Eber; and Salah lived after he begat Eber four hundred and three years, and begat sons and daughters" (Gen. xi. 14, 15). Salah means "the mission." "The four hundred and thirty-three years "represent the commencement of the journey towards the plains, three years before the close of this migration." "Heber" means "the settler over the river (Tigris)"; and "represents the period when the migrating race passed over the Upper Tigris on their way to Upper Mesopotamia. The year four hundred and sixty-four would in that case be the one in which they entered Mesopotamia proper, and the tribe must have remained in a compact body two hundred and thirty-nine years before a portion of them commenced the great migration southward which was the foundation of the primeval kingdom of Southern Asia." And so of the other names and numbers. But Bunsen has not told us what was meant, on his theory, by the frequently recurring phrase, "and he begat sons and daughters." This he was certainly bound to do. It is true that in the case of the two sons of Heber, Peleg and Yoktan, he makes the former mean "derivation," "division, two hundred and thirty-nine years," and the latter the real "father of thirteen South Arabian races"; which distinction appears to have been made on some principle of philosophy peculiar to him; but he ought not to have left unexplained so important a phrase so frequently occurring as "sons and daughters."

We must devote a little space to our author's chronology of Abraham and the two or three succeeding generations. For in this his "philosophy" appears to peculiar advantage.

After giving the well-known numbers, as in the following table:

"Abraham lived 175 years, Isaac, 180 years,
Jacob, 147 years, Joseph, 110 years."

Bunsen proceeds to say:

"Here it is not a question of a solitary exception in the case of one individual. It is true that no instance can be adduced demonstrably of any one reaching the age of one hundred and eighty. Such a case, however, as an exception, would not contravene the laws of nature. But that three patriarchs should have lived, one after the other, one hundred and fifty years, and even more, and the viceroy, Joseph, their successor, one hundred and ten, cannot be historical. There must be some means of detecting some blunder here, or else the historical nature of the narrative will be liable to grave suspicion. None but those who cling to the infatuation that the antediluvian patriarchs, as well as Noah and Shem lived from six hundred to one thousand years, have any excuse to offer for such purely childish delusions, persistence in which can only be productive of doubt and unbelief.

"But there is no country in which it is so improbable that a man a hundred years old should have a son as in a land of early development, like Syria and Canaan.[1] But are we compelled on that account to regard these four ages of the patriarchs as primitive inventions? No one who admits the strictly historical character of the principal branch of the family narrative of this period will come to this conclusion"[2] (Vol. iii. pp. 340, 341).

"But then this family possessed an era, as was always the case with noble Semitic races; this era must have been that of the immigration" (*id.*).[3]

"In the history of Abraham we find two predominant numbers, the seventy-fifth year (that of the immigration), and the one hundredth, the birth of Isaac. In this interval so many events occurred also, as to require a considerably long sojourn in Canaan prior to his birth.

"We assume, therefore, 75, as the year before the birth of Isaac; 25, as the duration of the sojourn in Canaan; and consequently, 51, as the first year of the settlement in Canaan.

"But there is also a place for the one hundredth year (which is said to be that of the birth of Isaac), as the year in which Abraham died. This again cannot be accidental. The computation backward — the turning-

[1] Our author's "philosophy" likewise sets aside the plain declarations of the New Testament. What becomes, on his theory, of Rom. iv. 19 and Heb. xi. 11, which endorse the account in Gen. xviii. 10–15 and xxi. 5.

[2] Our author distinctly admits that Abraham is strictly a historical person, as well as Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph.

[3] Mere assumption.

point is so historically important and well established — leads directly to the same conclusion. According to this Jacob died in the one hundred and forty-seventh year, not of his own life, but of the era from the immigration of Abraham. Joseph again, not of his own age, but of the era of Jacob" (Vol. iii. p. 344).

"*The reader will here find an account taken of every date which occurs in the scripture narrative.*[1] Whatever is determined upon grounds of internal probability, such as the births of Isaac and Jacob, is placed in brackets. There cannot, therefore, be an error of more than two or three years at most.[2] Those which are placed in parentheses are such as arise out of the entries in the Bible in reference to years of marriage. These are consequently in themselves thoroughly authentic. All the other dates are taken directly from the Bible."[3]

Truly, this is taking the subject of chronology "out of the domain of chronology and history into that of pure philosophy" (Vol. iv. p. 22). An account is taken of every date in the scripture narrative! Only the date of the son's birth is changed to that of the death of the father. The real date of this latter event being ignored altogether. Is any language, proper for a Christian to use, too severe in reprehension of such a proceedure? What! we involuntarily exclaim, was the man insane? Had he become imbecile? Had he so long been groping amid the sepulchral monuments of antiquity that he could not recognize, in the clear light of day which other men use, a plain historical fact?

"And Abraham was an hundred years old when Isaac was born" (Gen. xxi. 5); that is, as our author interprets it, "he was a hundred years old when he died." "And Abraham was seventy-five years old when he departed out of Haran" (Gen. xii. 4); that is, "the seventy-fifth year is the year before Isaac was born." And so of other dates and events in connection with the scripture narrative. "An account is taken of every date in the scripture narrative." He might as well have taken the alphabetical letters and figures in the first fifteen chapters of Genesis, and so trans-

[1] The italics are ours.

[2] Referring to a table which is not copied, the essential part appearing in what follows.

[3] Egypt's Place in Universal History, Vol. iii. p. 344.

posed and arranged them as to make out a story of the creation about 20,000 B.C., and of the flood occurring 10,000 B.C., and the "development" and "strata" of languages, etc., according to his system, and then have claimed the Bible as authority, telling us we should find "an account taken of every letter and figure in the scripture narrative." If any *x*'s or *z*'s, or other letters, or any figures, had remained unappropriated, he could have found a "place" for them. We say had he done this, the process would have been about as rational as that which he has adopted in relation to the history of Abraham and his successors in the patriarchal line.

Bunsen lays great stress on the improbability of a man having a son at the age of a hundred years, especially in such a land as Palestine; this improbability being even a corner-stone in his argument. With him, in his "philosophy," the assertion of the sacred writer, that the event is miraculous and the endorsement of the miracle by an inspired apostle (Rom. iv. 19 and Heb. xi. 11), go for nothing. Thus the New Testament suffers alike with the Old under this rationalizing process.

When we read the following caustic criticism on Bunsen's work, we thought it probably a little extravagant. But we are now prepared to receive it as just, though we have not given particular attention to points criticized.

"Sesostris is the great name of Egyptian antiquity. Even the builders of the pyramids and of the labyrinth shrink into insignificance by the side of this mighty conqueror. Nevertheless, his historical identity is not proof against the dissolving and recompounding process of the Egyptological method. Bunsen distributes him into portions, and identifies each portion with a different king. Sesostris, as we have stated, stands in Manetho's list as third king of the twelfth dynasty, at 3320 B.C., and a notice is appended to his name, clearly identifying him with the Sesostris of Herodotus. Bunsen first takes a portion of him, and identifies it with Tosorthrus (written Sesorthrus by Eusebius), the second king of the third dynasty, whose date is 5119 B.C., being a difference in the

dates of 1799 years — about the same interval as between Augustus Caesar and Napoleon. He then takes another portion and identifies it with Sesonchotis, a king of the twelfth dynasty; a third portion of Sesostris is finally assigned to himself. It seems that these three fragments make up the entire Sosostris."[1]

We say we can receive this as just and true; for if it should be found to be a little colored in relation to this particular point, yet we know it is strictly applicable to some parts of Bunsen's works. We have long entertained the opinion that the occupation of deciphering hieroglyphics and ancient inscriptions is not promotive of a healthy and sound mind, but rather the opposite. Except in cases where the character of the inscription is comparatively modern, or the subject-matter largely connected with well-known historical facts, there is much to be made out by conjecture, imagination, and assumption. The mind soon becomes accustomed to the work of combining doubtful elements, till at length conjecture and assumption are put on an equality with true knowledge and real fact. Whether Egyptology has, in general, fallen into unsafe hands, or the principle above alluded to operated with peculiar power in this department of research, owing, perhaps, to great inherent difficulties of the subject, the opinion seems to be wide-spread, even among the learned, that the principles of sound reasoning, sound philosophy, and common sense, are not, to say the least, very strictly adhered to by professed Egyptologers as a class. The following from the able writer last quoted, we regard as an appropriate and well-deserved criticism:

"Egyptology has a historical method of its own. It recognizes none of the ordinary rules of evidence; the extent of its demands upon our credulity is almost unbounded. Even the writers on ancient Italian ethnology are modest and tame in their hypothesis compared with the Egyptologists. Under their potent logic, all identity disappears; everything is subject to become anything but itself. Successive dynasties become contemporary dynasties; one king becomes another

[1] Sir G. C. Lewis's Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, p. 369.

king; one name becomes another name; one number becomes another number; one place becomes another place." [1]

The writer then adduces examples, a specimen of which is given in a preceding quotation. And do not the quotations we have given above from Bunsen's work fully sustain this caustic criticism? In a plain historical narrative names of men are transformed into names of places and countries and events; the number denoting the year of a man's life, denotes the time of the tribe passing the river Tigris; the date of the call of Abraham to leave his country is that of the birth of his son, and the date of the son's birth, becomes that of the father's death.

We would not undervalue the labors of Egyptologists. They have opened up a fascinating branch of study, and brought to light many interesting and valuable things—yea, even valuable truth. Their works give a general idea of the state of ancient Egypt, which in the main, we regard as truthful. They have translated portions of a chapter of the world's history, and we may admit with a good degree of correctness, which a few years since was altogether in an unknown language. But from the very nature of their materials, they can never produce any connected history or chronology that can set aside what has usually been received as authentic history or chronology from other sources. This is evident from the fragmentary state of the materials, the absence in them of authentic connection, and the presence of numerous irreconcilable contradictions. This being the condition, all that we can expect from Egyptology is a general corroboration of facts and truths elsewhere stated, occasionally clearing up a doubt or adding to an imperfect statement; and when new facts and truths are professedly brought to light which are independent, we will receive them for what they are worth. Egyptology has already furnished much that is corroborative of the general truth of the Bible, but we repeat it, it cannot, in its present state, be entitled to modify materially, much less controvert or set aside, any important fact or statement in the sacred volume.

[1] Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, p. 368.

ARTICLE VII.

FRESH NOTES ON EGYPTOLOGY.

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., NEW YORK.

DURING the current year there have been published in the department of Egyptology, two dictionaries,[1] two grammars,[2] two folio volumes of hieroglyphic texts,[3] an early text of the "Book of the Dead,"[4] and a complete translation of that national Ritual.[5] The *Zeitschrift für Aegyptische Sprache*[6] points triumphantly to this array of linguistic apparatus as the best answer to the attack sometimes made, even now, upon Egyptian studies as immethodical and unprofitable. Egyptian philology has been further enriched of late through the discovery of a bi-lingual inscription at Tanis, a site which had already proved exceedingly rich in remains of antiquity. Early in 1866, as Dr. Lepsius was exploring the Isthmus of Suez and the Delta in the vicinity of the ship canal, an employee of the Suez Company informed him that he had seen a Greek inscription among the ruins of San. Lepsius hastened to verify this statement, and succeeded in uncovering a stone seven feet high by two and a half in breadth, the upper part of which was covered with hieroglyphics numbering thirty-seven lines, and the lower with a corresponding Greek inscription in seventy-six lines. Having thoroughly cleansed the stone, his attendant, Mr. Weidenbach, took from it an impression upon prepared paper, from which the inscription has been lithographed in the size of the original.[7] The inscription is dated on the

[1] A Dictionary of Hieroglyphics, by Samuel Birch, LL.D., in Vol. v. of Bunsen's "Egypt's Place in Universal History"; and Dr. H. Brugsch's "Hieroglyphisch-Demotisches Wörterbuch." Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs.

[2] Hieroglyphic Grammar, by Samuel Birch, in Bunsen's Egypt; and Vicomte de Rouge's Chrestomathie Égyptienne, with a grammatical analysis. Paris: A. Franck.

[3] Altägyptische Tempelinschriften, (I.) Der Horustempel von Edfu, (II.) Der Hathortempel von Dendera. Von Johannes Dümichen. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs.

[4] Aelteste Texte des Todtenbuchs. Arranged by Dr. R. Lepsius after the sarcophagi of the old Egyptian kingdom, in the Berlin Museum. Berlin: W. Hertz.

[5] By Dr. Birch, in Bunsen, Vol. v.

[6] May 1867, p. 44.

[7] The writer had the pleasure of seeing this first impression in the study of Dr. Lepsius. The lithographed copy, with a translation and notes, has been published under the title, Das bilingue Dekret von Kanopus in der Originalgrösse mit Uebersetzung und Erklärung beider Texte, herausgeben, von R. Lepsius.

17th Tybi of the ninth year of Ptolemy III. Euergetes I., which Dr. Lepsius reduces to the 7th of March of the year 238 B.C. It recites that king Ptolemaus and his wife Berenice had made large gifts to the temple for the support of the priests and the sacred animals, and had shown great zeal in upholding religion; that in his campaign in Asia, the king had recovered the images of the gods which the Persians had stolen from the Egyptian temples, had brought these back to Egypt and restored them to the places where they formerly stood; that, while waging victorious wars in divers lands, he had maintained peace at home; that, to provide against a famine apprehended by reason of an insufficient rising of the Nile, he had imported corn from Syria, Phenicia, and Cyprus, etc.

In grateful acknowledgement of these and other good deeds of the king and queen, the priests, in assembly, ordained that the religious honors which this royal pair and their ancestors had hitherto enjoyed, should be increased; that a new order of "priests of the Beneficent Divinities" should be constituted in all the temples of the land for the purpose of maintaining their worship; and that a new feast should be established in honor of the king.

The length of this inscription and the almost perfect condition of both texts, give to it a greater philological value than now attaches to the Rosetta stone. By means of a somewhat extensive Egypto-Greek vocabulary, the Tablet of Canopus confirms the general system of hieroglyphical interpretation suggested by Champollion. As a complement to this, the indefatigable Mons. Chabas has published a revised translation of the Rosetta stone, with a glossary of Egypto-Greek.[1] M. le Vicomte Emmanuel de Rougé has published a valuable essay upon the earliest monuments of Egyptian history, entitled *Recherches sur les Monuments qu'on peut attribuer aux six premières Dynasties de Manéthon.*[2] This volume is the first instalment of the results of the mission organized four years ago by the French government, for historical explorations in Egypt. In this mission Count Rougé, the first of French Egyptologers, was accompanied by his son, who had prepared himself by three years of special study and practice in copying hieroglyphic inscriptions, M. Wescher, who has had much experience in deciphering Greek inscriptions, M. de Banville, a skilful photographer, and M. Mariette, who was detailed for this service by the king of Egypt. The material results of the mission were six volumes of inscriptions hitherto unpublished, copied by hand, and two hundred and twenty photographic plates, reproducing the historical walls of temples, the most important inscriptions, and the finest monuments of Egyptian art.

Berlin: W. Hertz. A rival edition, disputing the claim to the discovery, has been published in Vienna: Die Zweisprachige Inschrift von Tanis zum ersten Male herausgegeben und uebersetzt, von P. Leo Reinisch und E. Robert Roesler.

[1] L'Inscription hiéroglyphique de Rosette Analysée et comparée a la version Greque. Par F. Chabas. Paris: Maisonneuve. 1867.

[2] Paris: Imprimerie Impériale. Quarto. pp. 165, with plates. 1866.

This collection was made with a view to elucidate the chronology of Egyptian art and history. The epoch of the fourth dynasty — the epoch of the pyramids, the earliest which has yet been identified by contemporaneous monuments, is now richly illustrated by the spoils gathered by M. Mariette from the ancient field of Memphis, and deposited in the royal Museum at Cairo. Its statuary is marked by exactness of proportions, the careful study of the principal muscles, the fine sculpture of the figure, and individuality of expression, — altogether a new revelation concerning art at that early period.

The eleventh dynasty, whose burial place at Thebes was brought to light some time ago, is further illustrated through the recent discovery of the tomb of king Antef. Numerous monuments of the twelfth dynasty have been found near Abydos, where M. Mariette discovered the enclosure of a very ancient temple of Osiris, and a series of official steles, recording the visit of successive sovereigns who had come to render homage at this sanctuary.

Dr. Lepsius and others have placed the invasion of the Hyksos directly after the twelfth dynasty, but the colossal statues of Sevek-hotep III., the fourth king of the thirteenth dynasty, identified at the frontier town of Tanis, and erected to attest the authority of that monarch over the "Lower Country," are almost conclusive evidence that the shepherds had not yet crossed the borders. Comte Rougé promises a special memoir from M. Mariette upon the relations of Egypt with these oppressors, whose date he assigns to the eighteenth century B.C.

The New Empire, which dates from the expulsion of the Hyksos, is abundant in monumental records. Comte Rougé has succeeded in restoring entire the historical poem celebrating the campaigns of Sesostris, already partially known from the papyrus Sallier. These examples will serve to show what light may be expected from the working up of the materials collected by Comte Rougé and his collaborators. Meantime, Prof. C. Piazzi Smyth, Astronomer Royal for Scotland, from his most careful Astronomical data, computes the building of the Great Pyramid at 2170 B.C.

In the classification of the first six dynasties, our author was greatly aided by the lists of kings lately discovered at Memphis[1] and Abydos[2] — the first containing fifty-two names, of which ten are more or less illegible; the second giving an almost unbroken series of seventy-six royal cartouches, from Menes to Sethos I. (about 1400 B.C.), who appears upon the monument in the act of offering homage to his predecessors. The following Table will exhibit the results of these lists in comparison with the list of Manetho, according to Africanus, for the first three dynasties.

[1] The tablet of Memphis or Sakkarah, discovered by M. Mariette in 1860.

[2] The tablet of Sethos I., discovered by M. Dümichen in 1864.

Manetho.	The Turin Papyrus.	Tablet of Sethos I.	Tablet of Sakkarah.
First Dynasty.			
1. Menes.	Mena.	Mena.	*Wanting.*
2. Athothis.	....a	Teta.	"
3. Kenkenes.	....a	Ateta.	"
4. Ouenephes.		Ata.	"
5. Ousaphaidos.	T'at'a-ti.	T'at'ati.	"
6. Miebidos.	Meribipen.	Meribipu.	Meribipen.
7. Semempses.		(*Illegible*).	"
8. Bieneches.	.....buhu.	Kabuhu.	Kabuhu.
Second Dynasty.			
9. Boethos.	....biu.	Butau.	Neterbiu.
10. Kaiechos.	....ka.	Kakau.	Kakau.
11. Binothris.	....nuter.	Binnuter.	Binuteru.
12. Tlas.	.....s.	Ut'nas.	Ut'nas.
13. Sethenes.	Senta.	Senta.	Senta.
14. Chaires.	(Nefer ?) ka.		
15. Nephercheres.			Nefer kara.
16. Sesochris.	Nefer-ka-Sakru.		Sakru nefer ka.
17. Cheneres.	(Hu?) t'efa.		....t'efa.
Third Dynasty.			
18. Necherophes.	Beb...	(T'et'i?)	Bebi.
19. Tosorthros.	Nebka.	Nebka.	
20. Tyris.	Sar.	Sarsa.	Sar.
21. Mesochris.	Sar teta	Teta.	Sarteta.
22. Souphis.	....t'efa?	Set'es.	
23. Tosertasis.		Nefer kara,	
24. Aches.			Ra neb ka.
25. Sephouris.	Hu.		Huni.
26. Kerpheres.	Snefru.	Snefru.	Snefru.

The agreement of the two tablets with one another and with the Turin papyrus is so striking, that their united authority must be accepted as official for at least one mode of registering the royal succession. It remains to harmonize this, if possible, with Manetho, or to determine which of the two registers is entitled to the greater weight. Bunsen has attempted to rectify Manetho by Eratosthenes, whom he regards as of higher authority; but this he does by arbitrary corrections and transpositions. His assertion that "the Eratosthenian table solves all problems as to the first six dynasties and their representatives on the tablets of Karnak and Abydos," had reference to the old tables of Abydos; for the Sethos tablet had not then been discovered. This tablet is the only known monument that gives a complete list of the first dynasty, and its row of seventy-six consecutive kings between Menes and Sethos I. creates a formidable problem in chronology. The solution of chronological problems given by Bunsen in his fifth volume, calls for a more critical analysis than would fall within the

scope of the present Article, and must be deferred until the data of Mons. Mariette concerning the period of the Hyksos shall be fully before us. Assuming 1633 B.C. as the first year of Amos — the beginning of the New Empire — Bunsen makes 1426 years for the Old Empire (1076 years) together with the Middle Epoch or Hyksos period (350 years); thus bringing Menes to the throne in 3059 B.C.

The Egyptian "Book of the Dead" or "Funeral Ritual" is now receiving the special attention of several Egyptologers. The text of the Ritual of Turin, published by Dr. Lepsius in 1842, under the title of *Todtenbuch*, has been till recently accepted as the canonical standard; but Comte Rougé has now prepared from a collation of various papyri, an edition which aspires to be the official text.[1] Mr. W. Pleyte of Leyden has published a translation of the 125th chapter, which treats of the entering of the deceased into "the Hall of the Two Truths, and of separating a person from his sins when he has been made to see the faces of the Gods." Mr Pleyte's translation is based upon an analysis and comparison of the better manuscripts.[2] Dr. Samuel Birch, of the British Museum, has made a translation of the entire ritual, the first complete translation yet published, which is incorporated with the English edition of Bunsen's "Egypt's Place in Universal History."[3] An exposition of the belief of the Egyptians concerning the future condition of the soul, derived from the contents of this book and the study of various sarcophagi, will be given in a subsequent Article.

ARTICLE VIII.

LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Grundemann's Atlas of Missions.

We have called attention in a previous number of this Journal, to Grundemann's Atlas of Missions, and have published a translation of the Prospectus. Since that time the first part has appeared in quarto form, engraved with great delicacy, and colored in that neat manner for which German maps are noted. It embraces the Western Coast of Africa. The second part is nearly ready, and will comprise Southern Africa. The third is in a forward state of preparation, and will include Eastern Africa and Madagascar. This continent will be presented to the world in all its missionary fields, in less than a year from the present time. The other conti-

[1] Rituel Funéraire des anciens Egyptiens. Folio. Paris: 1861–67.
[2] Études Égyptologiques. Par W. Pleyte. Leide: E. J. Brill. 1866.
[3] Vol. v. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1867.

nents will follow in due course, and in about three years from this time Dr. Grundemann hopes to finish his task.

A work so valuable, and so thoroughly done, should not be confined to the German world, and the comparatively few scholars who are familiar with the German tongue. In all departments of Geography, the nation speaking that language leads the world; and the house that publishes Grundemann's Atlas of Missions is the largest geographical publishing house on the globe. Dr. Grundemann's long interest in missions, and his familiarity with them, indicates him as pre-eminently fitted for his task; while his piety, his sound evangelical belief, and his experience as a pastor with the wants of the Christian public, have still further enhanced the worth of his services.

Grundemann's Atlas, when finished, will be a work for the library alone, however; whereas our special lack in this country is a good, clear, and large series of wall maps. Serviceable as are those which are now most in use in our vestries, they are open to many serious objections. They are not engraved with marked skill; they are coarse and inelegant. Moreover they are not exclusively missionary in their character; they contain too much; they are almost as useful for general purposes as most of the wall maps that are sold. That this is so, indicates a great misapprehension. A missionary map should confine itself absolutely to that department. Where it recognizes political demarcations, it should do so in the most succint way, and only to such an extent as to indicate the country in which each missionary field is found. Its story should be told without digression; it should relate exclusively to the stations which the various organizations of Europe and America have established in all parts of the world.

This Dr. Grundemann, and he alone, has done. An enterprising house should take his quarto maps, and make them the basis of a new series of wall maps, engraved with skill, and adapted to adorn the vestry as well as to illustrate the Monthly Concert, and make that meeting effective. The continents should be drawn on a large scale in outline, the chief political divisions designated, and the chief missionary stations, whether carried on by English, Germans, French, or Americans, clearly indicated. The small and unimportant stations should be either omitted or entered with a minute lettering. The chief stations should be printed in letters so large as to be legible across the Lecture-room.

There is almost always a great deal of lost space in the margin of wall maps. The corners could, and should, be devoted to the copying, on a slightly reduced scale, of all the maps of Dr Grundemann's Atlas; and if this were done, the large central portion — the continents — might profitably omit the names of the smaller stations, and confine itself to the great groundwork of the missionary field.

Our plan goes one step further. Dr. Grundemann's maps being all reproduced, on the margin of the continental wall maps, from the stones

which form the margin, the smaller maps could be printed separately, and thus, at very little expense and with very little trouble, a volume could be produced for those who wish to place in their libraries a Missionary Atlas. A work of this kind, in both forms — the book for libraries, and the wall map for vestries — could hardly fail to have a large and remunerative sale.

The greatness of the missionary work is best understood by looking at the list of all the organizations which are engaged in carrying it on. We who are familiar with the names and the operations of a few great societies in England and America, are apt to forget the auxiliaries on the continent of Europe, as well as in the less prominent sects at home. It need hardly be said here that Dr. Grundemann has surveyed the whole Protestant field. He has visited England for the purpose of procuring data, and has communicated freely with all the leading missionaries and missionary boards of both hemispheres. German in his thoroughness and in his fairness, he has been misled by no national pride to extol the share which Germany is having in the great work, and tempted by no sectarianism to belittle the part of any body of Christians. We regret that he has made no account of Catholic missions. His plea is the great difficulty of obtaining the facts; but surely a visit to France would, with a man of his gentle, yet earnest, nature, not have been unavailing. As it is, the work is shorn of a most valuable part in this mission.

We venture to subjoin a list of all the missionary societies of the world, and the fields they occupy, so far as known to the writer of this Article. As personal friends of Dr. Grundemann, and greatly desiring that his work should be as perfect as possible, we would invite any contribution which would make this list more perfect.

I. *British Missionary Societies.*

1. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. 1701. East and West Indies, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, North America.
2. The Baptist Miss. Soc. 1792. East and West Indies, West Africa, China.
3. The London Miss. Soc. 1795. South Sea, East and West Indies, South Africa, Madagascar.
4. The Church Miss. Soc. 1800. East and West Indies, Turkey, China, New Zealand, West Africa, Mauritius, Madagascar, North America.
5. The General Baptist Miss. Soc. 1816. East Indies, China.
6. The Wesleyan (Methodist) Miss. Soc. 1817. East and West Indies, West and South Africa, China, Australia, Polynesia, North America.
7. Established Church of Scotland's Foreign Miss. 1824. East Indies.
8. Society for Promoting Female Education in the East. 1834.
9. Welsh Foreign Miss. Soc. 1840. East Indies (Silbet).
10. The Irish Presbyterian Church's For. Miss. 1840. East Indies. (Gugjerat), Syria.

11. The Edinburgh Medical Miss. Soc. 1841.
12. The Reformed Presbyterian Church's For. Miss. 1842. New Hebrides.
13. The Free Church of Scotland's For. Miss. 1843. East Indies, South Africa.
14. The English Presbyterian For. Miss. 1844. China, East Indies.
15. The South American (Patagonian) Miss. Soc. 1844. South America.
16. The United Presbyterian Church's For. Miss. 1847. East and West Indies, West and South Africa.
17. The Chinese Evangelization Soc. 1850. China.
18. The Primitive Methodist. Miss. Soc. 1858. (??)
19. The Free United Methodist Miss. Soc. 1860. East and West Africa.

20a. The Moslem Miss. Soc. 1860. Syria, Egypt.
21a. The Universities Miss. Soc. 1861? East Africa.
22a. The Foreign Evangelist Soc. 1864.

II. *American Missionary Societies.*

20. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission. 1810. East Indies, South Africa, Turkey, China, Polynesia, North America.
21. The Baptist Missionary Union. 1814. Birmah, Farther India, Siam, China.
22. The Methodist Episcopal Miss. Soc. 1819. West Africa, India, China, North and South America, Polynesia.
23. The Episcopal Board of Missions. 1820. North America, West Africa, China, Japan.
24. The Free-Will Baptist For. Miss. Soc. 1843. India.
25. The Board of For. Miss. of the Presbyterian Church. 1837. West-Africa, India, Siam, China, Japan, North and South America.
26. Vacat.
27. Lutheran Missionary Society (of the General Synod of Pennsylvania). 1837. India, West Africa.
28. Seventh-Day-Baptist Miss. Soc. 1842. China.
29. American Indian Miss. Association. 1842. North America.
30. The Baptist Free Miss. Soc. 1843. West Indies.
31. The Associate Reformed Presbyterian Board of Missions. 1844. India, Turkey, Polynesia.
32. Mission of the German Lutheran Synod of Iowa. (?) North America.
33. The Southern Baptist Convention Board of Miss. 1845. West Africa, China.
34. The Southern Methodist For. Miss. 1846. North America, China.
35. The American Miss. Association (in Albany). 1846. North America, West Indies, Egypt, Siam, Polynesia.
36. The Reformed Protestant Dutch Church's For. Miss. 1857. India, China, Japan.

37. The Board of For. Miss. of the Presbyterian Church of Nova Scotia, 1848. New Hebrides.
38. The Micmac Missionary Society. (?) Nova Scotia.

III. *German Missionary Societies.*

40. Mission of the Evangelical Moravian Brotherhood. 1732. Greenland, Labrador, North America, West Indies, South Africa, Australia, Thibet.
41. Evang. Miss Soc. at Bâle. 1815. West Africa, India, China.
42. Society for the Advancement of Evangelical Missions at Berlin. 1823. South Africa.
43. Rhenish Miss. Soc. at Barmen. 1828. South Africa, Holland, East Indies, China.
44. North Ger. Miss. Soc. of Bremen. 1835. West Africa, New Zealand.
45. Evangelical Lutheran Missionary Society, Leipsic. 1836. India.
46. Gossner's Evangelical Missionary Union of Berlin. 1842. Farther India, Holland, India, Australia.
47. Berlin Woman's Mission for China. 1852. China.
48. Berlin Man's Union for China. 1852. China.
49. Hermannsburg Missionary Society. 1854. South Africa, India.
50. Pilgrim's Mission of St. Krischona near Bâle — Palestine, Abyssinia.
51. Kaisersworth Deaconesses Institute. Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt.
52. Jerusalem Union at Berlin. Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt.

IV. *Dutch Missionary Societies.*

60. Netherland Missionary Society at Rotterdam. 1797. Ambon, Minahassa, South Celebes, Java.
61. The Java Society at Amsterdam. 1854. Java, Sumatra.
62. The Ermeloer Missionary Society. 1854. Talaut Islands.
63. Mission of the Separatist Reformed Church at Kampen. 1857. Surinam, Orange Republic.
64. The Netherland Missionary Society. Rotterdam. 1859. Java.
65. The Utrecht Missionary Society. 1859. New Guinea, Bali.
66. The Netherland Reformed Missionary Society. Amsterdam. 1859. Java.
67. Mennonites Association for the Diffusion of the Gospel in the Dutch Maratime Possessions at Amsterdam.
68. Java. The China Society.

V. *Scandinavian Missionary Societies.*

70. Swedish Missionary Society of Stockholm. 1837.
71. Missionary Society of Lund for China. 1852.
72. Missionary Institute of the Evangelical Fatherland's Foundation of Stockholm. 1860.
73. Missionary Society of Göteborg.

74. The Norse Missionary Society of Stavanger. 1842. South Africa.
75. The Danish Missionary Society of Copenhagen. 1821. India.
76. Finnish Missionary Society of Helsingfors. 1861.

VI. *French Missionary Societies.*

77. Society of Evangelical Missions, Paris. 1824. South Africa, Senegambia, Polynesia.

VII. *Colonial Missionary Societies.*

78. The Reformed Church Mission to the Cape. Capstadt. 1861. South Africa.
79. Society of Internal and External Missions. Batavia, 1851. Holland, India.
80. Presbyterian Missionary Society. Melbourne. (?) Australia.
81. Melanesian Miss. Soc. (?) at Aukland. 1861. Melanesia.
82. Hawaiian Missionary Society at Honolulu. Micronesia, Marquesas Islands.
83. Jamaica Baptist Miss. Soc. (?)
84. West Indian Missionary Board. West Africa.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT GERMAN PUBLICATIONS.

FROM OUR GERMAN CORRESPONDENT.

Jewish Angelology and Daemonology.[1] — Dr. Kohut, whom we presume to be a Jew, is well fitted, so far as mere acquirements are concerned, by his knowledge of the Zendavesta and Parsism, of the Old Testament literature, and especially of Rabinico-Talmudical works, for investigating the above subject. On the ground of the argument between Judaism and Parsism, as to the number, names, ranks assigned to, and circumstances in which, the angels are placed; as also, further, of various local and chronological data, he arrives at the conclusion, that the Jewish exiles derived their more developed ideas about a hierarchy of the angels from the religion of Zoroaster; though they subordinated what they appropriated to their own rigid monotheism. Jewish demonology he considers to be entirely post-exile; and maintains the idea of an evil being, as opposed

[1] Ueber die jüdische Angelologie und Daemonologie in ihrer Abhänzigkeit vom Parsismus. Von Dr. Alex. Kohut. Leipzig; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866.

to an evil principle, to be inconsistent with the cosmology of Judaism. We should find reasons enough for not agreeing with either Dr. Kohut's philosophy or etymologies in very many cases; and think most of his results very questionable; but must still allow his book to be worth a careful perusal.

Humanity and Christianity.[1] — Herr Kritzler's work is meant as an apology for Christianity, in opposition especially to Pantheism and Materialism; and is addressed principally to the educated classes. He evinces very considerable reading and acuteness, and writes in a liberal, generous, and thoroughly Christian spirit. His book is divided into fourteen chapters, treating of Humanity and Christianity; Modern Views of Humanity; the Unity of Life; the Central Life; Mystery and Revelation; Faith; the God-man; the Incarnation of the Son of God; the Two Natures in Christ; the Three Offices of Christ; the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit; Sin and Grace; Renewal in the Holy Spirit. If our space permitted we could quote a number of striking passages. The book seems well fitted for usefulness among the more educated middle classes, whose heads have been turned by the frothy talk about progress, humanity, culture, and the like. A second volume is to follow.

The Sinlessness of Jesus. The Life of Jesus.[2] — These are five excellent apologetic Lectures delivered by Drs. Niemann and Uhlhorn in Hanover. "Sinlessness," says Dr. Niemann, "was the starting-point of Christ's life; moral perfection its goal, which he reached through perfect obedience. Hence the necessity for his being tempted." That Jesus remained sinless is proved: 1. By the concordant testimony of his disciples, who could not possibly have invented such a life; 2. By the testimony of his enemies — the Pharisees, Judas, Pilate; 3. By his own testimony; whereas the best men of all nations have said, with Seneca, "we are all evil." Dr. Uhlhorn reviews in a most clear and thorough style various modern representations of the life of Christ. The first lecture is devoted to Renan; the second to Schenkel and Strauss; the third relates to the Gospels; the fourth to miracles. In the third lecture, the various critical schools are subject to a searching criticism; and in the fourth, particularly the hypothesis relating to the resurrection of Christ. His two main positions on the subject of miracles are: 1. Miracles presuppose a free personal God, who rules over and yet works in the world, and who gives the world a

[1] Humanität und Christenthum. I Band. Humanität und Offenbarung. Von H. Kritzler. Gotha: F. A. Perthes; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866.

[2] Jesu Sündlosigkeit und heilige Vollkommenheit. Von Gen. Supt. Dr. Niemann. Die modernen Darstellungen des Lebens Jesu. Von Dr. G. Uhlhorn. Hannover: Meyer; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866 Price, 5 sgr. and 12 sgr.

certain independence in its dependence. 2. The argument against miracles drawn from their supposed disturbance of the organism of the world, is chargeable with confounding a whole organized according to definite laws, with a complex of finite causes completed shut off by itself.

History of the Spanish Protestants and their Persecution.[1] — This is a German working-up of the Spanish history of Ad. de Castro, a work based on original sources, and marked by impartiality and faithfulness. The narrative is not quite so flowing as might be desired; but it may be relied on, which is, after all, a quality of prime importance. When one reads how many Protestants, Jews, and Moors were either banished or put to death on account of their belief during the reigns both of Philip the second, his predecessors, and successors, we cannot be surprised that Spain at present occupies so low a position among the nations.

On Conscience.[2]— Prof. Dr. Hofmann, of Leipsic, author of the Leben Jesu nach den Apocryphen, treats here of the important subject of conscience under the following heads: 1. The Idea of Conscience in its Historical Development, — in Heathenism, the Old Testament, the New Testament, the Church. 2. Systematic Exhibition — the nature of conscience; its binding, judicatory, and executive power; organic qualities; moral estimate of conscience in its anomalous state; relation of a deteriorated to the original conscience; conscience as the object of redemption; the relation of the renewed conscience to revelation. 3. The Practical Significance of Conscience for Christian Teaching and Life,— pastoral dealing with conscience; the sphere and rights of conscience in society; freedom of conscience. This outline will show how full the compass of Dr. Hofmann's plan is. Portions of the book are very valuable; other portions again lack clearness and breadth. His definition of conscience strikes us as far too vague — "the consciousness of the constant nearness of God." His idea of freedom of conscience, too, is what might be expected in a Saxon Lutheran. With his protest against constituting conscience an organ of doctrinal knowledge we perfectly agree.

Commentary on the Minor Prophets.[3]— A new volume of the series of commentaries on the Old Testament by Dr. Delitzsch and Keil.

[1] Castro Ad. de Geschichte der spanischen Protestanten und ihrer Verfolgung durch Philipp II. Nach dem Spanischen bearbeitet. Von Dr. Herz. Frankfort, A. M: Sauerländer; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 1½ Thaler.

[2] Die Lehre von dem Gewissen. Von Prof. Dr. Rud. Hofmann. Leipzig: Hinrichs; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 56 sgr.

[3] Biblischer Commentar über die Kleinen Propheten. Von C. F. Keil. Leipzig: Dorffling und Franke; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866. Price, 3⅓ Thaler.

We need not say that the above work is thoroughly orthodox. Prof. Keil's chronological arrangement of the minor prophets is as follows: Obadiah (889–884), Joel (875–848), Jonah (824–783), Amos (810–783), Hosea (790–725), Micah (758–710), Nahum (710–699), Habakkuk (650–624), Zephaniah (628–623), Haggai (519) Zechariah (from 519 on) and Malachi (433–422).

The State of Man After Death.[1]— Good books on eschatological questions are so rare that one must welcome every effort to further our knowledge of the subject. Six points are discussed by Pastor Rinck: 1. Death and the State of the Soul immediately after Death; 2. the Resurrection of the Flesh; 3. Final Judgment; 4. Heaven and the State of Perfection; 5. Hell; 6. the Heavenly Jerusalem. The following quotations will give some idea of the general tendency of the treatise. "Death is not a mere punishment inflicted from without, but the fruit and consequence of sin." "The state of the soul after death is one not of sleep, but of pure continuous development — for the good." Hades he places in the interior of the earth. Those who die impenitent, so far at all events as they were ignorant of the way of salvation, will have an opportunity of turning to God between death and the final judgment. He defends the resurrection of the body, on the ground that the germ of the bodily organism is indestructible. The final judgment will take place after the general resurrection, at the third coming of Christ, and will be a process of purification for the entire earthly creation. Future punishments are eternal, and consist in the damned being cast out of God's presence, in being robbed of every good while retaining the longing for it, and in the endurance of fearful inner and outward torture.

The History of Israel and of the Rise of Christianity.[2]— Dr. Weber who writes the first part of this work, The History of Israel, is the well-known author of one of the most popular Universal Histories in the German language; and Prof. Holtzmann, his son-in-law, was a collaborator of the late Baron Bunsen in the preparation of his Bibelwerk; he has written the latter part, the rise of Christianity. Both authors become rationalistic whenever they touch on the miraculous elements of the Old Testament. Prof. Holtzmann has prefixed to the whole work

[1] Vom Zustand nach dem Tode. Biblische Untersuchungen mit Berücksichtigung der einschlägigen alten und neuen Literatur. Von H. W. Rinck. 2d ed. Basel: Balmer and Co.; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1866.

[2] Geschichte des Volkes Israel und der Entstehung des Christenthums. Von Prof. Dr. George Weber und Prof. Dr. H. Holtzmann. 2 vols in three parts. pp. 1261. Leipzig: W. Engelmann; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. Price, 4½ Thalers.

an account of the sources of the history. His own — the second and more interesting portion — includes such subjects as the following: The Diaspora and Alexandrian Judaism; the age of the Maccabees; Internal State of Judaism; the Dominion of the Romans; the Appearance of Jesus as Messiah; the Last Hundred Years of the Jewish State; the inner Development of Christianity; Christianity in the Roman Empire. As the last production of the critical school in Germany — the school to which Strauss, Volkmar, Schenkel, and the like belong; and as the work of an able man, this history deserves attention. Erroneous as it is in our view, it unfortunately represents the opinions and spirit of perhaps the majority of the middle classes of Germany.

The Dogmatics of the Nineteenth Century in their inner flow, and in connection with the general theological, philosophical, and literary development of the same period.[1] — The above volume is the first published part of a larger work, intended to discuss the dogmatic theology of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries on the same principles and method; a concluding volume will work up the analytical results of the historical portions into one positive, synthetic whole. The author's theological position seems to coincide with that of Dorner, Müller, and the other coryphaei of the so-called mediatory or conciliatory theology of Germany (Vermittelungstheologie). Licentiate Mücke has essentially the same purpose in view as Kahnis and Schwarz in their works on the theology of the nineteenth century; only that he forms a more favorable estimate of its positive results than either of these authors, the former of whom wrote in a strict Lutheran, the latter in a mocking rationalistic, spirit. The principal German philosophers, theologians, and literary men of the close of the last and of the present century are passed in review, and the influence they have had on the various vital questions of dogmatic theology is estimated. Licentiate Mücke's style is livelier than that of most of his countrymen, and his book is well printed. As, however, is too common with German writers, he seems to take for granted that there has been next to no dogmatic theology outside of his own country; and yet styles his work "The Dogmatics of the Nineteenth Century." The least notable German works down even to the last year are noticed; while scarcely a dozen English, American, and French productions find mention during the whole century. It is high time that the attention paid in these countries to the course of German thought were a little more reciprocated than it is at present.

[1] Die Dogmatik des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts in ihren inneren Flusse und im Zusammenhang mit der allgemeinen theologischen, philosophischen, und literarischen Entwickelung desselben. Von. A. Mücke, Lic. Theol. Gotha: F. A. Perthes: London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867. Price, 2 thaler.

The Son of Man and the Logos.[1] — Professor Schulze's treatise is divided into two chapters with twenty-five paragraphs, of which we will here specify the principal. Chapter first treats of the Lord's self-designation — Son of Man; its principal paragraphs are, the Old Testament basis; its New Testament signification in the Synoptics and in the Gospel of John; critical review of other hypotheses. Chapter second treats of John's doctrine of the logos; its principal paragraphs are, usage of the word in John, and in the rest of the New Testament; explanation of the prologue, with its ideas, life, light, πιστεύειν, Son of God, flesh; its course of thought; the logos in John's Epistles, and in the Apocalypse; sources of John's doctrine as contained in the discourses of the Lord; connection with the Old Testament; connection with the speculations of the post-canonical apocrypha; comparison with the doctrine of the other apostles. The positive result to which the author arrives after a very careful investigation is, that John's Logos is a divine personality, with an independent self-consciousness, and of divine nature; and that Christ designated himself the Son of Man from the very beginning because he was conscious of being the Messiah.

The Fatherhood of God.[2] — Mr. Wright is the meritorious author of an edition of Genesis and Ruth in Hebrew, with notes, and a critical apparatus. He has here given a very clear and readable treatise on a subject which has been exciting a good deal of attention in England. Drs. Candlish and Crawford of Edinburgh have both written books on the Fatherhood of God, the former denying that God is in any sense man's Father by nature; the latter affirming it (see Bib. Sac. Vol. xxiv. p. 589). Mr. Wright inclines, with slight modifications drawn from other views he entertains, to Dr. Candlish's side. For our part, we cannot help regarding the controversy as to a considerable degree a dispute about words. Mr. Wright touches on a number of important questions which are left unnoticed by the other two writers; for example, the Tripartite Nature of Man, Traducianism and Creationism; the Natural Immortality of Man; Future Punishments; on all of which his remarks are decidedly worthy of attention. We do not agree with several things he advances; but where we differ we cannot but respect the reverent, judicious, and broad spirit in which his distinctive views are put forth. If controversy were always conducted in such a tone, we should have much less of it, or at all events, much fewer theological heart-burnings.

[1] Vom Menschen Sohn und vom Logos. Ein Beitrag zur biblischen Christologie. Von Prof. Lic. Dr. L. T. Schulze. Gotha: F. A. Perthes; London: Asher and Co., Trübner and Co. 1867. Price, 2 thaler.

[2] The Fatherhood of God, and its Relation to the Person and Work of Christ, and the Operations of the Holy Spirit. By C. H. H. Wright, M.A., British Chaplain, Dresden. Edinburgh: I. and T. Clark.

The following list includes some of the principal other publications which appeared towards the end of 1865 and at the beginning of 1866 :

Baltzer: Die biblische Schöpfungslehre (2 . $2\frac{2}{3}$). *Reusch:* Bibel und Natur (2 . $1\frac{2}{3}$). Works designed to show that there is no contradiction between natural science and Genesis, by two Roman Catholic theologians eminently fitted for the task. Good books, notwithstanding their Romish origin.

Riehm: Der Lehrbegriff des Hebraeerbriefes. A new and cheaper edition (2 . $2\frac{1}{3}$) of a valuable work on the Doctrinal System of the Epistle to the Hebrews by the able Halle Professor.

Keim: Der geschichtliche Christus. A third edition of a series of lectures on the Historical Christ, by a Zürich Professor, whom we might describe as the James Martineau of the German critical school. $1\frac{1}{2}$ thaler.

Rothe: Theologische Ethik. The first half of the second edition of Rothe's celebrated work on Theological Ethics. It is in reality a system of speculative theology.

Graf: Die geschichtlichen Bücher des alten Testaments. A valuable contribution to our knowledge of the course of development of Hebrew history, from a critical, but not hyper-critical, point of view. The Book of Chronicles, to which a good part of the book is devoted, he assigns to the fourth century before Christ. Price, $1\frac{1}{3}$ thaler.

Hilgenfeld: Novum Testamentum extra canonem receptum. Fasciculi i., ii., iii., iv. Clementis Romani Epistolae (Mosis Assumpsionis quae supersunt); Barnabae Epistola; Hermae Pastor; Evangeliorum secundum Hebraeos, etc. quae supersunt. Price, $5\frac{1}{3}$ thaler.

Postel: Palaestina, Land und Leute. A careful account of Palestine and its inhabitants, with constant reference to the passages in the Bible which may be illustrated.

Levin: Die drei ersten Evangelien synoptisch zusammengestellt. A synopsis of the three first Gospels, said to be better than any of those now in use. It is arranged in three columns, Mark in the middle, Matthew to the left, and Luke to the right. The text is that of the Codex Sinaiticus. The author's personal position seems to be rather free. The book is well got up. Price, $1\frac{1}{3}$ thaler.

Van de Velde: Karte von Palaestina. Eight maps, colored. 2d edition. Price, $2\frac{1}{3}$ thaler.

Krummel: Geschichte der böhmischen Reformation. A history of the Bohemian Reformation under Huss, in the fifteenth century. The author has used the valuable documents recently brought to light by Palacky and Höfler. Price, 3 thaler.

Schlekerer: Uebersichtliche Darstellung der Geschichte der Kirchlichen Dichtung und geistlichen Musik. A popularly-written history of Church Poetry and sacred music from the earliest times. The book has one fault very common to German productions; it ignores the two chief Protestant countries — Great Britain and America.

Langhaus: Pietismus und äussere Mission von dem Richterstuhl ihrer Vertheidiger. This is a sort of continuation of the same writer's virulent attack on Foreign Missions published about two years ago. Pastor Langhaus belongs to the so-called liberal party; i.e. the party that is liberal to everybody but the orthodox.

Stroh: Christus der Erstling der Entschlafenen. Intended to show that all men will be finally restored. The resurrection taught in 1 Cor. xv. 20–28, is a resurrection solely to life. The writer's three main grounds are: 1. That Christ, the first-fruits, is able to make all live; 2. That it is God's will (1 Tim. ii. 3, 4) and purpose (Eph. i. 3, 9, 10); 3. That the divine economy has this end in view. There are three classes of men, the first fruit, those who belong to Christ, and the end or remainder. Price, 9 sgr. pp. 110.

Sein und Erscheinung: A philosophical work, by a non-professional thinker, whose aim is to refute materialism, and to establish an ideal system which shall preserve to man some of his most precious possessions. It is a most unusual thing in Germany for a "layman" to write on such subjects: for nearly all the books published are the production of the so-called Fachmänner, men whose business it is to write.

Nippold: Neuere Kirchengeschichte. A Church History of recent times (i.e. as usual, mainly in Germany) written from the point of view of the church democratic party in Baden: the party, namely, that considers every respectable man above twenty-one or twenty-four years of age, as such, fit for and justified in managing and judging church matters.

Mayer: Zur Seelenfrage. Materialistic.

Wilmershof: Das Jenseits. A scientific attempt to solve the problem of immortality: well meant, but seemingly more fanciful than scientific.

Drobisch: Die moralische Statistik und die menschliche Freiheit. Professor Drobisch of Leipsic is a Herbartianer and a determinist. He believes in a freedom to consider prior to action, but not in a free, self-determining power of the will.

Huber: Studien. One of these studies is on criminal statistics and the freedom of the will. He defends the freedom of the will.

Kaulich: Ueber die Freiheit des Menschen. A defense of human freedom with a prior criticism of all the forms of determinism.

Carus: Vergleichende Psychologie, oder Geschichte der Seele in der Reihenfolge der Thierwelt. A history of the development of the animal soul, from the infusoria up to the ape.

Lewisch: Psychologie. From the point of view of the philosophy of the Roman Catholic Günther, which was recommended to the attention of Protestants by being condemned in Rome.

Stöckl: Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. A very detailed history of the scholastic philosophy by a Roman Catholic. Its chief recommendation is that it is detailed, and from the hand of an admirer.

Daumer: Der Tod des Leibes, Kein Tod der Seele. An interesting and painstaking collection of notices, going to show that the death of the body does not involve the death of the soul.

Haffner: Der Materialismus in der Culturgeschichte. A popular sketch of the various forms under which a materialistic tendency has manifested itself in the different periods of human history.

Schroder v. d. Kolk: Seele und Leib in Wechselbeziehung zu einander. Popular lectures in defence of the independence and difference of the human soul from the animal soul and the powers of nature.

Westhoff: Kraft, Stoff, und Gedanke. A heavy but not unmeritorious attempt to refute the materialistic views of Büchner, Vogt, Mayer, and Co.

Böhner: Naturforschung und Culturleben in ihren neuesten Ergebnissen. Also a refutation of materialism from the most recent results of natural science. Böhner's religious views seem rather vague.

Rosenthal: Convertitenbilder aus dem 19. Jahrhundert. Sketches of the converts to the Roman Church in Germany during the nineteenth century, by one who is himself a convert, or rather pervert.

Räss: Die Convertiten seit der Reformation. The first volume of a work similar to the above. It extends merely to 1566, and adduces twenty perverts. The author is Bishop of Strassburg.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PUBLICATIONS.

A Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament, with a new Translation. By M. M. Kalisch, Ph.D., M.A. ויקרא Leviticus, Part I., containing chapters 1 to 10. With Treatises on Sacrifices and the Hebrew Priesthood. 8vo. pp. 708. London: Longmans, Green, Pearson, and Dyer. 1867.— Dr. Kalisch is well known as the author of a "Hebrew Grammar with Exercises," and of two volumes, one on Genesis and one on Exodus, belonging to the present series of "A Historical and Critical Commentary." His writings contain much valuable information, but are disfigured by his irrational rationalism and illogical neology.

Genesis and its Authorship. Two Dissertations: 1. On the Import of the Introductory Chapters of the Book of Genesis; 2. On the Use of the Names of God in the Book of Genesis, and on the Unity of its Authorship. By John Quarry, A.M., Rector of Middleton and Prebendary of Cloyne. 8vo. pp. 635. London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate. 1866.— The author of these able dissertations attempts to show that

there is no need of any collision between science and revelation, because revelation was not designed, and does not pretend, to teach any definite system of science; that there is no need of denying or degrading the authority of the Book of Genesis on account of its imagined repugnance to the truths of science; and that there is no sufficient reason for questioning the unity of the book or of its origin.

Origin and History of the Books of the Bible, both the Canonical and the Apocryphal; designed to show what the Bible is not, what it is, and how to use it. By Professor C. E. Stowe, D.D. (the New Testament). Illustrated. 8vo. pp. 583. Hartford, Conn.: Hartford Publishing Company; New York: J. D. Denison; Philadelphia: Zeigler, McCurdy, and Co.; Cincinnati and St. Louis; Chicago: J. A. Stoddard; Cleveland: C. E. Wheeler. 1867. — This is a timely book. Its style is fresh and racy. It popularizes Biblical Literature in a felicitous way. We shall be happy to welcome Professor Stowe's promised volume on the Old Testament.

The Theology of the Greek Poets. By W. S. Tyler, Williston Professor of Greek in Amherst College. 12mo. pp. 365. Boston: Draper and Halliday. 1867. — Professor Tyler has here produced a work which is an honor to American literature. It is well fitted to be a classic in our colleges and theological seminaries. It furnishes admirable illustrations of the truths of both natural and revealed theology, and suggests original methods of defending these truths.

The Apologetics of the Christian Faith. By the late William M. Hetherington, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Theology, Free Church College, Glasgow. With an Introductory Notice by Alexander Duff, D.D., LL.D. 8vo. pp. 561. New York: Scribner, Welford, and Co. 1867. — This is one of the volumes originally published by T. and T. Clark, the Edinburgh company to whom our theological community owe a large debt of gratitude. Dr. Hetherington shows himself in the present, as in his preceding, discussions, to be an able defender of the Christian faith in its old forms. This volume is devoted to natural theology and the divine authority of the Bible.

Lectures on Christian Theology. By Enoch Pond, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary at Bangor. 8vo. pp. 785. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication. — This is a *new* edition of Dr. Pond's very valuable Lectures. It contains an Index, which augments the worth of the volume. We are happy to see that it is stereotyped. It deserves an extensive circulation, not only among clergymen, but also among intelligent laymen.

THE SCIENCE OF NATURAL THEOLOGY; or, God the Unconditioned Cause, and God the Infinite and Perfect, as revealed in Creation. By Rev. Asa. Mahan, D.D., Author of "The Science of Logic," "A System of Intellectual Philosophy," "Doctrine of the Will," etc. 12mo. pp. 399. Boston: Henry Hoyt. 1867. — This volume affords a new indication that the questions most seriously agitating the scientific world pertain not so much to Biblical interpretation as to the fundamental truths of natural theology. Dr. Mahan discusses these truths with great earnestness. Without assenting to all his propositions, we cordially approve the general aim of his treatise. He has succeeded in showing that "at the basis of the theistic deductions, in their entireness, there are valid analytical judgments, that is, universally absolute and necessary intuitive truths"; that "under these principles the entire facts of the universe bearing legitimately upon our [theistic] inquiries do in fact take rank"; that "all these deductions are the necessary logical consequences of these facts and principles, and therefore have not merely a relative, but real and absolute, validity"; that "the deductions of theism are in fact really and truly truths of science."

MODERN INQUIRIES; Classical, Professional, and Miscellaneous. By Jacob Bigelow, M.D., late President of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and late Professor in Harvard University. 12mo. pp. 379. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1867. — The Essays in this volume relate to the necessity of subdivision and selection in our educational processes, to the relative importance of Classical and Utilitarian Studies, to various questions of Medical Science and of general literature. They are distinguished by their good style and good sense. We think, however, that they depreciate classical learning unduly.

THE JESUITS IN NORTH AMERICA in the Seventeenth Century. By Francis Parkman, Author of Pioneers of France in the New World. pp. 462, 463. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1867. — Theologians will find this volume to be full of interest. It teaches many truths, and suggests more than it directly teaches.

Among other works which we would notice more at length if we had the requisite space are:

CHRISTOCRACY; or Essays on the Coming and Kingdom of Christ; with Answers to the Principal Objections of Post-millenarians. By John T. Demarest and William R. Gordon, Ministers of the Gospel in the Reformed Dutch Church. 16mo. pp. 403. New York: A. Lloyd. 1867.

CHRISTENDOM'S DIVISIONS: Part II. Greeks and Latins. Being a full and connected History of their Dissensions and Overtures for Peace down to the Reformation. By Edmund S. Ffoulkes, formerly Fellow and Tutor of Jesus College, Oxford. 16mo. pp. 601. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1867.

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